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Introduction
Criminal justice, security and safety are crucial aspects of a democratic state. In
the Netherlands these themes are subject of intensive political and public debate.
These debates are mostly oriented on national aspects. But some of these debates
are also relevant for other countries. Maybe other countries can learn from the
problems and solutions in the Netherlands. In this book I have tried to give an
overview of the main aspects of the discussions on criminal justice, security and
safety in the Netherlands.
This book is mainly based on fourteen Dutch volumes edited by expert authors
and myself. These fourteen volumes are Police, Armed Forces, Safety and
Security, Detention, Enforcement, Judiciary, Fire Brigades, Forensic Sciences,
Terrorism, Crisis, Crime, Intelligence and Security Services, Crises in the Nether-
lands and Risk. Many authors and editors have made important contributions to
these volumes. Together these books contain more than then ten thousand pages
of scientific descriptions and analyses of criminal justice, security and safety in the
Netherlands. I am very grateful for the time and effort of these authors and editors
to write an chapter in one of the before mentioned volumes. These volumes and
chapters were my main inspiration to write this book which can be seen as an
overview of the insights in these volumes. Next to these volumes I used my other
academic publications on security, safety and criminal justice.
The main parts of this book I wrote during a Visiting Fellowship at the Centre for
Criminology at Oxford University. My stay in Oxford in 2009 was a very inspiring
and life changing time. I am thankful to the director and staff of the Centre for
Criminology at Oxford University for the opportunity of this Visiting Fellowship.
I am grateful to my publisher Kluwer for also publishing this English book on
Dutch security, safety and criminal justice.
I dedicate this book to Berber Krop, my love.
Erwin Muller
May 2012
13

1 Security, safety and criminal justice
in the Netherlands
1.1 Security, safety and criminal justice in the Netherlands
Security, safety and criminal justice are key issues in an ever-changing world, also
in the Netherlands. Security, safety and criminal justice in the Netherlands are
prominent topics on the Dutch political and public agenda. In recent years many
new safety, security and criminal justice policies have been initiated and im-
plemented. The organizations which are concerned with criminal justice, safety
and security, such as the police, the public prosecutors, the judiciary, the armed
forces, the secret services and the prison services, have grown intensively. The
legal authority of most of these organizations has been expanded. The extent and
intensity of criminal justice, safety and security policies have a direct relationship
with the quality of society. The organizations of criminal justice, security and
safety have become crucial parts of the modern state.
In the Netherlands I edited fourteen Dutch volumes on security, safety and
criminal justice with all kinds of different experts.1 These fourteen volumes have
the following titles: Police, Armed Forces, Safety and Security, Detention,
Enforcement, Judiciary, Fire Brigades, Forensic Sciences, Terrorism, Crisis,
Crime, Intelligence and Security Services,Crises in the Netherlands and Risk.
Scholars and practitioners wrote chapters on all aspects of these topics and the
relevant organizations. Each volume functions as a reference book and textbook
for the study on this topic. These volumes give an overview of the current state of
knowledge concerning a specific topic or organization. The authors gave insight
into the history, present and future of the subject. They tried not only to give
a description but also a proper analysis and vision on the topic. By integrating
the available knowledge, new theoretical insights, practical guidance and future
research questions are formulated. The presentation of scientific insights regard-
ing the subject is a crucial purpose of these volumes. In doing so, the authors used
the available international scientific literature.
1 Muller 2004; Muller, Starink, Bosch and De Jong 2004; Muller en Vegter 2005 and 2009; Michiels
en Muller, 2006; Helsloot, Muller and Berghuijs 2007; Muller and Cleiren 2007; Fijnaut, Muller,
Rosenthal and Van der Torre 2007; Broeders en Muller, 2008; Muller, Rosenthal and De Wijk 2008;
Muller, Rosenthal, Helsloot and Van Dijkman 2009; Muller, Van Der Leun, Moerings and Van Calster
2010; De Graaf, Muller and Van Reijn 2010; Muller 2011; Ale, Muller and Ronner 2012.
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These volumes are in Dutch. The descriptions and analysis are useful for science,
professions and higher education in the Netherlands. But some important aspects of
these volumes should also be accessible for scientists, students and practitioners
outside the Netherlands. The topics and organizations of criminal justice, safety and
security in the Netherlands are relevant for other countries. To know more about
criminal justice, safety and security in other countries gives scientists, students and
practitioners an opportunity to reflect on these themes in their own country. The
specific characteristics in the Netherlands put criminal justice, safety and security in
other countries into perspective. This reflection is useful because criminal justice,
safety and security will be important and crucial over the next decades.
At this moment, there are only a few recent English books on aspects of security,
safety and criminal justice in the Netherlands.2 In different international journals
parts of criminal justice, security and safety policies and organizations in the
Netherlands are described and analysed.3 At this moment an integral compre-
hensive English book on these subjects is lacking. It is not possible to give the
reader all the information that is available in aforementioned volumes. Together
these volumes consist of more than 10,000 pages of information, description,
analysis and scenarios. Apart from these volumes I use, in this book, other
empirical academic research on security, safety and criminal justice which I
performed with other scholars in the Netherlands.4
Throughout the text footnotes are placed to make clear when I cite from or base on
my own (Dutch or English) published articles and books on security, safety and
criminal justice in the Netherlands (sometimes with others). The footnotes “based
on and cited from” refer to citation, editing and translation of my own publica-
tions. When these footnotes are used in this book quotation marks are not used. If
I cite from Dutch texts the translation is my responsibility and not the translation
of the orginal author.
In this book I present the insights which are most relevant for scientists, students
and professionals outside the Netherlands. It is also a useful overview on security,
safety and criminal justice for Dutch scientists, students and professionals. With
this book I want to serve the following purposes:
• give an overview and analysis of the organizations of security, safety and
criminal justice in the Netherlands;
2 Cachet, De Kimpe, Ponsaers e.a. 2008; Tak 2008; Tonry and Bijleveld 2007; Steden 2007;
Swaaningen 2006; Jones 1995; different publications of Pakes.
3 I will refer to these international articles in the specific chapters.
4 Such as Muller 2002; Beunders and Muller 2005; De Poot, Bokhorst, Van Koppen and Muller 2004;
Muller and De Roos 2006; Muller, Kummeling and Bron 2007; Muller, Rogier e.a 2008; Muller,
Brainich e.a. 2011; Muller, Zannoni e.a. 2011.
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• give an overview and analyses of the policies of security, safety and criminal
justice in the Netherlands;
• analyse the crucial themes in the present scientific, public and political
discussions;
• analyse the dilemmas these organizations are confronted with and which
may be more universal;
• formulate criticisms of and recommendations for the Dutch system of
security, safety and criminal justice.
In this book I will reflect on the question of how to organize safety and security in
a democratic state which wants to uphold the rule of law. In what way must the
police be organised to comply with the rule of law? What is possible in a
constitutional state in case of a major terrorist attack or a dramatic crisis? How
independent is the judiciary and the public prosecutors in a constitutional state?
What powers do the armed forces have within the state? In what way is
enforcement organised? These and other questions will be addressed in this
book. I focus on a legal and organizational perspective on security, safety and
criminal justice in Holland.
1.2 Definitions and perspective
1.2.1 DEFINITIONS
It is necessary to give a definition of the central concepts of this book: security,
safety and criminal justice. In Dutch there is only one word to describe safety and
security: veiligheid. A well-known dichotomy in the Netherlands is that between
social insecurity (threat to health and property by deliberate criminal acts of third
parties) and physical insecurity (threat to health and property by all kinds of
accidents). In the Netherlands it is common to describe social insecurity as a
security issue and physical insecurity as a safety issue.5
The concept security is in Dutch mainly used if one wants to describe the
protection against deliberate attempts of hurting someone or causing damage.
Insecurity is caused by people who are intentionally trying to hurt people or cause
damage to goods. Crime and terrorism are subcategories of security in this sense.
Safety is used to describe the protection against accidents regardless of the source
of the accident. Unsafety is caused by the risk of accidents where people or goods
are involved. Disasters, accidents with hazardous material and water flooding are
subcategories of safety in this sense.
5 Helsloot 2004.
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“Security is derived from the Latin Securitas, which was, since the Middle Ages,
concerned with persons and goods and thus with the protection of life and
property. After the Middle Ages this meaning stead important. We can translate
this as the protection of citizens against other citizens. This interpretation of
Securitas, which we can call internal security, stood next to a other meaning of the
term. Securitas was for the protection of the community as a whole and thus
indicative of defence, external security. Security in the sense of internal security
has a double meaning: protection against fellow citizens and protection against
the state. This double meaning is rooted in our legal thinking like the democratic
rule of law and characteristics of the modern state concept. This leads us to the
theory of social contract, in which security a central point appears to be. (…)
A further elaboration on the basis of safety, security and the importance of the
social contract brings us to the idea that the law in the context of security and
safety should be provide by means of individual rights and legal subjectivity. Legal
certainty should ensure order and peace and the law must be maintained. An
analysis of the classical values of Radbruch, efficiency, justice and legal protection
supports these results: safety and security is connected with fundamental rights,
the right to enforce these rights and the effective enforcement of these rights.
When we talk about security, we should take this into account in our current law
and policy.”6
“Security is the state of being secure, specifically freedom from fear, danger, risk,
care, poverty and anxiety. Security also implies certainty. The roots of the term are
in the Latin securitas/securus, derived from sine (meaning without) cura (care,
anxiety, pains, worry). Safety is closely related to security. Safety also means
freedom from danger or risk. However, it has additional connotations which have
more to do with physical conditions e.a. freedom from injury, the safety of the
body and property. In this context certainty refers to certainty of order, assurance
and predictability.”7 In this dictionary of criminology the concept of safety is not
defined. Criminal justice is defined as “the process through which the state
responds to behaviour that it deems unacceptable. Criminal justice is delivered
through a series of stages: charge, prosecution, trial, sentence; appeal; punish-
ment. These processes and the agencies which carry them out are referred to
collectively as the criminal justice system.”8
The Oxford English dictionary gives several descriptions of the concept of security:
1. The condition of being protected from or not exposed to danger.
2. The provision or exercise of measures to ensure such safety.
6 Van Zuylen 2004.
7 McLaughlin and Muncie, 2006, p. 371.
8 McLaughlin and Muncie, 2006, p. 94.
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3. Freedom from care, anxiety or apprehension: a feeling of safety or freedom
from danger.
4. Freedom from doubt; confidence, assurance.
5. The quality of being securely fixed or attached, stability.
The same dictionary gives the following descriptions of the term safety:
1. The state of being protected from or guarded against hurt or injury; freedom
from danger.
2. Close custody of confinement.
3. A means or instrument of safety; a protection, a safe guard.
4. The quality of being unlikely to cause hurt or injury; the quality of not being
dangerous or presenting a risk.
It is difficult to establish a single definition of security. Over the last years, many
books and articles have been published on security.9 Many use entirely different
definitions of security, some do not define the concept at all. Zedner makes it clear
that using security as a concept eases the achievement of specific goals. If a
problem or a solution is put into the security perspective this leads to increased
attention and increased financing possibilities. She speaks of an obsession with
security.10 “Security is a promiscuous concept. It is wantonly deployed in fields as
diverse as social security, health and safety, financial security, policing and
community safety, national security, military security, human security, environ-
mental security, international relations and peacekeeping. For security to keep
such varied bedfellows as these, it must only be promiscuous but also inconstant,
appearing as different object of desire in different places at different times. Yet
security wears the multiple identities so lightly it is easy to overlook the fact that it
is not a single, immutable concept, but many.”11 Zedner distinguishes five
meanings of the concept of security: security as objective state, security as
subjective state, security as a pursuit, security as a practice and security as a
symbol.12 It is important to make clear which kind of security concept is really
used. Traditional, security comes from the science of international relations but
now covers almost all sciences. It is difficult to make an explicit distinction
between all forms of security and insecurity.13
Safety is not a main topic in scientific research. When it is mentioned it is in the
context of health safety, road safety or safety of the human body. In law, public
administration and criminology the concept of safety is hardly used.
9 See for example Wood and Dupont 2006; Wood and Shaering 2007; Reiner 2007; Loader 2007;
Neocleous 2008; Zedner 2009.
10 Zedner 2009, p. 1.
11 Zedner 2009, p. 11.
12 Zedner 2009, chapter 1.
13 See Gardner 2001; Hope and Sparks 2000.
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Criminal justice is a widely used concept in the English scientific literature.
Sometimes it refers to the specific criminal investigation processes and stages, in
other situations it is concerned with organizations, agencies and institutions
which are involved in crime fighting. There are many textbooks on criminal
justice mostly on the criminal justice system in the UK and the USA.
There are no definitions of the main concepts in this book on which all scientists
and practitioners agree.14 An author has to be explicit on his own definitions and
perspectives. Unlike other science, the researcher chooses his own definition in
the absence of a general system of concepts. The choice for the definition of the
key concepts must be explicit.15
In my view, security and safety problems are comparable. The similarities are
greater than the differences. There is not only crime and nuisance, but also
accidents, unsafety, disasters, threat of terrorism, possibility of an epidemic etc.
They all have far-reaching consequences for the lives and welfare of citizens.
These risks are a reality for the public. They do not distinguish between these
risks. We need a broader concept. This is not just about whether and how one
becomes a victim of crime, but also what risks people run to become victims of a
terrorist attack, industrial accident or a major fire. Security and safety should then
be understood as a convergence of the prevention and threatening of risks for
citizens. There can only be a safe and secure situation if conceivable risks are
mitigated. Not only the risks of crime, but also the risk of an attack by a terrorist
organization or the risk of a major fire or disaster should be incorporated in the
concept of security.
In this book I define security and safety as prevention and response to intentional
and accidental risks for men and goods. Intentional risks are, for example, the
risks of crime or a terrorist attack. Accidental risks are risks such as accidents by
hazardous materials, flooding or infectious diseases. Security refers to intentional
risks and safety refers to accidental risks. I do not define it as human security
which refers to all risks that an individual runs. I am only concentrating on the
intentional and accidental risks. I define criminal justice as the organizations and
processes which are concerned with crime, defendants or criminals. These are, for
example, the police, the Criminal Investigation Departments, the judges and the
courts, the Public Prosecution Service, the Prison Service the Probation service,
the criminal investigation process and the forensic investigation process. Crim-
inal justice organizations and processes are in my definitions a substantial part of
security.
14 See also Den Boer and De Wilde 2008; Pieters 2006.
15 King and Wincupe 2008.
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1.2.2 LEGAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL PERSPECTIVE
In this book I use a legal and organizational perspective on security, safety and
criminal justice. Law, criminology and public administration are the main
scientific disciplines which I used and refer to in this book. In this legal and
organizational perspective, I use the organizations that play a crucial role in
security, safety and criminal justice as a starting point. These are organizations
such as ministries, municipalities, mayors, police, public prosecution, courts,
prisons, probation, fire services, medical assistance, inspections, enforcement
agencies, intelligence and security services, armed forces and forensic investiga-
tion agencies. In this book I refer to them as security and safety organizations.
With respect to these security and safety organizations in the Netherlands the
following legal and organizational questions arise:16
* What are the powers and authorities of these organizations and their
employees?
* What is the legal structure of the organization?
* What are the legal and actual goals of these organizations?
* What formal and actual policies do these organizations have?
* How are these organizations organized internally?
* How do these organizations cooperate with other organizations?
* In which network of organizations do these organizations have to act?
* How do these organizations function in practice?
* How can these organizations be controlled?
* How can these organizations be made accountable and monitored?
* What is the legitimacy of these organizations?
* Howmuch legal and actual power and authority do these organizations have?
These legal and organizational questions show how security and safety policies in
the Netherlands are designed. Not so much security and safety policy is the central
aspect of this book, but the way security and safety organizations are dealing with
insecurity and unsafety.
To deal with these subjects in the Netherlands I have divided the book into three
parts. Firstly, I distinguish the crucial organizations and processes in criminal
justice. Organizations such as the police, the judiciary, the public prosecution and
the prison services are the main parts of the criminal justice systems.17 Crucial
processes such as criminal investigation and forensic investigation are also
16 Based on Tsoukand and Knudsen 2003; Ferlie, Lynn and Politt 2005; Hatch and Cubnfille 2006;
Moran, rein and Goodin 2006; Peters and Pierre 2007; Barry and Hansen 2008; Greenwood, Oliverm
Sahlin and Saddaby 2008; Bercovitch, Kremenyuk and Zartman 2009; Clegg and Cooper 2009.
17 Zedner 2004.
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important parts of the criminal justice system in the Netherlands. Of course
criminal justice is a crucial part of security in the Netherlands. To make the book
more recognizable for the reader, I describe and analyse the criminal justice
organizations and processes in a separate part.
Secondly, I distinguish several other crucial security and safety aspects. Public
order is the regular known order in a social system. Public order maintenance is
the activity of all organizations concerned with the prevention or repression of
public order disturbances. National security is concerned with the internal and
external threats to the whole society such as terrorism. Crucial organizations in
public order maintenance and national security are, for instance, the intelligence
and security services, counter terrorism organizations and the armed forces. I also
describe and analyse the specific aspect of safety in the Netherlands. In this book I
limit safety to physical safety: the threat to lives and goods by external accidents
such as industrial explosions or water flooding. Crises are events which deeply
affect the functioning of an organization or a social system in which under
uncertainty and profound time pressure major decisions have to be taken. In this
book I limit myself to crises such as disasters, terrorism, public order distur-
bances, events, infectious diseases, water crises, food safety and international
crises. Within safety, risk and crisis management organizations such as the
specific ministries, fire brigades and medical emergency services are crucial.
The distinctions I make are related to the legal and organizational perspective
which I use in this book. One of my purposes is to give an overview of and insight
into the functioning of the many organizations in the Netherlands which have a
task in security, safety and criminal justice. If one chooses a different perspective,
different definitions of these concepts are possible. The definitions of security,
safety and criminal justice are relative and dependent on the perspective of the
specific author. There is no such thing as the ultimate definition of these concepts.
The relative character of these definitions makes it necessary for authors to be
explicit about their choices.
1.3 Security and safety in a democratic state
Security and safety in a democratic state under rule of law have received much
attention in recent years. Security and safety have become one of the main issues
for the public, media and politics. Security and safety are hot and sexy items,
which are attracting much attention. This is not necessarily due to the increased
objective insecurity or unsafety of citizens. It does have a relationship with
increased subjective insecurity and unsafety that citizens (and companies)
experience. One of the most complex questions is how these subjective feelings
of the public are affected. It seems that these subjective feelings are not so much
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affected by their own experiences of insecurity and unsafety by the public but
mainly by the images that people have via the media, stories and otherwise.
The increased attention security and safety has also increased the scientific
attention.18 The number of scientific publications in this field is large and still
growing. Not only in criminology and law but in many fields of science, scientists
focus on safety and security. Mainly the academic literature is concerned with
security. Safety is hardly a topic for academic research in law, criminology and
public administration.
It is currently almost impossible to provide an overview of all the different
perspectives or aspects related to security issues. However, an overview of
important issues in the current academic literature on security in a democratic
state under the rule of law is possible. In the next chapters I will describe these
developments more thoroughly. It gives the reader a first impression of the topics
which I will address in describing and analysing security and safety in the
Netherlands.
Much attention is paid to whether the intensity and scope of the jurisdiction,
authority and powers of security organizations have been increased. Has the
threat of (new) risks, such as terrorism, increased the number and nature of the
powers of different security organizations? It seems certain that police, intelli-
gence services and others have seen a strong increase in the number of powers in
recent years. It is not always clear whether these powers are actually needed. It is
also not always clear for which threat these powers have been granted. And it is
also not always clear whether increasing the powers has an effective impact on
reducing insecurity. The debate on security is often about the precise conditions in
which each organizations can use the new powers. The entire debate on security
has therefore a strong legal connotation.19
Another crucial issue in the debate on security in a democratic state concerns the
question of whether there is too much infringement on citizens’ rights. That the
powers of all organizations involved were extended seems clear. That this
potentially leads to a further breach of fundamental rights of citizens seems in
no doubt. The debate is on the question of whether these powers are lawful and
legitimate. Can the state infringe intensively on the rights of an individual to
protect the mass? And which safeguards are available for those who face these
powers? Different sides are formed around the answers to these questions. An
18 See for instance Loader 1999; Zedner 2003; Loader and Walker 2004; Muller 2004; Zedner 2005;
Goold and Zedner 2006; Pieters 2006; McLaughlin and Muncie 2006; Maguire, Morgan and Reiner
2007; Zedner 2009;
19 Zedner 2005.
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army of human rights specialists considers the infringements on fundamental
rights too much and too far-reaching. Another army of mostly politicians, police,
prosecution services and intelligence services representatives claims that the
current security threat makes it necessary to breach them.
A theme that is increasingly gaining attention in the scientific literature on
security is the extent to which the state has a continuing responsibility to achieve
security for its citizens. Traditional security was seen as one of the distinctive core
tasks of the government. The government has the monopoly on violence. In recent
decades there has been an explosive increase in private security industry. In many
countries the number of private security officers is much larger than the public
security officers. In many countries parts of security responsibility are privatized.
In some countries prisons are run by private companies. This leads to extensive
questions about responsibility and accountability but also on quality, management
and control. Is security a public service or just a commodity?20
How safe or unsafe it is, is also an important aspect in the scientific debates about
security. Figures on security always lead to discussion. Who has collected them,
who interpreted them, and what topics are covered are only a few questions which
are raised. There is no clear image on how safe or unsafe it is. Although there are
many official figures, there is always debate about the specific scope. Information
and knowledge on security means power and authority. The person who can
determine what formal figures are established also decides what policy is
successful and what not. It is unnecessary to say that this has important
organizational aspects.
The cooperation between all organizations involved in security is another crucial
issue. Many organizations are involved in security. In each country, the security
system is organized in a different way. Every organization has different powers.
The responsibilities of these organizations differ and there is some overlap of
responsibilities between these organizations. There are intensive and complex
cooperation arrangements to effectively work together and coordinate. The
complexity of such cooperation does not always lead to good results.21
An important topic in today’s scientific literature on security and safety is risk.
Many authors stressed that over the past few years risk has become dominant in
actions with regard to security and safety. It is now especially important to prevent
security and safety problems. These risks should be avoided and stopped. This
means that on the basis of risk analysis one estimates which persons, situations,
20 Loader 1999; Loader and Walker 2001; Loader and Walker 2004.
21 Loader 2000.
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places and processes are most at risk. With regard to these persons, situations,
places and processes preventive measures are implemented. These preventive
measures are often related to the ability to collect information on these persons,
situations, places and processes before the risk has materialized. That means that
onmany issues personal information is collected without an actual suspicion of an
offense. In the past, security and safety organizations focused on responding after
a crime or an accident had occurred. The focus of many of these security and
safety organizations is now moving into the prevention of risks.22
The degree of responsibility of citizens and businesses for their own security and
safety is also an issue that regularly is described and debated. The state is currently
in many countries mainly responsible for security and safety. Although in some
cases parts of security and safety are privatized, there remains a solid line to public
responsibility. It is now clear that the government alone is not sufficient to ensure
that the risks are prevented and combated. In addition, citizens and businesses
also have to play a role. The question is how far this responsibility of citizens and
businesses goes. Can all people be expected to take preventive measures? How can
an equivalent level of safety be achieved for both richer and poorer citizens? These
questions lead to complex discussions on the responsibility of state, citizens and
businesses for security and safety.
1.4 Security system in the Netherlands
The Netherlands are a constitutional state.23 In the Dutch Constitution the most
important organizations which play a role in safety and security are explicitly
mentioned. In this paragraph I give a short introduction into the legal aspects of
the Dutch security system. In the coming chapters I will describe, in more detail,
the institutional aspects of these different organizations in the Netherlands.
Holland is a constitutional monarchy. The Dutch people are represented in the
Dutch Parliament which consists of the Lower House and the Upper House or
Senate. The Lower House is directly elected by the Dutch population every four
years while the Senate is indirectly elected through provincial elections. The Lower
House consists of 150 members and the Upper House has 75 members. Cabinet
and Parliament form together the legislative authority in the Netherlands. In the
Netherlands a multi party systems exists. In 2009 more than ten political parties
had members in parliament. In the Netherlands there is always a need for
22 See Gardner 2008.
23 In this book I use the Netherlands, Holland and Dutch as similar concepts. See Lechner 2008; State
2008.
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a coalition cabinet. In recent Dutch history there was not a dominant political
party which could form a cabinet on its own. The coalition cabinets in the
Netherlands have to make a coalition agreement in which the most important
decisions on all policies are written down.
In the Netherlands various State departments are involved in security. Until 2010
these were primarily the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations and the
Ministry of Justice. In 2010 the new Ministry of Security and Justice was formed
which is a combination of both of the afore-mentioned ministries. But the
Ministries of General Affairs, Defence, Foreign Affairs, Health, Welfare and
Sport, Infrastructure and Environment and Social Affairs and Employment have
also responsibilities for specific security and safety issues.
The ministers in the Netherlands are appointed by the Queen and are politically
responsible to parliament. The ministers are not also members of parliament. The
political parties which form the coalition cabinet nominate the minister for the
departments which they have received in the coalition agreement. The Prime
Minister in the Netherlands is just another minister. In Holland he is the first
amongst equals. The Prime Minister does not have powers over the other
ministers. He chairs the weekly Council of Ministers. If one of the ministers
has to resign because parliament lost political confidence in the minister, a new
minister is nominated by the specific political party or the cabinet as a whole
resigns. Although the informal position of the Prime Minister has become more
important in the Netherlands, this function is not comparable to the Prime
Minister in the UK or the President of the USA.
In the Netherlands there are twelve provinces and more than 400 municipalities.
In these municipalities the mayor plays a crucial role in security and safety policy.
He is the competent authority over the police and fire brigades. The mayor
forms together with the aldermen the executive board of the municipality. They
are controlled by the directly elected municipal council. The mayors in the
Netherlands are appointed by the Queen on behalf of the Minister of the Interior.
The directly elected town council now makes a nomination which is regularly
followed by the Minister of the Interior. But Dutch mayors are not elected by the
people directly. This differs from most of the other European countries. Although
several attempts were made to change the Constitution to make it possible to elect
the mayor, all failed. It seems that the independent position of the mayors in the
Netherlands is valued more than the possibility to elect them. The provinces
have a limited role in security policy. The Commissioner of the Queen, who is the
chairman of the executive board of the province, has a supervisory role in relation
to the municipalities and the mayors.
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The organization of the court system is regulated by the Judicial Organization Act
(Wet op de rechterlijke organisatie). Judges are appointed for life by the Crown,
and retire at the age of seventy. Supreme Court justices are appointed from a list
of nominees drawn up by the Lower House. “Criminal offences are dealt with by
criminal courts at three levels. The first instance level are district courts
(rechtbanken). There are nineteen such courts. The district courts differ greatly
in size, which depends mainly on the number of inhabitants of the jurisdiction.
The second level is the court of appeal (gerechtshof ), of which there are five. The
highest level is the Supreme Court (Hoge Raad ) in The Hague. Unlike the other
courts, the Supreme Court does not deal with the facts, but reviews the lawfulness
of judgments of lower courts and the manner of proceedings.”24
“The prosecution service is a nationwide organization of prosecutors. It is
organized hierarchically. At the top is the Board of prosecutors-general. The
service functions under responsibility of the Minister of Justice, but it is not an
agency of the Ministry of Justice. The service is part of the judiciary (….). The
organization of the prosecution service is regulated by the 1827 Judicial Organiza-
tion Act (JOA).”25 The prosecution service is responsible for criminal investiga-
tions in the Netherlands and has authority over the police on this matter.
The police in the Netherlands still consist of 25 regional police forces and one
national police force. The task of the police force (sect. 2 Police Act) is to enforce
the legal order, and to assist those who need help. The enforcement of the legal
order comprises the enforcement of criminal law, the enforcement of public
order, and the performance of judicial services. The mayor is responsible for the
police in case of public order maintenance and the public prosecutor is respon-
sible if the police conduct any criminal investigation. The mayor of the largest city
in the region has a responsibility for the management of the regional police force
together with the other mayors in the region. The organization of the police is
regulated in the Police Act 1993. At this moment (2012) the government is
preparing an act to nationalize the Dutch police organization. The total amount of
policemen in the Netherlands is about 50,000.
The Prison Administration and the development of prison policy is the respon-
sibility of the Minister of Justice. The National Agency of Correctional Institutions
coordinates the decentralized management of prisons in the Netherlands. The
most important legislation on enforcement of prison sentences are the 1998
Penitentiary Principles Act (PPA), and the attached Penitentiary Rules.
24 Tak 2008, p. 55.
25 Tak 2008, p. 49.
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An intelligence service protects a democratic state against threats to national
security. The function of the Dutch General Intelligence and Security Service,
AIVD, is to give information to other government bodies and/or individuals to
enable them to takemeasures eitherwith the purpose of removing a certain threat, or
with the purpose of increasing their resistance to threats. TheAIVDhas far-reaching
powers to conduct their investigations. The AIVD is controlled in several ways:
A. by the service itself using internal rules, guidelines and procedures and
external publications such as reports and annual reports;
B. by the ministers concerned in particular the Minister of Interior Affairs;
C. by the Lower House in the form of the Commission on the Intelligence
Services and the Standing Committee for Interior Affairs;
D. by independent external audit as the Commission of Supervision on the
Intelligence Services, the National Audit Chamber (in particular the secret
expenditure), the National Complaints Court (specific complaints about the
AIVD) and the courts (whether administrative, civil and criminal);
E. by the media, scientists, and citizens’ groups.
The Royal Navy, the Royal Army, the Royal Air Force, the Royal Military Police, the
Service Command and the Defence Material Organization are all a part of the
Dutch Ministry of Defence. The Minister and the State Secretary together lead
the Ministry of Defence. Defence has more than 60,000 employees and is one of
the larger employers in the Netherlands. Within the Dutch armed forces there is
also a Military Intelligence and Security Service which plays an important role in
collecting intelligence for military deployments but also for counter terrorism.
In the Netherlands all municipalities, particulary the mayor, are responsible for a
fire brigade. At this moment the hunderds of local fire brigades are working
together in newly established safety regions which have the same size and
boundaries as the police regions. The tasks of the fire brigades are mentioned
in the 1985 Dutch Fire Services Act (Brandweerwet): “the prevention, containment
and extinguishing of fire, the limitation of fire hazard, the prevention and
limitation of fire-related accidents and all related activities; the limitation and
counteraction of hazards for persons and animals in the event of non-fire related
accidents; the containment and management of disasters”. Most of the about
30,000 Dutch firemen are volunteers, only a small part of the fire fighting force
are full time professionals. Next to the fire brigades the mayors and the safety
regions are responsible for maintaining a medical emergency service.
The Dutch Central Bureau of Statistics publishes every year comprehensive
reports and data on crucial data on security and safety in the Netherlands.26
Some crucial facts and figures are mentioned below:
26 www.cbs.nl
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* The total number of crimes in the Netherlands has been for some years about
1.2 million every year.
* About 22% of these crimes are solved by the police.
* A quarter of the Dutch population (25 percent) of 15 years and older
sometimes feel unsafe and two percent of them often feel unsafe.
* In their own neighborhood one in seven residents (16 percent) sometimes
feel unsafe. Two percent often feel unsafe.
* Citizens have about 25% chance of becoming a victim of crime in Holland.
* The Dutch government spending on public order and security amounted to
11.3 billion euro in 2007. This is 6 percent more than in 2006. The prison
system and administration of justice in particular cost more.
1.5 Contents
This book consists of two parts. Before the first part in chapter 2 an overview is
given of the role of the ministries, mayors and municipalities in Dutch security
policy. These organizations play a crucial role in different aspects of security,
safety and criminal justice in the Netherlands.
Part A concentrates on the criminal justice organizations in the Netherlands. In
chapter 3 the police and policing are described and analysed, while in chapter 4 the
judiciary and the public prosecution are portrayed. Chapter 5 concentrates on
detention policy and the prison service organization. In chapter 6 the criminal
investigation process in the Netherlands is described, while in chapter 7 this is
done for the forensic investigation.
Part B focuses on the security and safety in the Netherlands. In chapter 8 I give an
overview of the Dutch intelligence and security services. Chapter 9 concentrates
on the public order disturbances and the public order maintenance in the
Netherlands. In chapter 10 terrorism and counter terrorism policy and organiza-
tion in the Netherlands are described and analysed. The Dutch armed forces are
the main topic of chapter 11. The fire brigades and the medical emergency services
and the organization of crisis management are described and analysed in chapter
12. This book ends with chapter 13 in which I give an overview of the most
important trends and conclusions.
The text of this book was closed on March 1, 2012. Developments after that date
are not included in the text.
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2 Ministers, mayors and municipalities
Before we look into the various security and safety organizations and processes in
the Netherlands, it is necessary to give a more general overview. Some authorities
and organizations such as ministries, mayors and municipalities have a central
and dominant role in security, safety and criminal policy. They are not only
involved in specific security and safety organizations or specific security and safety
policies but they have a broader responsibility for security safety and criminal
justice. For a good understanding of the rest of the book, it is necessary to describe
the organization and activities at national and local level.
2.1 Ministers and ministries
2.1.1 ORGANIZATION
In the Netherlands various State departments are involved in security, safety and
criminal justice. Primarily, in 2010 a Ministry of Security and Justice was
established which is a combination of parts of the old Ministry of the Interior
and Kingdom Relations and the entire old Ministry of Justice. But the Ministries
of General Affairs, Defence, Foreign Affairs, Health, Welfare and Sport, Infra-
structure and Environment and Social Affairs and Employment also have
responsibilities for specific security and safety issues. Shortly, I will address
the responsibilities of each of these ministries in the Netherlands.
The Ministry of Security and Justice has an integral responsibility for security
and criminal justice in the Netherlands. Within this ministry national security
policy plans are made. The Minister reaches agreements with police regions and
security regions on performance targets. Crucial parts of the management of the
police and fire brigades (and in some cases the medial emergency services) are
performed from within this ministry. This management covers everything from
finances, staff and equipment to vehicles, uniforms and weapons. The influence
of the Ministry of Security and Justice on the day to day management of the police,
fire brigades and medical emergency services has risen in recent years. Crisis
management and disaster management are also a crucial part of the responsibility
of the this ministry. The management of the new National Police Force takes place
from within the Ministry of Security and Justice.
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On some aspects of security and criminal justice there is a joint responsibility of
the Ministry of Security and Justice and the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom
Relations. The General Security and Intelligence Service is the responsibility of
the Ministry of the Interior. The Ministry of Security and Justice is responsible for
counter terrorism. The National Coordinator Counter Terrorism is partly sub-
jected to the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations and to the Minister of
Security and Justice. The nomination of mayors in the Netherlands is the task of
the Minister of the Interior. As the mayor has a significant role at local level with
regard to security and safety, the Minister of the Interior has in this way some
influence. Within the Ministry of Security and Justice an Inspectorate of Security
and Justice operates for monitoring and controlling security policy and organiza-
tion in the Netherlands. This Inspectorate monitors police, fire brigades, medical
emergency services and municipalities on all kinds of security and safety topics.
The Ministry of Security and Justice is primarily responsible for law enforcement
and counter terrorism. This Ministry is the competent authority of the Public
Prosecution Service, which has largely an independent role. The Ministry of
Security and Justice and the Public Prosecution Service issue directives to
organize and regulate law enforcement by the police and special investigative
agencies. This department also manages the judiciary in conjunction with the
Council for the Judiciary and the Board of Prosecutors General. In addition, the
prisons are the responsibility of this Ministry as well as the Dutch Forensic
Institute.
The Ministry of General Affairs, the department of the Prime Minister, has a
specific role in determining the foreign task of the Dutch intelligence services. It
houses also a coordinator for the Intelligence and Security Services in the
Netherlands. The Prime Minister chairs the plenary meetings of the Ministerial
Council. The decisions in the Cabinet are prepared by Subcouncils. The Sub-
council for Security and Legal Order prepares the cabinet decisions on security.
The Ministers of Internal Affairs and Security and Justice are coordinating
ministers for this Subcouncil.
The Ministry of Defence has a direct responsibility for the armed forces and
military deployments. Also, the Military Intelligence and Security Service is the
responsibility of this Ministry. The Minister of Foreign Affairs has an important
role in shaping the international security policy. He also has a role in determining
the mandate of the intelligence services regarding their foreign tasks.
The Ministry of Infrastructure and Environment has the primary responsibility
for external security. This is the prevention of damage to men and buildings in
response to accidents. This ministry also has the primary responsibility when it
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comes to water safety and preventing floods. The Ministry of Health, Welfare and
Sport is in part responsible for the ambulances and the medical emergency
services. These departments also have a coordinating responsibility for specific
types of crisis respectively environmental incidents, flooding and infectious
diseases.
Many departments in the Netherlands have a responsibility for security and safety.
It is needless to say that this leads to intensive coordination. This creates, in some
cases, intensive political agency conflicts. Actually, none of these departments can
independently take far-reaching decisions concerning security. There is always a
need for cooperation with other departments. In the Dutch government no one
minister has authority over another minister. Even the Prime Minister has to
reach joint decisions. Partly because of the ever-present need for political
coalitions in the Netherlands there is no hierarchical relationship between the
Prime Minister and other ministers. The Prime Minister is first among equals.
The result of this compromise structure – also known as polder politics – is that
only small changes in security an safety policy can be realized, however, mostly
with broad support from politics, civil servants and experts.
2.1.2 SECURITY POLICY AND DUTCH CABINETS
The Dutch government publishes long term policy plans regarding security. In
this section I briefly describe these national policy security plans. The Netherlands
does not have an integrated national security and safety plan for all the different
forms of security and safety. Above we have already seen that this takes place
within the various departments.
Security policy plans
Since the eighties, the Netherlands became familiar with the phenomenon of
national security plans.1 The first plans focused on petty crime. These plans made
clear that not only the police but also all other public organizations and citizens
have a role in combating this form of crime. After a dominant focus on petty crime
in the eighties, the policy attention in the nineties was mainly devoted to
organized crime. Partly in response to a parliamentary inquiry into police
methods, organized crime received major attention from politicians, authorities
and officials. From the nineties an attempt was made by the Dutch government to
achieve a more integrated policy by the so-called Integrated Security Reports. This
integrated security policy tried to bring the different organizations together which
play a role in relation to security. Cabinets in the Netherlands showed growing
attention to security. In 1999, a policy memo on Policing 1999-2002 was
1 Cachet 2008.
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published by the Cabinet in which they directly intervened in the functioning of
the police. Until then, the interpretation of the role of the police was mainly left to
the municipalities and regions. In 2002 a National Security Programme was
published by the Cabinet. This programme showed a further nationalization of
security policy.
The national policy on security over the past thirty years has increasingly been
shaped by the national government. Although the mayor and the public prose-
cutor have formal authority over the police, and the regional council has a formal
role in the management of the police, the national government attained new
functions and powers and implemented far-reaching policies. The nationalization
of security policy in the Netherlands is increasingly becoming a reality. The
implementation of (national) security policy has to take place in the individual
municipalities. To show this development I describe the security policy plan of the
last and the current government in the Netherlands.
Coalition Cabinet Christian Democrats, Socialists and Christian Party 2007-2010
In 2007 the Dutch Cabinet reached a coalition agreement with explicit objectives
on security. The coalition agreement between the Christian Democrats, Socialists
and Christian Party presents the core of the security policy in the Netherlands.
This Cabinet reigned from 2007 until 2010. It is useful to display several key
components of this integrated policy. It displays the current characteristics of
Dutch security policy that differs from the tolerant image that many outside the
Netherlands still have.
“Safety is a core government task and a precondition for a free society that creates a sense
of belonging and togetherness. Crime has declined in recent years, and this trend must
be continued. However, measures to reduce the number of violent crimes have not yet
met with sufficient success and therefore merit substantial extra investment. The
Netherlands must be made even safer. Our efforts to fight terrorism and radicalisation
must not slacken. Measures to combat fraud, financial/economic and organised crime,
and cybercrime will be intensified. Crime prevention must also receive plenty of
attention. Probation and youth work services have a prominent role to play in this,
and will therefore receive extra funding. A safe society requires more than clear rules
that are properly enforced. Mutual respect and common decency are also essential in
creating a safe climate.
1. A new public safety programme will be launched, with the aim of reducing crime
in 2008-2010 by 25% compared with 2003. The functioning of the police and
Public Prosecution Service will be strengthened, and optimum use will be made of
new technology to improve the crime clear-up rate. Problems will be ironed out
and no new obstacles, procedures or restrictions will be imposed. Prison system
reforms will be continued, to create scope for greater differentiation. Extra
attention will be given to the level of support for work for prisoners, including
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those serving short sentences, and for treatment and aftercare. Reoffending will be
further reduced by reintroducing release on parole and tailored guidance and
aftercare.
2. Safety must be ensured nationally, and embedded locally; it must exist in
neighbourhoods, districts, villages and rural centres. Joint action by police forces
and cooperation between them must be improved. The bill to strengthen state
powers will be introduced as soon as possible. There is a need for an integrated
police information system and ICT network, specialisation between forces and a
common policy on human and material resources and management. Integrated
and joint tasks can be funded centrally. The power of the Minister of the Interior
and Kingdom Relations and the Minister of Justice to issue designation orders will
be simplified. Consideration of the bill introducing a national police organisation
will be suspended. If cooperation does not produce adequate results, the process
will be resumed, but in the light of the prevailing situation. The government will
take a decision before the end of 2008.
3. Safety begins with prevention. The government should encourage the public,
young people, schools, businesses, public services and institutions to play their
part. Neighbourhood initiatives to improve safety and curb antisocial behaviour
will be supported. We will work with schools to create a climate of safety. Crime
Prevention and tackling the laundering of the proceeds of crime (as laid down in
the Public Administration (Probity in Decision-making) Act are part of an
integrated municipal policy on safety. Reoffending will be reduced by introducing
release on parole, and strengthening supervision by the probation service and
aftercare by municipalities and civil society organisations. A project plan will be
drawn up setting out policy, initiatives and measures in the field of prevention.
4. The creation of ‘safety regions’ will be continued, and care will be taken to ensure
that they have adequate democratic legitimacy locally. No statutory measures will
be taken to force local fire services to regionalise. Providing an alarm centre is a
public responsibility.
5. Municipalities’ integrated safety policy will be further developed. As part of the
strong local approach mentioned above, efforts will continue to ensure that every
neighbourhood has its own police officer. We will seek ways of increasing public
involvement in improving safety at neighbourhood level, e.g. by means of ‘safe
neighbourhood’ budgets or by ensuring greater participation in setting priorities.
To promote safety, municipal wardens will be given the authority to hand out fines
for antisocial behaviour in public. Police numbers in rural areas will be increased
where necessary. Greater emphasis will be placed on prevention and on quality
rather than quantity when agreeing performance targets with police forces.
6. To protect public order and safety, clothing that covers the face may be banned.
7. Fighting terrorism and preventing radicalisation are an ongoing concern. The
Minister of Justice is responsible for combating terrorism and has the authority to
take measures in other ministers’ areas of competence in emergencies. The
necessary legislation will be submitted and introduced as quickly as possible.
min i s t e r s , ma yor s and mun i c i p a l i t i e s
35
8. To stop the dissemination of radicalising messages and information on terrorist
weapons, it will be made possible to prohibit internet providers from transmitting
certain information.
9. Maintaining law and order and enforcing legislation are preconditions for social
integration and development. Toleration of non-compliance with the law is not
enforcement, and existing practices in this regard will be minimised or abolished.
Measures will be taken to prevent further fragmentation of enforcement; an
integrated municipal safety policy and systematic enforcement by the authorities
will be promoted. The government will explain the need for any measures taken
and their impact on peoples’ privacy.
10. Combating drug production and trafficking will continue unabated, as will the
fight against nuisance caused by drugs. The bill to shut down homes involved in
the illicit sale of drugs will be ushered through parliament as quickly as possible. A
vigorous prevention policy will be pursued with respect to young people. ‘Coffee
shops’ (which sell soft drugs) near schools will be closed and their presence in
border regions will be curtailed. Efforts to tackle large-scale weed cultivation will be
intensified; there will be no experimentation and we will work closely with
neighbouring countries in border regions. ‘Coffee shops’must meet strict criteria:
no advertising, no hard drugs, no nuisance, no sales to under-18s, no more than
five grams per transaction. Any that fail to meet these criteria will be closed,
without exception.
11. Special measures are needed to tackle growing crime among youth: on-the-spot
penalties, greater sanctions, targeting risk groups, prevention through parenting
support, coaching, tackling early school leaving, and dealing firmly with truancy.
12. Priority will be given to tackling crime and antisocial behaviour. Streamlining
criminal-law and other measures will contribute to a clear and effective policy
capable of influencing behaviour (e.g. suspended sentences, conditional decisions
not to prosecute, mayoral orders).
13. The ‘citizens network’ (a telephone network enabling the police to enlist the
assistance of the public in search actions) will be rolled out nationally.
14. Legislation designed to deprive people of the proceeds of crime will be amended to
make it easier to seize profits resulting from criminal activities and to broaden its
applicability to include minor offences.
15. Measures to tackle domestic violence and ‘honour crimes’ will be pursued
vigorously and help for victims and their children will be improved.
16. Prostitution – despite being legalised – is still very much synonymous with black
economy work, traffic in women, money laundering and other forms of illegality
and criminal activity. Vigorous measures are required, but current instruments are
inadequate. There is therefore a need for more robust inspection and enforcement,
transparency and the creation of more individual liability (including prosecuting
clients of under-age and illegal prostitutes), using new instruments and amending
legislation where necessary. Victims and women who want to leave the prostitution
sector should receive extra attention, protection and aftercare. Municipalities will
be given greater freedom to take account of existing brothels in their spatial
cha p t e r 2
36
planning policy; this also applies in the region where the municipality concerned is
situated and includes the ‘zero option’.
17. The position of victims in criminal proceedings will be strengthened. Help for
victims of serious violent crimes will be intensified, and extra attention will be
given to victims of domestic and honour-related violence. Assistance in collecting
compensation for victims from offenders convicted by the courts will be improved.
18. The Netherlands is involved in efforts to strengthen executive cooperation between
the police and criminal justice system, and in the field of migration in Europe.”2
The government has translated the coalition agreement into a policy programme
for the period 2007-2011. The Ministries of Justice and Interior Affairs have
translated these objectives into a concrete programme. Safety begins with
prevention.3 In addition, the Dutch government has presented an action plan
Nuisance and Degeneration. This specific action plan focuses on reducing the
nuisance and degeneration in Dutch municipalities.
Coalition Cabinet Liberals, Christian Democrats and Party for Freedom 2010
In 2012 in the Netherlands a minority government rules. This governments
consists of ministers from the Liberal Party and the Christian Democratic Party
and is parliamentary supported by the Party for Freedom. On the topic of public
safety the three parties reached an agreement which I cite here. I cite this
agreement in full to give the reader insight in the way the Dutch government
intends to improve security in the Netherlands.
“Public safety is a core government responsibility. Freedom and public confidence
cannot flourish in an unsafe environment or one in which people feel constantly
threatened. Life in our streets, neighbourhoods and public areas needs to be made safer.
An effective crack-down on threatening or anti-social behaviour, intimidation, aggres-
sion, violence and crime demands a vigorous display of authority on the part of the police
and criminal justice authorities.
Anti-social behaviour, aggression, violence and crime will be tackled more directly and
effectively.
 The government will produce a proposal to extend powers to stop and search.
 The government will produce a proposal for harsher penalties for violence against
members of the police, fire and ambulance services and against other authorities.
 There will be more video surveillance.
Transgressive behaviour by young delinquents, operating individually or in gangs, will
be tackled, for example by responding instantly, removing them from the streets,
2 Coalition Agreement Dutch Cabinet 2007; www.government.nl
3 Ministry of Justice and Ministry of Internal Affairs and Kingdom Relations, Safety begins with
prevention, 2008, p. 4.
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bringing them before the courts and imposing immediate penalties. Wherever possible,
summary proceedings will be used (e.g. ‘night courts’).
 Efforts will be made to find a meaningful and effective way of dealing with this group
by way of a combination of criminal penalties, street bans, community service and
re-education via the home or school. Such punishment packages will be imposed, for
example, in cases of vandalism, threatening behaviour and property crime, and could
include payment of compensation, confiscation of property or the proceeds of crime,
parental accountability and an obligation to report regularly to the local police station.
In cases of non-cooperation or recidivism, overnight detention may be added to the
package. The aim of this approach is resocialisation and to get young offenders back
in school or work. The community safety partnerships (veiligheidshuizen)may have a
role to play in this.
 The government will produce proposals for an adolescent criminal code for the 15
to 23 age group.
 Children under twelve who display delinquent or criminal behaviour will be
identified as quickly as possible so that immediate action can be taken to address
the problem. Their parents will be made more immediately and financially
accountable. This will also be done in the case of older children.
The government will produce proposals for the introduction of minimum sentences for
adults convicted twice within ten years of an offence carrying a maximum statutory
sentence of twelve years or more. Courts will be able to deviate from these minimum
sentences in the light of highly specific individual circumstances but will have to state
their reasons for doing so. The specific circumstances will be spelled out in draft
legislation, as will the minimum sentence for each offence. The minimum sentence for
re-offending will be at least half of the maximum statutory prison sentence for the
offence concerned.
Offenders must be dealt with in their own home environments. The community safety
partnerships will have a major role to play in this. Through them, the various agencies
involved can take a concerted, offender-oriented approach to combating anti-social
behaviour, domestic violence and crime. This method of prevention has produced
good results and will therefore be continued and developed further.
Institutions where criminal offences have been committed by calling for or inciting
violence should be closed down and this will be done wherever possible, making use of
the available instruments.
The ban on squatting will be actively enforced as a matter of urgency.
Security in public transport will be improved. Employers in the public transport sector
will lodge criminal complaints on behalf of any employee who has become the victim of
violence. The same applies in other parts of the public sector, such as schools, hospitals
and the fire and ambulance services.
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Tougher action will be taken to stop animal abuse by a force of 500 ‘animal cops’. A
dedicated emergency number will be introduced for cases of animal neglect or cruelty
and the animal ambulance service will be connected to it (for example, 1-1-4 ‘animal
rescue service’).
Action will be taken to combat anti-social and criminal behaviour linked to prostitution
and drug trafficking.
 Coffee shops (which sell soft drugs) will become private clubs, with access limited to
people over the age of majority, resident in the Netherlands and able to produce
proof of membership.
 There will be a ban on locating coffee shops within 350 metres of schools.
 The minister will tighten up central government policy and will ensure that
municipalities enforce the distance-from-schools criterion and other relevant parts
of central government policy in their permitting procedures.
 The government will produce proposals for harsher penalties for importing or
exporting drugs (or making preparations to do so) and for cultivation and trafficking;
it will also modify the distinction between hard and soft drugs.
 To combat the trafficking and exploitation of women, the statutory minimum age for
prostitutes will be raised to 21. Greater efforts will be made to detect and clamp down
on trafficking in women. The administrative law approach (e.g. using the Public
Administration (Probity Screening) Act (BIBOB)) will also be stepped up.
Serious crimes, such as violent and sexual offences, have an extremely deep and
traumatic effect on victims and their immediate circle, especially if the damage is
irremediable. In addition, they diminish public confidence in the legal system and affect
the public’s perception of safety levels. To protect society against the perpetrators, it is
therefore essential to take measures to deal with them, including the imposition of
adequate sentences (custodial or otherwise).
 Action will be taken to ensure that those convicted of serious violent or sexual
offences remain (or are taken into) custody pending any appeal proceedings.
 When a ‘cold case’ is solved and new information emerges, the government will
make it possible to re-open the relevant criminal proceedings using the new
information to the possible detriment of the former accused (bill 32044); the
same will apply in cases of manslaughter, and violent or sexual offences resulting
in death. If necessary, the statute of limitations for manslaughter and certain other
violent and sexual offences will be relaxed to permit this.
 The government will produce proposals to extend the statute of limitations for
serious violent and sexual offences.
 The number of mentally ill offenders being placed under hospital orders (TBS) will
be minimised, without losing sight of the risks to society.
 Retrenchment measures will be taken in long-stay wings, provided that this does not
make them unmanageable.
 Following on from existing plans to improve cooperation between the regional
mental health authorities (GGZs) and the justice system, research will now be done
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on the possibility of permanent surveillance of sexual offenders who have completed
psychiatric treatment under a hospital order (TBS).
 The ministerial power to issue directives will be broadened and there will be
retrenchment in contracts with private TBS institutions and GGZ institutions,
without losing sight of the risks to society.
 The government will produce proposals to the effect that any offender subject to a
TBS hospital order who absconds while on temporary leave will not be granted such
leave again for at least one year, except on compelling compassionate grounds.
 If an offender fails to comply in full with an alternative sanction or other order, or to
fulfil the conditions for a suspended sentence, every effort will be made to ensure
that deprivation of liberty is the result.
Offenders will be dealt with more harshly and the position of victims will be
strengthened.
 Victim support will be improved.
 The means will be created under criminal law to seize the assets of defendants at an
early stage so that they can be used later to compensate victims and cover their legal
costs.
 A ministerial directive will be issued to the Public Prosecution Service and police to
the effect that people who defend themselves against attackers or burglars in their
own homes or business premises should not be arrested unless the examining
magistrate decides at the request of the Public Prosecution Service that they should
be remanded in custody on the grounds of strong suspicions that they have
deliberately taken the law into their own hands.
Speed checks will be stepped up where the safety of road users is at stake. Heavier fines
will be imposed in the case of serious speeding offences.
The police will take more effective action to ensure the safety of people and animals.
 The government will increase the operational strength of the police by 3000 officers,
including 500 ‘animal cops’ to combat animal cruelty. Manpower will also be
increased in the criminal investigation field and the judicial system.
 More frequent use will be made of the armed services when joint teams of police
officers and members of other services are being set up.
 Police response times will be improved in both urban and rural areas.
 The government will produce guidelines or, if necessary, regulations to ensure that
citizens can lodge criminal complaints quickly and easily, wherever they may be, and
that they are informed promptly about the action taken in response to their
complaints.
 Ticket quotas will go and will not be replaced by anything similar.
 The national and regional priorities laid down in annual police plans will take more
account of local problems in districts and neighbourhoods.
A national police force will be established under the responsibility of the public safety
minister, who will also bear final responsibility for its management. There will be ten
police regions, based topographically on the ten district court areas. Mayors will remain
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responsible for public order, the deployment of police manpower for local duties, and
permitting policies in their municipalities. Where there is disagreement about
police deployment within a region, the mayor of the region’s largest municipality will
have authority to decide, after consulting the regional Chief Public Prosecutor and
the regional police chief. The relevant mayors should agree procedures for this with the
other mayors in their region. Where there is inter-regional disagreement about police
deployment, the decision will be taken by the minister or a person he has mandated to
act on his behalf. In the regions, the usual triumvirate (public prosecutor, mayor and
head of police) will decide on police deployment, with the mayor having the deciding
vote. The existing bill to amend the Police Act (30880) will be redrafted to enable all this.
The police service will be made organisationally more efficient and effective.
 The duration of police training will be reduced without loss of quality.
 The government will produce proposals for the amendment of the Working Hours
Act and the national regulations on police working hours so that the police have
more time to perform their primary duties.
 There will be cuts in bureaucracy, overheads and procedures and more scope for the
police to do what they are trained to do. The result will be more officers on the beat.
The government will produce proposals for the costs of policing occasional commercial
events requiring permits to be passed on to the organisers.
The dynamic system of speed limits will be expanded. The speed limit on motorways will
be raised to 130 kph. Those on other roads will also be reassessed. Speed limits will be
reduced if air quality, noise pollution or traffic safety so require.
As soon as drug saliva tests are reliable, they will be used to combat the use of drugs by
road-users.
Vehicle recognition will be used to facilitate the prevention, investigation and prosecu-
tion of crimes and the enforcement of fiscal obligations. To this end, wide use will be
made of automatic number plate recognition systems.
The government will prepare to privatise tasks relevant to the prison system, with an eye
to retrenchment and cost-effectiveness. In this respect, the government will take account
of the results of the 2005 and 2009 studies on the privatisation of the United Kingdom
prison service.
Information security and personal data protection will be improved.
 Wherever possible, deadlines will be set for planned measures on the storage,
linking and processing of personal data and the effectiveness of such measures will
be checked thoroughly at the preparatory stage.
 The government will produce proposals for all public and private-sector information
society services to have a duty to report any loss, theft or abuse of personal data to a
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national supervising body, which will have powers to impose fines if any leakage of
such data is found not to have been reported.
 Systematic action will be taken to achieve closer supervision of large-scale compu-
terisation projects and the solution of problems with computer systems.
 The government will introduce an integrated approach to tackling cyber crime.”4
In 2012 in the Netherlands a minority government rules.
Finance and staff
The amount of finances for security in the Netherlands has risen significantly.
Nearly 12.5 billion euro, i.e. 2.2 percent of the gross domestic product (GDP) was
spent on prevention and combat of crime, urban decay and inconvenience in
2009, an increase of 4 percent relative to 2008.
Spending on security care, 2002-2009
Spending in current prices
2002 2003 2004 2005
Source: CBS
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In recent years, spending on security care has risen considerably. In 2009,
expenditure on security care was 4 billion euro up on 2002, an increase of nearly
50 percent. Corrected for inflation, the increase was approximately 2.3 billion
euro, i.e. 757 euro per capita. Personnel costs have risen by 2.5 billion euro over
the period 2002–2009. Just over half of this amount was spent on higher wages,
the remainder was spent on expansion of staff. In the same period, material costs
increased by 1.5 billion euro. Only 20 percent of the increase was the result of
higher prices; 80 percent concerned material costs.
4 Parliamentary Support Agreement VVD-CDA-PVV, 30 September 2010.
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Share in growing security care costs, 2002–2009
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Nearly half of the total costs of security care in 2009 were prevention-related.
Police and security firms are the main providers. The police are also responsible
for tracing criminals and offenders. The third important activity is law enforce-
ment, which is predominantly the responsibility of the Department of Judicial
Institutions (DJI). Management and maintenance of detention facilities, (e.g.
prisons) by the DJI weigh heavier on the budget than personnel costs. This
explains why law enforcement accounts for a higher share of material costs than
other activities.”
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Spending on security care by activity in current prices, 2009
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2.1.3 TOLERANCE AND MILDNESS ARE HISTORY
The Netherlands has long been famous abroad for tolerance and mildness towards
deviant and criminal behavior. In the seventies this became clear by low crime
rates, a low number of people in prisons, low penalties and tolerance on abortion,
euthanasia and drugs. For some, the Netherlands was seen as a lightening
example of how to deal with deviant and criminal behavior.5
This image is no longer applicable. “Tolerance lost its positive connotation of post-
materialism: it became a symbol of governmental indifference.”6 Although the
Netherlands has formalized policies regarding abortion, euthanasia and drugs,7
the security policy of the Dutch government has no longer tolerance and mildness
as their key elements. As in many other European countries, Dutch security policy
consists mainly of both repressive and preventive measures. In the Netherlands,
government is trying to create a security policy which is a combination of
preventive and repressive powers and measures. Both the security policy plans
which I cited before are examples of this development.
However, the Netherlands had to catch up in the last ten years with other
European countries with regard to the repressive side of security policy. Powers
of the police, the Public Prosecution Service and intelligence services have been
expanded, the amount of staff of most security organizations has increased, the
penalties have been extended, the size of the population in prisons has increased.
5 Downes 1988.
6 Buruma 2007, p. 85.
7 Tak 2008, chapter 2.
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The current security policy, as shown in the previous section, shows a very
different picture than the old security policy of tolerance and mildness.
Reasons for new security policy
There are several reasons for this significant change in the Dutch security policy.8
In the first place, the increase in crime contributed to the need and wish for more
repressive measures. Preventive measures and tolerance were not effective any-
more. Another strategy was needed. Additionally, the nature of crime in Holland
changed. Crime became more violent and more organized. And maybe even more
important, more people in the Netherlands were themselves confronted with
crime. Although there is no direct relation with the increase in crime rates, Dutch
citizens – and thereby the media and the politicians – became, at the end of the
eighties, fed up with crime. Crime rates were at that moment stabilizing, but in
the perspective of the public and the media were much too high.
Secondly, in Dutch public opinion, media and politics a change occurred in the
nineties. Crime, nuisance and insecurity were less tolerated. Citizens, businesses
and politicians wanted the government to act upon this insecurity. The govern-
ment was held fully accountable by both political parties in parliament and local
councils and by the intense media attention. The experiences in other surround-
ing countries contributed to the belief that security policy and measures had to
change in the Netherlands. Only preventive measures were not sufficient enough.
In the third place, some far-reaching incidents in the Netherlands and abroad
accelerated these changes. The political murders of Pim Fortuyn in 2002 and
Theo van Gogh in 2004 and the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 in the US
and in Spain and England in later years caused anxiety in the Netherlands. The
Dutch could not remain immune from the threat of terrorism. The Netherlands is
a (small) but integral part of an international security system. It is not possible
anymore to isolate one country from the security developments in other countries.
Fourthly, there seems to be a political and cultural change in the Netherlands
where compromise, coalition and agreement become less important. The compo-
sition of the Dutch population has changed dramatically over the last years and
especially became more multi-ethnic. Normative ideas regarding punishment,
tolerance and security changed and became generally harder and more one-
dimensional. In this hardened political-cultural climate, the demand for hard
repression intensified. The ruling political coalition was not always able to offer
resistance against these calls.
Dutch security policy now resembles the security policies in other European
countries. The facts and figures of Dutch security and security measures are at a
8 Compare Pakes 2004; Swaaningen 2005; Pakes 2006; Tak 2008; Tonry and Bijleveld 2007.
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moderate level compared with other European countries. Because of the interna-
tional nature of the Netherlands it is almost impossible to sustain their own form
of security policy. More and more security policy will be formulated at European
level. The possibility for a national Dutch security policy will not increase.
Drug policy
This is now also the truth for the Dutch drug policy. The Dutch drug policy has
changed fundamentally. Tak describes the unique elements of the Dutch drug
policy:
– “a distinction is made between substances with acceptable health risks for the
users, such as marihuana or weed, and drugs with unacceptable health risks
such as heroin, cocaine, XTC or other synthetic drugs. Substances with
acceptable health risks are called soft drugs; the other hard drugs;
– the market for soft drugs (coffee shops) is strictly separated from the market
of hard drugs;
– drugs users are not treated as criminal offenders but as medical patients who
might need help to improve their physical and mental health;
– the main feature of the Dutch drugs policy is harm reduction and its
objectives are to prevent the use of (hard) drugs and to limit the risks and
harm to the drug user;
– law enforcement is concentrated in the production, possession, selling,
import and export of drugs. The maximum statutory sentences for these
offences differ considerably dependent on the type of drug involved.”9
The Netherlands is famous abroad for their coffee shops. These coffee shops sell
soft drugs for which a permit from the municipality is required. The mayor can
close a coffee shop if there is a threat to safety or health. Coffee shops have some
negative side effects. To supply the coffee shops with drugs different forms of
drugs-related crime emerges, such as large weed plantations and home-grown
weed. In addition, there is a lot of nuisance in the border area where drug users
from abroad come to the Netherlands to buy and use drugs. Drugs runners create
a lot of security problems in and around the border towns. Drugs tourism is now,
for some communities, an almost unsolvable problem. “It was inconsistent that a
user buying small quantities of cannabis in a coffee shop was tolerated but is was
illegal for anyone to supply the coffee shop with its merchandise. Moreover, the
Netherlands is a small country, and many people from Germany and France
hopped over to buy their cannabis. This led to complex disputes in the context of
the European Union.”10
9 Tak 2008, p. 21-22.
10 Buruma 2007, p. 88.
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These negative side effects have led to a major change in Dutch drug policy. The
support of politics and public for a tolerant drug policy is declining. The number
of coffee shops in recent years has fallen from about 1,200 in 1997 to around 700
in 2007. In the vast majority of municipalities in the Netherlands there are no
coffee shops. Licences for new coffee shops are no longer given. Existing coffee
shops face tighter regulation. Mayors close a coffee shop faster if there are security
problems. There are now programmes in schools in which the use of soft drugs is
discouraged. All in all, this means a fundamental change in the drug-tolerant
Netherlands.
2.1.4 NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY
National security strategy
The Netherlands has adopted a national security strategy. Following other European
countries the Dutch government formulated a national security strategy. “Threats to
our security are changing and becoming ever more intertwined. Relatively minor
threats can, through increasing interdependencies, lead to societal disruption.
Answers to existing and new threats can therefore no longer be formulated and
implemented by a single ministry or organisation. We need an integrated and
coherent approach that can look beyond current threats. Planning and policy should
no longer be primarily based on individual (known) threats, but on the extent to
which overall national security is or can be threatened. In order to realize this
approach, the Cabinet has drawn up a national security strategy. The aim of the
strategy is to protect society and citizens within Dutch territory against internal and
external threats. Our national security, however, cannot be viewed in isolation from
the security of other countries, in particular those of our European partners and
NATO allies. This also explains why internal security policy, which this strategy
mainly deals with, and Dutch international security policy are so closely linked.
National security is jeopardized when vital interests of the Dutch state and/or
society are threatened to such an extent that one can speak of – potential – societal
disruption. The following vital interests have been defined: territorial security
(threatened through breach of territorial integrity), economic security (undisrupted
trade), ecological security (living environment), physical security (public health) and
social and political stability (e.g. respect for core values such as freedom of
expression).”11
This national security policy must lead to a better understanding of the risks
inherent in Dutch society. For now, it is primarily a document in which risks
11 Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations, National Security, 2007, p. 9
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are identified. This has led to the following inventory and assessment of risks in
the Netherlands.12
Catastrophic
Very severe
Severe
Signiﬁcant
Limited
Very unlikely               Unlikely                      Possible             Likely                   Very Likely
Likelihood
• Flooding EDO
• Flooding DR14
• Muslim extremism
• Pandemic f lu severe
• Ole geopolitical
• Pandemic f lu mild
• Political Salaﬁsm
• Nationw ide blackout
• Heat - drought
• Animal rights activism
• Right wing extremism
• Left wing extremism
• Intentional electricity
disruption
Category II
Category III
Category I
Risk diagram
Im
pa
ct
In the coming years this should lead to concrete strategies on how all relevant
government organizations, citizens and businesses act with respect to these risks.
In 2008, in particular attention is paid to flooding and major evacuations. In
2009, specific attention is paid to all relevant aspects of an influenza pandemic.
Protection of vital infrastructure
Within this national security policy, the protection of vital infrastructure plays an
important role. “The Dutch governement has identified 29 products and services
such as electricity, drinking water, dams, and banks as critical for society. If one of
these critical products or services fails, our society can turn into chaos and societal
breakdown can occur. To prevent this kind of critical products or services to fail,
the Dutch program Protection of Critical Infrastructures has been created in
2002. Nine Dutch ministries are involved in this policy program, coordinated by
the Ministry of Interior and Kingdom Relations. Within this program the
government works together with the public and private owners of critical
infrastructure and with the largest Dutch employers’ organization (VNO-NCW).
12 Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations, National Security Progress Report, 2008, p. 4.
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Protection of critical infrastructure demands an intensive collaboration of private
and public parties. The program’s aim is threefold:
1. to prevent large scale failure or disruption as much as possible;
2. to ensure public and private sectors are adequately prepared for the con-
sequences of failure or disruption;
3. to allow effective repressive measures to be taken in order to minimise
damage caused by failure or disruption as much as possible.
There are 12 critical sectors and 33 critical products or services.
Sector Product of Service
Energy 1. electricity
2. natural gas
3. oil
Telecommunications/ICT 4. fixed Telecommunications service
5. mobile Telecommunications service
6. radiocommunications and navigation
7. satellite communications
8. broadcasting
9. internetacces
10. postal services
Drinking water 11. drinking waterservices
Food 12. food services and safety
Health 13. emergency management
14. medicines
15. sera and vaccins
16. nuclear medicine
Financial 17. financial system
18. financial transfer government
Stemming and managing surface water 19. management water quality
20. stemming and management water quantity
Public Order and Safety 21. enforcement public order
22. enforcement public safety
Legal Order 23. dispensation of justice en detention
24. maintenance of law and order
Public Administration 25. diplomatic communications
26. information handeling government
27. military order
28. decision making public administration
Transport 29. mainport Schiphol
30. mainport Rotterdam
31. National infrastructure (main roads and rivers)
32. railway system
Chemical and nucleair industry 33. transportation, storage and production/handling of chemical
and nucleair substances
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Some of these critical sectors are owned by the government, such as the
management of surface water and public order and safety. About 80 percent of
the critical infrastructures is owned by private parties. The protection of critical
infrastructures always demands a public-private cooperation to be effective.”13
The protection of vital infrastructure requires intensive cooperation between the
government and industry. The project called Vital has been running for many
years and in practice, it is extremely difficult and hard to reach agreements about
security of vital infrastructure. Problems concerning powers and responsibilities,
information and finances prevent an optimal protected vital infrastructure in the
Netherlands. The vital infrastructure is owned by both public and private
organizations. At this moment there is no one organization which has the
authority or the power to lay down all regulations on all vital organizations
involved. Therefore, it is necessary to consult, to coordinate and to compromise.
2.2 Mayors and municipalities
2.2.1 ROLE OF MUNICIPALITIES AND MAYORS IN SECURITY MORE IMPORTANT
The role of municipalities in Dutch security policy is important. Increasingly,
tasks in the field of security are delegated to municipalities. The Dutch munici-
palities are responsible for all kinds of security policies. A quote from the Minister
of Internal Affairs shows the increased role of municipalities and mayors in the
Dutch security policy.
“The importance of the role municipalities is stressed by a policy guideline by the
Ministry of Interior. Antisocial behaviour, minor lawbreaking, and organised crime all
need to be tackled not only by the police and criminal justice authorities, but also by the
municipalities. So municipalities are to take responsibility locally for policy on public
order and safety. The Government will assist municipalities and other local bodies and
agencies in their efforts to reduce public nuisance and neighbourhood decay. Urgent
measures are required to deal with antisocial behaviour by juveniles, nuisance around
pubs and clubs, and a decline in residential neighbourhoods. One example is a bill to
combat football hooliganism and serious antisocial behaviour. Another is an act that,
from 2009, will empower municipalities to impose on-the-spot fines on persons causing
a public nuisance. The Government is also examining the possibility of giving mayors
the power to evict antisocial families who cause serious problems in their neighbour-
hood (…) Some antisocial behaviour involves juveniles under the influence of alcohol.
Young people are drinking more and starting younger. This calls for stricter monitoring
of the sale of alcohol. In 2010, the Government will transfer responsibility for this
13 Website Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations, April 2009.
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monitoring from the Food and Consumer Product Safety Authority to the municipa-
lities. Mayors will be empowered to take action against persons who sell alcohol to
juveniles. Under the new approach to fighting organised crime, the Government will
create a number of centres for joint operations by the municipalities, the police service,
the criminal justice authorities, the Tax and Customs Administration, the Fiscal and
Economic Investigation Service (FIOD-ECD), and the Social Security Information and
Investigation Service (SIOD). Participation will also be open to non-governmental actors
such as housing associations, estate agents, property developers, notaries, accountants,
and tax lawyers. The goal is to prevent criminals from infiltrating legitimate businesses
and exploiting legitimate structures and methods to carry out illegal activities. (…) Nine
municipalities will this year launch five pilot projects to develop citizens networks
(Burgernetten). These involve the police approaching people during a search operation
and asking them to look out for a person or vehicle. If the results are favourable, the
Government may introduce a nationwide Citizens Network programme in 2009.
Polarisation and radicalisation are being tackled mainly at local level. Community police
officers, youth and welfare workers, teachers and truancy officers work together to
identify, prevent and if necessary to combat polarisation and radicalisation. At central
government level, this local approach is supported by seven ministries and the
Association of Netherlands Municipalities. The General Intelligence and Security
Service is responsible for the timely identification of threats and risks to national
security. Its intelligence and advice serve as a basis for policymaking and action at local,
national, and international level.”14
The more than 400 municipalities in the Netherlands play an important role in
security policy. Partly because of the central role of the mayor in relation with the
police and firemen, the Dutch local government has in recent years become a
central nucleus in security and safety policy. The mayor in the Netherlands has
authority over the police and fire brigade. In the tripartite consultation between
mayor, public prosecutor and police chief and in the pentagon consultation
between mayor, public prosecutor, police chief, fire brigade commander and
the regional medical officer many aspects of security and safety issues are decided.
These include both safety and security policies.
The position of mayor in the Dutch constitution is particular. He is an official
authority appointed by the Crown. He is not directly elected by the people,
although the town council now makes an almost binding nomination to the
Minister of Interior. Neither the mayor nor the board of mayor and aldermen but
the city council is the head of the Dutch municipality. Nevertheless, the key
powers in the field of public order and safety are entrusted to the mayor.
The mayor has different roles regarding security. He has authority over the
police force and the fire brigade. He conducts administrative leadership during a
14 Website Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations, April 2009.
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crisis. He can exercise many powers to restore public order or to prevent public
order being disturbed. The mayor receives a lot of (confidential) information
about security and safety. The mayor plays an important role in the triangular
consultation with the prosecutor and the police chief. The mayor participates in
the regional council, which is responsible for management of the police. In some
cases, the mayor is also the police force manager, chairman of the safety region
and chairman of the fire region and the region of medical emergency service. The
mayor coordinates the administrative enforcement. The mayor has perseverance
powers over other organizations to realize actions by a specific person.15
In Dutch practice, we see that the mayors fulfil these roles quite differently.
Some mayors act as a sheriff and tackle all security problems of their citizens
directly and repressively. Some choose to remain in an administrative position
above all parties in the security domain. Others try to help specific individuals and
ensure strong cooperation between all organizations involved. And of course there
are many possible combinations of task performance. It is highly dependent on
the personality of the mayor, the extent of the security in the town and the external
pressure (from city council, media and citizens) how the mayor in security and
safety practice acts.
The city councils in the Netherlands have, in recent years, put more pressure on
the municipalities and the mayors to pay more attention to safety and security.
This has led to extensive safety and security programmes especially in the larger
municipalities.16 It also led to an increase in the number of people and resources
at local municipal level working with security. No longer, are only a few people
directly around the mayor concerned with safety and security, but all parts of the
municipal services do have to contribute to safety and security in a municipality. It
has also led to substantial expansion of powers of the mayor and the municipality
in the field of public order maintenance.
The municipalities vary greatly in size and capacity. The most intensive form of
local security policy will take place in the larger municipalities. The smaller
municipalities often try to create regional security policy. The regionalization
tendency is important for security in the Netherlands. The police, fire services,
medical emergency services and crisis management and disaster relief are now
realized in regional organizations. To this end, specific organizations are formed
such as the police regions, fire regions, medical emergency service regions and
safety regions.17 The local security policy must be linked to these regional
organizations. This leads to complex coordination problems as a fact sheet from
15 Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations, Burgemeester en Veiligheid, 9 April 2009.
16 See Marks and Van Sluis 2008 for example of Rotterdam.
17 In chapter 12 I will describe the concept of the safety regions in more depth.
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the Association of DutchMunicipalities shows. “The safety and security policy of a
municipality consists of five fields: safe living environment, activity and safety,
youth and security, physical security and integrity and security. Within the
security field there are many different themes: from nuisance to drugs, road
safety to the risks of natural disasters. Another feature of the security area is the
great momentum at both national and local level. What is not a priority today,
could tomorrow top the political agenda. A good example is radicalization. The
multitude of issues and stakeholders increases the probability of a large fragmen-
ted approach. The challenge for municipalities is to achieve a comprehensive
security policy that is borne by the partners.”18
The government wants the municipalities in the Netherlands to perform a more
directive role with respect to security and safety. They must be able to address the
parties involved in security and unite them. This more directive role will be legally
incorporated and the municipalities will receive specifically designated persever-
ance power over other organizations. The municipalities are required to make a
four-year security plan in which the security policy is conducted and it is pointed
out which organization will make which contribution. In this way, the role of
municipalities and mayors in the security policy becomes even more important.
2.2.2 LOCAL SECURITY POLICY
Integrated security policy
In Dutch municipalities there was a strong urge to formulate integrated security
policy plans. The core of this integrated security approach was:
– Understanding: the structural needs for security as an independent admini-
strative product. This is only possible if there is sufficient understanding
(numerical and otherwise) of the problems, risks and effects of different
policies for security.
– Security: ensuring safety must be more than a reactive and exclusively on
enforcement and control post-oriented approach. Therefore, the idea of a
safety chain is introduced. The various links – pro-action, prevention,
preparation, repression and aftercare – should give all organizations the
possibility for better coordination.
– Consistency: safety has interfaces with many other public functions. Atten-
tion is drawn to the fact that security has both social and physical compo-
nents. In addition to law enforcement and public order maintenance there
are also occupational safety, environmental safety and road safety.
– Cooperation: Police and justice should not only be responsible for safety and
security for. Collaboration with others, in particular, the local level is needed.
18 Factsheet Association of Dutch Municipalities.
min i s t e r s , ma yor s and mun i c i p a l i t i e s
53
The local administration has a central nucleus in establishing such coopera-
tion. Later this is called the direction role of the municipality. But there is a
still responsibility for the State government. The local government should be
encouraged and facilitated by the State.19
This text looks suspiciously similar to the texts currently circulating on the new
forms of security. In 2004, Cachet and Ringeling came to the following conclu-
sions over ten years integrated security policy in the Netherlands. “The integrated
security policy has had some effect. More attention to safety has emerged. The
policy of the central government has encouraged and helped communities to
formulate security policy, although some municipalities had little need for this
help or were already engaged in the development of security policy. Many
pretensions of the policy are not realized. The integral aspect of the approach is
very relative. Security is still perceived relatively limited. Reactive performance to
acute security issues still requires more attention than policymakers had expected.
The result is that the pro-active role got less attention than it deserves in their eyes.
Cooperation between public and private parties was in many cases not obligatory.
Whether at municipal level formulated policy was always effectively carried out, is
a difficult question. The same applies to the question what exactly the policy has
been. The influence of the national at local level can certainly be identified.
Nevertheless, municipalities were faced with significant challenges to the effective
conduct of security policy: scarce resources and expertise, difficulties with
partners, lack of stable political and managerial attention to safety issues. The
worlds of policy makers in The Hague and at the local level still seem to lie far
apart.”20
Integrated Security Policy in the Netherlands is still very important. In many
projects in municipalities one is trying to enhance security. The projects focus on
a multitude of subjects: bike theft, nighttime violence, youth violence, nuisance,
burglary etc. For these projects, many grants are available. These grant are paid by
the national and sometimes local government. For every spot or issue a separate
project is initiated and implemented. Every time new organizations and new
individuals have to be involved. Ideally, all projects shared have a positive impact
on security in a municipality. This full impact is not always clear in practice. “For
all these impulses, the development of the local safety policy is still a difficult
process. Successive studies conducted by the Court of Audit show that there has
been some progress, but usually in dribs and drabs. This has partly to do with the
trouble which local authorities have in steering more or less autonomous
organizations such as housing corporations, social work agencies, and all sorts
19 Integrale Veiligheidsrapportage 1993 in Cachet and Ringeling 2004, p. 638.
20 Cachet and Ringeling 2004, p. 660.
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of juvenile care or health institutions. However, it has also to do with the
multiversity, intricacy, and incomprehensibility of many safety issues: violent
crime, juvenile problems in general, often serious problems with certain im-
migrant juveniles (especially from Morocco and the Antilles), school absenteeism
and dropping out, nightlife violence, neighbourhood quarrels, noise pollution,
vandalism and destruction, drugs and alcohol addictions etc.”21
Security Houses
A much more recent development is the creation of security houses in Holland.22
In many municipalities security houses are formed which consist of a network of
all relevant organizations to combat crime and nuisance.23 In these security
houses different organizations are working together in tackling crime and
nuisance: municipalities, youth and health care, police and judicial authorities.
This happens as much as possible at the level of specific individuals, families and
spots. In case consultation between all relevant agencies decisions are made on
how the different organizations will intervene with regard to a specific individual
or family. The activities of various organizations are intensively coordinated.
There are several variants of security houses.24
The initial experience with these security houses is positive. The central govern-
ment has decided to establish a nationwide network of security houses. A recent
survey identifies the following success factors for the development of security
houses.
– “A good cooperation between justice partners and care partners is a critical
success factor. The strength of cooperation lies in connecting the different
networks around a client. The strength of the security house is that from a
physical location where all partners have working space, information about a
client directly can be shared with one another.
– The professionals working in the security house. Trust in each other and
working with enthusiastic, creative professionals from various cooperating
partners allows information about a client to be shared.
– The judicial case consultation. They exchange information about the client in
this case consultation. This is the binding agent between the professionals.
– The local approach. Problems are tackled and addressed locally. On this
basis, the appropriate (local) partners are put together. This flexible approach
and commitment of security houses makes it possible to tackle local crime
problems.”25
21 De Kempe and Cachet 2008, p. 228.
22 See for history Terpstra and Bakker 2004.
23 Ministry of Justice and Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations, Veiligheidshuizen, 2009.
24 Adviesbureau Van Montfoort 2008, p. 73.
25 Adviesbureau Van Montfoort 2008, p. 10.
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An evaluation of security houses led to the following conclusions. Amongst the
involved professionals a broad consensus exists about the fact that security houses
contribute to the quality of interventions, because interventions are more aligned
and integrated. Moreover, there are (less strong) indications that cooperation in a
security house contributes to earlier and better diagnoses of safety problems and
more rapid reactions to these problems. Realising sufficient input, throughput
and output turns out to be difficult in the initial phase, but there are indications
that in most cases the production gets going after some time. The research into
the shortening of completion times of interventions is scarce and the results are
contrary. In the realm of outcome and impact the research indicates that security
houses contribute to social improvements in the lives of clients and (as a
consequence) to lower recidivism rates in this group. Other crime reducing
effects have not been researched. Some studies report that security houses realise
cost-benefit advantages. These studies state that the additional cost of cooperation
is lower than the benefits that are gained from the lower rates of recidivism.
However, these studies invoke various theoretical and methodological questions.
Research into possible scale of efficiency effects is still absent. Other possible
societal effects/benefits of security houses have not been researched. Beside
positive results, the studies sum up a great number of problems that security
houses face realising their goals. From the list of problems that were mentioned a
Top-7 of most mentioned problems is listed:
1. the (internal) information about individual cases is insufficient
2. the functioning of and the cooperation with the donating mother organisa-
tions is insufficient
3. the control and organisation of the security house is insufficient
4. relevent partners are missing in the cooperation
5. specialized local care facilities for repeat offenders and former prisoners are
insufficient
6. the security house has formulated vague goals
7. (internal) communication between parties is insufficient
Comparative studies confirm that the conditions here presented as mayor
problems are important to realise results. security houses that do well perform
better with regard to these conditions. Moreover it turns out to be important that
local cooperation leads to concrete decisions in individual cases. Cooperation
without decision making is less effective. Some more theory oriented studies
show that many conditions must be met for security houses / (network organisa-
tions) to be effective.26
26 Rovers 2011, 2001, different chapters.
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There are still some problems in the organization and functioning of the security
house: the direction of the security house, the manner in which information on
individual persons can be handled, the registration of information, the extent of
the problems, finances, relationships with the new centres for youth and family,
etc. The security houses constitute a new contribution to the institutional
structure of security in the Netherlands in which an integrated security solution
for specific persons, families or spots are created.
2.3 Trends
At the end of this chapter I briefly sketch some institutional trends regarding the
role of ministers, mayors and municipalities in security, safety and criminal
justice in the Netherlands.
2.3.1 COMPLEX
The institutional security system in the Netherlands is complex. Many organiza-
tions and individuals are involved. At the national level, none of the departments
can independently make far-reaching decisions on security issues. Almost always
there is a need for inter-departmental coordination. None of the ministers has
sufficient power over the other ministers to actually overpower them. Even the
Prime Minister in the Netherlands always needs coordination, consultation and
compromise. There is now a Ministry of Security and Justice in which the most
important aspects of security and criminal justice in the Netherlands are decided
on. This situation arose late 2010 so it is still unclear what the organizational
consequences will be.
The disadvantage of this complexity is that always a lot of long consultations
and coordination is necessary. It is rarely possible to reach for a quick decision.
Another disadvantage is that only in a few cases substantial decisions can be
reached. Most of the times only small steps that can be taken. It is always
necessary to achieve compromises. Also there is the disadvantage that agency
policy conflicts between departments and other organizations can play a major
and sometime dominant role.
This complexity also has a number of advantages. The consultation and
coordination give way to many relevant arguments. A specific security problem
is looked at from different perspectives. The extensive consultation and discussion
creates the situation that ultimately maximum support for the decision exists. It is
probably not the best decision, but it is certainly the most supported decision. For
the implementation of decisions this is crucial. In this complex security structure
a system of checks and balances has emerged. No organization in the Netherlands
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can monopolize the decisions relating to security. The negative effects of a
monopoly in respect of security decisions will not occur quickly.
2.3.2 CENTRALIZATION
Unmistakably, however, in recent years in a centralization of security has occurred
in the Netherlands. We will continue in more detail on this in the next chapters.
The government and the ministries control, through a variety of ways, security in
the Netherlands. They have more powers to control the police forces, fire brigades,
medical emergency services, municipalities, etc. They have been given a greater
role in appointments of key people in these organizations. They have through the
allocation of finances and resources many possibilities to influence the security
priorities in the Netherlands. They have the key information on safety and
security. They are often the key contacts with foreign countries where security
and safety organizations in partly depend on. They make specific policies and
specific performance guidelines for all stakeholders in the security and safety
policies.
This centralization and nationalization of security policy is a response to
increased public and political unrest in the Netherlands about safety and security.
Security cannot only be the responsibility of municipalities and security is a key
concern for Dutch politics. Especially in response to some incidents and attacks in
the Netherlands the focus on security has increased significantly. The involve-
ment of the national government is rapidly increasing. Another argument also
plays an important role. One assumes that economics of scale in security will
increase effectiveness and efficiency. This is always one of the key arguments for
further nationalization.
My expectation is that in the next few years this tendency to centralization and
nationalization will continue. The Netherlands seems too small for too much of a
decentralized institutional security.
2.3.3 FOCUS ON MUNICIPALITIES AND MAYORS
Traditionally the main focus of security policy is at the municipalities. The mayor
is the central authority in the security field. He is the authority on police and fire
department and participates in many consultation bodies in the security field. In
recent years the emphasis has been firmly placed on the municipalities. Munici-
palities have to perform a directive role regarding security. They should not only
perform better themselves but also encourage others to do so. This is also true for
organizations which have no direct organizational relationship with the munici-
palities. In the past, these organizations operate in a network with each other.
Through plea conviction and compromise a security policy was designed. Now the
idea is that the municipality, and in particular the mayor, should have a more
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influential role. This perseverance will increase the expectations regarding the
performance of municipalities in the area of security. It is questionable how these
expectations can be realized.
The role of the mayor is changing in the Netherlands. In many municipalities
he/she is not the person anymore who functions above all parties and mediates
between parties. The new mayor is actively engaged in security. The councils and
the media encourage this behaviour of mayors. In some municipalities this leads
to a kind of sheriff behaviour by some mayors. Mayors have acquired, in recent
years, many new powers. With these powers, the mayor can in depth intervene in
the lives of citizens, even before a crime or public disorder has occurred. The
question is whether the expectations of the real potential of the mayor are not too
high. A mayor will not be able to resolve all security problems to the satisfaction of
all concerned. Another risk is that the mayor becomes too much of a factor in the
security field and he can therefore not fulfil his position above parties. The mayor
becomes just one of the contesting parties in the crowded field of security and
safety policy in the Netherlands.
2.3.4 PARTNERSHIPS
Because of the inherent consultation and compromise nature of the Dutch
security policy, many partnerships are created. In the following chapters we will
find many examples of them. Integrated Security Policy in the Netherlands is an
example of one type of institutional cooperation that has existed for many years
and played an important role in this field. Often there are intensive cooperation
projects in which it is not always clear what the practical results should be. The
number of consultations in respect of security and safety in the Netherlands is
extremely high. The administrative and bureaucratic busyness in relation to safety
is therefore very intense. There are many examples in the Netherlands of
integrated security projects but not so many examples of real long-term integrated
security policy.
In particular, the concept of security houses should be mentioned. What is
special about this form of cooperation is that all organizations involved in a
community, region and province come together to discuss and decide on a specific
person, family or spot. Security houses are aimed at concrete solutions. It seems
one of the main reasons for success. These security houses make it possible to
intervene effectively in individual cases. All organizations agree to the specific
tasks of these organizations towards a person, family or spot. It creates a much
more customer-oriented approach with individual goals. My expectation is that
these forms of cooperation in the coming years will increase in importance and
intensity.
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2.3.5 CONTENT OF SECURITY POLICY
The Netherlands was in the past famous for its tolerance of deviant behavior. The
small number of people in prisons, the tolerance of drugs, abortion and
euthanasia, the friendliness of the police, the relatively lower crime rates and
high security feelings were features which seemed to make the Netherlands
unique in the western world. These times seem long gone. The Netherlands has
just become a regular European country with respect to safety and security.
Tolerance and mildness fit no longer the public and political awareness of security
and criminal justice in the Netherlands.
The outline of the contents of the security policy in this chapter shows that the
Dutch government but also the Dutch municipalities are no longer afraid for
tougher punitive and repressive approaches to security. In recent years, a kind of
catch-up with the rest of the world seems to have occurred. However, in the
Netherlands the awareness is deeply penetrated that prevention and avoidance is a
crucial part of the security policy. To this end, specific policies, programmes and
organizations have been set up. The powers to act before a security problem
actually occurs, have only increased. Also in the Netherlands risk perception has
an increasingly dominant position.
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3 Police and policing
Police and policing in the Netherlands are multifaceted. In this chapter I discuss
the organization, both formal and factual, of the Dutch police and their role in
Dutch society. The developments in the Dutch police can be characterized in
regards to developments in Dutch society, especially to the extent to which the
Dutch are permissive or not.
After an introduction into the organization, facts and figures of the police in the
Netherlands, paragraph 3.2 is concerned with the role of the police in Dutch society
and two important reports by the police themselves. In paragraph 3.3 I will address
the topic of accountability of the police in the Netherlands. In paragraph 3.4 I give a
sketch of the principles of proper policing. In the last paragraph I will present ten
trends in policing and the organization of the police in the Netherlands. This
chapter is mainly based on the volume Police: Studies on its functioning and
organization (2007) edited by Fijnaut, Muller, Rosenthal and Van der Torre.1 In
this large volume (more than 1250 pages) almost every aspect of the police and
policing in the Netherlands is described en analyzed (in Dutch).2
3.1 Organization, facts and figures
To provide the reader with a picture of the organization of the police in the
Netherlands hereby some key facts and figures:
* In 2007, more than 52,000 police officers were part of the Dutch police. In
2011 the total amount of police in the Netherlands was 49,500.
* Per year more than 250,000 suspects are arrested by the police and delivered to
the Public Prosecution Service, which has to make the decision on prosecution.
* The Dutch population seems fairly satisfied with the availability of the police,
but less satisfied with the results and the quality of the police. Only 20%
agree with the statement that the police successfully combat crime. The
percentages on the interaction between police and citizens are also low. The
relationship between the police and society can be increased. The Dutch
Bureau of Statistics has also specifically looked at the reasons of those who
were less satisfied with the contact with the police.
1 Compare Newburn 2005 and Newburn 2008.
2 See for history Jones 1995; Van Steden and Huberts 2006; Wintle 1996.
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* “The police spent more than 2.4 billion euro in 2009 on investigation
activities, i.e. an increase by 12 percent relative to 2005. The police registered
a 7 percent increase in offences from 2005, but the number of crimes solved
by the police in 2009 dropped by 5 percent. Public spending on investigation
activities rose by 12 percent over the period 2005-2009. The crime solution
rate declined by 5 percent from 279 thousand in 2005 to 264 thousand in
2009. The number of crimes solved by the police grew marginally in 2006
and 2007, but in 2008 decline set in and the decline continued in 2009.
Crimes solved by the police
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* Crimes make up approximately 2 percent of criminal offences solved by the
police. The other 98 percent are offences. The police registered 12.2 million
offences in 2009, an increase by 7 percent from 2005. More than three
quarters of offences are speed limit violations; one in ten concern illegal
parking or red light jumping. This type of offences is solved at the moment
they are registered. The fines are forwarded by the police to the Central Fine
Collection Agency (CJIB), accountable for the collection of traffic fines.
* On average, the police spent 195 euro on the solution of crimes and offences
in 2009. Adjusted for inflation, the price of solution of criminal offences has
risen by an average of 5 percent.”3
3 CBS Web magazine, 07 April 2011 15:00.
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The Dutch government made an informative English brochure on policing in the
Netherlands which gives a good overview of the main organization of the police in
the Netherlands.5 “The Dutch police are divided into 25 regional forces and the
National Police Services Agency (KLPD), with various supporting divisions. A
regional police force is responsible for policing in a given area known as the police
region. The size of a regional force depends on factors such as population size,
crime levels and building density. Each regional force is in turn divided into a
number of districts or divisions. Districts are usually subdivided into basic units.
In matters concerning the maintenance of public order or the rendering of
assistance in emergencies, the competent authority is the mayor of the munici-
pality in which the police act. Responsibility for the maintenance of public order in
a province rests with the Queen’s Commissioner, who checks that the police carry
out their duties properly. The Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations is
responsible at central government level for the maintenance of public order and
security. Where the police are enforcing the criminal law or carrying out duties for
the justice authorities, they act under the authority of the public prosecutor.
Similarly, the Board of Procurators General of the five Courts of Appeal supervises
the police in the exercise of these duties. The Minister of Justice is politically
accountable for the work of the public prosecutor and the procurators general in
4 See for history of the Dutch police Fijnaut 2007. See also Punch 1979 for one of the first English
studies on Dutch policing.
5 Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations, Policing in the Netherlands, The Hague, 2007.
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this respect. Authority over the police is therefore determined automatically by the
nature of the police work and those having this authority are determined locally.
Tripartite consultations on policing are held regularly by the mayor, the public
prosecutor and the head of the local police force.6
The management of each of the 25 police forces is determined regionally. A
regional force is allowed wide discretion in the exercise of its duties and the
definition of its priorities. For example, it can itself decide on such matters as
funding, staffing, equipment, buildings, organization, operational management,
information systems and computerisation and the organisation of the regional
criminal investigation department.
The police force manager is the mayor of the largest municipality in the region.
As such he liaises with the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations. The
force manager generally delegates some of his decision-making powers to the
chief officer, particularly in matters of personnel policy. The administrative centre
of the regional force (i.e. the central police station) is also located in the largest
municipality of the region.
The main policy decisions are taken by the regional executive, which comprises
all the mayors of a region and the chief public prosecutor. Once policy has been
formulated in outline, the details are worked out by the force manager in
consultation with the chief officer and the chief public prosecutor. (…)
It is in keeping with Dutch tradition that no single body should have sole
authority over the police and that authority should be divided between two
ministers (the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations and the Minister
of Justice) on the one hand and the provincial and municipal authorities such as
the Queen’s Commissioner, mayor (force manager) and municipal councils on
the other. At central government level the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom
Relations is responsible for the arm’s length management of the 25 regional police
forces. He is also directly responsible for management of the KLPD. In cases
where this management involves the enforcement of the criminal law or the
performance of police duties for the justice authorities, the Minister of the Interior
takes decisions jointly or after consultation with the Minister of Justice. Examples
are the enforcement of traffic laws and the implementation of duties under the
immigration laws. This is because the Minister of Justice is politically accountable
for the enforcement of the criminal law, starting with the criminal investigation
duties of the police, and for the management of the other stages of the judicial
process (i.e. the prosecution, trial and punishment of serious offences).”7
6 See Albert 1996.
7 Ministry of the Interior, Policing in the Netherlands, 2007, pp. 10-11.
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Police Act and powers
The organization and functioning of the police in the Netherlands is based on
the Police Act 1993.8 In this Act, the functions and (part of) the powers of the police
are described. In Article 2, the tasks of the Dutch police are displayed: enforce the
legal order and render assistance or those who need help. The enforcement of
the legal order consists of the enforcement of criminal law and the enforcement of
public order. As noted above, the mayor exercises authority over the police when it
comes to maintaining public order and the prosecutor when it comes to criminal
enforcement of the law. The police have thus two immediate bosses, the mayor and
the prosecutor. They are responsible for the operations of the police. The
prosecutor is formally head of the criminal investigation, although of course
many duties and powers are delegated to police officers. Senior police officer are
also auxiliaries to the public prosecutor and in this capacity they can carry out some
tasks of the public prosecutor. To align the tasks of the police properly there are
regular tripartite consultations between the mayor, prosecutor and police chief.
In exercising its functions, the police use a variety of powers based in part on the
Police Act 1993, partly in the Code of Criminal Procedure and part on the basis of
specific laws.9 The police may use violence, in some cases lethal force, under
strictly defined conditions. The police have the powers to investigate the body and
cloths of individuals, to arrest and seize goods. The police can interrogate
suspects. The right to silence and counsel is crucial in exercising this power.
The police can search a house and correspondence and may within specific terms
exercise different forms of collusion detection (systematic observation, infiltra-
tion, etc). If the powers are more severe a auxiliary to the prosecutor has to make
the decision to use the power. This is also a (senior) police officer. To maintain,
hold and stop for questioning the police officer has its own authority. More severe
powers must be approved by the prosecutor and in some cases even by the court
commissioner. The police can solve certain offences themselves by issuing a
warning or a reduced penalty.
Monitoring and accountability
Monitoring the functioning of the police is done by different authorities. The
regional executive has a control role in the management aspects of the police. The
municipal council can call the mayor to account for the exercise of its jurisdiction
in respect of public order and authority over the police. The Lower House can call
the Minster of Security and Justice to account on how the Public Prosecution
service made use of its authority powers. The Minister of Security and Justice has
jurisdiction over the public prosecutors. The Minister of the Interior has no direct
8 Elzinga, Van Rest and De Valk 1995; Michiels et al 1997.
9 Buruma 2007.
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authority relationship with the mayor and has no direct authority over the police.
However, the Minister of the Interior has extensive management powers which
able the Lower House to hold the minister accountable. This means that there is a
limited and often indirect accountability of the operation and organization of the
police. There is in no direct elected body that can exercise full supervision on the
organization and functioning of the police.10
Nationalization
At the beginning of 2009, new plans for changes to Dutch police system were
made public. Although the government explicitly stressed that the regional police
system is preserved, the proposals all concentrate on forms of centralization and.
The proposal was to give the Council of Police Force Managers a statutory and
more influential role. The Council of Police Force Managers is the gathering of all
26 police force managers (mayors of main cities) in the Netherlands. The Council
of Police Force will make arrangements directly with the Minister of the Interior
on the performance of the police in the Netherlands in general and the police in
the region in particular. Also, they have to agree on the task performance and
management of the police. The decisions of the Council of Police Force Managers
shall be binding for all regions. This council will have an independent chairman.
The Council shall be accountable to the Ministers of the Interior, which is then
accountable to the Lower House of Parliament. The Council of Chief Constables
gets an advisory role in relation to the Council of Police Force Managers. There
will also be a national police organization, in addition to the individual police
regions, which is responsible for personnel, information, organization, finance,
automation, communications and housing of the Dutch police.
In 2010, the new cabinet presents far reaching plans concerning the organisation
of the Dutch police. The press release of the Minister of Security and Justice show
the impact of these decisions.
“The current 26 police forces will disappear and there will be one national police
force under the responsibility of the Minister of Security and Justice. National
organisation of the police will lead to less bureaucracy, increased unity, more
professionalism, better and swifter cooperation between the various units of the
police and more police officers involved in executive police duties. The objective is
a safe living environment and more effective investigation. This is written today by
Minister of Security and Justice Opstelten in a letter to the Lower House in which
the main lines of the legislative proposal to introduce a national police force are set
out. Upon recommendation of Minister Opstelten, the council of ministers has
agreed to submit the legislative proposal for consultation. Minister Opstelten:
10 See also Hoogenboom 2008.
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‘Safety and police expertise are of primary importance to me. The Netherlands has
to become safer for citizens.’ The Minister wants, inter alia, to have increased
police presence in communities. Community police officers now spend 65 percent
of their time in their community; the Minister wants to increase that percentage
to 80 percent. The number of investigation hours will be extended as well,
the reporting process will be simplified and the capacity for catching offenders
in the act will be increased. Bureaucracy and overhead will both be reduced by
25 percent. (…)
The national police has its basis close to citizens, therefore in the community
and the municipality. Jurisdiction of the police will therefore remain at the local
level. The mayor will continue to manage the police in the enforcement of public
order and provision of assistance in his municipality. The Public Prosecutor will
continue to manage the police during investigations. Minister Opstelten intends
the legislative proposal to strengthen the role of the municipal council when
determining the objectives for the police and the democratic management of the
police at the national and local level.
There will be one national police force, under the responsibility of the Minister of
Security and Justice. The existing regional police forces, the National Police
Services Agency, the Dutch Police Collaboration Facility and all other supra-
regional facilities will be incorporated in this single police force, which will consist
of ten regional units and one or more national operational units such as the
current National Investigation Service. The ten regional units will be responsible
for performance of the executive police duties in their area. They do so as part of
the national police force. The boundaries of the regional units are similar to the
proposed boundaries of the court districts (revised judicial map). This will
simplify cooperation in the judicial chain.
Police management will come under the direct responsibility of one minister, the
Minister of Security and Justice. This contributes to police unity in management
and to social functioning, which allows the police to deal more flexibly and
decisively with continuously changing safety problems. The supporting operation
duties IT, accommodations, purchasing, personnel and organisation and financial
management will concentrated in a single unit, where this results in efficiency
gains. The efficiency gains will benefit the work on the street.
The Chief Constable will be charged with the management of the national police
force, and is therefore also the figurehead of the national police. The Chief
Constable will be in charge of the regional and national units of the police force.
The Minister of Security and Justice will be in charge of the national Chief
Constable and set the framework within the Chief Constable performs his duties.
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A new official within the police system is the regional mayor. The regional mayor
is the mayor of the municipality with the largest number of inhabitants in one of
the ten regional units. The regional mayor has a special role in the determination
of the regional policy plan. If persons of authority (the mayors and chief public
prosecutor) from the area of a regional unit cannot reach agreement concerning
the above, the regional mayor will determine the policy plan.”11 The planning is
that the new national police organization will be operational in 2012.
The management aspects of the Dutch police are with these proposals effectively
nationalized. The development is clearly towards a national police organization.
Authority and management are formally separated in the Dutch police system.
But of course they have everything to do with each other. Now finances, personnel,
housing, organization, information etc will be organized and decided at national
level, the scope for national substantive control of the tasks and priorities of the
police increases. The minister has formally no direct authority over the police, they
actually get it through the management decisions. Managerially the Dutch
national police becomes reality if these proposals are agreed upon.12
This description makes clear how complex the Dutch police organization is. The
Dutch police system is also always in transition. The relationships between all
organizations involved are complex. History, structure and culture largely deter-
mine how the police organization in the Netherlands operates. The exact structure
of the police system is still under discussion. It will change substantial in the
coming years. Some find it too centralized, others too decentralized. Some find it
effective, others not. Some believe that the mayors have too much power, others
have the opinion that the role of the Public Prosecution Service it too important.
Some believe that national priorities should have priority, others believe that the
emphasis should be on the local community. Some believe that the national
government should have much more to say about the police, others believe that
the police should primarily remain a local matter. Some believe that the police
should be monitored by a directly elected parliament, others defend the indirect
accountability that now exists. These questions will remain. They are all concerned
with the power and authority over the police.
Privatization
In the Netherlands, the private security market has expanded in recent years,
although not as sharply as in other countries. There are about 30,000 private
security officers in the Netherlands (at a total of over 50,000 police officers). In total
there are approximately between 250 and 400 operational security companies in
11 Press Release Ministry of Security and Justice, 14-12-2010.
12 Vlek and Muller 2004; Muller 2009.
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the Netherlands, which have a yearly turnover of 1.16 billion in 2005.13 Despite the
importance of the private security industry there is still hardly any scientific
attention devoted to this theme. With the exception of Hoogenboom and recently
Van Steden the number of data and analysis are limited.14 In comparison with other
European countries the Netherlands has only limited privatization.15
Table 1 Size, order and ranking of private security industry in the EU
Country Population Police Security Security/police ratio
Hungary 10,000,000 40,000 80,000 2.00
Poland 38,600,000 103,309 200,000 1.94
Ireland 3,900,000 12,000 20,000 1.67
Luxembourg 462,000 1,573 2,200 1.40
Estonia 1,400,000 3,600 4,900 1.36
United Kingdom 60,270,000 141,398 150,000 1.06
Slovakia 5,400,000 21,500 20,839 0.97
France 60,400,000 145,000 117,000 0.81
Finland 5,200,000 7,500 6,000 0.80
Germany 82,500,000 250,000 170,000 0.6S
Netherlands 16,300,000 49,000 30,000 0.61
Portugal 10,500,000 46,000 28,000 0.61
Slovenia 2,000,000 7,500 4,500 0.60
Czech Republic 10,200,000 47,400 28,101 0.59
Sweden 9,000,000 18,000 10,000 0.56
Greece 10,700,000 49,900 25,000 0.50
Cyprus 776,000 3,000 1,500 0.50
Lithuania 3,600,000 20,000 10,000 0.50
Latvia 2,300,000 10,600 5,000 0.47
Belgium 10,300,000 39,000 18,321 0.47
Spain 40,280,000 193,450 89,449 0.46
Malta 397,000 1,800 700 0.39
Denmark 5,400,000 14,000 5,250 0.38
Italy 58,100,000 240,114 55,000 0.23
Austria 8,200,000 30,000 6,790 0.23
European Union 456,185,000 1,495,644 1,088,550 0.73
Sources: CoESS/UNI-Europa (2004) and Benyon et al. (1994).
Van Steden indicates that the growth of the private security industry in the
Netherlands is mainly caused by the government policy toward private sector
participation and economic rationalities. Causes such as the increase in crime, the
growth of mass private property and an overburdened police force would be less
applicable in the Netherlands. The professionalization of the private security has
made a contribution to this growth. His expectation is that this growth will occur.16
In addition, the Netherlands has a long tradition of intensive public-private
partnerships in the field of security. This public-private cooperation, both on very
specific situations such as the security of shopping centers or business terrains but
13 Van Steden 2007, p. 76.
14 Hoogenboom 1994; Hoogenboom 1999.
15 Button 2007
16 Van Steden, chapter 11 en 12. See also Van Steden and Huberts 2006.
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also on joint projects to prevent crime. In regional and rural bodies intensive
cooperation between government and industry in the area of security is organized.17
3.2 Police and Dutch society
Together with education and health care, the police are considered to be one of the
institutions that have a central role in present day Dutch society. The days in
which these institutions were taken for granted, are long gone. In 1993 the police
was restructured in a new Police Act. Although the basic tasks of the police
remained the same compared to the previous Police Act of 1957 – maintaining
order, giving aid to those who require it and solving crime – opinions in society as
to how the police should perform these tasks had changed dramatically. From the
outside, the Netherlands are often considered a rather permissive society, but
within that broader framework, there are all kinds of nuances. In short, develop-
ments during the last decades can be sketched as follows. In the fifties: this is
allowed and that isn’t; in the sixties: it should be allowed; in the seventies:
everything goes; in the eighties: should everything go?; in the nineties: it can’t go
on like that!; in the new era: we are going to do something about it.
The latter called for action by the police against violations of norms that were
tolerated in previous decades. That also has put the police in the spotlight of
public, political or media attention. At the same time, the solutions that are
required from the police are less straightforward than they were in the first half of
the twentieth century. A simple wrong-is-wrong approach is not accepted any
more. Instead, Dutch citizens expect the police to adjust their work to individual
needs of citizens and to deliver tailor-made solutions to problems. In short: the
police are expected to deliver more than just repression.
To describe the relation between the Dutch police and society I emphasis two
crucial reports on policing in the Netherlands. These two reports give an overview
of ideas on policing in the Netherlands. Both reports were written by leading
policemen. In the last subparagraph I will describe the main developments in the
relationship between police and Dutch society.18
3.2.1 POLICE IN CHANGE 1977
The development of the police was partly steered by developments in society, but
also by the police themselves. Until the report Politie in Verandering (Police in
change) by the Projectgroep Organisatiestructuren (Taskforce Organisation Struc-
tures 1977) the Dutch police force was a technocratic organisation strongly
17 Hoogenboom and Muller 2002.
18 Compare with Jones 1995 who gives an analysis of the organization of the Dutch police in the eighties
and nineties.
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directed to perform a government task. This report caused, at least within the
police, a fundamental change in the traditional manner of thinking about police
work and tasks. This report has been very important to present day functioning of
the police. Therefore, we will discuss it in more detail.
In the first decades after the Second World War the Dutch police could stick to
their classical manner of behaviour: dutiful enforcement of law conformity. But
the rapid successions of social changes during and after the sixties necessitated
organisational and structural changes in the police. In the report Politie in
Verandering a new view of police work was developed in terms of what functions
the police should have and in what manner these functions should be performed.
The report started from a historical analysis, both from the period before 1966 –
the traditional approach – and the period after 1966 – the so-called technocratic
approach.
In the traditional police approach not their role in society, but their function for
the government was central. The exercise of authority was justified by legal rules,
that in turn were seen as the highest norms supporting government behaviour
and thus also police behaviour. The formal goals of police activities were
maintaining the law and, related to that, maintaining public order. More socially
oriented assistance was of lesser importance than maintaining law and order. The
dominant police attitudes were detached and reactive. Preventive work by the
police was limited to mere public presence.
The absolute and oversimplified application of legal norms before 1966 left
little room for social developments. Police behaviour showed a painful lack of
flexibility and thus was seen as serving to maintain the social status quo. The same
lack of flexibility caused a very bureaucratic police organisation. The police
organisation was very centralised and hierarchical structured and left little room
for discretion for individual police officers. Decisions were made at the top, but
were also often based on incomplete information and an erroneous representation
of reality.
This type of organization of the police really had to change when rapid changes
in society took place in the middle of the sixties. For the government in general the
society went from a stable, well divided society into an instable and heterogeneous
one that showed uncertainty in many respects. As many parts of Dutch govern-
ment, the police had not anticipated these changes. Instead, the police reacted
with an abundance of sanctions and an even stricter application of law and order.
Soon, however, it was realized that all this large scale force only demonstrated that
the police force was defeated and was not up to present day society any more. The
course was changed; first only by introducing better technical means and
methods. In Politie in Verandering this was called the “means emancipation”:
the means became the target. This technocratic approach prevented a funda-
mental discussion of the functions of the police.
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The police concentrated themselves on the tasks where the frictions between
police and society were the most evident: maintaining the public order. Still, as
during the age of the traditional approach, the main task was keeping law and
order, but a shift took place to maintaining order, and maintaining law was more
and more seen as a means to maintain order.
At the same time, the police started to anticipate on social events to maintain
safety, order and social peace. Social problems started to receive attention, but still
were mainly assesses from the point of view of public order. Police assistance
became a task to further welfare, and maintaining law and order were the means.
But, assistance took place in a detached and impersonal fashion, based on a technical
instrumental concept of police work. Because social elements of police work were
missing in this manner, special police squads were created for social police tasks.
In the meantime, the organisation of the police was still based on the old
bureaucratic structure. The tasks were differentiated more and more, causing a
growth in hierarchical levels in the police organisation. The police followed
democratization in other parts of society, so police employees started to participate
in committees and work council type of organs, but all decisions were still made at
the top of the centralized organisation. And the top was quite far away from every
day practise. The wealth of information that was available at the bottom of the
organisation just did not reach higher levels. The growing social isolation of
the police thus was felt much more by common police officers than by the top of
the organisation.
In Politie in Verandering it was tried to change this sorry state of affairs drastically.
The report argued that the police should give a contribution to society in the form
of social control, not just to protect, but also to create conditions for social
developments, aimed at realizing essential values in the Dutch democracy. This
marked the change from classic police behaviour to an initiating role in social
development and renewal. The taskforce thus followed the social developments in
the years prior to 1977. Dutch citizens became more critical towards the police and
towards government in general. The gap between the police and the citizenry
needed to be closed. Under the motto: know and be known, authority needed to be
based less on the law and more on personal relations. The police needed to be
integrated in society, but not to an extend that it would prevent intervention when
called for.
Optimal integration would also mean that the police could have more social
information than in the past and would be able to act based on interests, needs and
opinions in society. Social control would then be more than just repression, but
also be aware and prevent problems and conflicts. Policing would then be not just
fighting symptoms, but taking away causes also.
This new form of policing required the police to decentralize to small districts.
In these districts the police would take up all necessary police tasks. Police officers
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were going to work in teams with strong internal coherence. Responsibility was to
be also decentralized to each team. The number of hierarchical levels needed to be
brought down and all police officers were going to participate in development
of policy.
The report Politie in Verandering has brought about major changes in the Dutch
police. Most of the proposals have been realized and have proved useful in
practice. Even the reorganization of the police in 1993 has not changed much to
this model. This reorganization brought about larger police forces, organized by
region, for purposes of costs and efficiency, but the organisation in small districts
is upheld everywhere.
3.2.2 THE POLICE IN EVOLUTION 2005
Headed by the police chief of Amsterdam a group of police chiefs wrote in 2005 a
new report which they named Police in Evolution. Their purpose was to develop a
new perspective on the police and policing in the Netherlands for the coming
years. This perspective is now agreed upon within the Dutch police to be a major
guideline for policy and organization in the coming years.
At this time this report plays an important role in the discussion about the
future course of the police and policing in the Netherlands. It is too early to say if
this report will have the same influence as the report I described before. But
because of a massive attempt by the police to implement these ideas it could be
happening. Therefore it is important to sketch the main points of this report
which they have summarized in ten points.
“1. The Dutch police want to contribute to safety In order to contribute to public
safety, the Dutch police service must take up a clear position in the
administrative, societal and even the operational fields of influence. The
police protect the agreements and institutions that bind the members of
society and link them together. The police make the greatest possible
contribution to the safety of citizens given their responsibilities, powers
and capacity. At the same time, the police represent the rule of law. This
means that the Dutch police embrace a twin set of responsibilities.
2. Reporting and giving advice is an explicit task of the Dutch police The task of
reporting and giving advice results from the three tasks stipulated in the 1993
Police Act, namely law enforcement, criminal investigation and emergency
assistance. Reporting and giving advice means that the police indicate the
areas where they feel that administrators, the Public Prosecution Service and
partners could and should contribute to the improvement of safety.
3. Police Tasks Subordination WITH authority determines the direction of the Dutch
police The Dutch police want to be a professional organisation with their own
area of responsibility. They perform their profession in an expert way
and with a level of independence that befits their professionalism. This
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professional space is filled with due observance of the responsibilities of the
authorities. The situation can be characterized as: freedom in restraint. Based
on their professionalism, the Dutch police strive for an authoritative position
in relation to their environment.
4. The community focus will remain a guiding principle for the Dutch police
The Dutch police choose to continue to work in close proximity to citizens
and to provide basic safety on behalf of the authorities in that way.
5. A nodal orientation is a necessary supplement to the local orientation in the
community focus Traditionally, the Dutch police mostly focuse on locations
(areas, territories). Social processes, however, are more and more defined by
flows of people, goods, money and especially information. The same applies to
crime and terrorism, for example. (…) The police will intervene at points
where the flows using the infrastructure come together, i.e. at the infra-
structure network’s nodes. At these nodes the police can carry out checks on
people, goods, money and information that are aimed at identifying potential
and current threats to public safety.
6. The Dutch police are focused on policing of communities The Dutch police want
their work to be integrated in society. The work not only concerns the
enforcement of rules (task-oriented), but also the provision of assistance
(demand-oriented, problem-oriented). In this respect nothing has changed
relative to the philosophy presented in The Changing Police. What is crucial,
though, is the recognition that contributing to safety is not just the respon-
sibility of the police, but of society as a whole.
7. The Dutch police want to work in an information-driven manner
Police work is to a large extent knowledge-driven. Knowledge about people,
situations, standards and processes determines what needs to be done. The
police aim to have information and knowledge play a more central role.
8. The Dutch police consider programme management as an adequate means of
collaboration Within the general safety policy, the police service is a crucial
link because of its added value in terms of improving safety. Other parties,
however, share in these responsibilities as well. There is a need to clearly
define responsibilities and the connections with these other parties in order
to avoid any overlap of working areas.
9. The Dutch police form an organisational entity
Over the past few years the police have shown that collaboration between the
different services is increasing. The police services together have started work
on a Netherlands Police Organisational Entity.
10. The Dutch police consider close collaboration between European police services as a
self-evident element of joint EU safety policy The Dutch police accept shared
responsibility for safety within the European territory based on the realisation
that the police need to make a fundamental contribution to matters of
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Community importance with a view to achieving the objectives of the
European Union.”19
3.2.3 DEVELOPMENTS RELATION POLICE AND SOCIETY
The relationship between the Dutch police and the society has changed in the
period between the two reports. This is not surprising since both society and the
police have undergone significant changes. Driven by both domestic and foreign
developments, the relationship between police and society is characterized by a
number of changes. In this paragraph I try to sketch the current relationship
between police and society.20
The mutual dependency between the police and society has intensified in the
Netherlands. The police needs society and its citizens for the necessary informa-
tion to do their work. A sufficient degree of legitimacy of the actions of the police
in society is also necessary for the police. Security has become increasingly
important within the Dutch society. The police are one of the major organizations
within the Dutch society which should realize this security. The police received
from society extra powers and extra resources to achieve these security goals. The
attention to and criticism of the police has in recent years increased substantially.
The relationship is becoming closer and is becoming more direct.
To accommodate this more intense relationship between society and police
specific organizational concepts were subsequently designed. Community poli-
cing has traditionally been a major concept in the Dutch police. Community
officers try to create an intensive network of contacts in the society. Community
officers should also be directly available and contactable for citizens. They are the
frontline of the police in society. Every police force in the Netherlands has
introduced some form of community policing although in each corps it is given
a specific name.
At the same time, in recent years the preventive element safety and security
policy in the Netherlands increased. Stopping, prevent, prevention have been
important concepts in Dutch security policy. In order to achieve effective preven-
tion a close relationship with society and its organizations is necessary. The police
participate therefore intensively in various partnerships.
On the other hand, there is a certain distance between police and society in the
Netherlands. The police are aware that a close and friendly relationship between
police and society is not always workable. In the eighties the Dutch police imaged
themselves as the best friend of the people. This worked unsatisfactorily because
19 Police in evolution, 2005, p. 10 and further.
20 See also Punch, Hoogenboom and Williamsom 2005; Cachet and Versteegh 2007.
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the police have also an enforcing and punitive role in relation to the population.
At regular times, it is also necessary that the police can use its assigned repressive
instruments. That does relate well with a too close and friendly relationship
between police and society. A degree of tension and distance is needed even in the
Netherlands.
This was promoted by the more business like work by the police. There are –
similar to New York experiences – targets and performance indicators. In these
arrangements explicit production number on suspects and fines are important
exponents. Such an approach does agree well with a very intense relationship with
society. The organization and management of the Dutch police is becoming more
national. Local and regional embedding plays a less explicit role and the relation-
ship between police and society becomes more distant.
The relationship between the police and society in the Netherlands may actually be
best described as a kind of LAT relationship: living-apart-together. There is an
intense mutual dependency and there are all kinds of intensive relations between
police and society. But there is also a kind of necessary distance to achieve
a workable and effective relationship in the longer term.
3.3 Police work and accountability in the Netherlands21
Accountability for police actions is a heavily debated subject in the Netherlands
and it is a problem that figures prominently among Dutch police scientists. In
everyday Dutch police practice, however, the subject receives much less attention.
How the police account for their actions is apparently considered to be of little
consequence for the police force’s daily performance. It would seem that this
subject is merely something that police scientists and the odd management cop
worry about.
Here we concentrate on the relationship between policeactions in practice and
the accountability for those actions. With many others we share the principle that
the justification of police work is essential in a democratic constitutional state. A
properly controlled police force is a prerequisite in a constitutional state.
The relations between the police, the government, the law and parliament
constitute the police force’s weakest point. Without good relations between these
different parties, a police force cannot be efficiently managed and controlled. In
the past, poor communication between the police, the government and the law has
led to serious problems in the police’s performance in the streets. There is a
relationship – be it a rather distant one – between the managerial and control
21 Based on and cited from Muller 2002.
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activities of the highest police officers, the mayors and the public prosecutors and
the police’s actual work in the streets.
3.3.1 POLICE CARE IN THE NETHERLANDS
Police care in the Netherlands is under a lot of pressure, since the organisation
and performance of the police, the government and the law are under constant
debate. In the recent past, various major incidents gave rise to national discus-
sions on the police. These discussions sometimes put down the police as part of a
crisis in our constitutional state. There have been two parliamentary inquiry
committees on policing methods, while these kinds of committees are rare in the
Dutch parliamentary tradition. Heated debates in our parliament and town
councils have led to sweeping statements on the police. Magistrates and political
and other authorities are suffering the consequences of the constant flow of
incidents concerning police care in the Netherlands.
We are faced with the problem of “structural incidentalism” – a constant pattern
of incidents that has major consequences for the organisation and performance of
the police, the law and the government, whose legitimacy is now at stake. This
structural incidentalism can be followed back to fundamental questions concerning
the performance of our democratic constitutional state and concerning the violation
of civilians’ basic rights, one of which is the right to safety.
Fighting crime and safety ranks highest, and has been raking highest, on the
public’s list of priorities. The debate on this issue, however, tends to focus too
much on the organisation of security care and too little on what that security care
should entail. This leads to a gap between the public’s security requirements and
the limited organisational conditions under which the police, the government and
the law have to function. Although the level of crime has been stable for the last
ten to fifteen years, new large-scale public order problems around football fields,
in entertainment centres and particular town districts are intensifying the public’s
feelings of dissatisfaction concerning lack of safety and security and the govern-
ment’s failure to take effective measures against it.
The authority of the police and the government in general has suffered the
consequences of the constant problems in security care and the long series of
incidents. The legitimacy of the actions of the police and the government, but also
those of ministers, is no longer a matter of course. All those parties have lost a lot
of their credibility. The public is aware of a discrepancy between political bombast
and the actual actions taken. There seems to be no end to the series of incidents
involving clashes between personal interests and public morals. The police and
the government will have to make efforts to re-convince the public of the
legitimacy of their actions.
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The organisation of the current police force is highly complex and is flawed in
several respects. There is insufficient dualism of authority and management. The
managerial dualism is unclear. The relations between central and local manage-
ment and control are unclear. The democratic justification system is inadequate.
The various parties operating within this faulty organisation go to a lot of effort to
arrive at consensus with respect to managerial issues, but the organisation as a
whole is characterised by substantial managerial chaos. The process of arriving at
managerial decisions involves a lot of personnel, and for many of those involved
the amount of time that has to be spent on consultations and planning is just too
great. History will show that the present police organisation is a transitional one.
Democratic accountability of regional police care is still highly limited. The
adjustments that have been and are being made in the administrative structure
and organisation of police care in several regions have done nothing to change this
situation. Town councils have no actual influence on the management and control
of the police. The competent authorities have sufficient formal possibilities of
management and control, but they do not use these possibilities. They make too
little effort to manage policeactions and exercise no actual control over the police
whatsoever. But is must be said: the police handle the latitude they are offered in a
responsible way and do not attempt to operate independently.
Different mayors in the police regions have different powers. The police force
manager – themayor of the largest town – is in every respectmore powerful over the
police than the mayors of small towns. These actual differences in administrative
powers are at conflict with the formal equality of the individual mayors in a regional
council and are leading to discrepancies in the exercise of authority.
In some way related to that, is that police care in the Netherlands is too
dependent on informal, personal relations. Only too often policeperformance is
determined by chance chemistry between the various parties directly involved in
the police’s management. There are insufficient corrective mechanisms. Key
individuals often prove to be more important than key functions. And at times all
this may work out well, but in some cases it leads to serious problems. A personal
conflict between a force administrator (mayor), a field officer and a force chief may
lead to a complete standstill in the police’s operation. The police organisation is
strongly founded on the premise that a compromise will always be found and on a
striving for consensus.
3.3.2 NORMATIVE PRINCIPLES
The need for democratically sound, effective and efficient police care is now
greater than ever. Such can be laid down in seven normative principles related
primarily to the organisation of police care, which is in turn directly related to the
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content of police care. Optimally organised police care is of great importance for
both objective and subjective safety and security.
1. Law and practice. A first important improvement from which police care
would greatly benefit would be to narrow the gap between law and practice.
A wide gap between the two implies a waste of administrative and organisa-
tional energy. In a living constitutional state it is quite alright to have tension
between the law and the practice of law. But a prerequisite for constitutional
police care is that the laws and the regulations based on them are not too far
removed from administrative practice.
2. Disclosure. Also important for good police care is that administrative decisions
are disclosed to the public, even if that may sometimes involve difficulties.
Disclosing administrative decisions is the best way of ensuring broad
involvement in administrative decision making and is in the interest of
democratic justification.
3. Transparency. Another important factor in good police care is transparency of
complex structures and processes. The police force functions in a context in
which consensus, consultation and compromising are highly valued. Of great
importance for ensuring transparency is an unambiguous distribution of
powers and responsibilities.
4. Prevention of concentrations of power. Police care will benefit greatly from
efforts to prevent concentrations of power, dual positions and personal
unions. Checks and balances, including dualism of authority and balance
of interests, are key issues in the Dutch constitutional state, and hence also of
great importance for sound police operation.
5. No authority without responsibility, no responsibility without justification. Because
of their appointed powers and the means at their disposal – including the
possibility of using violence – the police occupy a special place in society.
A strict rule holding for all conditions, relations and forms of consultation
within the police organisation is that all powers must be coupled to
responsibilities, and responsibility means that all actions must be justified.
6. Integral democratic justification. Something else from which police care would
greatly benefit is integral justification to a democratically chosen body. Such
integral democratic justification would enhance the legitimacy of the actions
of the police, the government and the law. At present, there is no form of
democratic justification of the police.
7. Primacy government. Irrespective of the great importance of safety and police
care, the police force must conform to the government’s basic characteristics
and not vice versa.
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3.3.3 ISSUES RELATING TO ACCOUNTABILITY OF THE POLICE
Based on an evaluation of the Police Act 1993 some major issues relating to
accountability of the Dutch police arose which are still relevant today.22
Formal and informal
Informal, personal relations between the parties involved in the police are crucial.
The need for good personal relations, especially between the members of the
regional triangle, is widely acknowledged. It is virtually impossible to enforce
the provisions of the Police Act if there are problems in the personal relations. The
Police Act is entirely in line with the Dutch political-administrative culture of
consultation, compromising and conflict avoidance. Many decisions relating to
the management and control of the police are taken in an informal manner. Only
rarely are the formal procedures followed. The advantages of informal decision
making are that decisions can be quickly made and that they are usually widely
supported. Disadvantages are the difficulty of controlling such decisions and their
susceptibility to change. Of importance in this respect is the existing management
culture in a particular region.
Consultation and decision making
The management and control of the police are topics of discussion in many
different contexts, such as the executive committee, regional triangle, bilateral
consultations, staff meetings, district consultations and local consultations.
Because these forms of consultation are so complex, it often happens that the
same subject is discussed in meetings in different places. Efforts are made to
coordinate expectations and wishes in all the different circuits, to avoid the risk of
actual decisions being taken by a formal committee, such as the regional council.
Police force managers realise that giving all the parties involved ample scope for
consultation is the best way of arriving at a successful police policy.
The many forms of consultation make decision making a diffuse process. It is
virtually impossible to reconstruct when and by whom a particular decision was
taken. The “formal” decision making procedures may have been followed, but the
background and reasons for the decisions often remain unclear. The main aims of
the many consultations actually prove to be coordination and implicit decision
making. And the main purpose of the formal institutes, such as the regional
council, is then to ratify the decisions. But as all the different parties have had the
opportunity to express their wishes in the extensive consultations, the great
majority of the members of the regional council support this development. And
in this way the regional council’s decisions end up being widely supported. This
22 Rosenthal, Bruinsma, Muller et al, 1998.
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form of decision making also means that the mayors in the regional council have
virtually no opportunity to influence decisions.
Information to town councils
The provision of information to the town councils is a case apart within the wider
context of information and communication. Under the terms of the Police Act, the
police force managers and the mayors are obliged to pass all relevant information
on to the councils without delay. In practice, however, this is not always done. The
police force managers almost always immediately forward the regional councils’
reports to the town councils, but the other mayors are usually more selective in
providing information to the town councils. This depends on the mayor’s style of
management and his or her relationship with the town council.
All this does not alter the fact that the town councils are presented primarily
with the results of formal communication patterns within their regions, optionally
supplemented with an explanation from the mayor. They get to hear virtually
nothing about the reasons for and backgrounds of the decisions. And they are
therefore never fully informed about the management and control processes in
their regions. Town council members of non-central towns rarely ask for further
information on general aspects of the regional police. They are interested in
detailed information on local safety. Town council members of central towns tend
to have more interest in information on the regional force. But it is often difficult
to draw a line between information relating to the mayor’s authoritative role and
that relating to the force manager’s managerial role. In actual fact the councils of
central towns quite regularly, both formally and actually, make statements about
managerial issues concerning the regional force or ask the force manager to
justify police actions. This is the great disadvantage of the dual role of the force
administrator/mayor of a central town.
Democratic accountability
Although the way the police forces account for their actions to the town council
meets the formal statutory requirements, they only account for the broad outlines
of their policies. The police forces seldom give a detailed account (through the
mayor) of the way they conduct their policies. Town councils generally approve the
reports by the police forces without much discussion. In-depth discussions about
the measures taken and the choices made are rare.
When it comes to the management of the police forces, democratic account-
ability is essentially non-existent. Mayors are seldom called to account by their
town councils for their role in the regional council. Town councils only discuss the
way the mayor exercises his or her authority in maintaining public order within
the municipality. The fact that in a few cases “authority” is confused with
“management” is taken for granted by both the mayor and the council. But if
democratic accountability for the management of the police forces is virtually non-
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existent, the situation with regard to democratic accountability for the mayor’s
authority in preserving public order is not much better. The town councils
primarily focus on their role in influencing the development of local and regional
plans.
Power and authority
Huberts et al conducted an empirical research on power and influence of different
organizations and officials on policy, management and authority of the Dutch
police.23 In two tables the outcome of this research are shown. The police force
manager, the chief public prosecutor and the chief constable are the main officials
who have a large influence and power on policy, management and authority of the
police. The chief constable and other police chiefs are supposed to have the most
power and influence on the policy, management and authority of the police. The
police control themselves for the most part.
The regional council has some influence and power, although they are formally
the council where the main decisions on management should be made. The
influence of the mayor and the prosecutor is less although they formally have
authority over the police. Ministers have an increasing influence and power over
policy and management of the Dutch police. Members of town councils do not
have any influence and power at all and members of the Lower House of
Parliament have very little influence.
Huberts et al come to the following conclusion. “All in all, it is clear that the
security system operates differently than the law requires. These differences
between law and reality are fairly stable. The (management) triangle is the central
actor, the chief constable plays one of the main roles. That does not lead to great
dissatisfaction. Satisfaction dominates, with one exception. The position of the
police force manager is seen as problematic. This officer has not managed to
develop into a public administrator of and for the whole police region.”24
Overview
Police practice and accountability do not relate very well. In the Netherlands, in
spite of well-meant rhetoric and principles endorsed by all, accountability has led
to a situation where the police are controlled only to a limited extent. In the
Netherlands, as well as in other countries, alternative forms of control are applied,
such as complaints handling schemes, planning cycles and self-evaluation. In
these forms of control, the controller is mainly the police force itself. There is too
little objective control from outside the police. Neither the police nor civilians
seem to make an issue of accountability. Especially in the Netherlands, the police
23 Huberts 2004.
24 Huberts 2007, p. 158.
cha p t e r 3
84
are assumed to operate within the confines of the law. There is no wish for further
accountability and disclosure.
3.4 Principles of proper policing25
Dubelaar, Muller and Cleiren conducted an intensive empirical research on the
judgements of the National Ombudsman and the Complaints Committee of the
Amsterdam police to see if there were principles of proper policing.26 The Dutch
Police Act and the Criminal Code are organizational and power acts. They hardly
give police guidelines on how to handle in specific situations. Dubelaar, Muller
and Cleiren described and analyzed thousands of judgements and came up with
the following principles of proper policing. These principles are important in
policing in the Netherlands because an individual police officer has a large
discretionary power. Within this discretionary power there are fifteen principles
of proper policing in the Netherlands which I describe below with some examples
of actual situations.
1. Necessity. The actions of the police in a particular case must be necessary to
solve the problem. There must be an acute or urgent reason to act or in some
cases not to act. If it is possible the citizens are to resolve their problems
themselves.
A recently divorced woman wants to collect some stuff from the former matrimo-
nial home. She asked the police to be present in connection with a possible
escalation. The police meet this request and together with the woman they enter
the house without the consent of the occupant, the ex-husband of the woman. The
question in the proceedings before the National Ombudsman is if the entry of the
home was necessary to avert an imminent danger. As the woman was not in the
house at the time of request, the National Ombudsman considers that entering
without the consent of the occupier was not necessary, since there is no identifiable
acute danger to the safety of persons or cargo. The entry was not appropriate.27
2. Proportionality. The actions of the police should be proportionate to the
problem. The performance of the police should be proportionate to the size
or intensity of the problem. A small problem should be handled with limited
resources and powers.
3. Subsidiarity. The police should always use the means that infringe the least on
the rights of citizens or existing powers. The police always have to consider
25 Based on and cited from Dubelaar, Muller and Cleiren 2006.
26 Dubelaar, Muller and Cleiren 2006.
27 National Ombudsman, 12 October 2001, report 2001/230.
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whether a lighter power can be used. Only if that is not workable and effective,
there could be more astringent methods used.
Mr. G., in possession of a transport ticket, is taken from the subway on September 5th
at about 00.15 hours by the police, because he has refused to retrieve his feet from
the bank. The Police Complaints Commission Amsterdam-Amstelland states that
“the police has the power to act against undue behavior in metro stations or
underground trains and it finds that the police could confront the complainants
reasonably because of his behaviour. When the complainant continued to refuse to
take his feet from the bank and did not react on the demand of the police to leave the
train, the police could reasonably decide to take him off the train.”28
4. Care. The police have a duty of care for persons and goods with which they are
faced. The police must ensure suspects, detainees and seized goods. In
carrying out the acts of the police they should take care of the property of
others.
5. Reasonable and equitable interests assessment. The police must act within a
reasonable balance of interests. This means balancing between the risk that a
person or situation entails for others and the intensity with which powers
should used on the individuals that mitigate this risky situation. The reason-
ableness of an informed outsider would represent the evaluation criterion.
6. Diligence / timeliness. The police should act vigorously and in time. If the
police decide to act, then it is expected that this will be done immediately.
How fast immediately is strongly depends on the specific situation.
7. Active and adequate information. The police should give adequate information
to stakeholders on that they are doing. Whether suspects, family, bystanders
in a conflict or other stakeholders, the police have a duty to provide sufficient
information. The police should have a proactive attitude towards providing
information.
8. Legality / correct legal basis. The police must act lawfully and on basis of the
appropriate legal terms. This principle is the heart of policing. The legality of
the actions of the police is essential for the democratic state. This legal
principle is crucial for policing in the Netherlands.
On December 17, 1997 Mr G. drives through a red traffic light. He is stopped by the
police and given a fine. One of the policemen notes that the car comes from a
company that has admitted selling stolen cars. He wants to check the chassis
number, and therefore he has to look at the inside of the right door of the car.
During this check, he sees a plastic bag in front of the chair. He has the impression
that there are bottles or something like that in the bag. He asked Mr. G. if he may
look in the bag. G. asks why, but gets no answer. Without G’s. authorization (but G
28 Compliant Committee Amsterdam Police, 8 July 1998, 3274.
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does not show disapproval), the policeman looks in the bag. There appears to be
nothing special. Mr. G. finds it unfair that the agent has looked in his bag. Since
there was no explicit consent given, no security reasons available and the police had
not otherwise any jurisdiction, the National Ombudsman considered it incorrect
that the police looked in the bag.29
9. Impartiality. The police should do its work in impartiality. The police should
not take sides for one of the actors in a conflict, especially as the interference
of the police is an initial act to a criminal investigation. The police cannot
show preference or bias. The presumption of innocence is of crucial
importance to the police.
On June 8, 1999, Mr X. has a dispute with the employees of a gas station about a
settlement, because X. believes that had to pay twice for the same fuel. Police
officials E. and M. come to the gas station following the notification of the
employees of the service station on the conflict. They first want to speak with
the employees to hear what the problem is. X. would like the first word, but
the police officials would not listen to him because they first want to speak to the
employees of the gas station. The situation gets out of hand. According to the
National Ombudsman it is not incorrect “that the officials concerned first wanted to
speak with the employees to find out what is causing the conflict, and then wanted
to speak with the applicants. They noted, however, that the applicant very much
wanted to tell his story and that he exhibited excited behavior. Therefore, they
should have decided because of mediating action and avoiding the appearance of
partiality to agree that one of them would speak with the employees and the other
with the applicant, for him to try to calm down.”30
10. Good and further research. The police should do good and further research if
the situation is not completely clear. The police may not rely on assumed facts
and have to take different perspectives of a specific situation in mind.
11. Careful. The police should act carefully. Carefulness requires precision, but
also ensures that all stakeholders are addressed. It is also necessary that the
police do not make the problem any more complex than it already is.
On July 16, 1999 Mr. B. and M. are playing music in the house of M. The neighbor
of M. experiences this nuisance and warns the police. The police come to the house
and the situation escalates when the cops threatened to give a minute because of
noise. Mr. B. calls one of the agents asshole. The police promptly arrest B for
insulting an official in office and bring him to the police station. The National
Ombudsman concluded, that in the light of the fact that the police in carrying out
an investigation in principle have to choose a process for the accused that is the
29 National Ombudsman 19 October 1999, report 199/45.
30 National Ombudsman 27 March 2001, report 2001/266.
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least burdensome, they had to refrain from arresting. All relevant facts were already
revealed. Also, the identity and address of Mr M. were known.31
12. Equality. The police cannot discriminate in its work and all involved are
entitled to an equivalent treatment. This does not mean that the police cannot
make a founded distinction but it does mean that equality is a crucial aspect in
policing.
13. Visibility and clarity. The police should recognizable. The public should always
know that they are policemen because they are told so or because they can see
clear symbols. In addition, the police should make the public explicitly clear
what the police want of them.
14. Hear both sides. The police should always hear both sides. In this way, a clear
picture of the situation can arise and legitimate desires of stakeholders can be
satisfied.
15. Trust. Citizens need to rely on statements and actions of the police. If the
police promise to act or not to act, the public has to trust the police.
The police must meet many standards. This is necessary because the far-reaching
powers they can exercise. This means that the police should know about these
standards and apply them correctly. In the Netherlands the regional complaint
committees and the National Ombudsman are handling complaints about the way
the police acted. With these principles police as well as complaint committees
have more transparent guidelines.
3.5 Trends in police and policing in the Netherlands
In this last paragraph I give the major trends in police and policing in the
Netherlands.32 These trends are based on and cited from the volume Police and
the research that was done by many authors for that book. When I describe these
trends I will refer to this research.33
3.5.1 POLICE IS INTEGRATED IN SOCIETY
The Dutch police are fully integrated in Dutch society. In the past there was
sometimes a debate on how great the distance between the police and society was.
That is no longer the case. The police have positioned themselves in relation to
citizens in such a way that the satisfaction of citizens about the police is now very
high. The perception of the citizens by the police is no longer customers or best
31 National Ombudsman 19 September 2002, report 2002/83.
32 Based on and cited from Muller 2007.
33 Compare Johnston and Shaering 2003; Joyce 2006.
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friends, but it differs according to the specific task the police have to provide
towards the citizens. It is clear that this perception is quite different when the police
are handling a suspect, or when they are confronted with an old woman who is
robbed. This differentiation makes the functioning of the police more effective.
In the Netherlands the police have decided to combine regional police forces with
local policing. In this way it responds to the wishes of many mayors, municipalities
and citizens to have police service in their own communities. This strengthens the
relationship between the police and the community, although in terms of effective-
ness and efficiency another choice could have been made. The new national police
force will have to deal with these regional and local expectations about the role of the
police.
The confidence of citizens is crucial for the police. Through the media, the
police tried to create a more positive image of the police. That has only been
successful to some extent, partly because the differences between the police and
the Public Prosecution Service, both are mainly concerned with their own image.
Today, the majority of police forces use their own performance as a guide for the
valuation of the public. This means that they are also increasingly try to inform
the citizens directly rather than through the media. In that way they think they are
more capable to influence the confidence of the citizens in the way the police are
organized and functions.
3.5.2 POLICE SYSTEM IN CONSTANT DEBATE AND REFORM
The police system is a troubled property. For many years there has been
discussion about further changes in the police system in the Netherlands.
Meanwhile a new Police Act is submitted that suggests a substantial centralization
of the management of the police towards a national police force. This centraliza-
tion should lead to more effective and efficient policing in the Netherlands. The
discussion on the police system will continue in the coming years. Although most
stakeholders do not want to talk about the structure, in effect, they often do.34
First and foremost it is important for the discussion on the police system to
consider the wider issues around security and safety. Safety and security are now
much more than just fighting crime. Many other forms of safety and security have
taken organizational positions. These other organizations have interests and
desires. In the discussion on the new police system, these other organizations
have to be heard.
But it is obviously important that safety and security issues are considered
more integral. A safety and security problem has not just a police dimension but
has more and other dimensions. The police alone cannot solve insecurity and
34 Compare Savage 2007.
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unsafety. There are others organizations that can and have to contribute. There is a
need for an integrated organizational approach to safety and security problems.
The development of safety regions in the Netherlands could affect the
organization of the police system. In the new established safety regions police,
fire brigades and medical emergency care are organizational integrated to prepare
for and act during crises and disasters. Police, fire brigades and medical
emergency care will be organized more closely together in an administrative,
organizational and operational way. There is already some discussion about an
operational emergency organization where all services are integrated. It will take a
long time before this is realized but it looks as if this is a conceivable perspective.
The organizational integration of the police, fire brigade and the medical
emergency care creates an organization which can be better managed and
controlled. Safety regions in which police, fire brigades and medical emergency
care have become one organization can easier be steered and controlled by the
national government. This could lead to an even more far reaching centralization.
The debate around the safety regions is still heavily focused on crisis manage-
ment. The current proposals are not creating safety regions as well as disaster
regions. Police, fire brigades and medical emergency care are working together to
improve crisis management in the region. But between the lines you can read that
the safety region will not always only be on crisis management but will also handle
broader issues of safety and security.
Democratic control of regional safety system seems to be just as imperfect as
the democratic control on the police system. In some plans there were ideas of a
directly elected security and safety board but this idea has now moved to the
background. The dominant view is that the affiliation will be sought to the existing
political-administrative structure in the Netherlands. This will mean that the
weakness of the democratic control will continue. There is no direct elected
council that can hold the police, fire brigades and medial emergency care
accountable. This has to be done indirectly by the town councils of the mayors.
There are significant resistances to many of these plans and developments.
The organization of the Dutch public administration has been shown to be
steadfast. Institutional interests are high. A comprehensive security and safety
system cannot be introduced at once. These developments will vary in each region
inevitably. In some regions they are already integrated the different organizations,
other regions have just started. In some regions, the police have a role in the
enforcement programme, in others they are only active on the sidelines. Support
for fundamental change is obviously needed.
Will a broader perspective on safety and security help the police? In the longer
term this will be the case, but in the short term, this means much time and
attention has to be paid to organizational reform. In the longer term, it will be
more secure and safe as a fully integrated safety and security organization. But
before this has been achieved in the Netherlands a long time will pass.
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3.5.3 POLICE IS BECOMING A PROFESSIONAL ORGANIZATION
The police became, in recent years, a more professional organization. There is a
functioning quality system. There are performance contracts between police
regions and the ministries on the basis of quantitative and qualitative targets
that actually work. Training for the police has been largely improved and
professionalized. There are more and more specific standards on how police
work should be done. There is increasing attention to the contents of the work.
There is a full complaints and disciplinary structure. There is a procedure for
appointing the top of the Dutch police. Conflicts between mayors and police still
exist, but they are resolved without much media attention. More and more, the
Dutch police functions as one organization.
This development into a professional organization is also reflected by the
police’s own vision of the organization and functioning of the police in the report
Police in Evolution. In this document, the top of the police has, for the first time
since the report Police in Change, written their own vision for the future of the
organization and functioning of the police. It should be noted that the document
within the police, with authorities, departments and science has not yet created
much enthusiasm. The embedding of its own vision in the broader thinking
within the public deserves more attention.
The trend towards further professionalization of the police can only be
welcomed. The police shall work more effectively, efficiently and lawfully. Of
course there are some wishes for the future. For the competent authorities it
means that the knowledge and skills of the police should be valued more. For the
police it means that they should give the competent authorities sufficient
information on the possibilities and limitations of the police. Professionalization
of the police can and must not mean that they will act independently from the
competent authorities. 35
3.5.4 INTENSIVE COOPERATION WITH OTHERS
The police work closely with others: local government, the Public Prosecution
Service, special investigation services, military, fire brigades and others. In recent
years, there have been intensive contacts between all these organizations. This
time the police have learned from the past. Increasingly, the exact duties are
clearly defined in agreements. The police do not perceive themselves as the
leading actor of all issues in the field of security, safety, law enforcement, crime
control, public order and combating nuisance. The police negotiate with other
agencies to agree on who is responsible for which task. The establishment of
35 Compare Sheptycki 1999.
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performance contracts has helped.36 The police were forced to accurate determi-
nate what they could do and what should be done by others.
This attitude of the police force is prudent and necessary. Only in this way can
it actually help to realize safety and security. This means that there will always be a
need for accurate agreements with other partners. The police shall often act as
initiator, but not as sole director and controller. Security and safety are tasks for
many organizations, inside and outside the public domain.
Security and safety can not only by realized by government organizations.
Citizens and businesses have a own responsibility for security and safety. The
government had claimed a monopoly on security and safety for a long time. Based
on the size of the problem and the necessary measures an awareness arose that
not only the government has a role in safety and security. Security is a broad
responsibility for all participants in modern society. The police have a role to
initiate and coordinate the debate on strengthening the role of citizens and
businesses in reducing safety and security.
3.5.5 POLICE HAS TO BALANCE DUE PROCESS AND CRIME CONTROL
The police have many powers. In the Netherlands the police have no need for new
powers. In recent years, the powers of the police (preventive search, better
exchange of information, new counterterrorism powers) were further extended.
Not only in respect of actual criminal acts (post crime), but mainly to avoid
offences (pre crime). A further expansion seems hardly effective and efficient. It is
first and foremost necessary to make better and more effective use of existing
powers. The general principles of proper policing can help to ensure that the
abstract standards of the legislature are workable for the police in specific
situations. It is therefore important that the police continue to have sufficient
knowledge about the legal aspects of the police. There are signs that this legal
knowledge in recent years has declined.
The due process function within the police is less robust than previously. The
law is used as a tool to achieve certain policy goals. But the law also provides for
citizens’ protection for a too intensive intervention by the government and in
particular by the police in the life of citizens. It is important that within the police
organizational provisions are made so that sufficient attention for the due process
side of police work. To ensure public confidence in the police in the long term
crime control is necessary but also the due process function is crucial. Recent
incidents of miscarriages of justice in the Netherlands should serve as a warning
for a too instrumental approach of law by the police.
36 Jochems 2008.
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3.5.6 THE CULTURE OF THE POLICE IS CRUCIAL
Confidence of citizens in the police is crucial. It needs measures and facilities in
the structural sense to shaped a clear organization, clear rules and good agree-
ments. But equally essential is the culture of the police. These include the way the
police acttowards citizens occurs and the knowledge they have about citizens and
conflicts. It also deals with the composition and diversity of the police themselves.
But also ethics and integrity of the police is of crucial importance. In the
Netherlands different codes of conduct try to influence the culture of the police.
The culture of the Dutch police does not differ very much from the culture of other
police forces in Western Europe. Maybe the Dutch police have a more intensive
relation with communities than in other countries.
In the Netherlands there were no major ethical or integrity problems within the
police. Although there are several incidents, they still remain limited. The specific
culture of the police does not conflict with citizens. However, there is no research
on how the specific culture of the Dutch police has an impact on the organization
and functioning of the police. In many discussions and debates about the police in
the Netherlands one concentrates on the structural aspects and organizational
components. Of course structure and organization of the police is very important,
but the actual functioning of the police is mainly determined by cultural elements.
This means that further discussion and debate about the organization and
functioning of the police should give more explicit attention to the value (and,
of course, limitations) of these cultural elements.
3.5.7 CONTENT OF POLICE WORK MORE ATTENTION
In recent years there has been more attention to the contents of the work of the
police. Within the police there were intensive discussions on how certain activities
can be handled in the most effective and efficient way. This has in many cases led
to specific standards for task performance. The Dutch Police Knowledge Net
brings these standards together. This professionalization of the work of the police
is crucial for the further development of the art of policing. This will also allow
showing the specific character of the art of policing. Especially if the police
manage to combine combining with law, social and other sciences the art of
policing can come to full maturity.
It should be called to ensure that too much implemented standardization does
not fit the specific character of police work. Many of the police activities can be
implemented with the help of standard, but there always has to remain some
space for their own interpretation and creativity of the individual policemen.
Increasingly, the duties of the police are put in planning. The freedom to act for
individual police officers is becoming smaller. That is a valuable development for
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the unity of policing. For the individual police officer, this may be a crushing
experience. For the top of the Dutch police it is a challenge to achieve a responsible
balance between the need for further standardization and adequate space for the
creativity of the individual police officers.
3.5.8 POLICE: PRIMARY FOCUS ON REPRESSION, PREVENTION IS FOR OTHERS
The police in the Netherlands have increasingly focused on repressive functions
and less on preventive tasks. Criminal investigation, counter terrorism and crime
fighting received the most attention. The use of specific legal powers is encour-
aged. The performance contract between the police regions and the Department of
the Interior focus first and foremost on the repressive (and measurable) aspects of
police work.
The police cannot take all preventive measures, there are others in the public
administration and also in the business more responsible. The police in
the Netherlands focus increasingly on their core business. These core activities
are still of a more repressive nature. It should be noted that public order
maintenance and public assistance played a less prominent role in police work.
Especially when it comes to large-scale public order maintenance that knowledge
and skills of the Dutch police are a diminishing. presence. But public assistance is
not only a task for the police. Other organizations in the public administration have
also a task to assist the public.
This development can be assessed as positive. The police focus on the core tasks,
primarily of a repressive nature. These core tasks has to be implemented by the
police. The police will do what they can and will do nomore. It is necessary that other
partners in safety and security take their responsibility for the implementation of the
preventive tasks. For it is undeniable that optimal safety and security can only be
achieved if both repressive and preventive measures are effectively implemented.
3.5.9 ALL ASPECTS OF POLICE WORK HAVE AN INTERNATIONAL DIMENSION
The police force has become increasingly international. Almost all parts of the
police work have an international dimension. There are now international
facilities within the regional forces but also at national level. That means that all
police officers should always take into account what kind of international aspect is
relevant for their work. The international police cooperation has a long way to go,
although there are major improvements in the Netherlands on this cooperation.
The increased focus on terrorism has contributed to it firmly.
Although policing has a more international character for a long time, much
police work is still regional and rural. International police work remains the
responsibility of specific departments within the police forces or at the national
level. What really should happen is that all police officers automatically identify
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the international dimension of their work. That means that police officers has to
be trained to act in this more international way. But it is also important that
international aspects become a more integral part of the structure of police work
and the daily culture of the police.
3.5.10 POLICE SCIENCE HAS BECOME RICHER
The police science in recent years in the Netherlands has become richer. There is
considerable scientific and practical research on the organization and functioning
of the police. The available scientific and practical knowledge of the police is
significant and will grow in the coming years. The wealth of theoretical and
practical knowledge of the police has great potential to improve the organization
and functioning of the police and policing in the Netherlands.
There are still some problems with regard to the further development of police
science. The police science is still too fragmented in different universities,
colleges, the police academy and institutes. There is no integrated research
program in which scientific and practical choices can be made by whom the
police research is done. Cooperation between universities, colleges and the Police
Academy can substantially be strengthened.
Also, the involvement of the police themselves in police science is of a minor
nature. This is due in some cases to a hostile attitude of some of the top of the
Dutch police in relation to scientific research. Too often they have to defend
themselves against negative results. The impression exists that scientific knowl-
edge hardly influences the Dutch police. The translation of existing knowledge for
daily practice requires a great effort. Knowledge and science is important for the
Dutch police. That is acknowledged by science and the police. Science and police
in he Netherlands have to searching for the most effective and efficient ways to
research the police and effectively use the outcomes of the research, off course
within the boundaries of each others responsibilities.
3.6 Closure
The police force is an important organization. The way the police work is of great
importance for the quality of a society. The society has given the police force the
monopoly of violence. The police should handle this monopoly of violence as
carefully as possible. The police force is a vital organization in a democratic state.
It is necessary that the public confidence in the police maintains. That can only be
realized if the police act effectively, efficiently, legally and constitutionally.37
37 Roberg, Novak and Cordner 2009.
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4 Judiciary: Courts and Public
Prosecution Service
The judiciary is one of the most important institutions in a democratic state
under the rule of law. The judiciary in the Netherlands includes both the courts
and the judges as the public prosecutors and the Public Prosecution Service.
The judiciary is a crucial power in the state. The way it is organized and operates
determines to some extent the quality of the state. Confidence of citizens in the
judiciary is crucial for the legitimacy of the decisions of judges and public
proscutors. Only if there is sufficient confidence in the judiciary, will citizens
behave according to the judicial decisions. The realization that the organization
and functioning of the judiciary is a necessary condition for a democratic state
under the rule of law led, in the last decade, to many changes in the
organization of the judiciary in the Netherlands.
Several new acts came into force concerning the organization of the judiciary in
the Netherlands: on June 1, 1999 the Act reorganizing prosecution and setting the
national prosecutor (Law of April 19, 1999, Stb. 194), on January 1, 2002 the Act
on the organization and administration courts (Law of December 6, 2001, Stb.
2001, 582 ) and the Act on the Council for the Judiciary Law (Law of December 6,
Stb. 2001, 583). This reorganization brought changes to the already existing
structure of the judicial system since 1838. These changes built on and were partly
related to the recent developments in the functioning and organization of the
judiciary. Since the introduction of these laws, the developments within the
judiciary have not stopped. Within the framework of this new legislation it is
necessary to make even more changes in the organization and functioning of the
judiciary because of the ever changing societal context.
This chapter is largely based on the volume Judiciary: Studies on judiciary and law
enforcement in the Netherlands (2006) edited by Muller and Cleiren. This is one of
the volumes in the series on security, safety and law in the Netherlands. In this
chapter I will make extensive use of the chapters of some of the authors in this
collection. I have used other scientific literature and documents of the Ministery
of Justice, Council for the Judiciary and the Prosecution Service in order to ensure
a comprehensive picture of the judiciary and prosecutors in the Netherlands.1
1 For example De Doelder 2008, Tak 2008; Margeury 2008.
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4.1 Judges and law
The judiciary in the Netherlands consists of judges and the public prosecutors.
Together they form the independent judiciary.2 In this section I describe the main
aspects of the organization of the judiciary in the Netherlands. The Act on Judicial
Organization was enacted originally in 1827, but underwent major reform in 2002.
4.1.1 STRUCTURE
The judicial organization in the Netherlands consists of different bodies. On the
website of the judiciary the organization of the criminal proceedings are explained
as follows. “In the Netherlands, there are four bodies that are involved in criminal
proceedings: the subdistrict court, the district court, the court of appeal and the
Supreme Court. By no means all criminal cases are brought before the court: the
criminal law also has other procedures. The police can dispose of some matters
themselves, for example. So can the public prosecutor.
The subdistrict court is the ‘lowest court’ in the Netherlands. It only deals with
summary offences. Often, these are cases in which the police or the public
prosecutor has proposed an out-of-court settlement. If the suspect does not accept
this proposal, the case comes before the subdistrict court. In that case, the suspect
receives a summons stating exactly what he is suspected of. The court examines, at
the hearing, exactly what happened. First of all, the public prosecutor addresses
the court, then the suspect or his lawyer. The court can also examine witnesses.
The suspect is always allowed to have the final word. The subdistrict court usually
gives its oral decision immediately after the hearing. An appeal is possible to the
district court against most decisions.
The district court in principle handles all criminal cases and appeals from the
subdistrict court. Uncomplicated cases are handled by a single judge sitting in the
police court as it is known. More difficult cases are considered by three judges.
Here again, the public prosecutor addresses the court first, followed by the suspect
or his lawyer. The police court usually gives its decision immediately. The district
court judges give their decision fourteen days after the hearing. An appeal against
these decisions can usually be lodged with a court of appeal. A number of
specialist judges work at the district court. The police court for economic offences
deals with infringements of the Trading Hours Act or the Commodities Act, for
example. The juvenile court deals with cases in which children are suspected of
having committed punishable offences.
The justices of the court of appeal generally handle all appeal cases. They
reconsider exactly what happened and listen again to the accounts of the
prosecution service and the suspect. The court of appeal does not have to take
2 De Lange and Mevis 2007.
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into account the decision of the district court. So, someone who has been
convicted in first instance may be acquitted, but he may also be given a more
severe punishment.
Parties who disagree with a decision can appeal to the Supreme Court. The
justices of the Supreme Court do not reconsider the facts of a criminal case, but
only examine whether the district court or the court of appeal has applied all the
rules of law properly. If they have not, a different district court or a different court
of appeal must review the case.”3
Besides these courts there are some other judicial courts. These are the Central
Board of Appeal and the Board of Appeal for the Economy. The first deals with
appeals in the civil service and social security matters, the second deals with
cases in the field of socio-economic administrative law. The administrative law
section of the Council of State deals with appeals. These are about adminis-
trative matters (cases against the government). The Council of State is not part
of the judicial system.
The Council for the Judiciary is the link between the Minister of Justice and the
courts. It represents the common interest of courts externally, ensuring facilities
for all courts, oversees operations and financial management and makes general
guidelines necessary in the field of business. The Council is the spokesman of the
judiciary in the political and social debate.4
4.1.2 ADMINISTRATIVE LEVELS OF THE JUDICIARY
In the Netherlands three administrative levels within the judiciary can be
distinguished: the courts, the national Council for the Judiciary and the Ministry
of Justice.5 The Supreme Court exercises a supervisory function in relation to the
judicial organization. This organizational structure has existed since the begin-
ning of this century after a major restructuring process. Since January 1, 2002
there was a a new law on court organization and this created an new judicial
organizational system.
Langbroek gives a clear description of the specific changes and the current
situation.6 “The radical change in the law on judicial organization means that
the judiciary functions within its own management framework, for which the
Minister of Justice can be held political accountable. The renewal of the judicial
3 www.rechtspraak.nl
4 See www.rechtspraak.nl
5 See Bovend’Eert 2006.
6 Langbroek 2006.
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system includes uniting the courts and legal services under the same organizational
and institutional flag. The organizational integration of the courts and the legal
services has taken place since 1989 and the new law gives this organizational
integration a new institutional framework. The purpose of the renewal is to reduce
the political responsibility to fiscal, legislative, regulatory and supervisory powers
(…) The traditional political system with full ministerial management responsibility
has been replaced by a system where this responsibility was largely transferred to
the Council for the Judiciary.
But the Minister of Justice still has much control over the judicial system:
– The Minister has powers of legislation and regulations on the judicial
system.
– The board of the courts and members of the Council are appointed by Royal
Decree, as well as the judges. What differs is that the members of the Council
and members of court boards are appointed for a period of six years, judges
are appointed for life. The Minister of Justice makes the nomination for
appointment.
– The Minister of Justice can nominate members of the Council for suspen-
sion and dismissal.
– The budget for the judicial system is part of the budget of the Minister of
Justice (…)
The Council for the Judiciary has a budget distributive power towards the court
organizations, has a supporting role for the organizational functioning of the
courts and is also equipped with surveillance powers towards the boards and
directors of the courts. Effectively, the Council for the Judiciary and the courts are
independent governing bodies. (…) That does not mean that the Minister of
Justice cannot have a significant regulatory influence on the administration of the
judiciary. Prior to the renewal of the judiciary, the Ministry of Justice did not have
good insight into management within the courts and district organizations of the
public prosecutors. The new system promotes transparency in the relationship
between the Ministry, the Council and the courts so that it is justified to say that
the department has never had so much insight into the functioning of the judicial
system as today. The department and the Council for the Judiciary ‘are living
separately’ but they highly depend on each other for good management, and
therefore are still ‘together’.”7
After this major reorganization of the judiciary an independent commission has
done extensive research into how the modernization of the judicial system has
7 Langbroek 2006, pp. 117-119.
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taken place. The main conclusions of these reports are positive about the changes
introduced.8
“The Committee is impressed by what the judiciary has achieved in recent years.
The principal objectives of the new legislation, and the modernisation operation in
a wider sense, have largely come within reach. A major system change was
conducted and successfully concluded, without significant shocks. Given the
fierce debate during the preparation of the new system, this smooth transition had
by no means been taken for granted. It is the Committee’s view that the courts
involved, the Council for the Judiciary and the Ministry of Justice have each
contributed their share to the judicial system’s successful modernisation.
The judiciary is now largely up-to-date again. There is, therefore, no need for
any drastic changes to the recently innovated system. Where flaws can be found,
they are not so much a consequence of the current statutory division of duties,
authorities and responsibilities, but rather of the way in which they are currently
put into effect by the parties involved. The Committee’s recommendations are
largely aimed at adjusting certain aspects of various practices that have developed.
The Committee was struck in particular by complaints of employees of the
judiciary regarding forced production, bureaucratisation and risk of quality loss.
To assess the value of those collective complaints and to separate fact from fiction,
the Committee had an inquiry conducted. Based on this fact-finding mission,
targeted measures can be proposed with due regard for the special position of
independent judges within the system. In the recent pioneering years, much of
the emphasis has, justifiably, been on sound financial and economic control of the
new system. In the years ahead, the challenge for the judiciary will be to undergo
the development from control to management. To make this possible, the
legislature will need to offer the courts more opportunities and space to organise
their management, subsidiary places of session and mutual cooperation. In turn,
the Council and the courts will need to define the responsibilities granted to them
more accurately and should actually assume them in the years ahead. The
Committee is of the opinion that this process could transform the nature and
scope of the current management model, which is perceived as bogged down in a
culture of excessive consultations, and that it could improve the organisation’s
responsiveness and reduce the work pressure and bureaucracy perceived by
employees. The central theme in all of this is quality improvement (…).”9
8 Committee for the Evaluation of the Modernisation of the Dutch Judiciary, Judiciary is quality, The
Hague, December 2006.
9 Committee for the Evaluation of the Modernisation of the Dutch Judiciary, Judiciary is quality, The
Hague, December 2006, pp. 2-3.
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Partly based on this report, the Council for the Judiciary made a new agenda for
the Judiciary 2008-2011. This Agenda contains the following objectives:
“I. Expert law: This objective is both to increase the available expertise within the
Judiciary as to improve the use of outside experts in procedures. Also the
judiaicry wants to learn from mistakes as an important tool for the maintain
expertise.
II. Reliable law: For reliability, alongside integrity it is especially important that
the public can have confidence that the law acts in a uniform manner.
Differences in procedure and / or outcome can be explained from the used
decisionsystem and the characteristics of the present dispute and not by the
individuality of the judge or the court.
III. Effective law: For all sectors it is necessary that turnaround time of cases is
standardized and that these standards are met. In addition, in certain cases it
is necessaty to give priority if time is of crucial importance.
IV. Law in society: For embedding in society, it is important that the Judiciary has
dialogues with its environment, is visible in the media, can pick up critical
and is transparent. In addition, the different populations groups in the
Nethernds must be visible in the staffing.”10
In 2010 a new Agenda for the Judiciary 2011-2014 was developed. The main
objectives of this agenda are now:
1. The Judiciary contributes to strengthening the rule of law.
2. The courts reinforce the core values independence, impartiality, integrity and
professionalism.
3. The courts work in line with needs in society.
4. The courts will implement the new judicial map.
5. The courts will become more professional and business organizations.
New plans
At the beginning of 2009, the government announced further measures to make
the law more accessible and make the judicial map of the Netherlands more
efficient and effective. In fact, this means that certain judicial districts will be
administratively moved to another area to make the districts more uniform. In a
press release in 2011 the Ministry of Security and Justice gives the following
overview of these organisational changes. “Changing the geographical distribu-
tion of district courts and courts of appeal will improve the efficiency of the
judicial system. On the recommendation of Minister of Security and Justice
Opstelten, the Council of Ministers has agreed to the legislative proposal that
10 Website Council for the Judiciary www.rechtspraak.nl.
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provides for the revision of the judicial map of the Netherlands. The revision
implies that the number of districts for district courts will be reduced from 19 to
10, and the number of districts for courts of appeal from 5 to 4. Since 1934 there
have been 19 district courts in the Netherlands. The 5 courts of appeal date back to
1877. As a result of the new geographical distribution, several district courts will be
merged, so that a total of 10 district courts will remain. In addition, the courts of
appeal in Arnhem and Leeuwarden will be combined. This up-scaling will
increase the possibilities of handling cases within a district court or court of
appeal in a more structured manner. It will also widen the scope for courts to gain
expertise in specialist fields, to administer customized justice, and to make the
administration of justice more transparent for the citizens.
Each district court and each court of appeal will have various court locations.
There will be a total of 32 court locations in the country that will be designated by
order in council on the recommendation of the Minister of Security and Justice. In
consultation with all the parties involved, the Council for the Judiciary will decide
how cases will be divided among these court locations. In addition, the Council for
the Judiciary may designate other temporary locations, for instance for trying
cases concerning criminal offences committed in a large-scale incident. The new
division into ten districts will also apply to the distribution of the future regional
units of the national police corps which is to be set up. The Public Prosecution
Service will also follow this division, resulting in ten district public prosecutor’s
offices. In addition, the existing five public prosecutor’s offices at the courts of
appeal will be replaced by one national public prosecutor’s office at the court of
appeal. However, not much will change for the Public Prosecution Service,
because the new division of districts will coincide with the current division into
regions, and because there already is one nationwide appeal court organisation in
the so-called second-line. The legislative proposal also provides that the court
executive committees will be organized differently. The court executive commit-
tees will become smaller and will be more involved in actually managing the
courts. The ‘new style’ court executive committee will consist of two judges and
one non-judge.”11 In the coming years these changes will be implemented. There
seems to be broad support for this new reorganisation of the judiciary. It created
hardly any public discussion in the Netherlands.
In the Coalition Agreement of the Dutch Cabinet of 2010 the following remarks
were made about the topices of minimum sentences. “The government will
produce proposals for the introduction of minimum sentences for adults convicted
twice within ten years of an offence carrying a maximum statutory sentence of
11 Press release Ministry of Security and Justice, 8-4-2011.
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twelve years or more. Courts will be able to deviate from these minimum sentences
in the light of highly specific individual circumstances but will have to state their
reasons for doing so. The specific circumstances will be spelled out in draft
legislation, as will the minimum sentence for each offence. The minimum
sentence for re-offending will be at least half of the maximum statutory prison
sentence for the offence concerned.” This govenment plan for mimimum sen-
tences created a lot of political and public decision within and outside the juidiciary.
The Council for the Judiciairy opposed firmly to these plans. They fear that judges
have to pass judgements which are not in accordance with the seriousness of the
specific crime.
4.1.3 CRIMINAL LAW
The Dutch law is concentrated, as in many countries, on civil law, administrative
law and criminal law. Because of the aim of this book we concentrate on the
criminal law. In the Netherlands we do not have lay judges. All criminal law is
done by professional judges. The way current criminal law is organised is reflected
in a quote from De Roos. “There is judged in two actual bodies, which is open to
appeal in cassation before the Supreme Court of the Netherlands in The Hague.
The Supreme Court doet not judge on the facts of the case, but answeres only the
question whether criminal procedures have been violated or whether the law is
violated. In doing so Supreme Court guards the unity of law and the legal
developments in the Netlands. The appeal seeks a new treatment of the case.
Both ‘parties’ (the public prosecutor and the accused) can appeal. It is the Court of
Appeal free to give a completely different opinion than the first lower court, even if
that opinion is to the detriment of the defendant f(reformatio in peius), though the
latter can only be achieved by unanimity. The vast majority of cases are dismissed
by a unus iudex (the magistrate). He can impose to one year imprisonment, which
was not long ago only six months. That is one of many indications of political
commitment to efficiency at the expense of quality. The unus-law is also more
normal now in appeal cases. Criminal cases are taken to court by the Prosecution
Service, in the nineteen district courts represented by the prosecutor. At the
Appeal courts the Prosecution Service is represented by the Advocate General.”12
12 De Roos 2006, p. 364.
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4.2 Public Prosecution Service
4.2.1 ORGANIZATION13
The Dutch Public Prosecution Service has three main tasks: investigating criminal
offences, prosecuting offenders and making sure that sentences are carried our
properly. In the Netherlands the Public Prosecution Service is the only body that
can decide to prosecute somebody. The Public Prosecution Service has a mono-
poly on prosecution. In the next table the cases handled by the Public Prosecution
Services are shown.14 After this table I present a table in which the criminal cases
handled by the prosecuting authorities in European countries are compared.15
Cases handeled by the public procedution service (by defence, in%)
Violence against persons
Traffic violations
Criminal damage and public order offences
Other offences
Offences under firearms
and ammunition act
3 %  8 %  1 1 %  1 6 %  1 7 %  1 8 %  2 7 %  
Offences under opium act
Property offences
13 See more in depth Marguery 2008, chapter 4. See also Pakes 1999.
14 Public Prosecution Service, p. 15, website Public Prosecution Service www.om.nl.
15 European Sourcebookof Crime and Criminal Justice Statistics, 2010, p. 134.
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Table 4.2.1.1 Criminal cases handled by the prosecuting authorities – Output cases: Total
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
% change
2003-7
Albania 354 442 448 480 … …
Armenia 312 332 270 298 293 –6
Austria 8 076 6 903 7 489 7 238 7418 –8
Belgium 8 923 8 024 7 514 7 000 6 836 –23
Bosnia- Herzegovina … … … … … …
Bulgaria 2 405 2 624 2 269 2 444 6 131 155
Croatia 1 053 1 082 1 053 1 085 1 078 2
Cyprus … … … … … …
Czech Republic* 1 238 1 190 1 117 1 043 1 009 –19
Denmark … … … … … …
Estonia … … … 2 862 2 726 …
Finland* 1 469 1 583 1 538 1 489 1 403 –5
France 8 074 8 009 7 685 7 815 … …
Georgia … … 1013 1291 … …
Germany* 5 778 6 058 6 023 5 929 6 050 5
Greece 5 775 6 214 4 859 5 522 5 668 –2
Hungary 1 124 1 352 1 384 1 340 1 298 15
Iceland* … … … … … …
Ireland* 240 230 237 240 … …
Italy 5 018 5 103 4 697 … … …
Latvia* … … … … … …
Lithuania 1 080 1 844 1 988 2 004 1 801 67
Malta … … … … … …
Moldova … … … … … …
Netherlands* 1 803 1 803 1 751 1 757 … …
Norway … … … … … …
Poland 4 020 4 038 3 929 3 606 2 888 –28
Portugal 4 841 4 837 4 640 4 723 … …
Romania 1 693 1 709 1 623 1 732 2 076 23
Russia* … … … … … …
Slovakia 2 107 2 403 2 545 2 257 2 311 10
Slovenia 1 607 1 633 2 128 2 103 2 008 25
Sweden* 2 814 2 793 2 837 3 035 3 095 10
TFYR of Macedonia … … … … … …
Turkey 2 576 2 849 2 906 3 304 … …
Ukraine … … … … …
UK: England & Wales* 2 562 2 470 2 166 2 045 1 982 –23
UK: Scotland … … … … … …
Mean 3 123 3 147 2 964 2 906 3 115
Median 2 256 2 436 2 166 2 103 2 193
Minimum 240 230 237 240 293
Maximum 8 923 8 024 7 685 7 815 7 416
Tak has described the current organization of the Public Prosecution Service as
follows. “The prosecution service is a nationwide organization of prosecutors. It is
organized hierarchically. At the top is the Board of Prosecutors General. The
service functions under responsibility of the Minister of Justice, but it is not an
agency of the Ministry of Justice. The service is part of the judiciary, but its
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position differs from thay of the other part of the judiaicry, that is, the judges. The
judges are independent, have life tenure, and are separte from the Ministry of
Justice. Public prosecutors are civil servants, may be fired and fall under the
political responsibility of the Ministry of Justice. (…) The prosecution service is
organized in two layers, corresponding to courts of first instance and courts of
appeal. At the (…) district courts, the prosecution service consists of prosecutors
with the rank of the chief prosecutor, senior prosecutors, prosecutors, substitute
prosecutors, and prosecutors acting in single court sessions. (…) At the five courts
of appeal, the service consists of the chief advocate-general and the advocates-
general. The main task of the service at the court of appeal level is to deal with
charges in appellate cases.”16
In addition to the prosecution services at district court level there is a national
prosecution office and a functional prosecution office. The national prosecution
office is responsible for the criminal investigation of organized and international
crime and terrorism. They supervise the National Criminal Investigation Depart-
ment which is the police force which is responsible for criminal investigation of
organized and internatiol crime and terrorism. The functional prosecution office
is investigating and prosecuting fiscal, economic and fraud crimes, sociale
security crimes, health crimes and environmental crimes. Therefore they have
the authority over four special investigative agencies: the Economic Control
Agency and the Customs and Excise Investigative Office of the Inland Revenue
Ministry, the Social Information and Investigation Agency of the Ministry of
Social Affairs and Employment, the Investigative Agency of the General Inspec-
torate of the Ministry of Agriculture, Nature and Food Qulity and the Information
and Investigation Agency of the Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and the
Environment.
The Dutch prosecution service is chaired by a Board of Prosecutors General. All
public prosecutors in the Netherlands are subordinated to this board. The Public
Prosecution Service in the Netherlands is now one organization. The Board can
give general or more specific instructions to the public prosecutors. In the Dutch
criminal justice system the public prosecutor is the leader of the criminal
investigation process and has therefore authority over the police. The Public
Prosecution Service has a large influence on the policing in the Netherlands. The
Board of Prosecutors General can influence the acts of the individual public
prosecutors in a far reaching way. The Ministry of Justice and the Board of
Procurators General have a close relationship.
16 Tak 2008, p. 49. Table from Public Prosecution Service, p. 25, www.om.nl.
j u d i c i a r y : cour t s and pub l i c p ro s e cu t ion s e r v i c e
107
Powers of the Prosecution Service
The Public Prosecution Service has a specific position in the Dutch criminal
justice system. ‘t Hart has done extensive research on the organization and
operation of the Public Prosecution Service. The following quote shows how far
reaching the powers of the Dutch Public Prosecution Service are. “The duties and
powers of the Public Prosecution Service, following art. 125 of the new Law on the
Judicial Organization, are performed by the Board of Procurators General, by the
Advocate Generals and their deputies and by the public prosecutors and their
alternates. But within the circle of these officers, there are differences, not just
concerning the processes but also the powers themselves. The criminal investiga-
tion is governed by the Code of Criminal Procedure (CCP). In art. 141 CCP, the
general criminal investigation civil servants are mentioned and, in art. 142 CCP
the extraordinary criminal investigation civil servants are mentioned who have
limited investigative powers. The public prosecutor is the first criminal investiga-
tion civil servant to be mentioned in art. 141 CCP. In addition, art. 148 CCP states,
that the public prosecutor can not only personally excercise a criminal investiga-
tion, but he can carry out its investigative task by giving orders to the other
criminal investigation civil servants. The public prosecutor is exclusively respon-
sible for the criminal investigation processes. (…). This is as it actually should be:
the public prosecutor decides, often in agreement with others, within the frame-
work of policy directives; the public prosecutor is asked by the police when in a
case serious decisions regarding the criminal investigation and their precise
methods should be taken; the public prosecutor must ensure the law, the public
prosecutor can take the lead in the criminal investigation processes himself in
specific circumstances (…). The Procuror General and the Adcocate General do no
have investigative powers and they have neither the leadership of the criminal
investigation.”17
The Public Prosecution Service has formulated a long term perspective in which
the following principles are applied. “The Prosecution Service does not lack
attention and this will continue. The Prosecution Service is now permanently in a
dynamic environment. This means that the organization must continually
recalibrate in order to respond to any changes. In Perspective towards 2010, the
long term plan of the Prosecution Service, the choices and concerns in policy and
implementation of the Prosecution Service for the next four years are indicated.
Crucial is the way in which the Prosecution Service will deal with developments in
society and the (partly related) trends in crime. The society requires, for example,
more protection against recurrent offenders. The police system is back in full
discussion. The relationship with the lawyers and the media deserves more
attention, and there is a tendency to criminal law in exchange for administrative
17 ‘t Hart 2006, p. 168.
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enforcement. The Prosecution Service itself is changing. It is restructuring her
organization, so that the Prosecution Service can continue its mission.”18
But the public prosecutor or magistrate is not only responsible for the criminal
investigation process. Since 2006 it has become possible for the magistrate to
directly punish someone on the basis of the Public Prosecution Service Decision
Act, 7 juli 2006. This new legislation creates a new independent power penalty for
the Public Prosecution Service. The public prosecutor gets an independent
authority, without intervention of the court, to impose a penalty for crimes and
offences in which a sentence of imprisonment of up to six years is mentioned in
the Crimal Act. The legislature intends by this Act to promote that only more
serious crimes are judged by the courts. Some of the judgements which were
previously monopolized by the judges are now transferred to the Public Prosecu-
tion Service.
4.2.2 THE PROSECUTION SERVICE AND CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION
“The public prosecution service has an extraordinary central position in the
Dutch criminal procedure. Its pivotal role is exemplified by the following
features. The police functions under the command of the public prosecution
service (Article 13 of the Police Act of 1993). A prosecutor is entitled to give
orders to the police in criminal matters and the police is obliged to obey those
orders. As far as the prosecution is concerned, the public prosecution service is
placed in a monopoly-position (Articles 167 and 242 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure). Third parties, including victims, can not institute proceedings
against the suspected perpetrator of a criminal offence. Nevertheless there are
some exceptions to this, the general rule is that a prosecutor is dominus litis in
criminal procedures. Furthermore, the decision to prosecute is directed by the
principle of opportunity or expediency (opportuniteitsbeginsel, paragraph 2 of the
Articles 167 and 242 of the Code of Criminal Procedure). For a long time this
principle was applied in a negative way which meant that prosecuting was the
rule and dismissal the exception. Nowadays it is understood in a positive way.
This means that only when the public interest is served by doing so, prosecuting
is the appropriate approach. At the end of a criminal procedure when a judge
has imposed a punishment, the public prosecution service legally is responsible
for the execution of it (Article 553 of the Code of Criminal Procedure). However,
the execution of imprisonment-sentences is in practice more a matter of the
Ministry of Justice than of the public prosecution service. On the other hand a
18 Openbaar Ministerie, Perspectief op 2010, p. 3, www.om.nl.
j u d i c i a r y : cour t s and pub l i c p ro s e cu t ion s e r v i c e
109
prosecutor has a wide competence on certain other (forms of) punishments like
the transaction and the conditions imposed for a suspended sentence.”19
The Public Prosecution Service in the Netherlands is thus most important in the
criminal investigation process.20 The public prosecutor is the leader of the
criminal investigation process. He has to decide if certain specific powers can
be used in a specific case. The police have to consult with him on a regular base on
the use of specific powers. Although the Minister of Security and Justice has a
political responsibility for the Public Prosecution Service, he will not intervene in
a particular criminal case although formally he is capable to do so. The Public
Prosecution Service can independently formulate demands in court. In the
Netherlands political influence by a Minister of Justice in a specific case would
be highly inappropriate. There is a deeply felt need for distance between the Public
Prosecution Service and politics.
“The prosecutor is leading the investigation, and as such he has to legally
supervise the criminal investigation by the police or the special investigation
services. This is not only necessary for effective and efficient search for truth, but
also to respect the interests of the accused and other stakeholders, such as
witnesses, experts, victims or the families, the citizens in general (eg when it
comes to telecommunications taps which information is obtained on innocent
non-citizens only crime), the press and other public bodies such as municipalities
(maintaining public order!) and provinces (environment).”21
The public prosecutor is also responsible for the interests of the defence. In the
Netherlands the public prosecutor should act “magistrately”. Sometimes a Dutch
public prosecutor is called a magistrate. This means that he is not only responsible
for trying to get a defendant accused, proofed guilty and sentenced, but also for a
fair trial and the correct use of investigative powers. This means that information
that is positive for the defendant and is found by the police has to be included in
the criminal case file. The public proscutor is responsible for the way the police
handle the defendant. Too much pressure to use non-allowed methods has to be
prevented by the public prosecutor.22
The way in which the Public Prosecution functions, has changed a lot since the so-
called Park Murder in Schiedam. In this murder inverstigation all kinds of
forensic errors were made by the police and the Public Prosecution Service.23
Police-officers and public prosecutors were too eager to get a convinction. Because
19 De Doelder 2000, pp. 187-188.
20 See also Pakes 1999.
21 De Roos 2005, p. 369.
22 See De Doelder and De Meijer 2006.
23 In chapter 7 forensic investigation I will describe this more thoroughly.
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of that an innocent person was convicted. All these events led to a comprehensive
Programme to Improve Criminal Investigation and Prosecution. In this Pro-
gramme different kinds of measures are pronounced. The most important are to
intensify the leadership of the public prosecutor over the criminal investigation by
the police, the organization of counter-evidence and counter-disscussion, a more
intensive and better cooperation between the police, the Public Prosecution
Service and forensics experts and audio-visual registration of interrogations. In
the Netherlands there was a great political and public shock and discussion about
this and other miscarriages of judgement. We did not have any experience with it
in the past. They changed the way the Public Prosecution Services functions
intensively.
4.3 Media and public prosecution
The proposition can be defended that “police”, “prosecution” and “media” have
become key institutions in the minds of the everyday life of citizens. This
sometimes leads to hyperbolic requirements to those institutions and even
hyperbolic statements about the power of them. The reality is that the current
network of police, prosecution and the media has no high degree of stability.
When it comes to the battle between the various interest groups – politics, police,
administration, Public Prosecution Service (PPS), injured citizens, lawyers, public
opinion and the media – the only statement that can be made is that this game is
played harder. This is all the more reason to pay attention to the structural
relationship between police, prosecution and the media.
Crucial is the organization and content of the relationship between police,
media and PPS, not only structurally but especially during incidents and crises.
The importance of this relationship lies not only in the image of an organization
like the police and the PPS, how important this has become in this time of image-
building. A good image is more than a feeling of warmth, pride and self respect. It
is, especially for organizations such as the police and PPS, vital for the imple-
mentation of the operational tasks which they are facing. Legitimacy is based
partly on image. Without a good relationship between police, media and PPS there
is no guarantee of good information to and from the citizens. In a democracy, this
is and remains the fundamental task of a watchdog role of journalism.
The relationship between police, PPS and media has changed. It became
harder, but also more complex. This has to do with the growing pressure on police
and the PPS by “politics”, “public” and the legal profession. It also has to do with
the changes in the media. The statement “the newspaper is a gentleman” is no
longer true. Especially in television, but also in newspapers and radio, there is
hardly a journalist-gentleman that is accountable, even though growing criticism
on the media has now made the media more cautious.
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Police, PPS and media are amongst the most powerful and most important
institutions in society. They all feel increasingly uncertain about the relations to
each other and to the other parties in the field of crime, security and safety. The
unstable nature of the current media society reinforces this uncertainty to a great
extent. The current media is also an emotional culture which has become highly
susceptible to the virus of “scandal”, the moral panic, “the crisis” and “hype”.
Based on these principles an extensive empirical research into the relationship
between police, PPS and media in the Netherlands was conducted by Beunders
and Muller in 2005 (second edition 2009). During this research we not only
interviewed many police officers, prosecutors and journalists but also made an
extensive content analysis of the main newspapers in the Netherlands and held a
survey amongst police spokesmen. In this paragraph I present the results of this
research related to the interaction of the PPS and the media. The relationship
between the PPS and media is not only relevant for the Netherlands.24
4.3.1 PUBLIC PROSECUTION SERVICE AND THE MEDIA
The PPS has made a winding road to a structured media policy. It was difficult for
the PPS to maintain a positive image in the media. The PPS faced, in the past, an
almost exponentially growing interest in crime and criminal matters from the
public, and in an almost equally exponentially growing number of TV pro-
grammes and journalists who –more occasionally than structurally – were dealing
with crime. The PPS started courses for the media to improve their knowledge of
policing and prosecution. Also it provides courses for special target groups, such
as commercial journalists, for whom the legal knowledge was very limited. These
courses are highly appreciated. The digital information from the PPS to the public
has increased significantly. The sites openbaarministerie.nl and om.nl publish a
selection of requisitoirs (as rechtspraak.nl does with some court decisions). The
PPS site also answers audience questions, sometimes even (semi-) live, as, for
example, after the murder of Fortuyn.
The written press and audiovisual media are still treated differently. The world of
justice has traditionally been the world of quality newspapers and only since a
decade or so it includes some high quality honorable news items on television, the
NOS and RTL News, Network, Nova and Buitenhof on Sunday. This is the TV
world where the top of the PPS feel themselves somewhat at home, and where
they want to be accountable if it is really necessary. Other TV programmes such as
24 See for history Brants 1993.
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talk shows and certainly the programmes of the commercial broadcasters – such
as Heart of the Netherlands, where crime every evening is an issue – do not seem
to get much attention from the top of the PPS. However, the press prosecutors are
welcome guests in the programmes of these channels.
In all those dozens of small and large trials, small and large incidents in the past
ten years which created large media excitement, the media was publishing
negatively on the PPS. It lasted until 2002, 2003 before the PPS reorganized
their public affairs more professionally. This late moment was caused mainly by
the traditional aversion to that elusive mass medium of television. Television
contradicts the confidentiality which is characterized by Dutch law. The PPS
centralized the information and media affairs and reduced the autonomy of
the prosecutors on this point. The emphasis in the policy was shifted to the more
legal, way of operating and public affairs. This led to a culture of silence within
the prosecution organization. In the circle of reputable journalists who focus on
crime and justice, the opinion on the PPS was not positive.
What impact has the growing reluctance of the PPS in the mainstream public
affairs had on the media and the general public? This is not positive. But not only
the PPS is to blame, the media themselves are not free of mistakes. First, the
Dutch Society of Journalists decided to withdraw from a consultation meeting
between police, PPS and the media. This rift was restored much later. But it is now
not more than once per year. Secondly, “the media” have never shown any
willingness to consider “pools” of journalists to attend court meetings. The media
have not succeeded in achieving a joint arrangement on topics concerning the
police and the PPS. Thirdly, the journalism itself used a growing self-censorship
on the privacy of suspects in the nineties that almost corresponded with the PPS
guidelines on the subject. Privacy was very important for all newspapers, even if
the were suspects involved.
Almost all participants felt that nowadays only image counts. And almost all of
them see that television and American television series on police and justice have
a phenomenal influence on the perceptions of citizens of the police and the PPS.
The PPS realized a much more intensive control over the information which it
gives to the media. The PPS used the strictest possible interpretation of the new
privacy legislation. This seems politically counterproductive. Last but not least, the
competition with the police in the past ten years was an important motive in
drafting of the media. Several times the PPS and the police quarreled over the
media policy, both trying to protect their own image.
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4.3.2 PATTERNS IN RELATIONS WITH THE PPS AND THE MEDIA
In recent years communication methods are used increasingly in the criminal
investigation process. The media play an important role in these communication
methods. Through newspapers, but increasingly through television and internet, the
police try to solve crime. Opsporing verzocht (Crimewatch) on Dutch television is the
best known example, but also Internet and telephone click lines are increasingly
used. Citizens really want to assist in the criminal investigation process.
The media have a major impact on the perception of safety and security among
citizens. Although the idea is that the media reports negatively about security and
the police, the content analysis in the Netherlands showed that this is not the case.
The dominant image of insecurity, however, remains prominent. The media did
not only affect the perception of security, but also the picture that citizens have
about the effectiveness and efficiency of the police. The police has increasingly
recognised this problem of rising expectations.
The image of the organization and functioning of the police, as it is spread by
fiction programsme, has important consequences for the image of the police. Not
only the media and the public implicitly expect that the police acts as on television,
but also the police themselves are trying to behave according to this expected
pattern. The number of television programmes in which police and crime are
prominent, is enormous. This makes it unlikely that this fact has no influence on
the public’s perception of the police.
Police and the PPS in the Netherlands became more and more concerned about
their own image after several affairs. Not only substantive and organizational
changes were necessary, but also better communication with citizens. Although
police and the PPS are traditionally closed organizations, they have, for several
years, been more open to the media. The result was that after initial positive
imaging of police and the PPS increasingly negative images about the police and
the the PPS emerged. Slowly but surely the police and the PPS communicated less
with the outside world. The previous consultation between the PPS, police and the
press was becoming less frequent and substantive.
Within the media dissatisfaction existed on the way police public affairs were
working. The restrictive directives and instructions of the PPS, and especially on
its image policy, made the media an “enemy” for the police. The media were
increasingly less able to collect independent information.
But also police public affairs officers were negative on the restrictive guide-
lines. These focused too much on the privacy of suspects. The police should not
tell the media anymore that an arrest was made. Only after the accused had been
led before the court commissioner were specific communications by the PPS
possible. The police saw the opportunity to explain its work and influence of its
own image, greatly reduced.
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The police were becoming increasingly aware that “the media” did not exist.
Newspapers, radio, television and the Internet are completely different worlds.
Each medium is looking for a way in which messages can be formulated and
disseminated. Crime and police news are ideal for specific groups. This meant for
the police that they could choose where and how to deposit their messages.
Not only the actions of the police, but criminal cases get ever more attention from
the media. At the beginning of the eighties the PPS was not prepared for this
massive media attention. Over the years the PPS in the Netherlands learned. It
was difficult for the PPS to determine what could and could not be said to the
public in the media.
Not only police but also the PPS appeared sensitive to marketing and PR. The
fight against crime is not only fought in court, but increasingly in the newspapers
and on television. The PPS in the Netherlands took many and varied initiatives to
try to improve their own image. Sometimes the PPS tried consciously to play the
media, for example in some of the larger criminal processes.
The PPS tried to increase the authority over the police when it comes to
providing information and pr. In the past it was allowed that the police held press
conferences when sensational arrests weremade. Today, this takes place under tight
control of the PPS. The PPS has becomemuchmore cautious in its statements after
a few lost criminal cases. A suspect is not yet convicted. Around public affairs and
public relations there is growing competition between police and the PPS.
The PPS also used information as a political signal on specific legal or organiza-
tional problems. The PPS used –more than the police – information and media in
its political management. Soon it became clear that the media operates according
to their own known laws and that there was in the long-term little or no guidance
by the interests of the PPS.
After a brief period of openness and proactive information, a more restrictive
policy became dominant. A cautious strategy was used by the PPS, with minimal
information to the media about ongoing criminal cases. Only when specific
interests of the PPS were at stake or if national security is in danger would the PPS
departfrom this strategy.
4.4 Trends
In ten propositions I reflect my view of the important trends and developments
regarding the organization and functioning of the judiciary.25
25 Based on and cited from Muller 2006.
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4.4.1 THE JUDICIARY OPERATES INCREASINGLY IN CLOSE INTERACTION
WITH SOCIETY
The judiciary needs to adapt its organization to the expectations and aspirations of
society. The recent restructuring of the judiciary and the prosecution service
stemmed from political and public dissatisfaction with the functioning of these
organizations. The often informal way of working does no longer fit with the
desire for transparency and formality. Internal rules on which judges and
magistrates act, have to be transparant. There is an increasing demand for
openness and transparency of the work of the judiciary, for example cameras in
the courtroom and published judgements. Judicial independence does not mean
(anymore) that the judiciary can ignore the wishes and demands of society. In an
organizational and regulatory sense, the functioning of the judiciary is increas-
ingly regulated.
The judiciary and the law will remain favourite topics for political discussion.
My expectation is that in the next few years this relationship between the judiciary
and society will intensify. This may raise conflicts. The need for independence and
distance of the judiciary is not in accordance with the short-term needs and
desires of politicians, the media and the public. The members of the judiciary
should therefore participate in public and political debate to constantly explain the
position of the judiciary.
The judicial independence for decisions in concrete cases is still in place. There is
no direct formal involvement of others. But we also see that politicians and
citizens are intervening regulary with the content of a verdict. The distance
between politics and law seems to be diminishing. The same can be stated with
respect to citizens or action committees who demand criminal investigation on
the basis of their own investigations. On the other hand, there are more judges
and members of the Public Prosecution Service that are actively and publicly
involved in the debate on new forms of legislation, for example terrorism
legislation. The question is whether this is desirable. The separation of state
powers, especially when it comes to the separation between the legislative and
executive power on the one hand and the judiciary on the other hand, is crucial
and essential for a democratic state under the rule of law. It is necessary that a
sharp separation be continued. The long-term consequences of a breach of this
separation are greater than the short-term benefits in a specific case.
In recent years in the Netherlands there have been some incidents which showed
that people were wrongly convicted, as in the Schiedam Park Murder. This has led
to considerable public and political commotion. This has also led to an active
citizengroups that conducted self-exmination. The report on the Schiedam Park
Murder has shown a number of weaknesses in the investigation and prosecution
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processes. Following an evaluation, a programme to strengthen criminal inves-
tigation and prosecution was started. Improvement in the five central themes is
elaborated:
– General requirements for the screening;
– The authority on the criminal investigation;
– Reinforcement of skills;
– The importance of leadership for a good criminal investigation and prosecution;
– A culture of contradiction and reflection, and continuous quality develop-
ment.
Also, a structure is designed according to which old cases could be reviewed. The
necessity of these measures is best supported by pointing to the need for public
confidence in the judicial system. If too many incidents occur, this crucial trust
will decrease. This is also reflected in an increasing relationship between the
judiciary and the media. Law is very important for the media. The Public
Prosecution Service in the Netherlands was closely involved in its own image-
building. To a lesser extent it also seems that the judges are dealing with the media
in the same way. The relation with the media is much more than just giving
information. Media management has become an integral part of the work of the
courts and the Public Prosecution Service. With the increasing media coverage of
cout cases, this will grow in the coming years. This requires a clear policy for the
judiciary to handle the media. A more proactive approach of the judiciary towards
the media will be necessary.
4.4.2 THE DEMAND FOR JUSTICE WILL INCREASE QUANTITATIVELY
AND QUALITATIVELY
The demand for justice will increase in the future. The quantity of the demand for
justice will increase if only because of the growth of the population. In addition,
there will be more and more conflicts brought to court. Alternative dispute
resolution will lighten this a little, but it is not expected that the increase of the
number of lawsuits will decrease substantially. This means that the organization
of the judiciary will be confronted with an increasing stream of cases. This means
a constant growth of the judiciary. The annual reports and annual plans of the
judiacry show this growth. This automatically has impact on the financial position
of the judiciary. Only with an equivalent financial growth, can the growth of the
number of cases effectively and efficiently be addressed.
But alongside the growth in quantity there is also a growth in quality of justice to
be expected. The justification of judgments will be more extensive and transpar-
ant. The legal knowledge of citizens will increase. The questions of journalists
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will be better. The complexity of cases will increase because of the increasing
complexity of society. Legislation and case law are becoming more extensive.
The influence of international law and jurisprudence is increasing. Politics and
the public will not be satisfied with vague decisions. Appeal Courts will judge
more severely. All these developments have to lead to an increase in the quality of
the judiciary. This implies intensive and continuous education and training. The
plans and reports from the judiciary stress the importance of education, training
and management development. There is the need of an explicit quality system for
the judiciary, which is now developing in the Netherlands.
It is therefore also necessary to pay enough attention to the composition of the
judiciary. It will be necessary for the judiciary – while maintaining the necessary
legal expertise – to allow a more diverse composition in order to represent the
actual societal composition more. But primarily the quality of the persons within
the judiciary is of paramount importance. It would be desirable if the judiciary
considers the experience gained with other organizations in the public sector with
policy on diversity. In these other organizations there were in some cases
expensive lessons learned because they diversified their organization too quickly
and with too little quality. This has created sound problems.
4.4.3 ORGANIZATION OF THE JUDICIARY CRUCIAL CHARACTERISTIC
OF DEMOCRATIC LAW
The organization of the judiciary is of great importance for the functioning of the
democratic state under the rule of law. A democratic state without an independent
judiciary is not a democratic state. In the Dutch Agenda for the Law it explicitly
states that the judiciary has a special responsibility to monitor the law and to
ensure legal protection. The independence of the courts and the Public Prosecu-
tion Service is an asset in a state where there is a genuine separation of powers.
The organization of the judiciary must be formed in such a way that it can judge
without external interference.
In the Netherlands, both the courts and the Public Prosecution Service have been
fundamentally reorganized. This has led to central-led organizations, which
should ensure uniformity of law. This reconstruction contributed to a more
effective and efficient organization, since more attention has been paid to
governance and management. There is more emphasis on management and
quantitative and qualitative objectives. Nobody will deny that in recent years much
has happened within the organizations of the judiciary. Criticisms of previous
commissions and studies on the functioning of the judiciary have been taken to
heart and actually led to fundamental changes in both organization and operation
of the organizations of judges and magistrates.
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There are also criticisms with regard to these reorganizations. In summary they
are concerned with the lack of distance between the judiciary and politics (and in
particular the Minister of Justice). The independence of the judiciary may be
jeopardized. They argue that the risk of political interference in the judiciary by
political intentions is becoming too great. The Council for the Judiciary and the
Board of Procurators General offers too little power to ensure that this does not
happen in their opinion.
The political culture in the Netherlands ensured in the past that there was too
much interference from politics in law. Not everyone realizes at this moment the
need for distance. The tendency to react in the very short-term by politicians is
sometimes too great. But key players in political and judicial positions are in
general aware of the need for distance and independence of the judiciary. But it is
unwise in the long term to depend on key players for such a fundamental principle
function. In current regulations, the necessity of the separation has to be clearly
regulated and formulated.
4.4.4 PUBLIC CONFIDENCE ESSENTIAL
Public confidence in the judiciary is of crucial importance. Overall, it appears that
citizens are satisfied with the content of judgments of the judiciary. This is an
important finding. The judiciary must maintain and strengthen these positive
confidence in the coming years. The duration of procedures is an important
element, but the treatment of the parties is at least as important. The standards for
the duration of the procedures must be tailored to the wishes of the parties. In
addition, the professionalism of the judges is of great importance for the question
if citizens having confidence in the judiciary. The general trend in society to
achieve transparency and uniformity is also important for the juridiciary, espe-
cially now that many judgments can be consulted via the Internet (in the
Netherlands www.rechtspraak.nl).
The confidence in law depends not only on how the judiciary and the Prosecution
Service operate. The confidence is partly dependent on the confidence in other
public institutions, including the police and other investigating authorities.
Incidents in these other organizations affect the level of confidence in the
judiciary. The public seems to make little or no distinction between all organiza-
tions involved in law enforcement. That means that the courts should spend time
on how their image is determined and can be affected. The image of the judiciary
is not a way to distinguish itself from other organizations in public administra-
tion, but could be a way to improve public confidence in the law. That means,
however, that citizens should be given good and sound information from the
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judiciary. A targeted information policy aimed at strengthening public confidence
in the law can make an important contribution.
An effective and efficient enforcement of the imposed sanctions is necessary to
maintain the confidence of citizens in the law in the long term. Sanctions which
are not implemented, or implemented at a very late stage, create public frustra-
tion. The obstacles in execution should therefore be resolved. It is necessary to
create a higher status for the execution within the judiciary, but also in the
academic world. It is an integral part of the functioning of the judiciary and one of
the crucial elements of the chain of law enforcement.
A particular aspect of the confidence of citizens in the judiciary is the relationship
between the Public Prosecution Service and the media. The Public Prosection
Service has travelled (…) a long and often winding road made with regard to the
media. The path to the media was full of unexpected bumps and pits that are often
too high or too deep to bring clearly the own policies and images to the front. The
Public Prosecution Service faced in the past decade an almost exponentially
growing interest in crime and criminal matters from the public, and an almost
equally exponentially growing number of TV programs and journalists who are
interested in crime and criminal investigation. (…) The competition with the
police around the most positive image was in the past ten years an important
motive towards the decided media policy. Several times had the judiciary found it
necessary to act, because otherwise the police would collect too much honour.26
In a new guideline on information from police and magistrates there is a plea for
more openness and clarity. For the public’s confidence in the police and the
judiciary this is essential.
4.4.5 JUDICIARY DEVELOPS TOWARDS A PROFESSIONAL AND MODERN
ORGANIZATION
The judiciary is clearly and steadily developing into a professional and modern
organization. The management and governance structure of the judiciary has
fundamentally changed and improved. Management and policy have been
separated and connected in a more meaningful way. Attempts have been made
tot realize integrated management in the administration of the courts and the
Public Prosecution Service. Management issues are carried out by experts and not
by judges or prosecutors. Quality assurance systems have been introduced and
effectively implemented. The transparency of the judiciary as an organization is
growing. IT has become an indispensable part of law. Experts from outside
(including forensic expertise) play an increasing role in the law. Uniformity and
26 Beunders en Muller 2006.
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standardization of cases that are eligible is increasingly taken place. There are
annual plans and annual reports on the various levels in the courts and the Public
Prosecution Service. There are clear and quantitative targets on production and
quality. The physical and logistical infrastructure of the judiciary has been
improved. Management and administration are not deprived subjects with respect
to the content. Partly as a result of some incidents structures are designed to learn
from these incidents. Both organizations are constantly restructuring with the aim
of becoming a better and more professional organization.
Although there are still some people who object to this organizational develop-
ment, they are a minority. The benefits of development into a professional and
modern organization are obvious. In this way a more effective and efficient law
can occur where uniformity of law can be ensured. This requires a degree of
bureaucratization of the judiciary at all levels. This is not a problem, since each
organization needs a certain degree of bureaucracy. It is necessary to achieve a
balance between the respective roles and responsibilities of all concerned within
the law and the need for uniformity. The experience of other organizations in the
public administration has shown that the risk of over-bureaucratisation is always
lurking. If this happens to the judiciary, the creativity and inventiveness of the
members of the judiciary will reduce. Too much bureacucratization is never good.
4.4.6 MORE CENTRALIZATION AND UNIFORMITY IN MANAGEMENT,
GOVERNANCE AND POLICY
With the establishment of the Board of Procurators General and the Council for
the Judiciary centralization occurred in the judiciary. The purpose is to create a
greater degree of uniformity than is possible in a more fragmented organization.
Internal reorganizations are still in progress. There are still questions about the
precise relationship between the two bodies and the Minister of Justice. The
position of the Supreme Court against the two agencies is not fully clear.
Centralization is a development that is visible in several areas of security and law
enforcement. In the organizations of the police, fire brigades, prison services and
in other sectors, such centralization can be seen. It has undeniable advantages
particularly with regard to management issues of scale and uniformity that can be
achieved. However, a certain degree of centralization and standardization of policy
and content takes place. With such central bodies, it is easier to use directives,
covenants and agreements to manage the judiciary. This may not be possible in a
particular case, but the way priority is given to certain cases will be subjected to
central control.
It has major advantages if the two bodies are aware that a certain degree of
differentiation is possible. Not everything has to be centralized. In this way, the
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judiciary can balance the wish for uniformity of law and the need for differentia-
tion because of the characteristics of a case. The Council for the Judiciary and the
College of Procurators General have to achieve a responsible balance between
centralization and bureaucracy on the one hand and decentralization and
individual creativity on the other hand.
4.4.7 JUDGES AND MAGISTRATES MORE APART
Some authors speak about the law if they mean the judges, sometimes they mean
the magistrates. Some do not want to include the magistrates in the judiciary any
more. This is not always a conscious difference in the use of terms, but sometimes
a real actual difference. Formally in the Netherlands the judiciary consists of both
the judges and the magistrates.
Nevertheless, we note that the distance between the judges and the magistrates
has grown in recent years. Although both formally were part of the judiciary, they
both had their own organizational development. The judges are increasingly
turning to the substantive aspects of justice. Legal protection is a main concern of
the judges. The Public Prosecution Service focuses more increasingly on the
police to lead the investigation and on the national policy on crime control and law
enforcement. The Public Prosecution Service concentrates on the effectiveness
and efficiency of the criminal investigation process. Of course there is coordina-
tion and consultation, but the character of the judges on the one side, and the
prosecutors on the other side, is becoming more dominant. The fact that both are
led by now powerful and strong central bodies contributes to this character.
This development is not negative per se. It offers the opportunity to develop the
organization on the basis of the requirements of both organizations. These
requirements are different, as we have seen in the first argument. Society
demands something else from the judges than from the public prosecutors.
That means that both organizations should given space to develop themselves in a
manner in which they deal effectively and efficiently with the demands of the
environment. Of course it is necessary that alignment and agreement between
both organizations exists on crucial points. That must simply and clearly be
protected. Both the prosecutors and the judges are a crucial part of the enforce-
ment chain. But while this alignment and coordination takes place, there is no
fundamental objection to more self-development in both organizations.
Sometimes the Public Prosecution Service uses the argument that if its focus on
the police and crime fighting would increase, the acceptability of the Public
Prosecution Service in court would be reduced and would be at the same level as
the lawyers. This does not have to happen if the Public Prosecution Service
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effectively anticipates the verdicts of the judges and act not only as crime fighters
but also as real magistrates. It is also necessary that judges fully recognize the role
of the Public Prosecution Service in the criminal investigation process.
4.4.8 COOPERATION AND COORDINATION IS BECOMING INCREASINGLY IMPORTANT
Several authors are promoting enhanced judicial cooperation. Within the Public
Prosecution Service cooperation is more natural because of the way it is organized
and operates. Cooperation between judges and courts is not natural because of
the judicial independence. There are various forms of cooperation now and in the
future. For the unity of law it is essential that cooperation and coordination take
place. There are now many forms of IT support that makes an effective
implementation of judicial cooperation possible. This judicial cooperation will
increase and be even more important in the coming years.
For the unity of law and the confidence of the citizens, judicial cooperation
strongly is encouraged and should be standardized. This is an important task for
the Council for the Judiciary. The College of Procurators General has realized this
responsibility by publishing many policy guidelines. It would be valuable if such a
structure would also be used by the Council for the Judiciary. In this way, citizens
can themselves consider how judgments are passed. Of course, there is always a
possibility to deviate in a specific case. In these cases there is a deviation from a
standard which is known and clear.
4.4.9 INSTRUMENTALITY VERSUS LEGAL PROTECTION
The development that the law is increasingly used as a tool for policy targets,
continues unabated. The legal protection function is a function which seems
primarily to be implemented by the judiciary (the judges and the prosecutors). The
centralization of administration, management and policy within the two organiza-
tions makes it easier to use the law by government to achieve certain established
policies. There is a direct relationship established between the government and
the judiciary, making it more and more possible to translate political will into
demands on policy, management and administration. From that perspective, the
instrumentality of the law has further increased. The annual plans and vision
documents make this clear.
But there is another trend to be aware of. Judges are becoming the guardians of
the legal protection function. That is also explicitly reflected in the plans and
reports from both organizations. It is significant that the legislative and executive
power seem to favour the instrumental function beyond the legal protection
function. In this way there seems to be a new kind of balance being created
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between the legislative and executive focus on instrumentality and the judiciary on
the legal protection. The Public Prosecution Service has a responsibility towards
both functions.
The reality is not as dichotomous as I now sketch, but a clear development can be
recognized. The question is whether this is a development that should be
continued. In my opinion it would be desirable if the powers in the state make
themselves a balance between instrumentality and legal protection. The legal
protection function is also important for the legislative and executive power, as the
instrumental function is important for the judiciary. It is not good if one of the
forces identifies itself with one specific function. Constantly conflicting powers in
a state do not contribute to the democratic ideal. This means that within each of
the powers adequate organizational and substantive arrangements have to be
made to balance both functions.
4.4.10 ETHICS, INTEGRITY AND SYMBOLS AS CRUCIAL VALUES FOR THE JUDICIARY27
In this paragraph I note that public confidence in the law and the judiciary is
crucial. This needs structural measures and facilities like a clear organization,
clear rules and good agreements. But just as significant are the cultural elements
for confidence in the law and the judiciary. Professional ethics for judges have the
following core concepts: integrity, independence, impartial judgements, skills and
behaviour, efficiency, management and organization. The judiciary should ensure
its integrity. Behavourial policies are important to achieve this, but also actual
compliance. That is also a crucial element of the culture of the judiciary. In the
context of this discussion two documents are published concerning the improve-
ment and structure of the integrity of the judiciary. It is in the Guideline
Impartiality of the Judiciary and the Code for the Public Prosecution Services.
Both documents provide general guidelines how to proceed with integrity
conflicts.
In many discussions and debates on the judiciary, authors concentrate on the
structural and organizational aspects of the judiciary. There should be more
attention for the different cultural aspects of the judiciary. Of course structure and
organization of the judiciary are very important, but the actual functioning of the
judiciary is still largely determined by cultural factors. That means that in further
debate and research on the organization and functioning of the judiciary the
cultural elements should be given more attention.
27 See more Loth 2005; Myjer 2005; Hol 2005.
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4.5 Conclusion
The state of the judiciary is essential for the quality of the democratic rule of law. In
this chapter I outlined the state of the judiciary. In the Netherlands there have been
enormous changes in the organization and structure of the judiciairy. In the next
few years these changes will be further detailed and implemented. Standardization
and unification will be key principles. It will also be important to be able to
differentiate based on specific topics and themes within the judiciary. Unity is only
necessary if it is crucial for an effective and efficient judiciary, but in some specific
cases there is more to be said for a degree of difference between organizations,
organization components, persons or components. It is crucial for the democratic
state under the rule of law that the judiciary constantly adapts itself.
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5 Detention, prisons and probation
Detention is one of the crucial links in the criminal justice chain in the Netherlands.
The primary objective of detention is the implementation of court decisions.
Offenders must be punished. The various detention organisations in the Nether-
lands are responsible for the manner in which this detention is designed. This is
frequently changing. The ideas about themost effective detention develop in relation
to social trends. Detention remains topical in the Netherlands. In the media and
politics it is widely discussed. Not only incidents but also the broader detention
policy gets ample attention. It is and remains a grateful subject for politics and
media. In the Dutch academic world only a few are interested in this topic. In this
chapter I give an overview of current and future detention in the Netherlands.
Although detention in the Netherlands is not “a beacon of enlightenment”1 any-
more, it is still important to look at its institutional and organizational characteristics.
The Dutch prison system was in the past appealing to international scholars.2 This
chapter is mainly based on the volume Detention: Prisons in the Netherlands (first
edition 2005, second edition 2009, in Dutch) edited by Muller and Vegter.3
5.1 Facts and figures
For a long time the Netherlands was relatively famous for its low prison rates
compared with other European countries. In the next table the actual prison rates
in Europe are shown.4 The Netherlands is now a regular European country at this
point. The relative prison rate has risen substantially in the Netherlands over the
last years.5
1 Pakes 2000.
2 Downes 1988; Vagg 1994; Pakes 2007; Downes and Van Swaaningen 2007.
3 Compare Brand-Koolen 1987; Gelsthope and Morgan 2007; Jewekes and Johnston 2006; Jewkes 2007.
4 European Sourcebook of Crime and Criminal Justice 2010, p. 295.
5 See also Vagg 1994; Cavadino and Dignan 2006.
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Table 5.2.1.1 Prison population per 100 000 population: STOCK – Total
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
% change
2003-7
Albania 53.9 76.6 109.8 123.2 76.0 41
Armenia 170.6 88.9 87.7 88.2 116.5 –32
Austria 88.0 92.8 97.9 97.7 108.4 23
Belgium 88.2 92.5 93.0 98.5 100.5 14
Bosnia-Herzegovina 56.3 57.9 61.8 … … …
Bulgaria 120.4 129.4 140.5 148.5 151.0 25
Croatia 63.1 68.1 78.5 86.3 95.5 51
Cyprus 49.3 74.1 70.7 77.7 85.4 73
Czech Republic 169.4 179.7 185.0 180.6 184.8 9
Denmark 66.7 68.8 73.8 72.4 66.7 0
Estonia 321.5 339.1 327.6 320.8 262.6 –18
Finland 65.8 65.8 72.7 70.4 65.5 0
France 92.8 91.8 92.3 91.3 99.6 7
Georgia 187.3 210.1 210.2 351.6 403.9 116
Germany 94.5 94.9 94.4 92.8 89.8 –5
Greece 73.8 80.6 88.9 92.2 … …
Hungary 198.3 187.2 172.2 162.1 150.4 –24
Iceland 39.1 39.3 40.2 39.1 38.1 –2
Ireland 77.8 76.7 73.2 72.9 79.2 2
Italy 94.9 97.2 102.3 66.8 84.5 –11
Latvia 353.6 331.5 304.2 290.0 289.8 –18
Lithuania 233.4 236.5 238.3 238.0 220.0 –6
Luxembourg 110.3 119.6 149.0 159.7 154.9 41
Malta 69.7 69.0 72.9 92.5 95.0 36
Moldova 298.4 288.1 250.1 245.9 183.9 –38
Netherlands 110.2 118.9 125.5 118.2 115.2 5
Norway 63.8 64.8 67.0 67.9 70.9 11
Poland 211.3 207.8 216.6 229.9 234.2 11
Portugal 130.6 123.4 120.3 117.6 107.2 –18
Romania 208.6 187.9 175.4 166.4 140.5 –33
Russia 585.9 530.6 575.4 611.8 624.7 7
Slovakia 164.1 176.6 172.4 160.6 151.2 –8
Slovenia 55.0 56.4 56.6 64.8 66.5 21
Spain 131.5 138.7 141.2 145.5 147.0 12
Sweden 75.4 81.5 78.1 79.0 74.6 –1
Switzerland 71.8 81.5 82.2 78.7 75.6 5
TFYR of Macedonia 78.8 86.0 104.7 99.9 99.7 26
Turkey 90.8 81.5 77.7 96.5 127.7 41
Ukraine 400.9 398.7 363.1 343.7 323.3 –19
UK: England & Wales 139.5 140.4 142.7 145.1 147.5 6
UK: Northern Ireland 67.9 74.0 75.9 84.7 82.9 22
UK: Scotland 131.2 135.4 133.4 140.6 144.9 10
Mean 141.8 141.4 142.7 149.0 148.4
Median 94.7 93.9 103.5 99.9 111.8
Minimum 39.1 39.3 40.2 39.1 38.1
Maximum 585.9 530.6 575.4 611.8 624.7
In the past in the Netherlands only a limited number of people were in prison
compared with other countries. In recent decades in the Netherlands we have seen
a rise in the prison population towards a European average. The last couple of
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years there has been a decrease in the total amount of prisoners. At this moment
(2011) there is now an overcapacity of prison cells. Some prisons have to be closed
now. The following table shows this tendency of decrease in the last years.6
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Total amount of
prisoners 12410 13060 13980 16455 17600 16230 14450 13530 13260 13295
5.2 Structure and organization
The Minister of Security and Justice is ultimately responsible for the detention
policy and the Prison Service in the Netherlands. The State Secretary of Justice
exercises this political responsibility in daily practice. The crucial legislation on the
enforcement of prison sentences and the organization of the Prison Service are
the 1998 Penitentiary Principles Act, and the attached Penitentiary Rules.
5.2.1 FORMS OF DETENTION
In the Netherlands different forms of detention can be distinguished. Detention
can be imposed in anticipation of a criminal trial, so-called preliminary custody.
“Detention can also be applied as a sanction after the court determines that an
offence was committed. That detention can be imposed as a punishment or a
measure. (…) For people over the age of eighteen years, there are two custodial
sentences: imprisonment and custody. Imprisonment is the usual sentence for
criminal felonies, while the main sentence for criminal offences is custody.”7 Next
to imprisonment and custody a new sentence was developed, so-called community
service. “In practice, the core of the community service is usually the offender
doing simple work done for the community.”8
These forms of detention are all sentences. It is also possible in the Netherlands to
impose freedom restricting measures. The most important one is the detention
during his Majesty’s pleasure (TBS) in specific TBS institutions. In the last years a
new form of freedom restricting measures has arisen because of the so-called
repeated offenders. In the Netherlands these repeated offenders can be placed in
an institution for repeated offenders for a period of two years. Youth offenders
have their own detention institutions for sentencing. The last form of detention
which has to be mentioned here is the detention of aliens (strangers who are not
naturalized).
6 CBS 2012.
7 Vegter 2009, p. 48
8 Vegter 2009, p. 49.
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“The guiding principles of the Penitentiary Act are: the principle of resocializa-
tion, the principle that a sanction is implemented as soon as possible after it is
imposed, and the principle that the incarcerated person is to be subjected to as few
restrictions as possible.
The Penitentiary Principles Act, furthermore, covers the principles governing the
regulation of different types of penitentiary institution. The three different types are:
• remand houses mainly for implementation of pre-trial detention orders and
for implementation of certain prison sentences or other kinds of deprivation
of liberty;
• prisons for the implementation of prison sentences at large, and
• institutions for persistent offenders
Penitentiary institutions do not include institutions for the treatment of those
under an entrustment order due to their mental disorder at the time of commit-
ting a crime, or the institutions for juvenile detainees. The Penitentiary Principles
Act is not applicable for these institutions. A separate set of Principle Acts exists
for the deprivation of liberty of juveniles and the implementation of entrustment
orders. The Penitentiary Principles Act also elaborates the principles in respect of
classification of prisons, level of association, selection of prisoners, use of control
of and violence against prisoners, degree of contact with the outside world, social,
spiritual, and medical care, prison work, recreation, discipline, and the complaint
procedure for prisoners.”9
5.2.2 PRISON SERVICE
Organization
The Prison Service in the Netherlands was reorganized thoroughly in the nineties
of the last century. One of the main problems of the existing prison system was
that each prison institution made its own policy and regulations. There was hardly
any national policy or regulation. With the establishment of the national Correc-
tional Institutions Agency a more integrated and national policy and organization
of the Prison Service emerged. The Correctional Institutions Agency is the central
authority over all prison services in the Netherlands. This agency has four
divisions: prison division, division for Entrustment Orders Treatment Institu-
tions, division for juvenile custodial institutions and a division for special
detainees like illegal immigrants and drugs offenders.
The implementation of detention in the Netherlands is monitored by the
Inspectorate for Sanction Application that is part of the Ministry of Security and
9 Tak 2008, pp. 141-142.
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Justice and became a part of the Inspectorate of Security and Justice in 2012. The
independence of this inspection is ensured in a specific arrangement. This
inspection has issued a large amount of specific inspection reports on virtually
every part of detention in the Netherlands. “The Inspectorate for the Sanction
Application is critical about the differences between judicial institutions and
organizations in the Netherlands. Detainees can experience legal inequality. This
is the main message in the year report 2008 of the Inspectorate for the Sanction
Application. It appears that the operation and implementation of national rules in
the detention organizations themselves are too different. Many prisoners come
during their ‘career’ in contact with detention organizations in different locations,
so they can make a comparison. The Inspectorate urges the head of the
Correctional Institutions Agency again to give more guidance to the detention
organizations systems and the introduction of new policies.”10 The independent
Council for Criminal Law Application and Youth Protection gives advice and
passes judgments in specific complaints procedures. The council has 60 mem-
bers: specialists in prison law, juvenile and family law and behavioural sciences,
members of the judiciary and the legal profession, public administration officials,
and a number of physicians.
In total, the Netherlands has about one hundred prison institutions. The various
establishments have close contacts with the municipality, police and fire brigade.
Especially after the major fire in a prison at Schiphol on October 27, 2005 where 11
detained illegal immigrants died, the safety side of prisons has become of crucial
importance. This means that correctional institutions, municipalities, police, fire
brigades and medical emergency services now exercise regularly various types of
crisis that may arise. In addition, some of the correctional institutions participate
in so-called security houses which are created in various municipalities.
There is much debate and discussion about the exact structure of the organization
of the Prison Service in the Netherlands. Plans for large-scale reforms faced strong
objections of employee participation organizations. There is a long discussion
about the management structure of the Prison Service. Internal reorganization
processes were delayed for a long time. The power of the individual prison
directors and the strength of the employee participation organization within the
Prison Service is too large to make direct extensive changes. The Dutch Cabinet
made a new detention policy for the coming years to reduce the recidivism of
prisoners. Assistance and support from the staff of the correctional institutions is
therefore essential.
10 Press statement Year report 2007 Inspection for Sanction Implementation.
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More persons in one cell
In the Netherlands for many years there was great opposition towards a policy of
more persons in one cell. This principle was not in accordance with the main
prison policy which was dominated by resocialization. In the last five years many
prisons were reconstructed to make more (mostly two) persons in a cell possible.
There are now experiments with prisons where there are six persons in one cell. In
its annual report of 2007 the Correctional Institutions Agency described these
developments as follows: “Multiple-person cell use was introduced to the prison
system in September 2004. Multiple-person cell use is now a regular and fully
accepted way of enforcing penal measures. Increasing the use of multiple-person
cells is an important government-assigned task. An investigation examining the
possibility of an increase in multiple-person cell use in existing new-build institu-
tions was therefore conducted in 2007. The Correctional Institutions Agency and
the Government Buildings Agency took stock to find out howmuch space in the 22
most recently built locations could still be used for an increase in the number of
multiple-person cells. Based on these findings, a decision will be made in 2008 on
how to give shape to an expansion of the number of multiple-person cells. If new
institutions are built, they will be fully suitable for multiple-person cell use. (…)
Starting in February 2006, a new detention concept was tested at Lelystad
Penitentiary Institution. Detainees stayed in six-person cells, and guards did part
of their work with electronic aids, such as palm pilots (hand-held computers). The
first experiences of this test became clear in 2007, following an assessment. It turns
out that both a greater sense of responsibility among detainees and less personnel
in this specific setting works well. The present concept will therefore continue to be
used in Lelystad and further developed. To that end, special attention will be paid
for the continued development of electronic aids, and work is being done to
determine the exact cost per detention location.”11 At this moment in time hardly
any discussion exists anymore about more persons in one cell. It is now an accepted
way of detention in the Netherlands.
5.2.3 SECTORS OF THE DUTCH PRISON SERVICE
Prisons and remand houses12
The main part of the Dutch Prison Service is the regular prison sector where the
remand houses and the regular prisons are covered. They constitute the vast
majority of correctional institutions and inmates in the Netherlands. Within this
sector one high security prison is established.13 Also some limited security
institutions are a part of the regular prison system. The capacity of the regular
prison system was in 2005 15,482 prisoners and in 2009 13,662.
11 Correctional Institutions Agency, Annual Report 2007, p. 13 and p. 14.
12 See in more depth Fiselier 2009.
13 See Boin 2001.
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There are also some special groups of prisoners within the regular prison system.
Since 2004 the Reoffender Institutionalization Measure can be imposed which
makes it possible to send persistent offenders (mostly drug addicts) to prisons.
These persistent offenders are placed in institutions for persistent offenders in the
Netherlands which generally are ordinary prisons and remand houses. This
measure aims mainly to protect society and end the recidivism of the defendant.
Mostly they are offenders who have already committed many offences, usually
caused by a (drug) addiction.14
Women are a special category in Dutch prisons. In total there are approxi-
mately 900 places available for women in Dutch prisons. The main policy in the
Netherlands is that female and male detainees are separated from each other.
There are some very specific correctional institutions for detainees who need
special care such as institutions for special care of the psychologically immature,
addicts guidance department, individual counseling department, forensic mon-
itoring and guidance department, observation clinic Pieter Baan Centrum,
detention hospital and terrorists institution.
Institutions for mentally ill offenders15
In the Netherlands there is a long history of institutions for mentally ill offenders.
The legal basis for these institutions is formed by the Principle Act on Care for the
Mentally Ill Offenders. In Holland it is possible to impose a so-called TBS
measure. “The acronym TBS stands for ‘placement under a hospital order’. TBS
is a treatment measure the court imposes on people who have committed serious
offences and suffer from a psychiatric illness or disorder, which influences their
behaviour to a greater or lesser extent. As a result the court does not hold these
people fully accountable for their actions. However, for the part of the offence for
which the person in question can be held responsible the court can impose a
prison sentence; the so-called combined sentence (e.g. eight years imprisonment
in combination with TBS). In order to treat the disorder and prevent repeat
offences (recidivism) TBS is imposed in addition to the sentence. The objective of
TBS and combined sentences is to protect society. There are two variants of TBS: a
hospital order with compulsory treatment (custodial measure) and a conditional
hospital order. In general the hospital order with compulsory treatment, officially
called ‘TBS with a government order for compulsory treatment’, is the one
referred to most often. In this case an offender under a hospital order is placed
in a custodial clinic and given treatment. In the case of a conditional hospital order
the person is not forcibly placed in a clinic, but the court imposes conditions on
the person’s conduct. For instance, the person must undergo compulsory treat-
ment, or is prohibited from using alcohol or drugs. If the person in question fails
14 See in more depth Moerings 2007; Boone and Moerings 2007; Kooijmans and Meijer 2009.
15 See in more depth Koenraadt and Mooij 2007; Veurink 2009.
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to comply with these conditions the court can convert the conditional hospital
order to a hospital order with compulsory treatment. The court will impose a
conditional hospital order if outpatient treatment is sufficient to mitigate the risk
of recidivism. The Netherlands has a total of eight custodial clinics and four
Forensic Psychiatric Clinics (FPKs) where TBS treatment places are purchased.
Today the custodial clinics and the FPKs are jointly referred to as Forensic
Psychiatric Centres (FPCs).”16 The number of and capacity for TBS detainees has
risen from 970 in 1998 to 2,084 in 2009. This is partly caused by the increasingly
longer duration of TBS. In spite of the extension of capacity detainees must still
wait for a suitable place in the TBS system.
The special characteristic of the forensic correctional institutions is that the vast
majority is private. Only one of the forensic institutions is a public establishment,
the others are all owned by private (hospital) organizations. Although the Minister
of Justice states the conditions for the implementation of the TBS policy and gives
guidelines on the demands on treatment, the implementation of the TBS is almost
entirely privatized. There are many discussions on the degree of independence of
these private TBS clinics. In some cases they are almost entirely part of private
hospitals.
In the Netherlands in recent years there has been a lot of discussion and debate
about the parole system for TBS detainees. In some cases, TBS detainees on
parole committed serious crimes. These offences (murder and rape) created much
political and public turmoil in the Netherlands. These events even led to a
parliamentary inquiry committee that evaluated the total TBS policy. The security
of TBS detainees on parole was subsequently intensified. Despite many objec-
tions, the Minister of Justice, backed by parliament, agreed to maintain parole as a
key part of the Dutch TBS policy.
Youth correctional institutions17
In the Netherlands a specific sector for youth correctional institutions exists.
Placing in these institutions was done on behalf of child protection or as
punishment on the basis of the juvenile criminal law. Since 2008, this changed
now that specific institutions for closed youth care are created for children in need
of protection, in addition to specific judicial correctional institutions for the
implementation of youth criminal penalties. The institutions for closed youth care
are the responsibility of the Minister of Health, Welfare and Sports and the
judicial correctional institutions are the responsibility of the Minister of Security
16 Website Ministry of Justice www.justitie.nl
17 See more in depth Wijers and Liefaard 2007; Liefaard 2009.
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and Justice. This change has taken place to prevent youngsters with a criminal
history from being placed together with a youngster who is in need of protection.
The Netherlands had at the end of 2007 (before this new policy) fourteen youth
correctional institutions with approximately 2,750 places. In the years before 2007
this number had increased substantive, partly due to the aggravation of the
juvenile criminal law and the increased demand for closed places for child
protection. After 2007 the amount of youth in correctional institutions decreased
to 1,882 in 2009. The Principle Act Youth Correctional Institutions is applicable
to these devices. These youth correctional institutions could be both public
institutions and private establishments.
Foreigners18
Illegal residence in the Netherlands is not a criminal offence. Nevertheless, there
are several detention institutions in the Netherlands for illegal foreigners who
have to leave the country. These are mainly rejected asylum seekers and foreigners
who have no residence permits. The detention of illegal foreigners is not based on
a criminal conviction but on the basis of an administrative measure on the basis of
the Foreigners Act. Due to the increased number of illegal foreigners, and
particularly the tightening of immigration and asylum policy and the intensifica-
tion of control and detection devices specific foreigners detention institutions in
the Netherlands were created. Even here, however, in recent years we have seen a
decline in the use of available capacity for illegal aliens. In 2005 12,485 aliens were
placed in a detention institution for illegal foreigners. This amount was in 2009
reduced to 7,867.
One of the current discussion topics is that detention of illegal immigrants is
actually the same as criminal detention. The regime to which the detained aliens
are subject is almost the same as detainees who have a criminal sanction.
“Foreigners, along with suspects and convicts imprisoned under a regime that
is established with a view to criminal proceedings, feel not without a reason
discriminated and criminalized.”19 There is no special regime for detention of
foreigners. This practice in the Netherlands has led to substantial (international)
criticism.20
18 See more in depth Van Kalmthout 2007; Van Kamthout 2009.
19 Van Kalmthout 2009, p. 321.
20 Committee for the Prevention of Torture ad Inhum and Degrading Treatment, Visit to the Netherland
June 2007, www.cpt.coe.int; Amnesty International, The Netherlands: The detention of irregular
migrants and asylumseekers, jun 2008; Raad voor de Sanctietoepassing, Vreemdelingenbewaring,
16 June 2008 (all cited in Van Kalmthout 2009, p. 332).
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5.2.4 PROBATION
Probation in the Netherlands has a long private history. Traditionally, there were
many organizations that have a task in the field of probation. Recently, the
organization and functioning of the Probation Service has changed intensively.
Professionalism and efficiency are now key concepts. In the Netherlands there are
three probation organizations: the Probation Department of the Salvation Army,
the Social Rehabilitation for Addicted Offenders and the Dutch Probation
Foundation. Together these organizations are the Probation Service in the
Netherlands. “The Probation Service performs the following tasks:
• diagnosis and advice;
• supervision of conditional sanction modalities (for example, the suspended
prison sentence, suspension of pre-trial detention under conditions and
detention under hospital order with conditions);
• performing behavioural interventions;
• performing task penalties, in particular labour penalties.
The Probation Service can only perform probation activities as commissioned by
the judicial authorities: the Public Prosecution Service, the judiciary and the
prison system.”21 The rehabilitation organizations operate on the basis of the 1995
Probation and After-Care Order.
Each of these organizations has a specific group of persons for which they carry
out probation tasks. The Salvation Army focuses on suspects and offenders who
became criminals because of housing problems. They receive about 8% of the
overall budget of the Probation Service and employ about 200 persons. The Social
Rehabilitation for addicted Offenders concentrates on addict litigants. Here,
approximately 500 employees annually treat about 16,000 people. They receive
about 28% of the overall budget. The Dutch Probation Foundation provides
probation for all other groups and is actually the largest probation organization. It
has over 1,600 employees and every year more than 65,000 contacts with
(ex-)detainees. They receive 65% of the overall budget.
The three organizations worked intensively in the Netherlands Foundation of
Probation Offices but because of bureaucratic political conflicts this came to an
end. The Minister of Justice now controls the rehabilitation organizations more
thoroughly. In fact, they became a full part of the criminal chain. With its clients
(Public Prosecution Service Ministry, the judiciary and Correctional Institutions
Agency) concrete quantitative and qualitative production numbers are agreed. In
each prosecutor district there is now a probation counter established which is
the main contact for the probation orders from the Public Prosecution Service,
the judiciary and the prison system and from which they tasks are distributed
21 Van Kalmthout and Tigges 2008, pp. 680-681.
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among the three rehabilitation organizations. In some municipalities the Dutch
probation organizations are participating in the newly established security
houses.
Primary objective of the probation organizations is to prevent recidivism, and
to a lesser extent the welfare of individuals. Contributing to the safety of society
is the key task for the rehabilitation. The Probation Services in the Netherlands
has gradually changed from an aid organization to a criminal justice organiza-
tion.22 “It cannot be said that the probation betrays its raison d’être, it can be
said that the probation during its existence has been exposed to different
influences and that some aspects of the probation work that were for a long
time important are now due to the unilateral emphasis on effectiveness seem to
be lost. This is especially true for those activities that express the concern that
the probation has long been cherished for the welfare of litigants and ensuring
their fundamental rights.”23
It seems impossible that the three probations organizations will become more
integrated. The backgrounds and aspirations of the three probation organizations
differ too much. This requires all stakeholders in the probation process but also
in the criminal chain to realize different forms of cooperation and coordination.
The tasks and organizations in the field of probation in the Netherlands are very
fragmented. This has negative consequences for the effectiveness and efficiency of
the probation tasks in the Netherlands. A more integral Probation Service could
contribute to improving the realization of the probation objectives.
5.3 Trends in detention24
Detention is an ever-developing and changing topic. The future of detention is
unpredictable. I would, however, like to try to sketch a few trends in detention and
prisons in the Netherlands.
5.3.1 DETENTION IS HIGHLY DEPENDENT ON SOCIETAL DEVELOPMENTS
The history of detention shows that in defining policies and structuring detention
organisations, policy-makers have always taken societal developments into ac-
count. Even though there is sometimes a delayed response, the detention system
always adjusts to new societal developments. In the 1960s and 1970s, the position
of the defendant – and, hence, the inmate and his rights as well – received a great
deal of attention. In the 1980s and 1990s, the emphasis shifted to improving
22 Van Kalmthout and Tigges 2008.
23 Boone 2009, p. 353.
24 Based on and cited from Muller 2009. See also Pakes 2000; Pakes 2007.
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effectiveness and efficiency in society and, therefore, of detention as well. The
ever-changing regulations, directives, organisational forms and even new forms of
detention reflect the constant need to adjust to a changing society. This means
detention reflects thinking in society.
Two inmates in one cell, specific facilities for criminal addicts, changes in the
entrustment order system and maximum security institutions all respond to
specific societal trends. Society puts more emphasis on causing distress after a
criminal offence rather than extensive forms of resocialisation. The detention
sector follows. By far the most significant change in the detention system of the
past few years has been the introduction of multi-occupancy cells. Some years ago,
this was considered politically unfeasible, but now there are hardly any opponents.
Multiple prison cells are becoming the regular norm in Dutch prisons. On all
fronts, far-reaching experiments are conducted for the purpose of examining to
what extent the multi-occupancy cells can achieve the objectives of detention. New
prisons are only built with the possibility of multiple cells. There are now even
experiments with six persons in one cell. The broad social debate on the
introduction of multi-occupancy cells was held only to a limited degree. The
prison sector and the government in particular felt that there were hardly any
objections to this radical change among the population.
The programme Modernization Prisons has also as a starting point the close
connection to the needs of society. This programme should lead to ensure that:
– a contribution to the safety of society is realized;
– the implementation of sanctions and measures will be more effective and
efficient;
– a contribution is made to the achievement of the DJI imposed financial
targets;
– better cooperation within the prison chain is realized.
“The need and desire for change remains high. Firstly the prison system is faced
with more and more psychiatric and addiction problems in prison so the demand
for adequate care increases. Secondly the cooperation in the prison chain needs
improving. Thirdly it is necessary to respond effectively and efficiently quantita-
tive and qualitative changes in the need for prison capacity. Flexibility of capacity
management is required. Within the maximum capacity of a prison fluctuations
in the supply of prisoners have to coped without leading to new construction or
abandonment of facilities. Finally, the prison system has to achieve cost reduction
next to some new investments.”25
The history of detention in the Netherlands shows that this process did not
start only in the past few years. In the past few centuries, the detention sector has
adjusted to new societal developments time and time again. The form and
25 Brief staatssecretaris Justitie 12 November 2007.
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substance of detention reflect the state of society. In other words, society receives
the detention system that it deserves. It is to be expected that this will happen in
the coming years as well. This will mean that we can expect further functionality
and greater austerity in prison regimes.
5.3.2 CHANGING DEMANDS FOR DETENTION: NEED FOR FLEXIBILITY
Increase in capacity was a top priority for the Dutch Government in office.
Deprivation of liberty in whatever form will exist in the future as well. Capacity
deficits will always be a hotly debated issue in the future too.26 The Netherlands
has had a structural capacity deficit since 2001. By now, the punishment regime
has lost its universally praised leniency. Calls in society for higher and longer
sentences have proved persistent and undoubtedly affect the level and term of the
sentences. The need for retaliation is considerable. People are striving ever more
ambitiously for a safe, riskless society from which all offenders and bad guys
should be removed. The government is expected to ensure that society will be safe.
For this purpose, detention capacity had to be extended.
Until a few years ago convicted persons had to be released prematurely to make
room for new convicted persons. Such premature releases (including conversions
into electronic house arrest) affected the very core of the legitimacy of the
detention policy. Political and public support for this kind of rear door policy
could not be continued for a long time.
The last few years in the Netherlands there was a large extension of the capacity of
prison cells. At the same time the total amount of prisoners declined. At this
moment (2012) there are too many prison cells so a lot of prison cells are empty.
Some prisons have to be closed now. The demand for detention capacity was
reduced. The government identifies as a key cause the reduced insecurity and
unsafety. The government provides in its plans to seek a 25% reduction in crime
in 2010 compared to 2002 and a 10% decrease in recidivism. If these objectives
are to be achieved, the necessary capacity of detention will continue to fall. Based
on these objectives, the number of places in prisons will decrease even further in
the coming years.
However the government chooses to continue and expand the use of multiple
prisons cells, even the government says that these multiple prison cells are
primarily a measure for capacity shortages. But it looks like a good possibility to
reduce costs in prisons. The main objective of these multiple prison cells is a
financial objective. It also provides the possibility to use detention capacity in a
flexible way. With multiple and one persons cells the Netherlands can anticipate
an increase or decrease in the need for detention. The predictability of prison
26 And they were hotly debated in the past as well; see the special issue of Justitiële Verkenningen, 6, 1995.
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capacity is not always very high, so the Prison Service is compelled to create a
more flexible placement of prisoners.
5.3.3 DEFECTIVE KNOWLEDGE OF DETENTION
Citizens, but also many authorities and the media, have only limited knowledge of
detention. They systematically fail to appreciate the standard distinction between
prisons and detention centres. Information about detention is available only to a
limited extent. It is hardly included in any scientific or other study programmes. It
has increasingly become a subject for specialists and persons working in the
sector. In view of the immense significance of the subject to society, this is
undesirable.
Detention is not a high priority in the ordinary public and political perception.
Detention is prioritized only if there are incidents, such as escapes or criminal
offences committed by patients who have escaped from forensic institutions. Such
cases are often discussed and assessed, however, without proper knowledge of the
subject of detention. The basic assumption is that the detention sector should
particularly ensure that incidents are prevented. The manner in which detention
is regulated is not a subject of political or public debate. This means that there is
diffuse societal support for the detention policy. As only few people are really
knowledgeable about detention, it cannot be said that the detention policy is
broadly supported by the population. In all likelihood, the majority of the Dutch
population would favour an even more sober and stricter regime.
The citizens’ and politicians’ perception of detention is based largely on media
reports on detention. In these reports, popular pictures prevail, which are hardly
related to the reality of penal institutions. When there are incidents, politicians
and the media frequently misuse the citizens’ ignorance about detention. The
detention sector is not very active either in providing information about the
content and operation of the detention system, even if there are simple pictures
and diagrams to clarify the system. The open days of the institutions are a positive
exception. The future requires a more substantive and consistent policy, which
will increase the knowledge and insight of the persons involved in the various
sectors of society.
For the legitimacy of the detention policy it would be desirable to give politics,
media and citizens more insight into the actual operation and organization of
detention in the Netherlands. Managing public and political confidence are
nowadays very regular in many government. In the field of detention, there is
resistance to open and transparent display of the organization and functioning.
For the long-term legitimacy of detention it is necessary that sufficient attention is
available for managing the public and political confidence in the prison system.
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5.3.4 DETENTION IS A HIGHLY JURIDICAL POLICY AREA
Detention ultimately encroaches on the fundamental rights of citizens. The
inmate is completely dependent on the government. This necessitates an exten-
sive system of regulations and statutes that gives substance to the position of
inmates. The basic legislative system has been valid for many years,27 although it
was found necessary to make adjustments relating to the inmate’s position.
Generally, the rights of inmates have been reduced in the course of time
because of the general security interest and the greater emphasis on the functional
side of detention. This relationship should be balanced.
The large number of legal arrangements about nearly all aspects of living in
detention particularly reflect the process of juridification. Everything is regulated
or will be regulated in the near future. As the prison population has extensive
experience in legal proceedings, inmates are not afraid to conduct these proceed-
ings. This means that there must be proper rules. Recent case law shows,
however, that measures will have to be taken in this area. In this respect, the
authorities always seek the limits of what is possible in the context of international
human rights legislation in particular.
A substantial amount of scientific literature about detention in the Netherlands
has a primarily legal background as well. Even though a few behavioural scientists
have concerned themselves with the sociological, psychological or other aspects of
detention, they are a minority in Dutch scientific literature. In this context, an
exception must naturally be made for the extensive literature about forensic
science. Even so, it is useful and necessary that other sciences will focus more
attention on detention on a long-term basis. In this way the primary focus on the
legal aspects could be reduced.
5.3.5 NEW ATTENTION TOWARDS RECIDIVISM
Over the years, resocialisation has received less and less attention. There is an
emphasis on the repressive and functional nature of detention rather than on the
inmate’s return to society. First and foremost, detention is designed to execute a
punishment as retaliation for the commission of specific criminal offences. The
other function is to prevent the person concerned from recidivism. Much of the
organisation and the type of detention has been made subordinate to these
functions. Admittedly, the formal documents still and explicitly mention resocia-
lisation, but in practice, it is less and less dominant. There are fewer and fewer
possibilities for inmates to actually resocialise in the penal institutions.28
27 Kelk, 2003.
28 See also Schuyt and Kommer 1998.
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Rehabilitation and recidivism had become increasingly unimportant in the
Netherlands. One of the underlying causes was that it became more and more
clear that types of resocialisation used earlier did not have the desired effects in
terms of reducing recidivism. The greater emphasis on the repressive and
functional aspects has made life in the penal institutions ever more uniform.
The possibilities for inmates had become increasingly limited. The tasks for the
employees in the detention sector had become increasingly uniform.29
The Dutch government has announced a major shift in this lack of attention for
rehabilitation and recidivism. Government in Holland became worried about the
numbers mentioned in this table.30
Figure 3 Adjusted percentages of general recidivism two years after imposing the sanction, or
release from the institution, by year of imposition/release
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The above figures, triggered the new Secretary of Justice to initiate a programme
in 2008 to reduce the recidivism rate, making it one of her priorities. For each
prisoner with a sentence or a sentence remainder of four months a re-integration
programme by the prison system in cooperation with Probation is created. To
realize this government has realized a specific programme, Reduction Recidivism.
There have been specific agreements between DJI, municipalities and other
partners to ensure that ex-prisoners get an identity, a house, work and income so
29 Compare Kommer 1991.
30 WODC Factsheet 2009-5a Recidivism report 1997-2006.
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that they can fully participate in society. A crucial part of this new policy is more
intensive after care of prisoners. The new government in the Netherlands, which
came into office in 2010, continued this policy on reducing recidivism. It is
gratifying to note that there is renewed attention for rehabilitation with the aim of
reducing recidivism. The person-oriented approach to detainees could lead to many
benefits. It offers the ability for tailor-made and concrete events per individual with
all organizations involved. It will, however, create huge demands on the organiza-
tion of detention, and particularly the cooperation with other organizations.
5.3.6 NEED FOR LONG TERM POLICY
In the past few years, differentiation was to become an important issue in
detention policy in the Netherlands.31 After the Minister of Justice’s opinion letter
called “Modernisation of the Application of Sanctions”, the role of differentiation
in forms, organisation, treatment and duration of sanctions has become crucial.
More and more specific programmes for specific target groups have been
developed, based on the argument that ever-changing circumstances require
variation and differentiation. The government welcomed the resulting implication
that multi-occupancy cells could be introduced at the same time. In this way, a
substantive change in the application of sanctions could be effectively connected
with the necessity of efficiency improvements.
Deprivation of liberty comes in an increasing number of varieties. In this
context, the most effective sanction is formally preferred. The most effective
sanction is a sanction that can best prevent an inmate from reoffending after his
release. By now, it is clear that some kinds of sanctions are ineffective in some
cases, but it is still not entirely clear which sanctions work well in specific cases.
This will require a great deal of research in the future. But above all, it will be
necessary to properly describe and evaluate the experiences with the various
detention forms that are now being gained in order to establish whether these will
result in improved recidivism figures. Increased attention for differentiation,
including selection and counselling, is to be encouraged both from the inmate’s
perspective and the government’s perspective. In this way, personal needs can be
satisfied to the maximum extent possible.
Although the current preferred approach seems promising, it is necessary to
examine the possibility of a longer term policy on detention in the Netherlands.
Although social developments change frequently, it is necessary for a longer term
to create clarity about the substantive and organizational aspects of detention in
the Netherlands. The person-oriented approach is of crucial importance but to be
effective it should be consequently implemented in the next ten years. This
31 Compare Boin 1998.
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implies that in the coming years no fundamental change in this person-oriented
policy will take place. My plea is to achieve a long-term policy on the content and
the organization of detention. Too many substantive and organizational changes
will have a negative impact on the effectiveness of the detention policy as a whole.
5.3.7 THE DETENTION SECTOR IS PRONE TO INCIDENTS
The detention sector is prone to incidents. Examples include escapes, unrest in
institutions, offenders placed under an entrustment order who commit criminal
offences on trial leave. The day-to-day work of penal institutions consists in
preventing these incidents. But if these incidents occur, the media and politicians
are often the first to comment on them. It requires the Minister of Security and
Justice to hold emergency debates and to tighten the measures. In this context, it
must be pointed out that the number of political and public incidents has dropped
over the past ten years. The number of escapes has dropped. The number of
suicides is increasing, but these are not considered incidents deserving public and
political attention. These statistics are soon forgotten by politicians and the public
alike if serious criminal offences are committed by entrustment order offenders
who have escaped or who are on trial leave.
The detention sector being incident-prone has everything to do with the increased
importance that citizens attach to security and the corresponding attention paid to
security by politicians and the media. Incidents involving the detention sector take
place under heavy and constant public and political scrutiny, as a result of which
those involved do not always keep their distance, which is necessary to achieve
practicable measures. Incidents are not expected to fall in the coming years. An
increase in knowledge will ensure, however, that the response to specific incidents
will be less hysterical and arbitrary.
Incidents may also be used to achieve fundamental changes in the detention
policy. The “drug swallowers affair” played an important part in the run-up to
reforms within the regular prison system in two aspects. The political commotion
caused by this affair functioned as a lightening rod for an insidious institutional
crisis within the prison system. The release of drugs couriers was initially
particularly associated with the culture of regulated toleration in this country, not
with the structural shortage of cells and the inability of the current prison system to
deal with peaks in the supply of inmates. Nevertheless, the drug swallowers affair
eventually functioned as a catalyst for policy reforms. The emergency act resulted in
a breakthrough in the debate on “two-to-a-cell”, which meant that a number of
political parties were prepared to discuss the introduction of multi-person cells in
the regular system. Accordingly, the detention sector should be vigilant in the case
of incidents and crises, not only because of the incidents and crises themselves but
also because of the potentially far-reaching and long-term implications.
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The fire in the Detention Complex Schiphol-Oost for illegal aliens in the night of
October 27, 2005 in which eleven people died, increased within the detention
sector the focus on (internal) security greatly. After a report of the National
Research Board for the Safety of September 21, 2006 the cabinet announced a
large quantity of measures to improve the (fire) safety in all detention facilities in
the Netherlands. Within Correctional Institutions Agency a security programme
is designed to ensure that Correctional Institutions Agency has full knowledge on
the risks of physical security, to implement an effective policy to the physical safety
and to respond to signals that can improve physical safety. There is a crisis
structure established and crisis plans were made. Correctional Institutions
Agency has made a specific vision on safety and security in prisons. Training
and exercise are crucial part of improving safety and security in Dutch prisons.
“In recent years, tremendous efforts have been made to raise the standard to
higher levels in all institutions. But when something does go wrong, human
action remains the most important thing. That’s why it’s essential that employees
know what they should do in such situations, and that their actions become
‘automatic behaviour’ as much as possible. As a result, drills dealing with crisis
situations were regularly conducted in all institutions in 2007. One example is the
multidisciplinary crisis drill in the Achterhoek penitentiary institution, which took
place in September, following a year of preparations. Many Correctional Institu-
tions Agency employees – not to mention the police, fire brigade, municipality,
Medical Assistance in Accidents and Disasters, and the Public Prosecutor’s office
– participated in the drill. With nearly five hundred participants, it was one of the
largest drills ever held in the Netherlands. This part of the exercise in particular,
i.e. drills and training, will be fine-tuned even further in years to come.”32
Safety and security in prisons is one of the main concerns of prison administra-
tion in the Netherlands nowadays. Politics and media are very keen on incidents
concerning safety and security in prisons. At this moment the prison adminis-
tration has re-earned political and public confidence concerning safety and
security in prisons.
5.3.8 FUNCTIONALITY AND SAFEGUARDS
The concept of functionality occupies a central position in the current policy of the
Ministry of Justice on detention.33 Functionality is absolutely defensible, because
32 DJI jaarbericht 2007.
33 Opinion Letter on the Modernisation of the Application of Sanctions, Minister of Justice, 7 June 2004.
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there is a need to work more effectively with more limited resources. In this
context, the Ministry of Justice wants to give further substance to the concept of
demand side management. For the foregoing reason, it is a good thing and logical
to seek and find the best form of sanction for specific inmates. This functionality,
however, can be achieved only to a limited extent in the light of ever changing
frameworks and reduced financial resources. The functionality of the sanctions is
conceivable and practicable only if more generous resources and facilities are
provided for this purpose.34
Besides, it is crucial that the safeguard function under the criminal law should
always continue to apply to inmates in the future as well. This function is
supposed to safeguard the inmate against the sentence-executing government.
In the past, too much attention was paid to the inmate’s legal position. This is
shown by the extensive possibilities of the right of complaint. This attention ran
parallel to the attention that was focused on the defendant in criminal cases. The
shift in emphasis from the safeguard function in the past to the functional aspect
at present should not result in the former being pushed aside too much.
Arbitrariness in the execution of sentences must be avoided, even if based on
efficiency considerations.
Generally speaking, everybody will agree with efforts to achieve a responsible
balance between functionality and safeguards. It is more complicated and
controversial, however, as far as specific situations are concerned. In the detention
world, new forms of detention are subject to many experiments: multi-occupancy
cells and electronic detention are only a few examples.35 In the case of these
specific measures, this balance must be achieved as well.
5.3.9 DETENTION IS AN INTEGRAL PART OF MANY POLICY CHAINS
Detention is part of various chains. The detention sector depends on others very
much. It determines the quantity and quality of the supply of inmates only to a
limited extent. Others are primarily responsible for the investigation, prosecution
and trial stages. This dependency may be reduced but a certain degree of
dependency is inevitable. The police, the Public Prosecution Service and the
courts will continue to determine the size and quality of the services to be supplied
for the most part. This is all the more true since judges increasingly specify in
their decisions how sentences are to be enforced.
The criminal justice chain constitutes the most crucial chain for the detention
sector. The criminal justice chain starts with the police, followed by the Public
Prosecution Service and the judiciary, and ends with the Custodial Institutions
34 See also De Keijser 2001.
35 This was also the case in the past. See the special issue of Justitiele Verkenningen,1, 1999, Sleutelen aan
detentie.
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Service, which has to deal with partners such as the Probation and After-Care
Service, the Salvation Army and the addiction care institutions. “The partners
within a chain strongly depend on each other. The proper exchange of information
and clarity about the possibilities and impossibilities are crucial. If the police, for
example, decide to take action against bag snatchers, the police stations and
detention centres must, of course, have sufficient capacity to detain the persons
arrested. If necessary, the Custodial Institutions Service must be given the
opportunity to take measures to provide the police with capacity for persons
under arrest in a timely fashion, if this kind of action leads to a capacity
problem.”36
The care chain is relevant in the case of entrustment orders with or without
treatment. The limited number of places for entrustment patients necessitates
coordination with the Public Prosecution Service, the judiciary, the Probation and
After-Care Service and the Dutch Mental Health Care Association. For this
purpose, coordinators for forensic psychiatric integration of treatment services
were set up in 2004. Their activities have by now become part of the regular
activities.
Within the juvenile chain, a distinction is made between the criminal chain and
the civil chain. The type of chain a young persons ends up in is determined largely
by chance. As a result of the large number of partners in youth care and the large
number of juvenile detention forms, the network of organisations involved is
complex.
Finally, the aliens chain is distinguished. For the purposes of the execution of the
aliens policy, capacity must be made available for the detention of aliens.
The above mentioned chains show that a well-functioning detention system
requires many partners. The cooperation, coordination, information exchange
and balancing between all these partners require a great deal of effort. By now, it is
recognized that cooperation with the chain partners is of crucial importance. It is a
key objective of the government’s policy. Improved cooperation between the chain
partners in the detention network can be helpful in this context, but cannot solve
the problem as such. The detention sector will be able to exert only limited
influence as far as the extent and quality of its own problems are concerned.
Experiences gained in other sectors with capacity and performance contracts may
be highly relevant to the detention sector.
36 Annual Report Correctional Institutions Agency 2004, p. 17.
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The extent of the discretionary freedom of the parties involved is also of crucial
importance to a properly functioning network of organisations in the detention
sector. In various chapters, it has been pointed out that many persons affect the
quantity and quality of the inmates. But how far does the discretionary power of
the police, the Public Prosecution Office and the courts extend in this context? Do
they have to take account of the limited capacity of the detention sector or are there
other considerations? And do they have to take into account specific deficits and
surpluses? It is highly questionable whether the capacity issue can be solved by
practicable production arrangements in the various sectors. The “production” in
respect of crime and security can be planned partly, but not entirely. The entire
chain system is unpredictable to a certain extent.
5.3.10 QUALITY OF DETENTION IS AN IMPORTANT INDICATOR FOR THE QUALITY
OF SOCIETY
I began this chapter by describing the close relationship between society and
detention. I want to end it by bringing them together again. The state of detention
reflects the quality of society.37 The manner in which detention is organised and
implemented in a country is highly indicative of the quality of this country. This
does not necessarily mean that inmates should be treated nicely and softly, but it is
necessary that a detention system should satisfy some crucial criteria.
First, the type and execution of detention should be democratically legitimate.
This means not only that the laws and regulations under which detention is
organised and executed must be enacted in accordance with democratic and
statutory rules but also that the type and execution of detention must – above all –
be in line with the views of the majority of the population. And this especially
means that the detention sector should be able and willing to adjust to changes in
society time and again. Legitimacy of detention can be guaranteed in the long term
only in this way. Actual and formal detention and the ideas society has about the
foregoing may not be substantially different from each other.
Second, there should be a sound balance between the functionality and the
safeguard function of detention. Inmates should be subject to the penalties or
sanctions that best reduce the risk of recidivism. The sentence must be executed
as effectively as possible. In addition, society has a right to expect the detention
sector to spend its resources as efficiently as possible. This applies not only to the
resources of the detention sector as a whole, but also, in particular, to the facilities
for the inmates. In this context too, there should not be too great a difference
between the level of facilities considered appropriate by citizens and the police on
the one hand and the real level of facilities on the other. The detention sector must
be effective, functional and efficient.
37 Compare Franke 1990; Franke 1995; Franke 1996; Weringh 1993.
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But it is also crucially important to the state of detention and the quality of
society that the inmate’s position is sufficiently safeguarded, both formally and in
actual practice. Inmates are at the mercy of the government, which is responsible
for administering fair punishment on them. Formal and actual safeguards should
prevent the arbitrary execution of detention. Not only is this crucial in terms of the
inmates and their rights, but it also crucial in terms of a functional, effective and
efficient detention system. The unequivocal and clear definition of the inmate’s
rights and obligations as well as the latter’s formal and actual possibilities for
lodging complaints are essential to the safeguard function. There should be a
possibility of measuring the state of detention. By now, many data and figures
relating to the detention sector have been collected. The desirability and feasibility
of a Detention Indicator for the purpose of assessing the quality of the state of
detention should be considered.
In most international literature on Dutch detention in recent years authors have
written with disappointment and horror that the Dutch prison policy has become so
much worse. Sometimes very dramatic terms were used.38 The past is in these
articles wrongly glorified. The prison policy in the Netherlands has in my opinion
been more grown-up in the last decade. Not only prevention and tolerance
were used but at necessary moments repression and detention were possible.
The better combination of these measures has also helped to improve security in
the Netherlands. It has also contributed to the (temporary) surge in the number of
people in Dutch prisons. The number of persons in Dutch prisons has decreased in
the last five years. A more long-term perspective is sometimes necessary – for
government, prison service and scientists – to see and to judge the ultimate effects.
5.4 Conclusion
Detention is a crucial part of the administration of justice in the Netherlands. The
quality of society can even be measured in terms of the state of detention. This
work shows a great diversity of detention forms. The work also makes it clear that
detention is always subject to changes. Science, politics and detention practice
should always be prepared to start the debate and dialogue about any changes that
may be possible or desired within the detention sector. Changes in the detention
sector will be necessary in the future as well for the purpose of integrating
society’s ever changing perception of detention.
38 See for instance Pakes 2006; Downes and Van Swaaningen 2007.
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6 Criminal investigation
The criminal investigation departments of the regional police forces and the
national police force have to solve crimes. That is one of the most important tasks
of the police. Solving crimes is not always an easy task. For those who watch too
much television, it seems so easy. They will have a romanticized perception: one
or two investigators go out with a superior talent search and within a one hour
broadcast grasp the offender. The impression is that complex crimes can be easily
solved with the right doses of experience, intuition and perseverance. And one
gets the impression that a handful of people is sufficient to clarify the matter.
The reality of the criminal investigation is more prosaic. A large number of
criminal investigators are necessary who are also assisted by special investigators,
such as the technical criminal investigation department (TR) or the Dutch
Forensic Institute (NFI). They are all concerned with the collection and processing
of relevant information. What information is collected, at what time and what to
do with it requires an effective and efficient working organization. The Public
Prosecution Service has to control and lead the criminal investigation by the
police.
Criminal investigation has an additional problem: a lot of information or traces
is rapidly lost or witnesses quickly forget crucial information. This means that in
many cases the most important information must be gathered in a short period
after the discovery of the crime. Criminal investigation does not only mean a well
functioning organization, but also an organization effective in a very a short time.
It is also necessary that all organizations work together in an effective way and
exchange relevant information.
This chapter is based on and cited from an extensive empirical research on
criminal investigation in the Netherlands called The criminal investigation process
by De Poot, Bokhorst, Van Koppen and Muller, 2004.1 In this study three themes
were researched: (1) how the criminal investigation process is organized, (2) the
methods and powers used in the criminal investigation and (3) the way criminal
investigators try to solve crime. This seems like three separate themes, but that they
are not. Crime solving depends on how the criminal investigation is organized and
which powers and methods are deployed.
1 De Poot, Bokhorst, Van Koppen and Muller 2004. Compare Raine and Wilson 1993; McConville and
Wilson 2002; Ashworth and Redmayne 2005; Newburn, Williamson and Wright 2007; Sanders and
Young 2007.
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More than one hundred criminal investigation processes were intensively and
empirically researched. This research was performed in six Dutch police regions.
The research focused on arson, theft with violence, abuse, kidnapping and hostage
taking, assault and rape, murder and homicide and house burglary. The police
organisations gave full information about the processes of the criminal investiga-
tion. With a comparable analytical framework the different criminal investigations
were analysed. I have tried to aggregated from the typical Dutch situation and
formulate the dilemmas in a way that can also be used in other countries. The
reader can judge if these dilemmas are also applicable for his own organisation
and country. When I mention the results of research in this chapter it is the above
mentioned research on criminal investigation in the Netherlands.2
In this chapter I will sketch the dilemmas which occur in the criminal
investigation process in the Netherlands. It concerns dilemmas which are
primarily of importance for the management of the criminal investigation, but
also concern ordinary investigating officers. When conducting a criminal inves-
tigation the pros and cons must always be weighed against each other and
I present those usually in the form of a dilemma. The dilemmas are in fact
always choices which must be made by the management of the criminal
investigation and by the investigating officers. In this chapter I will focus on
the dilemmas concerning investigation and evidence, concerning the organisation
of the criminal investigation and concerning the methods used. These dilemmas
are crucial for the way the criminal investigation takes form. But before that I will
give a short overview of the organization of the criminal investigation in the
Netherlands.3
6.1 Criminal investigation in the Netherlands
The criminal investigation organization in the Netherlands is in transition. For a
good understanding of the criminal investigation process it is necessary to give a
brief sketch of the wider criminal investigation organization in the Netherlands.
The police are responsible for the enforcement of the law. The public prosecutor is
the leader of the criminal investigation. Crucial decisions in the criminal
investigation process and in particular the use of specific investigation methods
and other powers require the consent of the prosecutor. The prosecutor is the link
to the courts for the police. In larger cases, a specific public prosecutor in
particular has the formal leadership of the criminal investigation.
In the Netherlands there are 25 regional police forces and one national police
force. Each of these forces has its own criminal investigation departments (CID).
2 See also Muller, Van der Leun, Moerings and Van Calster 2010.
3 See for history Brantjes 2001.
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In our study we concentrated on the CID of the individual regional forces. Within
these regional police forces there are CID’s on area teams, district teams and the
regional level. Police forces in the Netherlands have a high degree of freedom to
establish their CID organization in their own corps. There are significant
differences between the regional forces in the way the CID functions are
organized. When the national police force will be implemented this will change.
Besides these regional forces in recent years there was much discussion on
inter-regional and national criminal investigation. Since a long time, there are so-
called core teams on the inter-regional level which are mainly concerned with the
criminal investigation and prosecution of serious organized crime. There are also
now regional criminal investigation teams for the mid-crime, joint teams with
foreign countries and inter-regional fraud teams. In addition, since 2005
a national CID for serious organized crime and counterterrorism has been
established. The CID system in the Netherlands is thus a wide range of
organizations which all in one way or another contribute to the criminal
investigation and the prosecution of criminal offences. Cooperation, coordination
and information exchange between these organizations is a constant concern. The
debate about the proper structure, especially the inter regional and national CID is
long, complex and politically sensitive. Nevertheless, it seems that in the Nether-
lands a growing centralization and concentration of the CID function occurs. This
is attempted to connect with the changing nature and extent of organized crime.
The centralization and nationalization of the police as a whole in the Netherlands
is also happening to the criminal investigation departments.
The Dutch criminal investigation was faced in recent years with many develop-
ments. In the first place further professionalization of the criminal investigation
and criminal organization was necessary for tackling the new and ever-changing
forms of crime. Within the Dutch police there are many initiatives to improve the
criminal organization and professionalism. A national programme (ABRIO)
attempted, through the standardization of criminal investigation processes, to
achieve more uniformity of criminal investigation processes in the Netherlands.
In most police regions, detectives are increasingly working with intelligence led
criminal investigation processes. The Institute for Crime Control and Criminal
Science has fully reviewed its education. Today some Dutch journals on the topic
have emerged. This development is partly motivated by the growing professiona-
lization of the Criminal Intelligence Unit.
Crucial to the developments of the Dutch criminal investigation has been the IRT
affair in the mid-nineties of the last century. Although this affair was primarily
concentrated on the use of special investigative methods of organized crime, the
affair had far reaching effects on the further professionalization of criminal
investigation. The report of the Parliamentary Investigation Committee on
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Policing Methods (better known as the Committee Van Traa, 1996) led to
profound changes in both the formal rules and the organization of the criminal
investigation. A subsequent Parliamentary Investigation Committee (better
known as the Commission Kalsbeek, 1999) made it clear that the Dutch criminal
investigation has learned very much from this affair. A new way of criminal
investigation has now emerged.4
Within the criminal investigation organization various functions can be distin-
guished. The tactical CID is responsible for the content and organization of the
criminal investigation. Tactical investigators determine what elements should be
investigated and how the search process should be established. The tactical CID
focuses on delivering the evidence for specific cases. In various forces within the
tactical CID there are specialties, such as youth and vice. If a substantial or
significant offence – mainly capital offences – occurs, a special investigation team
is formed with tactical criminal investigators. The other services listed below often
fulfil a key role.
The technical CID focuses on the technical elements of the criminal investiga-
tion of the offence. The technical CID identifies tracks on the crime scene and is
doing further research into the background of these tracks. To this end, regional
police forces have their own technical CID, but increasingly the technical CIDs are
working together on inter-regional and national level. The Dutch Forensic
Institute is also of great importance to this feature of the criminal investigation.
The Criminal Intelligence Unit (CIE) collects and processes all relevant
information about crimes and suspects. For the collection of information it makes
use of informants and other methods. In recent years, partly as a result of the IRT
affair, a strong professionalization of the information function within the CID
occurred. Most regional forces have a separate unit specifically focused on crime
analysis.
An observation team (OT) can be used for observing people. If during an
observation or at other times in the criminal investigation technical tools are used,
aid can be invoked by a section of technical support (STO). If dangerous suspects
are to be arrested the use of an arrest team (AT) is possible. Many regional police
forces also have an agency that is primarily focused on the financial aspects of the
evidence against specific suspects. The Recognition Service maintains the Service
Recognition System (HKS) in which the records of crimes and suspicious persons
are registered. Within various forces there are – to a greater or lesser extent –
specialties: youth and vice, police infiltration, environmental police, fraud, drugs,
firearms, robbery, car crime, burglary, money and securities, human trafficking
and prostitution, hostage negotiators, and counter terrorism.
4 I was secretary of both these parliamentary inquiry committees.
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6.2 Investigation and evidence5
If resources and time were unlimited, more criminal offences would be solved.
That is more than just stating the obvious. It appeared in the research in the
Netherlands that quite regularly the criminal investigation service makes choices
which, with the limited resources and time, are also detrimental to the criminal
investigation. The activities which the police undertake appear to depend espe-
cially on what they immediately learn about a case.
6.2.1 COMPLETING LINES OF INVESTIGATION
Many criminal offences which the police are aware of are not solved. This is partly
because cases are not investigated and partly because the criminal investigation
fails. There are a number of causes which all have to do with lines of investigation
in a criminal investigation. Investigations quite often lead to areas which are
difficult to investigate, e.g. because the area of investigation is extensive, because
the investigation involves a lot of costs, or because the investigation is difficult to
organise. This kind of areas is mostly not investigated. For instance, in a murder
inquiry no investigation was carried out at the asylum seekers’ centre which the
victim often visited, since in order to question the inhabitants of this centre many
different interpreters were needed. In another murder case an Eastern European
group was not questioned for the same reason. In a third murder case the victim
was found close to a big pond. In that investigation the murder weapon was
searched for in the surroundings of the crime scene, but the pond was left out,
since much time and money would be involved in searching that pond. So, by no
means all possible chances of finding evidence and tracing the perpetrator are
used. In general, in a criminal investigation the investigators try to weigh the
chance that a search area will yield meaningful information against the invest-
ment which has to be made to explore that search area. If the costs are high, the
search area is left unused.
Search areas do not yield any information
Often potential search areas do not yield any information. This sometimes
happens since there is no information. In many cases though the information
is (has been) present, but cannot (or can no longer) be retrieved or is overlooked.
For instance, after a case has been solved there almost always appear to be
witnesses who knew more about the case, but did not report to the police.
Information that is searched for also appears quite often to have been destroyed
when the police ask for it. This is for instance an issue with video tapes of security
5 Based on and cited from De Poot, Bokhorst, Van Koppen and Muller 2004, paragraph 6.3.
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cameras and with physical traces which were initially not considered. For
instance, in a murder inquiry the technical investigation service only got the
idea to search the victim’s telephone for finger prints after the print list showed
that a call had been made from the victim’s house. In that inquiry the traces of the
perpetrator were still found on the telephone, days after the crime and after the
crime scene had already been cleaned. If no traces had been found, it would never
have been possible to find out that they ever existed. In another investigation one
wanted to find out, in order to verify the story of a witness, in which gear the car of
the offenders was left when found. This question could no longer be answered,
since this car, which caused quite a lot of smell and mess in the garage, had been
ordered to be taken away. It also happens quite often that people cannot remember
anything of the particular day or evening, since they are asked far too late about it.
For instance, we followed a murder investigation in which the direct neighbours
of a victim were questioned for the first time more than a month after the murder.
Although these people were at home when their neighbour was killed in her own
home, they could remember little of that evening.
Search areas yield contradictory information
Information which originates from different sources often appears not to be
reconcilable. For instance, the one witness may allege that the perpetrator had a
pistol in his hands, while the other asserts that he threatened with a knife. The
descriptions of the same perpetrator are sometimes also irreconcilable. For
instance, in an investigation the same person was characterised by one witness
as a large dark man, and by the other as a somewhat stocky blond person. In an
investigation in a missing person case it appeared afterwards that the lady in
question had still been seen after her death by thirty witnesses at different places
and in different clothes. Since in almost every somewhat larger investigation there
is irreconcilable information, the police still attempt to continue the investigation
in most cases on contradictory information. Various strategies are used for this.
The most common strategy is to appraise the reliability of the various sources of
information and subsequently to take the most reliable information as a starting
point. The information which fits in best with the other information is in general
judged as the most reliable. However, by this procedure relevant information
which initially does not fit in with the reconstructed story is easily passed over.
A second strategy is to look for similarities in the information and to subsequently
continue the investigation on the basis of this more or less certain information. In
that case the information is not considered unequivocally as unknown until new
information is found which this information can be compared with. A third
strategy is to search for some sort of average. The man who is called black by the
one witness and blond by the other is then assumed to be dark blond.
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Possible clues or traces are overlooked or not followed up
Tips which the police receive, or information which comes to light during the
investigation, are by no means always rated at their true value. Sometimes
the information cannot be reconciled with the story that is believed, sometimes
the information itself is implausible and sometimes the acquired information is
considered to be of little value for the investigation. The way in which the flow of
information is regulated also often appears to be one of the causes that acquired
information is overlooked. In large investigations much information is received at
the same time. This information must be properly organised so that it can be used
if needed. The value of the acquired information is not always immediately clear.
Only in the course of an investigation will it become clear if acquired information
agrees or is irreconcilable with other findings of the investigation. Often the
acquired information is initially not used in the further investigation, but at a later
stage of the investigation this information becomes especially meaningful as
support of a story. Only when the information is properly organised and
documented, can it be retrieved at the correct moment and be used in a mean-
ingful way. However, in large investigations such information management fairly
often turns out to be lacking.
Lines of investigation lead to nothing
In an investigation many potential investigation possibilities lead to nothing. For
instance, witnesses have often observed the event so poorly that they cannot
recognise the perpetrator, nice flawless traces are found which do not match with
the traces in available files, or traces can indeed be identified, but turn out not to
be unique. For instance, it may turn out that the tape used by the perpetrators is
the best sold brand and is sold in many different store chains. It may also turn out
that the shoe prints found at the crime scene originate from soles which are under
almost all common sport shoes. It also often turns out that afterwards an
investigated trace does not agree with the information looked for. It may for
instance turn out that although a potential suspect possesses a pistol, the weapon
found on him is not the weapon used inmurdering the victim. Another example is
that the watch sold by a receiver of stolen goods to a customer who had resold it
again to another person is indeed traced, but turns out not to be the watch stolen
from the victim.
Lines of investigation stop prematurely
The most important reason to stop a line of investigation is that the statement by a
witness or the information found is seen as a confirmation or refutation of the
story which is being reconstructed. When a potential suspect has for instance an
airtight alibi, it is assumed that he has nothing to do with the crime. If he has an
airtight alibi in respect of his presence in the surroundings of the crime scene, it is
also quite often assumed that he has nothing to do with the crime. This first
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decision seems legitimate, the second not at all. Earlier convictions of potential
suspects for similar cases are in general seen as confirmation of their being the
offender. If, from the information found, it turns out that these suspects do not
occur in the files, it is often assumed that they have not committed a crime. The
rules used to make a certain decision are in short quite often open to question.
Lines of investigation often turn out to stop prematurely because of the belief in
rules which have quite a number of exceptions. This also results in chances
offered by the investigation – not being used.
6.2.2 CLASSIFICATION OF CASES
The choice of the strategy which the criminal investigation service will use in
solving a crime strongly depends on the knowledge and experience it has built up
in the course of time. In that connection the necessity to make a meaningful
classification plays an important role. Catching an offender red-handed will lead to
another strategy than crimes whereby the perpetrator still has to be found.
The classification of events also depends on the way in which the police learn of
the events. In case the police are immediately on site (more) information can be
collected quickly than when they arrive later. However, in most cases the police
arrived only later at the relevant spot which made them strongly dependent on the
stories of witnesses. The police in fact only quickly arrive on the scene when
assistance is needed. It is crucial that when providing assistance the police already
take account of the various aspects of criminal investigation. In case of other
crimes the police are less quickly on the scene. This choice is directly related to the
way in which priorities are set. From the perspective of investigation a rapid
response and presence is preferable in order to record and collect the relevant
information as quickly as possible. The daily priorities in police forces often do not
make this possible.
After a specific case has become known to the police, it will be necessary to
come to a classification of the crime in question. Various factors play a role in this
respect. In the first place it should be established whether it concerns a crime.
Often not all circumstances are known and it cannot unequivocally be determined
whether it in fact concerns a crime. In that case the method of interpretation of the
available facts becomes most important. The knowledge and experience of the
officers involved play an important role in this. Apart from this the officers
involved mostly have an explicit wish for more information before they come to a
definitive interpretation. The seriousness of the case is a second reason for going
over to investigation. In a serious case a criminal investigation is mostly started
before it has become completely clear that a crime has been committed. That is
different in less serious cases. In the third place it is considered whether a criminal
investigation serves the desired ultimate goal. In some cases welfare services or
other forms of assistance may give a much more important contribution to solving
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the underlying problem than setting up a criminal investigation. Finally the
investigating officers will estimate how difficult or easy it will be to solve a specific
crime. In our investigation there turned out to be a preference for crimes that are
easy to solve. In these cases the distance between the measures to be deployed and
the desired ultimate goal is smaller.
The way in which the police learn about the crime and the way in which they
subsequently define and categorise the crime is of great importance for the
method of investigation. At this preliminary stage of the actual investigation the
officers already take the most crucial decisions. At this stage the actual definition
of the problem, the crime and the directions of the solution are formulated. It is
therefore important that the criminal investigation management and the investi-
gating officers pay much attention to the process and content of this first crucial
stage.
6.2.3 CHOICE OF INVESTIGATION CATEGORY
Cases of criminal investigation may be distinguished in cases whereby at the start
there are both a story and a suspect who has allegedly played a role in it; cases in
which there is a story, but no suspect; cases in which only a suspect is known, but
no story and cases in which neither a story, nor a suspect is known. The choice of
the necessary investigation strategy depends on the classification into one of these
categories.
In the first case I speak of clear-cut cases in which the police catch someone
red-handed or someone gives himself up and there is no discussion about the
nature and background of the crime. Verification cases form the second category
in which both a story about what has happened and the identity of the suspect are
known at the start of the investigation. The criminal investigation service then
only has to verify the story. In the third place I distinguish tracing cases in which
there is a story but no suspect. In such a case the criminal investigation focuses on
tracing a suspect of a known crime. Finally I distinguish so-called search cases in
which it is both unclear what has precisely happened and who has done it. The
police will have to search for both the story and the suspects and witnesses
involved.
It will be clear that different forms of criminal investigation, different methods
as well as different tactics and strategies should be used for the different
categories. The police search cases are the most difficult ones but also the most
challenging. Clear-cut cases hardly form a challenge but do rapidly lead to the
desired result. It is up to the criminal investigation management to create a
sensible combination of the various kinds of cases within its own organisation.
The criminal investigation service will try to make a search case into a tracing case
by creating a scenario for the crime. In the course of the investigation a tracing
case is made into a verification case by completing the scenario with the identity of
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a perpetrator. A verification case will become a clear-cut case if the story and the
identity of the perpetrator can be established. Needless to say, in the daily practice
of conducting criminal investigations things are mostly not that simple, nor follow
such a process.
Whether an investigation is started in a case depends on the investigation
category to which a case belongs. Clear-cut cases are all investigated while that is
only true for half of the search cases. About 70% of the verification cases and
tracing cases are investigated. There are various reasons why a large part of the
search cases and part of the verification cases and tracing cases are not
investigated. The policy of the Public Prosecution Service of deciding not to
prosecute, the quality of the story and the evidence, the estimate of success by the
police and public prosecutor, the absence of witnesses or other information may
all contribute to the decision not to start an investigation. However, mostly it was
not completely clear why it was decided not to investigate further.
6.2.4 INVESTIGATION STRATEGY
The strategy to be used strongly depends on the category the case belongs to. In
tracing cases and search cases the investigation first of all focuses on identifying
the perpetrator. The information which is known at the start of the investigation
strongly determines the result. The original story is then the most important
guiding mechanism. The search process is guided by a story, constructed by the
investigating officers or in another way, and the available information. The
investigation is aimed at giving further shape and content to the story.
For this various lines of investigation are formulated at the beginning of the
investigation. These lines of investigation give direction to the way in which the
investigating officers subsequently carry out their work. Formulating the lines of
investigation is therefore crucial. The activities of the criminal investigation
service are directed at verifying or falsifying these lines of investigation. The
key elements and details of a supposed story must be completed. Various
investigation methods are used for this.
For the criminal investigation management it is of crucial importance that
these lines of investigation are the correct lines based on the investigation. A good
assessment of the available information is necessary for this. But it is also
necessary to arrive at other and new lines of investigation if certain lines do not
lead to the desired result. That makes it necessary to constantly redefine the
situation and the information and the desired lines of investigation. And that
requires from the criminal investigation management an especially open and
creative way of directing a criminal investigation. A certain persistence is
necessary, but it is necessary to keep an open mind for the possibility that the
wrong lines of investigation were pursued earlier.
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6.2.5 IDENTIFICATION STAGE AND EVIDENCE STAGE
The criminal investigation process can be divided into an identification stage
which runs from the moment that the case is reported until a suspect is identified
and an evidence stage which includes the next investigation period in which the
legal proof for the actions of the suspects is found. In clear-cut cases and
verification cases the emphasis is on the evidence stage while in tracing cases
and search cases the identification stage takes central place. In the evidence stage
methods are used for verifying the reconstructed story. In the identification stage
they are sometimes used to reconstruct a crime and sometimes to trace a suspect
and sometimes to provide evidence at a later stage of the investigation.
There is a close connection between the two stages. At the beginning of the
investigation it is necessary to anticipate information which may later be used for
the evidence stage. Some evidence can no longer be used if no specific investi-
gative acts have been carried out in the identification stage. The interaction
between the two stages is an important factor for the criminal investigation
management. At each step in the identification stage they will have to consider
what consequences this has for the later evidence stage.
6.3 Organisation of the criminal investigation process6
There are several moments in the organisation of the criminal investigation
process at which choices must be made. The organisation of the criminal
investigation determines they effectiveness of the investigation because crucial
choices about management, means and staff have to be made.
6.3.1 CENTRALISED OR DECENTRALISED
Criminal investigations may be conducted at various levels within a police force:
neighbourhood, district, region or even supra-regional and national. There are
various criteria that can be used to choose the most desirable level of investigation.
The distinction between petty crime, midlevel crime and serious, organised crime
often played a role in this respect. However, in practice a flexible attitude was
adopted as regards these criteria. The available capacity and the importance of a
case are more decisive than the question whether a case fits into the definitions of
the various levels. Because of the possibility to get better support, the choice was
sometimes made to set up an ad hoc criminal investigation team. It is useful to
explicitly formulate criteria for choosing the level at which criminal investigations
6 Based on and cited from De Poot, Bokhorst, Van Koppen and Muller 2004, paragraph 6.2.
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are conducted, but these criteria must be applied in a flexible way. In this
connection it must always be avoided that an unclear definition causes some
offences to fall between two stools.
It is important to organise criminal investigations in such a way that at a central
point there is an overview of the criminal investigations and the information they
handle. In that way it can be ensured that information in one investigation may
possibly also be used in another investigation, whereby the applicable rules must
of course be observed. In addition it should be possible to arrange the forms of
support for the various investigations in an equal way, at any rate there should be
clear criteria on which basis these support units may be deployed. The choice
must not be made on the basis of differences in accessibility of support services.
Finally it should always be examined to what extent the criminal investigation is
connected with other forms of police care. The other police departments often
have a lot of information on certain areas and people. The form of the organisation
must be such that this information is optimally used.
If a new investigation must be started and the first actions on site have been
carried out, almost immediately the question arises which part of the organisation
must carry out the investigation. In general the answer to this question for the
Netherlands is clear. Although police regions differ in the form of their organisa-
tion, three levels are in general distinguished. At regional and supra-regional level
the criminal investigation service deals with organised crime. At district or supra-
local level the so-called midlevel crime is dealt with. This includes robberies, rape,
murder and manslaughter and serial crime. The focus at the local level is on petty
crime. If it concerns a capital offence which exceeds the capacity of the district,
support may be asked from all districts in the region. In such a case a Criminal
Investigation Support Team is formed. In other countries similar structures are
eminent.
However, not all cases fit neatly into this organisational division and it is therefore
not possible for all cases to give an unequivocal answer to the question where and
on whose responsibility the case must be dealt with. If a crime does not fit into the
police organisation chosen, there often follows an inadequate reaction from the
police and the investigation fails. Examples of this kind of cases are: (1) cases that
are too big or too complicated to be investigated within the criminal investigation
department of a district, (2) cases that are in fact too big for the region and should
be dealt with in an interregional framework, and (3) forms of organised crime
involving visible offences.
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6.3.2 GENERAL OR SPECIALIST KNOWLEDGE
For the organisation of the criminal investigation service in a police force the
choice between general and specialist knowledge about criminal investigations is
important. In criminal investigations there exist a variety of specialities. Some-
times the specialities have to do with the use of special investigation methods,
such as scent sorting tests, evidence investigation, ear prints or other technical
knowledge. In other cases specialists know a lot about certain offences, such as
youth and vice, child porno, container smuggling, financial economic crimes,
thefts of certain goods or murders of homosexuals. The degree of specialisation
strongly depends on the circumstances of a police force and the experience of the
investigating officers involved. Sometimes more offences of a certain type are
committed, at any rate the police carry out more investigations into these offences.
Such a selection of cases makes it possible for a certain speciality to develop. The
development of such a speciality has then in turn a direct influence on the
selection of new cases.
The question is whether a police force must focus on the further development of
general knowledge of criminal investigation or whether each police force should
have a certain degree of specialisation? The choice must in any case be made
explicit. If the competent authorities and the police choose to deal with certain
offences over a long series of years, then there is also a case for specialising in
them. But in that case the criminal investigation service must be assured of the
longer term support by the competent authorities. It takes several years to develop
and maintain specialities. The effectiveness of specialities can also only be
established in the longer term.
6.3.3 PRIORITIES OR POSTERIORITIES
Time and again priorities must be set in each police force in order to be able to
determine which investigation will be started and which will remain shelved.
Criteria have been developed and committees have been set up which must
determine how to decide on the priorities of the criminal investigation service.
Rational scoring models were developed on which basis the value of a specific case
was determined. Informal views also play an important role in the eventual
selection. The attractiveness of a case, the chance of success, earlier experience
with similar cases and such informal views play an important role in the
assessment.
An important role in setting priorities is reserved for the method of case screening.
With this method a selection of cases can be made that fit within the priorities of
the force and have a great chance of success. An important part of the case
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screening is the investigation assessment which indicates what the chance of a
successful criminal investigation is.
It is very well conceivable and even desirable that, if criteria have been set for
choosing certain cases for further investigation (priorities), it will also be indicated
which cases will not be investigated (posteriorities). Making explicit which cases
will not be investigated will strengthen the picture of the way in which cases are
selected. That must be made as explicit as possible, certainly since time and again
a certain arbitrariness can be seen in the selection of cases. The competent
authorities, the citizens and also the victims are not only entitled to clarity about
the priorities, but also about the posteriorities.
6.3.4 THE REASON FOR AN INVESTIGATION
There are various reasons for starting a criminal investigation: being caught red-
handed, report, notification, information, questioning, informers, witnesses and
analysis. In some cases the criminal investigation service has in fact no choice.
Certainly where the offender is caught red-handed or in case of some reports to
the police the citizen expects the criminal investigation service to take immediate
action. Also in case of serious offences the criminal investigation service should
immediately start a criminal investigation, if only because otherwise traces and
witnesses will be more difficult to find. In other cases the criminal investigation
service has indeed a choice of how to handle the information. Information from
questioning or from informers or based on analysis does not have to lead to a
criminal investigation. In such cases the criminal investigation service has a choice
whereby the priorities set and the available capacity will play an important role.
The criminal investigation service must try to find a balance between the cases
that come up suddenly and the cases that can be systematically investigated.
Murders, rape and kidnappings are difficult to plan. Although on the basis of
information on these offences in previous years an estimate can be made of the
necessary capacity, these offences mostly follow other patterns. There are always
cases of organised crime, financial economic crime or drugs cases and they can
better be dealt with in a systematic way than the cases mentioned above. So such
cases can much better be planned for in the total criminal investigation process.
It is difficult to achieve a workable balance between the sudden and the systematic
cases. Because of the pressure of the sudden cases, the systematic cases more than
once had to make way. That pressure also comes from outside the criminal
investigation service: the public, victims, media and politics. Such pressure is
mostly absent in the case of crime which is permanently available.
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This dilemma makes it necessary for the criminal investigation service to always
keep a certain part of the capacity available for these sudden cases. This capacity
may in outline be determined on the basis of historical data about the number and
intensity of earlier criminal offences. The criminal investigation management
should always be aware of the possibility that because of the sudden cases
the more systematic cases must be set aside. The importance of the case and
the outside pressure legitimise such setting aside. But here too it applies that the
criminal investigation management must insist on such choices being made
explicit.
6.3.5 PREPARATION OR IMMEDIATE START
On the basis of a preliminary investigation a more substantiated decision may be
taken on whether it is desirable and feasible to carry out a real criminal
investigation. A preliminary investigation is in fact a continuation of case screening
in which a case is only looked at in outline. The criminal activities, the offences
and the group of offenders are analysed better insofar as possible. Although no
specific investigation methods are used for a preliminary investigation, the
available information in the police files is used.
In research in the Netherlands after a preliminary investigation in the great
majority of cases a criminal investigation followed. The preliminary investigation
mostly formed a substantiation of a choice made earlier to investigate a certain
offence or a certain case. A preliminary investigation only seldom led to the
decision not to investigate. So in most cases it was a first exploration for the later
criminal investigation. The question is whether this is really meaningful.
If the decision to start an actual criminal investigation has in fact already been
taken, it is better to immediately employ the available investigation methods, also
because in the course of time information will become blurred. However if
preliminary investigations are used as a selection method, they may have great
extra value for setting priorities for the activities of the criminal investigation
service. In that case the criminal investigation service must not be reluctant not to
continue a preliminary investigation. Knowingly not choosing for an investigation
may have great extra value and may prevent later disappointments for both the
criminal investigation service and the competent authorities. The investment of
the preliminary investigation will then not have been for nothing, but will have
contributed to improving the selection of cases. In this respect it can always be
examined to what extent the information from the preliminary investigation may
still be used in other cases.
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6.3.6 OBJECTIVES
A criminal investigation may serve several purposes. The criminal investigation
may for instance be used to obtain more insight into the working methods of a
criminal group, to track down offenders, to dismantle a criminal function, to stop
criminal actions, for prevention, for repair of damage or to confiscate illegally
obtained assets. The objectives can be named more explicitly. It is conceivable that
if e.g. preventing or stopping criminal actions is the primary objective of the
criminal investigation management and the competent authorities, other means
must perhaps be employed than when offenders and evidence are searched for.
In line with the basic principles of responsible project management, I am
therefore in favour of more explicitly stating the objectives in the case of large-
scale criminal investigations which can be systematically planned. That must not
be done to satisfy the competent authorities or to aim at a rational process, but in
order to be able to specify which methods and resources can be deployed most
effectively and efficiently and which forms of expertise are necessary. Methods,
resources and expertise will vary according to the objectives which must be
realised. But then it is important that not only the public prosecutor and the
criminal investigation management use the objectives to guide their actions, but
that much attention will be given to clarifying the objectives and their conse-
quences to the investigating officers and the support services which must carry
out the actual investigation. They must be aware that in different cases different
objectives will be pursued and that they must give form and content to their
investigation work in a different way.
Finally during the investigation process it should regularly be considered to what
extent the objectives must be adjusted. It is not necessary to hold on to objectives
when it becomes clear during the investigation on the basis of acquired informa-
tion that the objectives can no longer, or may be difficult, to realise. It will then be
prudent and sensible to arrive at an adjustment of the objectives in consultation
with the competent authorities and the team members involved. But here too it
applies that this should be done as explicitly as possible.
6.3.7 COMPOSITION OF THE TEAM
The choice of the composition of the criminal investigation team is one of the
most essential choices to be made. In the first instance there is the question of the
size of the team. A team consists in any case of a team leader, a tactical
coordinator, a report coordinator and various investigating officers. Teams in
the Netherlands vary from about six people to at most 80 people. In most cases a
rough estimate is made for this by the team leaders and the public prosecutor. In
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systematic cases more time is spent on this, in sudden cases the structure and size
of a Criminal Investigation Support Team is followed. The estimate of the size of
the team is especially based on the facts that are initially available, the knowledge
about the offenders and the importance of the case. The differences in size also
imply that these teams were organised in completely different ways. Apart for this
it is always the question which kind of expertise and quality of investigating
officers are needed.
The duration of an investigation varies greatly. Some teams exist for a week, other
teams are active for months. Of course this also depends on the size and intensity
of the crime under investigation. But it is more important whether there are
indications on which a meaningful investigation can be conducted. If after a
certain period there are no meaningful lines of investigation, it is rather soon
decided to reduce a team. Only if information is available on which further
investigation activities can be carried out, can the team continued.
6.3.8 DIVISION OF TASKS
Tasks within a criminal investigation team may be divided in various ways. Team
leaders and coordinators are in general responsible for keeping track of the
situation and for formulating tasks. Investigating officers work in pairs whereby it
is not always clear on which criteria these pairs are formed. Neither is it always
clear why virtually all tasks must be carried out in pairs. Some tasks, especially
checking data or visiting authorities in order to obtain information, can just as well
be done by a single officer.
Considerable gains may be realised in the division of tasks in the teams. If the
team management succeeds in actually having a complete overview of the
available information and determines the lines of investigation in consultation
with the investigating officers, a more effective and efficient criminal investiga-
tion can be given shape. In the cases in the Netherlands there were too often ad
hoc decisions about lines which had to be further investigated. It seems to depend
too strongly on the specific superiors to what extent structure is actually given to
the internal division of tasks within a team.
When giving shape to the division of tasks, the question is whether the team
management uses the insights from the project management. These insights may
help to create a more structured working method and to make it clearer for
everybody in which way which tasks must be carried out within which period and
with which resources.
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6.3.9 FORM OF MANAGEMENT
Within the criminal investigation management both strategic management and
operational management should be given shape. Strategic management concerns
questions such as the use of methods, the lines of investigation to be followed, the
use of special investigation methods and “managing” the outside world. Strategic
management also has an important role in coordination with the Public Prosecu-
tion Service as regards the content and scope of the criminal investigation. The
operational management focuses on the day-to-day course of affairs, which has
also already been discussed above.
There are various forms of leadership. The most common style of leadership is
leadership whereby the individual officers are left a lot of room and freedom. That
also fits in with the culture of the criminal investigation service, in which freedom
and self-initiative are held in high esteem. However the consequence of this is that
the overview is less than in the other leadership style, which is more hierarchical.
In that style the superior tries to keep complete control of the information and the
execution of tasks by the officers. That may lead to a more effective and efficient
criminal investigation, but our investigation showed that this poorly fitted in with
the wishes and perception of the officers. Not surprisingly, in some of the
investigations quite strong resistance could be felt against hierarchical leadership.
The choice of the form of leadership is strongly influenced by the personal
preferences of the superiors. The experience of the superiors plays a role in this.
More experienced superiors tend to choose a leadership style which leaves more
room and flexibility to the individual officers. In their view optimum use is made
in that way of the creativity of the experienced individual officers. This creativity
and the sudden discovery are designated as crucial by these superiors.
6.3.10 INFORMATION TRANSFER
Information forms the heart of a criminal investigation. A criminal investigation
is ultimately all about collecting and processing information. So for a team it is of
great importance that a clear structure is chosen for information transfer. There
are all kinds of forms of information distribution with the aim to providing all
members of the team with the same level of information. Information was stored
in files, reproduced in day reports, put in folders on reading tables and other
forms. However it actually turned out all the time that not every officer was fully
aware of the relevant information. In many teams there is a certain degree of
freedom to take in information. It is done when there is time left. When there is
no time, it is not an essential part of the work to get to know the other information.
This causes some tasks to be done twice or not the maximum is gained from
certain investigating actions.
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Much information also turns out to be shared all the time at informal moments at
which officers come together (coffee, breaks, meals). Although this seldom
happens in a very structured way, it is for many officers an important source of
information. The question is to what extent such forms of informal information
transfer can better be utilised. The criminal investigation management may to a
certain extent count on the informal information transfer, certainly if the
operational management also has a task in this. But it is then important not to
disturb the informality by new formal forms of consultation.
6.3.11 SUPPORT AND ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANISATION
The criminal investigation service partly consists of support services: technical
investigation, technical support, observation team, arrest teams, criminal intelli-
gence service, information desk and others. Much use is made of these support
services. For the criminal investigation management the question always arises to
what extent the support services must have the information from the investigation
at their disposal. In some cases the information will be necessary in order to be
able to properly carry out a specific investigation. For instance, an arrest team will
want to know whether the suspect is armed and dangerous. But for the same
arrest team it is not necessary to know which informers have given which
information or which specific lines of investigation there are.
The way in which the administrative organisation has been set up is important for
the way in which the information can eventually be processed into official reports.
A report coordinator and an administrative coordinator can be added to a team.
Although the administrative tasks in a criminal investigation team have not a high
status, they are of essential importance. Standard protocols and systems for
recording information during criminal investigations are essential. The adminis-
trative organisation is responsible for drawing up a master official report.
6.3.12 FORM OF DIRECTION AND CONTROL
In the investigation in the Netherlands various forms of direction by in particular
the public prosecutor appeared. In most investigations there was an active public
prosecutor who visited the team at various moments and who was intensively
involved in the most crucial decisions. In some cases it was difficult to make a
distinction between the members of the team and the public prosecutor. There is
in general much oral and telephone consultation with the public prosecutor. The
team frequently gets in touch with the prosecutor in order to assess the legal
feasibility and desirability of certain steps in the investigation.
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In general a public prosecutor is very well informed about what is going on in a
team. But it is mostly the team leader who comes with proposals about lines of
investigation or investigation methods, after which the public prosecutor must
give permission for this. The prosecutors ask the team leaders and the investigat-
ing officers to give extensive reasons why a certain investigation method must be
used. At various times a difference of opinion could also be discerned between the
team leaders and the public prosecutors.
Public prosecutors can choose how to give shape to the direction and control of the
separate criminal investigations. While doing so they must always navigate
between keeping a certain distance and having sufficient information and
involvement to be able to form a view. The authority which a public prosecutor
has with the team, and in particular with the investigating officers, is reinforced if
he or she gets thoroughly familiar with a case and thinks along with the
investigators.
6.3.13 MEDIA MANAGEMENT
The media play an increasingly large role in criminal investigations. It is striking
in this respect that most team leaders in the Netherlands choose to adopt a reactive
attitude towards the regular media. In general no information, or hardly any, was
made public via the media. An exception to this rule is the programme Opsporing
Verzocht (Investigation Requested) but in that connection the teams also have the
feeling that it is in fact broadcasting time for the police. In that programme they
can ask the public for tips in respect of an investigation. Other media are kept far
from the individual criminal investigations. Attempts by journalists to get
information and articles in newspapers about a case are seen as an infringement
of a current investigation.
The question is whether the criminal investigation service cannot adopt a more
proactive attitude towards the regular media. The media may be of use in
supplying tips and other forms of support for an investigation. More than the
police, and even more than Opsporing Verzocht, they form a window to the world
which may help the police to get new relevant information about an investigation.
On the other hand, many investigating officers know stories about journalists who
disrupt the course of a criminal investigation on the basis of incomplete
information. For many officers it meant that they had developed a certain fear
of the media. With such a fear it is difficult to come to proactive media
management.
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6.4 Methods7
Investigation methods are an important part of the criminal investigation process.
Most results can be achieved if the right combination of investigation methods is
used. It is not possible to give the right combination of investigation methods on
forehand. This highly depends on the specific crime, the underlying story and the
background and characteristics of the possible perpetrators. For the management
of the CID it is therefore of paramount importance to achieve a balanced and
responsible combination of existing methods. Overall, we found in the Netherlands
a wide and intensive use of investigation methods in extensive criminal investiga-
tions, while a limited range of methods were used in other major cases.
6.4.1 RESEARCH AT AND AROUND THE CRIME SCENE
Research at and around the crime scene focuses on the search for traces, such as
finger traces, shoe traces, odor traces, blood and break traces. The technical
investigation will take place by the technical CID or the Dutch Forensic Institute.
This research at and around the crime scene creates the following dilemmas.
During the investigation at and around the crime scene as much information
as possible should be collected. For the detectives and the CID management it is
essential to choose what information is collected and what information is
neglected. While endeavoring to collect all relevant information, choices have to
be made in practice.
The first is to determine which crime scene must be examined. Is it just the
place where the corpse is found, or also in and around his car, home and work?
When should that happen and by whom? How the investigation at the crime scene
is formed is largely determined by the initial assumptions of the investigators and
CID management on the relevant case. The definition of the crime scene in the
more figurative sense, is an important choice point for the CID management.
In the second place it is necessary to ensure that the traces at the crime scene
remain intact as much as possible. Nothing can be changed, everything should be
fixed. This assumption is easy to write down but in practice this is difficult to
achieve. There are too many people present, there must be demolition of some
sort to rescue victims or bystanders and is not always clear what should be
recorded on photo and video. “Everything” is in criminal investigations to be a
relative concept. In the hustle and bustle at the beginning of an investigation it is
not always possible to identify how the crime scene was. This can result in the
subsequent investigation to questions and sometimes difficult investigation
problems.
7 Based in and cited from De Poot, Bokhorst, Van Koppen and Muller 2004, paragraph 6.4.
c r im ina l i n v e s t i g at i on
171
In the third place it has be determined if a search for fingerprints is necessary.
The search for fingerprints is an absolute standard method of criminal investiga-
tions. In our study of all the cases in the Netherlands, fingerprints never led to
finding a culprit. Fingerprints were used as supporting evidence (there was
already a suspect and his fingerprint was found to correspond) or exculpatory
evidence (there was no match between the arrested suspects and fingerprints
found). The most problematic issue is whether a fingerprint which was found at
the crime scene actually belongs to the offender. In many criminal investigations a
lot of time is devoted to determining whether a match exists. But in most cases it
was difficult to determine with any certainty whether a finger trail came from a
perpetrator. For shoe traces a similar reasoning can be given.
In the researched cases DNA analysis was used frequently. DNA research is, in
addition to fingerprints, now one of the standard investigation methods during
the criminal investigation. DNA research does not automatically lead to the
perpetrators. In the cases investigated by us this was not the case. In some cases
this was due to the amount of time the DNA research took before the results could
be used. For the CID management this means that DNA research is valuable, but
that other investigation methods also have to be used for identification and to
collect evidence.
6.4.2 NEIGHBORHOOD SURVEY
The neighborhood survey is a standard method for more serious crimes. This
investigation aims at determining whether there are witnesses and to create a
picture of a victim. Especially if the victim is deceased a neighborhood survey can
play an important role in mapping out the background and habits of the victim.
But a neighborhood survey must be done in a timely and thorough manner,
otherwise it makes little sense. That means that at the beginning of the
investigation it has to be decided almost immediately whether and how much
use will be made of a neighborhood survey. The neighborhood survey is focused
on information that people soon forget – a car present or a man walking – so
timeliness is a crucial element. It is also important that careful coordination of the
neighborhood survey takes place, otherwise there is a risk that unnecessary
investigation will be conducted while some information has already been falsified.
Such coordination is the responsibility of the CID management.
At the time that the survey is conducted it is not yet clear what information you
are looking for. All information can be relevant. The investigators, however, need
some clues to ask specific questions. CID management should. Not everything
can be examined. There are specific choices to make in the priorities. The
information from a neighborhood survey usually refers to the background of
the victim, identification of potential perpetrators, names of other witnesses, the
time of the crime and details of vehicles such as cars and scooters.
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The neighborhood survey can be of great value for a criminal investigation. It is
a very labour-intensive method, many officers and detectives should be deployed
at short notice and the information from the survey should be investigated further.
It is also difficult assess the value of the information from the neighborhood
survey. This surveys often provides a lot of different stories about an event.
The neighborhood survey provides a lot of work for the police. The question is
to what extent the results of a neighborhood research outweigh the costs. The
answer to this question can only be given in a specific situation with a specific
crime. But for CIR management the question of the usefulness and necessity of a
neighborhood survey at the beginning of each investigation always remains
important.
6.4.3 OBSERVATION AND POSTING
Observation is often used in more serious criminal investigation. The main
objective is to investigate the possible courses of suspects and witnesses. Some-
times it is also used to determine criminal offences. Observation gives the CID a
better picture of the behavior of a person and what he does. It offers the possibility
to gather further information in addition to the information already collected
using other methods. In this regard the observation should be interpreted as an
additional investigation method. Observation is increasingly a specialized method
primarily performed by a trained surveillance team. In some cases, even regular
detectives were assigned to observation.
The risk exists that potential offenders notice that they are being observed and
then adjust their behaviour. Increasingly, therefore, observation is done by
technical means such as surveillance video and photo equipment. If carefully
prepared, this will reduce the chance of discovery. Observation by the police
themselves is labour intensive. Observation is mostly waiting until something
actually happens. This requires the appropriate person to carry out the
observations.
6.4.4 COMPOSITION DRAWING AND CONFRONTATIONS
Composition drawings and photo confrontation are used less frequently during a
criminal investigation than one would think. The use of composition drawings is
only relevant if witnesses can remember someone who could have played a role in
the offence. Also, these witnesses have to have a clear and consistent picture of
this person to produce a good composition drawing. Before a good composition
drawing can be made by the police a lot of work has to be done. Composition
drawings are used to approach witnesses or to be submitted to suspects. It is
unnecessary to say that the reactions of other witnesses and suspects do not
necessarily match. Sometime this creates more confusion than clarity.
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In mirror and photo confrontation a distinction should be made between
investigation confrontation and evidence confrontation. An investigation con-
frontation aims to collect detailed information about the possible identity of the
offender. An evidence confrontation (or Oslo confrontation) aims to identify the
suspect as the perpetrator of the crime and contribute to the evidence. That is why
this procedure has to comply with precise rules.
There is much attention in the Netherlands to the risk that memory bias in
confrontations wrongly designated an offender. Our investigation revealed, how-
ever, often the opposite case. Witnesses doubted whether they recognize a
particular person. These doubts, however, did not always lead to the rejection or
exclusion of a particular suspect. Not resembling a composite sketch or not being
recognized at a confrontation has a limited impact on the criminal investigation. A
positive identification, however, is still hard evidence in criminal proceedings.
The discussion about the value of testimonies works both ways. Drawings and
confrontations can confirm but also invalidate the assumptions of the CID team.
Both results have a similar value for the continuation of the criminal investigation
and prosecution.
6.4.5 TAPPING AND PRINTING
The tapping of telephones and printing of telephone numbers is a very commonly
used detection method. In any case of serious crimes, but also for other forms of
crime, it is often used. At the start of a criminal investigation it is important to
gather as much information as possible about the victims, their friends and
relationship network and the environment in which the victim was. A telephone
tap is very appropriate. Phone taps provide information to create a more concrete
picture of a specific criminal environment. Phone taps are particularly useful for
the progress of the criminal investigation. Tapping supports observation because
suspects can be located if they use their mobile phones. In addition, the
information obtained by tapping plays an important role in the interrogation of
suspects. In some cases the results of tapping structure the criminal investigation
process. Only rarely does a phone tap leads to direct evidence against a suspect.
Subjects are generally aware of the possibility that they may be bugged and adjust
their behaviour accordingly. Information from the tap may be combined with
other detection methods as an important contribution to the criminal
investigation.
Tapping is a very labour-intensive method. Listening to the taps – both live and
afterwards – takes a very long time and capacity to complete. In addition
processing tap conversations involves many administrative acts. It is increasingly
necessary to work with interpreters, which makes tapping even more difficult.
Finally, there is not always the capacity for listening live to taps. Tapping is
therefore a complex investigation method.
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The same can said for print data of phones. With print data the phone contacts
of relatives of suspects and victims can be identified. Similar to tap data, print data
are used to determine relationships. Also, depending on the print data from
mobile phones pole locations are determined that can create a picture of the
presence of a particular person at a certain time at a certain place.
Tapping and printing are important investigation methods in the Netherlands,
but actually only in conjunction with other investigation methods. In a prelimin-
ary investigation the interaction between the different investigation methods is of
great importance. It is crucial that the investigators and the CID management are
aware of this interaction.
6.4.6 INTERROGATION
Several elements are of interest concerning interrogations. In the first place in
criminal investigations much attention is given to the method of questioning. In
major cases nowadays many interrogations are taped on video. In most cases
interrogations are conducted by fixed couples of detectives who are supported by
so-called shadow couples. These couples act as a sounding bar for each other.
Many of the interrogations were characterized by building up pressure on the
suspects. The investigators used different techniques such as confronting with
lies or revealing what some other suspects have said. The use of interpreters
during an interview is difficult because interrogation techniques do not work well
if an interpreter has to translate them. Much attention is paid to the reporting of
the interrogation. Obviously, not all elements of an interrogation can be written
down. In fact, the investigators choose what is written. There are significant
differences in the way an interrogation is documented. Although many investi-
gators tend to write a formal report others tend to write a more factual story.
The second important element is the content of the interrogation. For this
purpose, in larger criminal investigation cases, interrogation plans are made
which indicated how to obtain certain information from the suspect. In criminal
investigation processes on less serious crimes there is hardly an extended
interrogation plan. The main method used is to slowly give more information
to the suspect so that he becomes slowly aware of what the police know and what
they do not. It is crucial that the interrogation couples know the facts of the case
well so they can confront the suspects at any time during the interview with their
knowledge.
Interrogation is an art. Within the applicable legal rules detectives have tot try
to get information in a responsible manner. They must always weigh the
information they are able to give to the suspects. The information that the
investigators have collected must be used strategically. Of course, an interrogation
is aimed at finding the truth. In practice, investigators try to define this truth by
using their own reconstruction of the event as a starting point and to verify this
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story by the suspect. Holes and contradictions in the story can often be clarified
during an interrogation. An interrogation is therefore the method of choice for a
complete reconstruction of the crime story.
6.4.7 HOUSE SEARCH
In most criminal investigations house searches are made at houses of victims and
suspects. The search at a house of a dead person coincides with the crime scene
investigation. Searches at houses of suspects is often combined with an arrest. In
both cases, the time and intensity of the search are significant. What is being
sought and how long a search takes? Especially when a search should be done at
the beginning of an investigation, there is no clarity about how to find
information.
In extensive investigations, accurate preparation of a search site is necessary.
For this purpose, a plan is drawn up which indicates dates, times and people for
the house search. This is necessary because often there has to be a search in
different places simultaneously. In this preparation, data gathered on the suspect,
a map of the object and the activities and business in the area are crucial.
Especially in large scale investigations searches are preceded by an observation on
the spot.
Only in rare cases do searches produce directly usable evidence. In general,
house searches produce general background information on the suspect and his
involvement in a crime. With this information the number of scenarios that the
police use can be reduced or extended. House searches prove their value in
combination with other investigation methods.
6.4.8 INFORMATION, KNOWLEDGE AND EXPERIENCE
Besides the above mentioned investigation in a criminal investigation information
is collected or processed in other ways. While this might not be appointed as a
investigation method, the investigators themselves act as an important source of
information for the interpretation of information and the reconstruction of a
crime story. Knowledge and experience is not always inside ICT systems but is
primarily in the minds of the investigators.
In the first place, the information from the Criminal Investigation Unit (CIE)
plays an important role in criminal investigations. The CIE reviews if it has
relevant information about suspects or circumstances which may be related to the
case. The extent to which CIE information plays a role in investigations varies
widely. Sometimes there was relevant information and this information could play
a role in further filling in missing gaps in the story. In other cases there was
discussion between the CID team and CIE on whether specific information could
be used. Although we sometimes found examples of problems between CIE and
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CID teams in many regions, an improvement occurred in the communication
between CIE en CID. Meanwhile, the establishment of information desks in
different regions created greater coordination of present CIE information.
In the second place, crime analysis plays an important role in investigations
into serious crimes. The crime analyst performs different functions in a CID
team. He or she creates a timeline of key events in the criminal investigation. In
addition, a crime analyst creates relationship diagrams which indicated how the
relations in a criminal network are. And finally, a crime analyst plays an important
role in the supervision of the survey in respect of the investigation. To this end, a
crime analyst draws a picture of the whole and tries to look for contradictions and
slackness in the investigations. Crime analysts are an important sounding board
for the investigation and CID management.
In the third place, the police have many files in which much computerized
information on suspects, events, places and vehicles is present. The Recognition
System and the Management and Processes System are the main sources for the
police to create an initial picture of the background of a person or event.
Finally, as revealed in many studies, the local knowledge of police officers is
very important. This knowledge is in the minds of the officers and is only partially
defined in systems. But in several cases we have seen that the knowledge and
experience of investigators were of great interest for the criminal investigation.
The same is true for the relation network of investigators and CID management.
Soft information appeared to be crucial in many criminal investigation cases in
the Netherlands.
6.5 Conclusion
A criminal investigation process is a complex process to manage. There are several
dilemmas which play a crucial role in the way the investigation process functions.
All these dilemmas obliges the management of a criminal investigation process to
make choices and decisions. When the management of a criminal investigation
process consciously takes decisions concerning these dilemmas the chance of a
more effective criminal investigation arises. Of course, it is necessary to translate
the dilemmas which are based on research on criminal investigations in the
Netherlands to the specific local aspects in other countries. I expect that
the findings in the Netherlands are roughly also applicable to other countries in
Western Europe.
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7 Forensic investigation
Forensic investigation is – especially since the advent of DNA identification
research – becoming an increasingly important part of the criminal investigation
process in the Netherlands. Forensic investigation creates crucial information
today that is increasingly important for the truth. While the tactical police
investigation deals with gathering evidence, forensic investigation facilitates the
tactical investigators. The role and significance of forensic investigation in the
near future is increasing. It is no longer just only support for tactical processes,
but more and more a crucial way of criminal investigation.
This growing influence of forensic expertise is mainly reflected in the growth of
the number of research techniques, the investments made by the police and
justice in this area and the importance of forensic investigation in policy plans.
In the Netherlands we had some high profile cases like the Schiedam ParkMurder
and the Murder in Putten where the role of forensic expertise in the criminal
investigation became crucial. These cases showed also the complexity of coopera-
tion between the crucial stakeholders in forensic investigation: the police, the
Public Prosecutor Service and the Netherlands Forensic Institute.
Forensic investigation is of crucial importance for criminal investigation. It is now
a unique institution with complex cooperation. In this chapter I give an overview
of that institutional framework within which forensic investigation is shaped.
Because of this importance it is crucial in a book on security, safety and criminal
justice in the Netherlands. The chapter is mainly based on the volume Forensic
Science: Studies on forensic knowledge and organization (2008) edited by Broeders
and Muller.
7.1 Facts, figures and organization
7.1.1 NETHERLANDS FORENSIC INSTITUTE1
The Netherlands Forensic Institute (NFI) has in the Netherlands a virtual
monopoly in the field of forensic investigation. There are some other forensic
1 Based on and cited from Muller and Otto 2008, paragraph 19.3.
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institutes (TMFI en IFS) but although these new services are established the NFI
remains the most important forensic service in the Netherlands.
The NFI is a part of the Ministry of Security and Justice and conducts research in
criminal and sometimes civil cases. The task order of the NFI mentions that this
institute comes under the Directorate-General for Enforcement of the Ministry of
Security and Justice and the head of the NFI is designated by the Minister of
Security and Justice. In this task order it is made clear that the Director of the NFI
not only derives his powers from the Minister of Security and Justice, but also has
to act within the frameworks set by the Minister. For the majority of funding the
NFI is dependent on the Ministry of Security and Justice.
The principal of the NFI is, formally speaking, always a judge or a public
prosecutor, but in practice it is the police who use the services of the NFI. The
NFI does not work in principle for private clients, such as lawyers or suspects, but
they can apply to the public prosecutor or the examining judge to conduct an
inquiry. The NFI does not provide information about ongoing research to third
parties. It reports only to the applicant or client, mainly the police and the
judiciary.
The task order of the NFI reflects the three core tasks of the NFI. First, to provide
and report on independent case-related forensic research based on technical,
medical and biological science. Second, to develop and implement new research
methods and techniques for police, justice and for their own use. Third and last, is
to become an international knowledge and expertise centre for forensic
investigation.
The practice of criminal investigation can be divided into technical and tactical
research. The assistance of the NFI to the police relied on the technical research,
which contains search and investigation of traces. The police have also a
specialized staff of their own to do forensic investigation. The police would often
prefer to use their own people. But if they lack the capacity, the NFI is asked to
assist. This happens often in difficult and complex cases. The experts of the NFI
are required to visualize, interpret and assess the traces. “The core business of
forensic investigation is to collect information from traces found at the crime
scene, storing the information in trace files and analyze the information for the
investigation.”
Traces found at the crime scene and which are safely collected by the technical
investigation are sent for further investigation to the NFI. Fingerprints are made
visible by the NFI. The visible fingerprints are assessed by the NFI for suitability
for identification. Fingerprints are photographed and the pictures of the prints
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are sent to the technical investigation of the regional police forces where they are
compared with prints in a local fingerprint collection or with the national
automated collection HAVANK. Also in case of blood or semen found at the
crime scene the NFI is asked to conduct the forensic investigation. Samples of
forensic material found at the crime scene are sent to the NFI for DNA research.
In the future there will likely be an increase in digital forensic detection.
The forensic research of the NFI is very broad and has many scientific specialties.
In total in 2011 more than 550 people worked at the NFI. The research
opportunities of the NFI are divided into more than 40 forensic competence areas:
– (Waste) substances research
– Alcohol Determination
– Image Research and Biometrics
– Soil, water and fertilizer research
– Composition and emissions research
– Ecological, technical and human toxicology
– Fire accelerating research
– DNA Research
– DNA-affinity investigation
– Document Research
– Drug Analysis
– Eco- and human toxicology
– Explosions and explosives investigation
– Forensic Anthropology
– Forensic Archeology
– Forensic medicine
– Glass Investigation
– Hair Research
– Handwriting Research
– High volume Crime DNA research
– Scratch, feeling and form trace
– Machine and Biometry Research Micro trace
– Environmental analysis
– Environmental Sampling
– Research illegal drug manufacturing
– Research closed systems (ICT)
– Research industrial chemicals
– Research non-human biological trace
– Research open systems (ICT)
– Pathology
– Soil water Research
– Trace research
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– Speech and audio analysis
– Toxicology
– Paint Research
– Traffic Study
– Fibers and Textiles Research
– Finger traces
– Vehicle Identification survey
– Arms and ammunition research.
The NFI staff responsible for conducting the investigations and reports, the so-
called “forensic experts” have a scientific basis or a higher vocational training in
one of the following disciplines (this list is not exhaustive): biochemistry, biology,
soil science, chemistry, electronics, pharmacy, computer science, linguistics,
materials science, environmental health, physics, psychology, statistics, traffic,
mechanics or pathology.
The NFI is responsible for DNA and other forensic investigations, such as blood-
alcohol provision. This is by law entrusted to the NFI. The NFI has three main
directions of research: medical and biological research, chemical analysis and
physical and electronic research. This shows that the NFI does much more
forensic research than just produce DNA profiles. The DNA research is, however,
an increasing proportion of the tasks of the NFI.
In 2001, new DNA legislation came in force in the Netherlands. This law
regulates that anyone who is suspected of a crime, for which a sentence of four
years or more is possible, is obligated to surrender DNA cell material to a national
DNA databank. In 2003 a law came into force which made it possible to connect
DNA material with this DNA databank. The public prosecutor or the judge can
give the NFI an order to conduct this investigation.
7.1.2 POLICE AND FORENSIC INVESTIGATION2
Forensic investigators within the police
The regional forces of the police have their own forensic investigators. The total
strength of the technical investigation units within the 25 police forces includes
673 policemen, two-thirds of which is directly involved in the research at the crime
scene. This part of the total police strength is relatively limited. The technical
investigation units have a limited number of specialties related to forensic
expertise.
2 Based on and cited from Muller and Otto 2008, paragraph 19.4.
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The forensic-technical examination in the Netherlands obtained an increasingly
important role in the criminal investigation process. Especially the new DNA
technology and related legislation have a strong momentum. The quality of the
forensic-technical examination has been assessed as good by the Public Prosecu-
tion Service and the police. The quality – and hence the efficiency – of the forensic-
technical examination can be further improved by better instructing the police
officers who are often first at the crime scene. They need better education about
securing a crime scene or specific tracks and how to support the technical police
investigators in their work. Efficiency improvements are also possible by reducing
the delivery terms of the NFI.
Cooperation between police and the NFI
Most police regional forces prefer working with their own people. If a specific
police force has relevant forensic knowledge, other police forces preferably use
this police knowledge rather than ask the NFI to conduct an investigation. Police
forces work better with other forces rather than asing for the services of the NFI,
because it saves time and money.
There were several attempts to improve communication between police and the
NFI. All innovation is welcomed by the police because they hope that the
research time could be made shorter. One of the main criticisms of the police is
about the fact that the NFI often takes a long time for the studies. On this point
the NFI and police differ structurally. The police are in need of rapid indications
and the NFI wants maintain its good reputation and wants to deliver only
thorough investigations. Another reason for some irritation with the police is
that police forces are asking for more research applications by the NFI than is
strictly necessary.
The Council of Chief Commissioners has made a future vision on the role and
organization of forensic investigation within the police for the coming years. It
recognizes that strong maintenance is needed in forensic investigation. “The
forensic investigation is insufficiently embedded in tactical and operational search
processes, the skills of forensic investigation are no longer consistent with the
competencies required in today’s technologically complex process, sometimes a
hobby culture prevails over necessary specialization and the quality is sub-optimal
and there is insufficient support and attention to forensic investigation by both
management.”3 A typical quote shows the importance that the police forensic
expertise will be given in the future. The report describes many positive develop-
ments for the future. “The forensic investigation is an essential part of the
criminal investigation process. Along with tactics and intelligence it is part of
3 Council of Chief Commissioners, Vision on Forensic Investigation 2004, p. 29.
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the criminal investigation process. (…) The core of our vision is that the role and
significance of forensic investigation in the near future will increase and that it is
no longer only support to tactical processes, but more and more in control.”4
In order to improve this cooperation Centers for Cooperation in Forensic
Investigation (FSO’s) have been designed. The FSO should create better coopera-
tion in the forensic investigation. In this FSO people from the police technical
investigation unit and the NFI will work together. An NFI employee participating
in the project has several advantages. He can quickly be at the crime scene, is well
aware of the technical possibilities and of the NFI and can therefore quickly
consult the appropriate experts. The purpose of the FSO is to prevent bureaucratic
errors, but it is also expected to ensure efficiency by improving the cooperation
between the police and the NFI. A non-negligible risk of the laudable efforts to
effectively assure possible traces is that the NFI experts are too early and
intensively involved in the investigation process so they lack the necessary
distance. Measures that could be rendering this risk, such as the involvement
of lawyers are missing so far.
7.2 Crucial forensic cases in the Netherlands5
In the Netherlands in recent years some key cases occurred which showed that
forensic investigation in general and the cooperation between police, the Public
Prosecution Service and the NFI was not optimal. It concerns the Schiedam Park
Homicide and the Putten Homicide. I am fully aware of the fact that these cases
do not give a representative picture of the relationship between police, the Public
Prosecution Service and the NFI. In the vast majority of cases, the cooperation
between the three organizations is fine. These cases show however the degree of
complexity and fragility in the relationship between these different organizations.
It can easily go wrong. In addition, the Schiedam Park Homicide led to a major
programme for improving forensic investigation in the Netherlands.
7.2.1 SCHIEDAM PARK HOMICIDE
On June 22, 2000, the ten-year old Nienke Kleiss and her friend Maikel were in
the Beatrix Park in Schiedam, They were forced by an unknown man in the
bushes and he committed sexual acts with them. The girl was later found dead.
Her friend barely survived and later described the offender. He described the
4 Council of Chief Commissioners, Vision on Forensic Investigation 2004, p. 9.
5 Based on and cited from Muller and Otto 2008, paragraph 19.2.
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offender as a white man, between 25 and 35 years old, with a striking pockmarked
face, dressed in a dark, possibly leather jacket and with a baseball cap on his head.
After a month the police suspected an initial witness, Kees B., of the murder of
Nienke Kleiss. During a series of long interrogations Kees B. admitted he had
committed the crime. A day later he withdrew this confession. The court in
Rotterdam sentenced Kees B. on May 29, 2001 to eighteen years imprisonment
plus TBS. This sentence was confirmed in appeal.
Some years later, another man, Wit H., confessed out of the blue that he had
murdered Nienke. New DNA research confirmed this confession and he was
sentenced for the murder on Nienke. Kees B. was released from prison after
serving four years of his sentence. In retrospect it appears that serious errors in
the criminal investigation and prosecution were made by the police and judiciary,
in cooperation with the NFI. The Commission Posthumus, installed by the Public
Prosecution itself, examined the case in detail.
At the crime scene and in and around the body of Nienke dozens of biological
traces were secured. In seven cases of samples containing traces complex DNA-
mixing profiles were obtained: from the dirt under Nienke;s nails, from her left
boot, from her left shoulder, from her belly and three from the ten samples of the
lace which was around her neck. The samples of the soil from under her nail and
the left boot both yielded a complex mixture of DNA profiles of Nienke and Maikel
and a third person. These results are as such mentioned in the report of the NFI
and in the courtroom. The sample from the belly resulted in a mixture of DNA
profiles of Nienke and a second profile which could not be traced. Both aspects
were mentioned in the report and in court. The three samples of the lace all
showed a mixture of DNA profiles of Nienke and Maikel, as did Nienke’s left boot.
The NFI researcher and the NFIexpert who were most involved in the DNA
research had different opinions on the interpretation of the profiles that were
obtained from the samples from the lacing and the shoulder. The researcher
found that the characteristics all pointed essentially in the direction of the same
unknownman. The expert was more cautious because the composite profiles were
unclear and because he had to consider the interpretation of all possible errors.
The profiles were not replicable and, therefore, in the opinion of the expert not
reliable enough to be scientifically valid. Because the opinion of the expert was
paramount, these profiles were disregarded in the NFI report.
However, the researcher and the expert agreed that these profiles did not only
contain the profiles of Nienke and/or Maikel, but also contained additional DNA
characteristics. Also, they agreed that the profile of Kees B. could not be found in
the mixed profiles. This gave rise to major doubts concerning the involvement of
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Kees B. in the offence. They shared their doubts in an interview with the then
Director of the Division of Biology of the NFI, who submitted the case to the Chief
Executive of the NFI. The two directors expressed their doubts to the Procurator-
General, who was responsible for the forensic-technical investigation. He
arranged a meeting between the public prosecutor in this case and the employees
of the NFI, on July 10, 2001, almost two months after the court conviction of Kees
B. This was the first time in the history of the NFI that such an event occurred.
During an earlier meeting at the NFI on January 19, 2001 (before the first court
trial of Kees B.) the researcher stated that he considered that in all mixed
profiles the profile of the same third person could be identified. The expert was
more cautious, but suggested to decline DNA material from more acquaintances
of Nienke. This was rejected by the public prosecutor, because: “it was unbelievable
to continue to search because there was a suspect who had confessed”.
The additional features in the three samples of the lace were ultimately not
included in the report and debated in the courtroom. So not all information was
known to the judges at first instance, the Appeal Judges and the defence. The
existence of the traces on the lace was explicitly denied in court by the Advocate
General in her indictment. But the Commission Posthumus concluded, after
extensive research, that the attorney-general did not deliberately lie or withhold
evidence. However, the committee concluded in its report as follows: “I think
the prosecutor and the Advocate-General should have done more with what
they had heard from the NFI-employees.”
Prof. Van Koppen, who researched this case earlier, stated that in this case an
incomplete and unilateral suspect leading file was presented to the judiciary. Such
statements can also on reflection be found in the report of the Commission
Posthumus and in the letter that the Minister of Justice wrote to parliament in
response to the Posthumus report. The conclusions of the Posthumus report will
be represented briefly here because of the relevance of the cooperation between
the NFI, the police and the Public Prosecution Service.
The fact that Kees B. made a confession ensured that further criminal investiga-
tion was suspect led. The criminal investigation process was hardly structured and
there was no contradiction organized. Therefore errors in the criminal investiga-
tion process did not come to light and a tunnel vision developed after the
confession of Kees B.
There was also lack of consistency between the technical and tactical police
investigation. There was insufficient guidance for the technical staff, which had,
for example, the effect that micro tracing at the crime scene was a messy process.
Possible important traces were lost by not properly dealing with evidence by the
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technical police service and by not properly packing evidence (such as the body of
Nienke) which was send to the NFI. It was not strange for anyone that no traces
were found of the offender. Too little attention was paid to the fact that the NFI
noted that the traces that were found led to an unknown third man.
There was also, especially in the evidentiary phase of the criminal investiga-
tion, too little tactical leadership and too little room for contradiction. As a result,
after the confession of Kees B. the research concentrated too little on the truth of
his confession and the possibilities of other perpetrators. The police did not
handle Nienke’s friend, Maikel, with care. This could have also a negative impact
on Kees B., since Maikel’s statements were exculpatory for B.
Another point is that the public prosecutor was no longer critical after the
confession of Kees B. The Advocate General was, although initially very critical,
scared to free Kees B. This was mainly due to the seriousness of the facts, but
unacceptable given the fact that they both were aware of the doubts of the NFI
which were hidden from the court. Finally, the communication between the
police, the Public Prosecution Services and the NFI was lacking.
7.2.2 PUTTEN HOMICIDE CASE
Also in the Putten Homicide Case, the murder of Christel Ambrosius, mistakes
were made in the criminal investigation and two men were wrongly convicted. On
Sunday, January 9, 1994, the 23-year-old stewardess Christel Ambrosius was
murdered. Herman du Bois and Wilco Viet were held as suspects in this case. But
on April 24, 2002, after eight years in prison, they were both acquitted for lack of
evidence by the court in Leeuwarden. In this case errors were also made regarding
the interpretation of forensic reports.
Trail Track
On the upper right leg of Christel there was a drop of material that contained
semen. The question was whether it was present there due to sexual intercourse
during the crime, or due to an earlier voluntary sexual contact. A number
of experts examined the possibility that the stain on the leg of Christel could
have occured by a process that was called “trailing”. According to experts, the
method of trailing of the semen cannot be excluded, but the absence of a drag
trail track established the contrary. Moreover, the possibility of trailing decreases
as time progresses. However, in the judicial process the existence of a trail track
was adopted. This is partly due to the declaration of ad hoc expert Eskes,
a gynaecologist.
During the retreatment of the case by the court in Leeuwarden, Eskes declared
that he had been wrong. The semen found on Christel could not be anything other
than a perpetrator track. “The trailing theory was unjustly addressed to me,” he
said. The use of an ad hoc expert such as Mr Eskes creates specific risks. The
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Public Prosecution Services was guided by this expert, but did not give him full
information. A trained forensic expert would be more aware of the importance of
his statement for the Public Prosecution Service.
Hair
The sweater that was worn by Christel Ambrosius was seized and sent to the
Forensic Laboratory (the predecessor of the NFI). The report of the Judicial
Laboratory shows on the sweater there was a hair that did not fit in the palettes of
hair of Christel and the suspects. This information was not used later in the
judicial process. Also, there was a pubic hair found on the sweater that had great
similarities with the pubic hair palette of Wilco Viets. An expert from the Forensic
Laboratory for DNA Research in Leiden performed mitochondrial DNA research
on this pubic hair. In his report, the expert concluded that the pubic hair could
come from Wilco Vites but, in any case, from all in the female line to him related
male and female family members and an unknown number of other people.
The expert told the Appeal Court that mitochondrial DNA is not specific to a
particular person, but is basically unchanged passed along the female line. The
court should take into account that the found mitochondrial DNA profile may
occur in all persons who were related through the female line in any degree
whatsoever. The evidence of such an match is very low. This conclusion is
reinforced by the fact that the pubic hair was not found until the sweater was
investigated for the second time by the Forensic Laboratory, while the sweater was
not well-preserved in the intervening time.
Fibers
More than a month after Christel was killed, Herman du Bois was arrested in his
home and the police seized two pairs of his trousers. On one of these pairs of
trousers the Forensic Laboratory found a few microscopic fibers that could not be
distinguished from the fibrous materials in a mat and a carpet that were found in
the living room of the house where Christel has been found dead (her grand-
mother’s house). According to the Forensic Laboratory it is “possible” that the
trousers and the mat and/or carpet were in contact with each other. In the car of
Gerrit Schuchard (a friend of the suspects and initially also suspected in this case)
the same fibers were found. The Forensic Laboratory stated that they may have
come from the mat and the carpet.
Important for this case is that materials incorporated in the mat and the carpet
were popular and frequently sold in and around Putten. Therefore it cannot be
excluded that these materials came from somewhere else. However, the public
prosecutor in this case stated explicitly that the fibers must come from the
grandmother’s house.
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Injuries
The pathologist-anatomist found a strangle trace and stitch and cut wounds on
Christel’s necl. According to the Advocate-General Herman du Bois strangled
Christel by pressing the arteries in her neck with his thumbs. This is not
consistent with the findings of the pathologist-anatomist. The declaration does
not match the facts, but nobody paid attention to this fact during the criminal
investigation. The pathologist-anatomist writes later in the process to the Advocate
General that Christel’s injuries may have been inflicted with the knife found in
Gerrit Schuchard’s car. The Advocate General concluded that the injuries were
inflicted with that knife. This was another erroneous interpretation, because the
pathologist-anatomist used the lowest level of probability.
Another knife was found in bushes near a campsite, which makes it not
unlikely that this knife is not case related, but was from one of the guests. The fact
that the knife was covered with a layer of humus and was very difficult to find
leads to the conclusion that there was no relation between this knife and the case.
The mere fact that Gerrit Schuchard said that Herman du Bois had thrown
something out of his car at this point, is not enough to believe that this was indeed
the murder weapon.
After the suspects were arrested, the criminal investigation focused for the most
part on proving the guilt of the two men. This is reflected in the technical journal,
but also from the fact that the accused is told that the fiber track on the trousers of
Herman du Bois actually proved that he had been at the crime scene. Also, the
indictment of the Advocate General was incomplete. Although the experts have
shown that some confessions could not be true, the Attorney-General does not
mention this in his indictment. This is probably due to the thinking of the
Attorney General, who assumes that the statements of the suspects are sound.
Evidence to the contrary was ignored.
7.2.3 PROGRAMME TO IMPROVE FORENSIC INVESTIGATION AND PROSECUTION
The report on the Schiedam Park Homicide by the Commission Posthumus
showed structural weaknesses in the forensics and criminal investigation. Follow-
ing this evaluation, a programme to improve forensic investigation and prosecu-
tion was created by the Public Prosecutors Service, the police, the NFI and the
departments of Justice and the Interior. In the programme five themes are crucial:
– General requirements for criminal and forensic investigation;
– The authority on the criminal and forensic investigation;
– Reinforcement of the skills of the police and forensic researchers;
– The importance of leadership for a good criminal and forensic investigation
and prosecution;
– A culture of contradiction and reflection, and continuous quality development.
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Content of the programme
The basis of the programme is that the police, the Public Prosecution Service and
the NFI have to make extensive organizational and substantive changes in the
criminal and forensic investigation. The quest for unity in terminology is a good
example. In this context, a new term was born: forensic investigation. This includes
both forensic-technical investigation and forensic information investigation: looking
for tracks and the maintenance of forensic information. The Technical Research
departments of the police and the NFI together are named forensic investigation.
Also, new agreements were made on the task division between the police and
the Public Prosecution Service in specific investigations. The leading role of the
public prosecutor remains prominent. He has to put both burdensome as
exculpatory information in the files. In this way, the quality of the criminal and
forensic investigation and the use of forensic expertise can further be improved.
The report revealed that detectives were often not optimally trained. The police,
the NFI and the Public Prosecution Service wish for this to change by distinguish-
ing different types of crime scenes. For each type of crime scene different forensic
specialists will be used. Also, forensic prosecutors are employed with a deep
expertise on forensics so they can act as fully fledged partners with the police and
the NFI. Also, a National Forensic Investigation Team (LTFO) is established for
the efficient handling of disasters and terrorist attacks.
To realize the advocated contradiction the NFI introduces a doubt procedure
for cases where there is doubt on the interpretation of the NFI reports by police
and the judiciary or on the involvement of suspects in a particular case. The above-
mentioned forensic prosecutor gets a role as a contra speaker on a forensic
technical investigation. Within the police and the Public Prosecution service
contra procedures and review procedures are organized to prevent tunnel vision
during the criminal investigation. The prosecutor’s leadership and direction of the
police forces will also include an explicit role in the contradiction so that their
substantive involvement also increases.
The NFI has to report more clearly. The technical world of NFI should be
linked in the right way to the legal practice of investigation and prosecution.
Reports of the NFI have to be understood by those who read them. The filing of
cases and evidence must be better addressed. In this filing additional exculpatory
evidence has to get more attention. For the management and analysis of traces
several people will be appointed as the forensic coordinator and track coordina-
tors. The national database of tracks will be used. Already many forensic technical
standards have been developed.
The programme provides a wide range of substantive and organizational measures to
improve the forensic investigation. The scale and intensity of the needed improve-
ment raises questions about the quality of the forensic investigation before these
measures were actually introduced. Meanwhile, many of the recommendations from
cha p t e r 7
190
the report of the Commission Posthumus have now been further developed into
concrete plans. The actual implementation is a lengthy process involving many
changes in the organization of the police, the Public Prosecution Service and the NFI.
In 2010 all parties concluded that they have implemented these changes effectively.
Review Commission
After these and other miscarriages of justice a Review Commission was estab-
lished in the Netherlands. This Review Commission started in March of 2006. It
consists of Advocates-General, former police officers, (former) criminal lawyers
and criminal law scientists. It aims to determine whether during the criminal
investigation problems arose that would prevent a proper assessment of the facts
by the court. This Review Commission has to investigate if a criminal case is
suitable for a new criminal and forensic investigation.
It must involve serious criminal matters (i.e., rape, manslaughter, murder,
robbery with victims, etc.) that are particularly susceptible to tunnel vision and the
desire to obtain a (fast) solution of the case. The Review Commission responds to
signals of problems during the criminal investigation in a specific criminal case.
The signal must be submitted by (former) professionals (police officers, members
of the PPS and the NFI) or scientists. The Review Commission gets access to all
relevant persons and documents of the police and the public prosecutor. For
constitutional reasons, judges are not included in the investigation by the Review
Commission. The committee reports to the Board of Procurators-General. The
results of investigations of the Review Commission are public. An investigation
will generally lead to a recommendation to start a new investigation or a review by
the Supreme Court. The Board of Procurator-General decides what to do with the
recommendation of the Review Commission.
The Review Commission has dealt with a few more cases in the Netherlands.
Some of these cases led to the release of prisoners. The procedure of the Review
Commission will be altered. The Procurator-General at the Supreme Court will
get the authority to render an investigation if signals arise on potential mis-
carriages of justice. In this way the possibility of reviewing criminal cases is more
fundamentally institutionalized with the judiciary in the Netherlands. Also in the
Netherlands it is necessary to have an independent procedure to investigate
possible miscarriages of justice.
7.3 Trends in forensics6
In this paragraph I sketch ten trends in forensic investigation in the Netherlands.
These trends represent the major topics in policy and debate in the Netherlands.
6 Based and cited from Muller 2008A.
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7.3.1 FORENSIC EXPERTISE VERY DIVERSE
The forensic expertise is diverse and extensive in the Netherlands. Many different
forms of knowledge are placed under the wider concept of forensics. It is actually
all knowledge in one way or another used in a form of judicial investigation,
including criminal investigation, litigation and mediation. Forensic expert is
currently still not a title or a function that is legally protected in the Netherlands,
virtually everyone can use the term. Sometimes it looks like alternative medicine.
It is highly questionable if it is effective and efficient for the further development
of forensic expertise in the Netherlands if almost every day new forms of forensic
expertise are added. In itself it is recommended that all relevant knowledge can be
used in criminal investigations and litigation. But there should be clear require-
ments as to when an expert is legally a forensic expert and may be heard in a
judicial trial. This means that a system of admission and assessment should be
formed. If forensic expertise will continue to grow uncontrolled, the risk exists
that the public and political confidence in forensic science and expertise will
decrease. At this moment a new act will be implemented in the Netherlands where
more regulations are made for determining who can call themselves forensic
experts.
A uniform quality system has to be developed so that the police, the Public
Prosecution Service and judges can know which forensic expert can actually make
a valuable substantive contribution to the criminal investigation and who does not.
In fact that means the provision of a specific label by an independent body. As in
many other sectors in public administration it would be useful to have some form
of accreditation of forensic experts. For the NFI there is already such a procedure,
through the Council for Accreditation, but it would be desirable and useful if it
would apply for all forensic experts.
7.3.2 FORENSIC EXPERTISE INDEPENDENT ROLE
In the Netherlands we had in recent years several incidents involving improper
forensic investigation which led to miscarriages of justice. It became clear that the
forensic expert should play an independent role in the criminal investigation and
the judicial process. This will strengthen confidence in the forensic science in the
long term. This independent role of the forensic experts should be legally defined.
This means that the relationship between the police and the OM on the one
hand and the forensic experts on the other hand should not be one of client and
contractor. The forensic experts should be independent of the person making the
request and he should be able to assess their views independently. It should also
be possible for lawyers to demand a forensic research on behalf of their clients. In
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both cases, there is no hierarchic relationship between the forensic expert and the
person requesting the forensic investigation. In fact, this will mean that a specific
commission or agency assesses the requests of the police, the PPS, the court
commissioners, the lawyers and the defendants on the ground of feasibility,
desirability and finances.
The independence of the forensic expert is very important for the value of the
opinions of the experts. If only the appearance of a bias is dominant, the value of
the opinions of the forensic expert is reduced. This means that the independence
of the forensic expert should be regulated in law. This legislation could include the
criteria and procedure for accreditation of forensic experts, the requirements for
requesting forensic expertise, the criteria for a forensic examination, the way of
reporting and the method of financing.
The request must be made both by the police, the PPS and the court commis-
sioner as well as the defendants and lawyers. The importance of the forensic
investigation is widening. Technical evidence on the basis of forensic expertise is
generally conceived as important by judges, even more than a testimony. This is
an important reason to also allow lawyers the application of forensic research. The
confidence in forensic science will increase if all parties can ask for an indepen-
dent opinion of a forensic expert.
7.3.3 CLEAR STANDARDS FOR FORENSIC EXPERTS NEEDED
There are many different types of forensic experts. It is important that comparable
standards are developed for these different forms of forensic expertise: standards
on how to collect evidence, on how it should be transported, on how it should be
assessed and on how it should be reported etc. For various forms of forensic
expertise these standard exist. The NFI have developed some standards in
consultation with the police for different areas of expertise within the NFI. It
would be desirable if this could be realized for all approved areas of forensic
expertise.
It is also important to involve the police and the PPS in the adoption of these
standards. Both organizations have an important role in the first actions at the
crime scene and the subsequent prosecution. The standards must not only apply
to the forensic experts, but also to the police and the PPS. It should distinguish
between different types of crime scenes. Only when these standards are developed
jointly, will all parties commit to effective action conform these standards.
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7.3.4 MUCH ATTENTION HAS TO BE PAID TO EXPOUND AND EXPLAIN
TECHNICAL FORENSIC KNOWLEDGE
Forensic expertise is first and foremost (technical) science. The forensics experts
know a lot about an often relatively small subject. Forensic experts are experts in a
specific scientific area. They speak and write in the language and style of that
science. This is for the police, the PPS, the judge, lawyers and defendants often an
incomprehensible language. Usually, these subjects are not trained with regard to
the specific expertise of the forensic expert.
It is therefore important that the forensic experts pay much time and attention to
the explanations of technical knowledge: not only in the courtroom, but also to
police and the public prosecutor during the criminal investigation. This means
that in training of police and PPS forensic science and forensic investigation
should be integrated. Only in this way, can the possibilities and limitations of
specific areas of forensic science become clear. In addition to the above standards,
it is important to explicitly reflect on the translation of technical and specialist
knowledge to the non experts in criminal investigation and the judicial process.
7.3.5 ADVANCING KNOWLEDGE AND TECHNOLOGY SHOULD BE CAUSE FOR REVIEW
Recently there were several cases in the Netherlands where people were wrongly
convicted. This has led to judicial revisions with public and political debate. In
these cases it was obvious and imaginable. But it is also possible that by advancing
knowledge and better technology better or more precise results can be achieved
than in the past. With the current DNA technology you need much less material
than in the past. It is expected that in the coming years the forensic technology will
increasingly be developed and the possibilities of forensic expertise will increase.
This means that the possibility of a revision of a specific conviction should be
made simpler. At this time it is a long and arduous process that only applies in a
single case. This is because a review felt like a failure by the police, the public
prosecutors and the judges. But if it is possible – of course under specific
conditions – to review because there are new and better technical forensic
resources that can contribute to a better law and no one is to blame.
7.3.6 NEED FOR MORE KNOWLEDGE FOR POLICE, JUDGES AND LAWYERS
ABOUT FORENSIC EXPERTISE
As forensic experts must do more to ensure that technical knowledge is translated
for the persons involved in the criminal investigation, the police, the public
prosecutors, the judges and lawyers should ensure better knowledge and under-
standing of the possibilities and limitations of forensic expertise. Only with such
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knowledge can they meaningfully ask for specific forensic investigation, they can
better assess the results and it may be useful in the courtroom debates. Police,
public prosecution, judges lawyers do not have to have knowledge about a specific
type of forensic expertise, but that they have to know what the specific opportu-
nities and restrictions of forensic expertise are.
This implies that forensic expertise is a crucial part of the training of police
officers, prosecutors, judges and lawyers. It is even the question whether it should
not be a crucial part of the regular education in law partly because of the expected
importance of forensic expertise in the future. But certainly it is an indispensable
component in the training for policemen, judges, prosecutors and lawyers. The
training and education should not only indicate the characteristics of specific
kinds of forensic expertise, but also pay attention to domestic and foreign cases
involving successful and unsuccessful use of a specific type of forensic expertise.
7.3.7 MORE ATTENTION FOR PROCESSES, COOPERATION AND MANAGEMENT
The forensic investigation can only take place in cooperation between different
organizations. In several cases – not only the incidents – it has become clear that
with regard to cooperation between police, public prosecutors and the NFI there
are specific problems. It would be useful to develop not only content standards for
various forms of forensic expertise but also standards for forms of cooperation. It
is also conceivable that, through joint exercises and simulations, opportunities for
better cooperation in practice will arise.
It is clear that in the future forensic experts must not only consider the content of
their expertise, but also pay attention to the process and management of forensic
investigation. In the coming years a substantial improvement in the processes of
the use of forensic expertise in criminal investigation has to be made or the risk
exists that the substantive knowledge of the forensic experts will be less important.
In the before mentioned programme many good measures are proposed and
should become reality in the coming years. The significance of the forensic
knowledge can be improved if the procedural and process aspects of the use of this
knowledge are adequately protected. This is necessary to ensure and protect the
legitimacy of forensic expertise in the future.
7.3.8 CONTRA-ARGUMENTATION AND REVIEW AS STANDARD
Because of the incidents in the Netherlands there is rightly much attention for
processes of contra-argumentation and review. To this end, specific procedures
are developed so that a selection can be made of cases against where contra-
argumentation and review are required. In a transition period that is desirable and
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necessary, but it is necessary to include contra-argumentation and review
regularly in criminal investigation and judicial trials. Ideally, any criminal
investigation and criminal proceedings are organized in such a way that contra-
argumentation and review are possible and present. It would be crucial for the
effectiveness, efficiency and legality of the criminal investigation and judicial
process.
That does not mean that there should be a devil’s advocate for any form of criminal
investigation or judicial process. Such structures have a limited extent for a short
term. Chiefs of police and chief prosecutors and judges have to fully realize clearly
that contra-argumentation is good and necessary. The chiefs of police have an
important task in this respect. That implies an intensive substantive involvement
of the chiefs of police in specific criminal investigations. For the prosecution it is
vital that a structure for contra-argumentation is available. This contra-argumen-
tation role should also be more appreciated. This is complicated in a time when
policy performance targets have to be achieved. But maybe contra-argumentation
can be incorporated in these policy performance targets.
7.3.9 STRENGTHEN INTERNATIONAL EXCHANGE OF FORENSIC EXPERTISE
The international cooperation in the field of forensic expertise is complex. It is not
expected that in the coming years this will be reduced rather it will increase. The
forensic experts, but also the police, for the judges and lawyers need some
knowledge on how specific forensic knowledge abroad can be obtained. It is
also conceivable that they use forensic knowledge abroad more often. It is not
necessary that all possible forensic knowledge is available in the Netherlands.
Some forms of forensic knowledge are so specific that it is only necessary in very
rare cases. It would be recommended to come to an international agreement on a
certain degree of specialization of certain types of forensic knowledge in specific
countries. It allows countries to specialize in specific kinds of forensic expertise. It
is therefore necessary that there is strong international agreement on mutual use
of each other’s forensic knowledge.
7.3.10 FORENSIC SCIENCE HAS TO WORK TOGETHER MORE INTENSIVELY
Forensic science is fragmented among a large number of different sciences.
Forensic experts are mainly active in their base science. There is little or no
coordination of the expertise of forensic scientists themselves in the Netherlands,
perhaps with the exception of the NFI. But as already mentioned, the NFI does not
have the monopoly on forensic expertise in the Netherlands. It would be desirable
if the forensic scientists would work more together from the concept of forensic
investigation. In this way, the experiences of those involved in the use of their
cha p t e r 7
196
specific knowledge in criminal investigation can be exchanged. This would also
encourage making standards for forensic investigation. The way in which educa-
tion and training of police, prosecutors, judges and lawyers is realized can be
coordinated by forensic scientist working together. If forensic scientist is the
Netherlands would work more together forensic science will flourish. At this
moment there is emerging competition between forensic experts and forensic
institutions in the Netherlands. Hopefully this will lead to a higher quality of
forensic science in total in the Netherlands.
7.4 Closure
Forensic expertise is increasingly important in the criminal investigation and
judicial process in the Netherlands. To ensure long term sufficient confidence in
the forensic expertise it is necessary to pay more attention to improvements of the
processes and procedures using forensic expertise. It is imperative that the
forensic expertise itself imposes high quality standards and realizes accreditation
of those who may actually call themselves forensic experts. The key is an
independent role in the criminal investigation and judicial trial for the forensic
expert. Only with this independence can confidence in the forensic expertise in
the long term be secured.
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8 Intelligence and security services
8.1 Intoduction
Intelligence services play an increasingly important role in society. The emerging
terrorism is a main cause for the rising importance of intelligence services.
Intelligence services can use far-reaching powers. It is therefore of great impor-
tance that the democratic control of intelligence services is well organized.
Intelligence services play a significant role in counter terrorism but also in
intelligence gathering regarding organized crime and large-scale public distur-
bances.1 Intelligence services are a crucial part of the safety and security organiza-
tions in the Netherlands.
In this chapter I describe the General Intelligence and Security Service (Algemene
Inlichtingen en Veiligheidsdienst (AIVD))2 and the Regional Intelligence Services
in the Netherlands. Shortly I will go into the Criminal Intelligence Services and
the relationship with the Public Prosecution Service. The Military Intelligence and
Security Service is dealt with in the chapter on the armed forces.
This chapter relies in part on the report The AIVD in transformation from the
Administrative Review Commission AIVD (2004) and the Defence Intelligence and
Security Report: Quality, capacity and cooperation of the Research Committee
Defence Intelligence and Security (2006). I was secretary and member of these
committees. These reports are the first full public reports of external committees on
the two secret services in the Netherlands. For a complete picture of the intelligence
and security services I can refer to these reports. The Cabinet endorsed the
conclusions of both committees – with a few exceptions. In addition, I use recent
scientific literature and documents of the AIVD, the Review Committee on the
Intelligence and Security Services, the Lower House and the Ministry of Interior
Affairs and Kingdom Relations. This chapter is also based on the volume
Intelligence and Security Services (2010) edited by De Graaf, Muller and Van Reijn,
which is one of the volumes in the series on criminal justice, security and safety in
the Netherlands.3
1 Compare Andrews, Aldrich and Wark 2009; Gill, Marinn and Phytian 2009; Harfield, Macvean,
Grieve and Philips 2008; Johnson 2009.
2 See for history De Graaff 1992; Engelen 1995; De Graaff and Wiebes 1998.
3 See for Dutch and other literature on the Dutch Intelligence and Security Services De Graaf, Muller
and Van Reijn, 2010. See also the English part of the website of the AIVD www.aivd.nl.
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8.2 The General Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD)
8.2.1 FUNCTIONS AND TASKS
An intelligence and security service protects a democratic state against threats
to national security. The function of the AIVD is to provide information for other
government bodies and/or individuals to enable them to take measures to remove a
certain threat to their security. This function has been pursued in five specific tasks.
The AIVD has formulated its mission as follows. “The AIVD is responsible for
national security by timely identifying threats and risks that are not immediately
visible. For this purpose the AIVD conducts investigations both within and outside
the Netherlands. The AIVD shares specific knowledge and information enabling
partners and interested parties to take appropriate measures. The AIVD identifies
threats and risks, advises and mobilises other parties and actively reduces risks
itself. By doing so the AIVD fulfils its own role within the network of government
organizations involved in the protection of national and international security.”4
The AIVD functions on the basis of the Intelligence and Security Services Act
2002 (ISSA 2002) and the Security Investigations Act. In the Intelligence and
Security Services Act five statutory tasks for the AIVD are named in Article 6
paragraph 2. In the interest of national security the General Intelligence and
Security Service has the following tasks:
A. conducting investigations regarding organizations that, and persons who,
because of the objectives they pursue, or through their activities give cause
for serious suspicion that they are a danger to the continued existence of the
democratic legal system, or to the security or other vital interests of the
state;
B. conducting security clearance investigations as referred to in the Security
Investigations Act;
C. promoting measures for the protection of the interests referred to under a,
including measures for the protection of information that is to remain secret
for reasons of national security, and information pertaining to those parts of
the public service and business community that in the opinion of the relevant
Ministers are of vital importance for the continued existence of the social order;
D. conducting investigations regarding other countries concerning subjects
designated by the Prime Minister, Minister of General Affairs, in accordance
with the relevant Ministers;
4 Website AIVD.
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E. drawing up threat and risk assessments at the joint request of the Minister of
the Interior and Kingdom Relations and the Minister of Justice for the benefit
of the protection of the persons referred to in Article 6, third paragraph under
b, and Article 38, first paragraph under c of the Police Act 1993 and the
guarding and security of property and services that have been designated
pursuant to Article 15a of this act.
With the introduction of the Intelligence and Security Services Act in 2002, the
AIVD obtained a new task: the intelligence mission abroad. Therefore, the original
name of Internal Security Service (BVD) was changed to General Intelligence
and Security Service. The AIVD has, since mid-2002, a combined intelligence and
security task. This means that the AIVD may collect information to protect
national security (defensive) but also is allowed to collect information abroad
(offensive).
8.2.2 POWERS AND INTELLIGENCE
The acquisition of information by intelligence agencies is performed in a number
of ways. Traditionally a distinction is made in the way information is collected.
Humint (human intelligence), Sigint (signal intelligence) and Osint (open sources
intelligence) are the main means of acquisition.
Humint or human intelligence is the oldest form of information and was
traditionally the most important, until in the twentieth century because of
technical progress other forms of information became available. Humint involves
information obtained from human sources. Humint can openly be obtained (the
acquirer is identified as a member of the AIVD) but also in a non-public way (e.g.
through agents). Humint is considered high-quality information. It requires
building a network and is therefore labour intensive.
Sigint is signals intelligence and covers the interception and localization of
electronic signals from various types of information collected for a particular
purpose. Sigint can be listening to radio broadcasts, the interception of radio
frequency, satellite interception, interception of telephones et cetera. Sigint
distinguishes itself from other methods of acquisition by the possibility of
collecting international information without the need to be in another country.
Osint is all information obtained from open sources (open source intelligence).
It is all the information that legally can be acquired. This can be commercial
online databases but also Internet and print sources. The strength of Osint is that
it is available and relatively cheap. Technical progress makes it possible to collect
Osint easier and cheaper than ever before. Osint experts estimate that Osint can
provide 80% of the information needed by the intelligence services. Intelligence
information is not necessarily related to secrets and espionage.
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The AIVD has extensive powers to perform its tasks. The ISSA 2002 (Articles 17 to
33) gives an exhaustive list of these powers. Analogous to the Special Investigation
Powers Act the legislature has chosen, in the ISSA, to give a precise overview of the
powers of the AIVD, which indicates under what conditions and with whose consent
the powers of the AIVD can be used. To show this I will give some examples.
Article 17
1. In performing their tasks, or in order to support a proper performance of their
duties, the services, in order to collect information, are authorised to apply to:
a. administrative bodies, public servants and furthermore any persons deemed
capable of providing the necessary information;
b. the person responsible for processing specific information.
2. In the case referred to in the first paragraph, opening words and under b, the
public servant charged with the matter is obliged to prove his identity to the person
responsible for the processing of information in a specific case, on the basis of an
identity card provided by the relevant head of a service.
3. The provisions in force for the person responsible for processing information in a
specific case regarding the furnishing of such information do not apply if such
information is furnished pursuant to a request as referred to in the first paragraph,
opening words and under b.
Article 20
1. The services are authorised to:
a. conduct surveillance and within this context record information relating to the
actions of natural persons or information relating to objects, whether or not
with the aid of observation and registration instruments;
b. trace and within this context record information relating to natural persons
or information relating to objects, whether or not with the aid of tracing
instruments, location positioning equipment and registration instruments.
2. Using observation and registration instruments as referred to in the first
paragraph, under a, and installing tracing instruments, location positioning
equipment and registration instruments as referred to in the first paragraph
under b by the Defence Intelligence and Security Service is only permitted, in
so far as this concerns the use or installation of such instruments or equipment
in enclosed spaces not in use by the Ministry of Defence, if permission therefore
is granted in accordance with the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom
Relations or, in so far as applicable, the head of the General Intelligence and
Security Service.
3. Using observation and registration instruments as referred to in the first para-
graph, under a within dwellings is permitted only if the relevant Minister has given
the head of the service written permission to do so. In the case referred to in the
second paragraph permission is granted, in so far as dwellings are concerned, by
the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations.
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4. The request for permission as referred to in the third paragraph is made by the
head of the service and contains at least:
a. the address of the dwelling in which the instrument is to be used;
b. a description of the type of instrument to be used;
c. the reason why the use of the relevant instrument is deemed necessary.
Article 21
1. The services are authorised to:
a. deploy natural persons, whether or not under cover of an assumed identity or
capacity, who, under the responsibility and on the instruction of a service, are
charged with:
1°. collecting in a directed way information relating to persons and organisa-
tions that can be relevant to the performance of the tasks of a service;
2°. promoting or taking measures to protect the interests attended to by a
service.
b. setting up and using legal entities in support of operational activities.
2. The relevant Minister can instruct in writing the relevant administrative bodies
to co-operate in so far as necessary to provide a natural person as referred to in
the first paragraph, under a with an assumed identity. The statutory provisions
in force for the administrative body relating to the activities requested, will not
apply in so far as these provisions are in conflict with the execution of such
activities.
3. The natural person referred to in the first paragraph under a can receive
instructions from the service to perform activities that may result in rendering
assistance in the committing of an offence or in committing an offence. An
instruction as referred to in the first sentence is only issued if a proper
performance of the duties of the service or the safety of the relevant natural person
so require.
4. The natural person referred to in the first paragraph, under a, in carrying out the
instruction is not permitted to get someone, due to the first person’s actions, to
carry out other actions regarding the devising or committing of offences than those
actions the second person was intending to carry out already.
5. On issuing the instruction referred to in the third paragraph, the person in
question will be instructed:
a. under which circumstances it is permitted to carry out activities pursuant to the
instruction that may result in rendering assistance in the committing of an
offence or in committing an offence;
b. how the instruction is to be executed, including the nature of the activities that
will be carried out by the person in question, in so far as these activities can be
foreseen on issuing the instruction.
6. The instruction to a natural person as referred to in the first paragraph, under a, is
recorded in writing.
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Article 22
1. The services are authorised, with or without the aid of a technical instrument:
a. to conduct a search of enclosed spaces;
b. to search closed objects;
c. conduct an investigation of objects aimed at establishing a person’s identity.
2. The execution of the power referred to in the first paragraph by the Defence
Intelligence and Security Service outside of places in use by the Ministry of
Defence, is only permitted if permission therefore is granted in accordance with
the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations or, in so far as applicable, the
head of the General Intelligence and Security Service.
3. If required for an investigation carried out by a service, an object found in the course
of the execution of the power referred to in the first paragraph can be removed for a
limited time by the service in question, in so far as examination of the relevant object
at the site of the search is impossible and the intended collection of information
cannot be accomplished in any other, less intrusive manner. The object in question
will be replaced as soon as possible, unless this conflicts with a proper performance
of the duties of the service or no reasonable interest is served by replacing the object.
4. The power referred to in the first paragraph, under a, may only be exercised, in so
far as it concerns dwellings, if the relevant Minister has given the head of the
service written permission to do so. The execution of the power referred to in the
first paragraph, under a, by the Defence Intelligence and Security Service relating
to dwellings outside of places in use by the Ministry of Defence, is only permitted if
permission therefore is granted in accordance with the Minister of the Interior and
Kingdom Relations.
5. The permission referred to in the fourth paragraph is granted for a maximum
period of three days. The General Extension of Time-limits Act does not apply.
6. The request for permission as referred to in the fourth paragraph is made by the
head of the service and contains at least:
a. the address of the dwelling that is to be searched, and
b. the reason why the dwelling is to be searched.
The AIVD can obtain, process and disseminate almost all available information.
Article 17 of the ISSA – general information powers – gives the AIVD the power to
collect information from governing bodies, civil servants and anyone who is
deemed to provide the necessary data. This article includes the power to ask for
information in “data holders” without hinderence by the Personal Data Protection
Act. In addition, the AIVD has a large number of special powers, known as special
information resources. The AIVD may observe and follow people, run agents
(natural persons who collect information for the AIVD), deployment of infiltrators
(both employees of the AIVD and citizens), search property, open letters, enter an
automated work, use all forms of call interception, non-cable based telecommu-
nications at home and abroad, and record information from providers
of telecommunications networks. The AIVD has access to any place where it is
reasonably necessary.
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For each of these powers it is precisely defined when the power may be used and
who must give permission. For more intense powers the approval of the Minister
of Internal Affairs is required, for other powers the authorization by the Head of
the AIVD or by mandate of others within the AIVD is enough. The requirements
of proportionality and subsidiarity are fully applicable for the use of certain powers
of the AIVD. The ISSA obliges the AIVD to report the use of special powers to the
persons concerned, unless there are important interests that makes it impossible
to inform these persons. The special powers may only be used for the A and D task
of the AIVD.
The special powers are mostly focused on gathering information. This may
be waived with the possibility of giving a natural person (“agent”) a special
responsibility to promote or take measures to protect the national security. The
AIVD can disturb certain actions of individuals or organizations that endanger
national security. These are situations in which the democratic legal order,
national security or other important interests of the state are likely to be harmed.
The conditions that determine if the AIVD can disturb a certain action are
numerous: time shortage, source protection, insufficient evidence or unclear
responsibility of third parties. The disruptive actions by the secret service can be a
nuisance to subjects, talking to subjects to let them know that they are under
surveillance, spreading disinformation or frustrate planned violent actions. The
AIVD uses this power regular. Small forms of disturbance are quite frequently
used, while radical measures are used only sporadically.
The AIVD is not a criminal investigation agency. The employees of the AIVD have
no criminal investigative powers like police officers do. In the Netherlands, a strict
separation exists between the intelligence and security services on the one hand
and criminal investigation services on the other hand. If the AIVD has informa-
tion relevant to a criminal investigation process this information could be made
available for the Public Prosecution Service through the National Public Prose-
cutor for the AIVD. A recent act on shielded witnesses makes it now possible,
under specific conditions, to use AIVD information in a criminal proceeding.
8.2.3 ORGANIZATION AIVD
The AIVD is a part of the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations. Within
the AIVD there are now different units organizations:
“National Security: This unit is responsible for protecting the democratic legal
order, for state security and for promoting security measures. This means
managing the risks associated with counterterrorism, radicalisation, counterintelli-
gence, political extremism, animal-rights extremism and security promotion.
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Service Centre: The Service Centre is responsible for all generic standard
services within the AIVD. These include personnel and financial information,
human resources, records and archives, procurement, premises, internal security,
transport, catering and office supplies.
Information Management: This unit supplies and manages permanent ICT
facilities and services as required by the organisation.
Foreign Intelligence: This is an offensive intelligence unit, which contributes
to the formulation of foreign policy by producing relevant reports. It operates in
accordance with the Foreign Intelligence Guidelines.
Knowledge Centre for Development and Innovation: This unit contributes to
the AIVD’s development as an outstanding organisation by:
• Identifying and promoting opportunities for improvement and innovation
• Advising on the potential for improvement and innovation
• Overseeing improvement and change processes
• Support ‘process owners’ in optimising those processes
Operational Expertise and Support: This unit performs and supports the im-
plementation of a wide range of intelligence resources for other teams and
departments, provides training and is responsible for operational relationship
management.
Coordination: This unit promotes greater internal cohesion and better co-
operation in order to improve the results of the intelligence process.
Strategy and Policy: This unit ensures that the AIVDmanagement team receives
sound advice and support in determining the organisation’s direction (through
frameworks and policy), in guiding andmanaging all its primary processes (though
control) and in representing the service.
Trend Analysis and Research: This unit identifies, highlights, analyses and
explains phenomena within the AIVD’s areas of interest which are beyond the
scope of any one team or unit. The knowledge and insights thus gained are passed
on to other interested parties, both internal and external, in a variety of forms.
National Communications Security Agency: The National Communications
Security Agency (NBV) safeguards the security of critical information for which
the government is responsible. As a partner and guide to the government, it thus
plays an active and visible role in national security. It possesses unique skills in the
field of information security.
Security Screening: Responsible for an effective process of clearing candidates
for positions involving confidentiality, this unit conducts security screenings in an
authoritative manner.”5
5 www.aivd.nl
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The AIVD does not perform its tasks in a vacuum. There are intensive steering
and controlling relations which I will describe further on in this chapter. The
AIVD cooperates with a large number of national and international organizations.
These national and international organizations are different arenas in which the
AIVD operates.
The AIVD functions in the social sphere of citizens, community organizations
and businesses. The relationship between the AIVD and citizens, community
organizations and businesses is reciprocal. The AIVD information informs
citizens, businesses and other civil society organizations on relevant develop-
ments and threats, while conversely they can alert the AIVD to potential threats to
national security. The cooperation between the AIVD and businesses is concen-
trated on particular companies that have vital functions for the Dutch society.
The government (both the national and the local administration) is responsible
for ensuring safety and security in the Netherlands. The AIVD is one of the
services within the Dutch context that contributes to ensuring safety and security.
The AIVD is at the beginning of the investigation chain in which the PPS,
the police, the Immigration Authority and the special investigation services
conduct their research. The AIVD can provide information to the PPS or
encourage others to research and investigate. In addition, the AIVD works closely
with a large number of Intelligence and Security Services abroad. Most relation-
ships with foreign services are organized in broader NATO and EU context.
This multiplicity of relationships makes demands on how the partners will be
served. This requires a large capacity for differentiation in the products that the
AIVD supplies, as well as how the AIVD communicates with the various
partners.6
8.2.4 INTELLIGENCE AND CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION
The AIVD has no criminal investigation powers. If the AIVD considers that, on
the basis of available information, a criminal investigation can be started, the
AIVD formulates a formal notice for the PPS. The PPS has national prosecutors
engaged in combating terrorism and in the AIVD. These officers have very
frequent contact with the AIVD and are aware of all ongoing operational cases.
They have an office in the building of the AIVD. These prosecutors can get formal
notices which can be forwarded to prosecutors to request a criminal investigation.
With a formal notice the AIVD sets a criminal investigation in motion.
Information which may be important for the criminal investigation or
prosecution can be communicated by the Minister of Internal Affairs, or by the
Head of the AIVD to these prosecutors. The PPS should be able to assess the
reliability of the data. So the AIVD cannot give information directly to the police. It
6 See Valk 2005.
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is always necessary to do that through interference of the prosecutor. It may be
noted that the AIVD and the PPS can both render investigations to the same
individuals or groups because the AIVD and the PPS serve different purposes.
There has been discussion about whether parallel investigation by the AIVD and
the police is possible, but the Hague Court saw no objections.
The criminal intelligence units and tactical teams from the regional criminal
police investigation can instigate a criminal investigation into people who may be
involved in preparing criminal acts, conspiracy, or participation in a terrorist
organization. The AIVD and the criminal intelligence units can investigate the
same persons or groups. They do this, however, from a different perspective. The
AIVD investigates to ensure national security and therefore in particular with a
view to prevent harm to national security. The criminal intelligence units and the
police act in order to collect evidence for a trial. Intelligence and security services
have primarily a future-oriented task, while criminal investigators focus primarily
on events that have already occurred. The police are not equipped to estimate the
likelihood of future serious events. The AIVD is not primarily aimed at collecting
evidence. National security is not always best served by prosecution of perceived
offences.
8.3 Regional Intelligence Services
Each regional police force in the Netherlands has a Regional Intelligence Service
(RID). The RID can be seen as an extension of the AIVD in the region. Through
the RID, the AIVD has the possibility to access “the capillaries of society”.
Members of the RID are so called Article 60 ISSA officials and in that sense
can be regarded as AIVD members at a distance. In the ISSA it is not stated how
many Article 60 officials there should be in a regional corps. The size of the RID
therefore varies significantly (from l to 20 employees). In general it can be argued
that the RID in the four major cities are relatively large and that in the rest of the
country there are relatively small RID.
The RID has several tasks: the AIVD task and a public order task. RID formally
derives its right to exist from the AIVD. In addition, the RID works on gathering
information in the field of public order under the authority of the mayor. These
intelligence activities are intelligence gathering on football hooliganism, problems
with youth, and short-term activities to ensure predictable major policy issues.
The intelligence networks of the RID for the AIVD and for the public policy
task reinforce each other. This double task can also lead to complicated situations,
since the public order task and the AIVD task are not always sharply divided from
each other. For instance when disturbances are expected during political events it
is possible that both interests must be served simultaneously.
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The work of the RID for the AIVD is not restricted to the information needs
arising from team orders from the AIVD. Since 2001 a number of RID executes
investigation on the basis of the Security Investigations Act. In addition, the RID
has a role in the system of guarding and protecting threatened persons. For the
purpose of this system the regional information coordination (RIC) was estab-
lished. This structure is also used at large-scale events such as football matches.
The tasks of the RID for the AIVD are implemented under the responsibility,
direction and authority of the AIVD. The RID is then part of the information
process of the AIVD, the AIVD is responsible for the sources and the derived data.
AIVD information (collected by the RID) can be authorized by the AIVD to be
made available to the regional information coordination. AIVD information
obtained by the RID can sometimes be traced back to the police forces which
provided it if it is non-personal information and has no legal effect.
The work done by the RID in the field of public order is carried out under the
authority of the mayor. The RID is, by executing this task, part of the information
process in the police region. In carrying out this task the RID runs informants, does
short observations and contacts informants. In this way, the RID contributes to a
regional picture regarding public order. The AIVD contributes through the RID
where possible to improve that image of public order, unless laws and regulations
require otherwise.
8.4 Control and supervision
8.4.1 CONTROL
The AIVD carries out its duties in accordance with the law and in subordination to
the Minister of the Interior. The Minister of the Interior is responsible not only
for management but also for task performing of the AIVD. The Minister of
the Interior is responsible for the exercise of special powers. Furthermore, for the
implementation of foreign tasks a responsibility for the PrimeMinister exists. The
Prime Minister drafts, in accordance with the Ministers of the Interior and
Defence and in consultation with the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the designation
that indicates which countries and subjects are to be investigated by the AIVD in
relation to the foreign task.
Meanwhile a complex administrative and management plan cycle is formed to
ensure that all stakeholders have sufficient opportunities to influence the work of
the AIVD. In the Council for National Security (RNV), the ministers come
together who have a responsibility in respect of the intelligence and security
services. In the Committee Combined Intelligence Services Netherlands
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(CVIN) the decisions of this Council are prepared. There is also a Coordinator for
the Intelligence and Security services, in the person of the Secretary-General of
the Prime Minister who should coordinate the implementation of the tasks of the
AIVD and the Military Intelligence and Security Service (MIVD). Also, since
March 2004 a National Terrorism Coordinator (NCTb) has been appointed to
coordinate the counter terrorism activities. In this complex arena the AIVD must
function effectively and efficiently.
8.4.2 SUPERVISION7
The AIVD is supervised in several ways:
A. by the service itself through internal rules, guidelines and procedures and
external publications such as reports and annual reports;
B. by the ministers concerned in particular the Minister of the Interior;
C. by the Lower House in the form of the Commission on the Intelligence and
Security and the Standing Committee for the Interior;
D. by independent external audit organizations such as the Review Committee
on the Intelligence and Security Services, the National Audit Chamber
Court (in particular the secret spending), the National Ombudsman
(specific complaints about the AIVD) and the court (whether administrative,
civil or criminal).
E. by the media, scientists, and citizens groups.
In the remainder of this paragraph, I focus on the supervision by Parliament and
the Review Committee. These forms of supervision are in practice the most
intensive and structural.
Parliament
In the confidential parliamentary committee on Intelligence and Security Services
the Cabinet presents the Lower House with the work of the AIVD. Until mid 2003,
this committee consisted of the leaders of the largest political parties in parliament.
Meanwhile, all political parties in the Lower House sit on this committee with the
exception of the Socialist Party. Annually, this committee publish a short report of
its work.
The Cabinet expressed the importance of this confidential parliamentary
committee as follows: “In the Committee on Intelligence and Security Services it
is possible to account confidentially for the more operational aspects and the
functioning and organization of a secret service. To the committee the AIVD sends
nowadays the quarterly reports on the investigations of the AIVD.”8 The Admin-
7 See also CTIVD, Acoountability of Intelligence and Security Agencies, Den Haag: 2007.
8 Letter Minister of Interior and Kingdom Relations, Aanbieding onderzoeksrapport democratische
controle inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten, 14 December 2005, p. 4.
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istrative Review Commission AIVD came at the end of 2004 to the following
conclusion on this confidential committee: “The Commission finds that the CIVD
is of great value for both the Lower House as for the Minister of Internal Affairs and
the AIVD. It is an instrument by which can be ensured that confidential statements
about the functioning and organization of the AIVD can be made. The Commis-
sion concludes that the committee is generously informed by the Minister and the
AIVD. The number and depth of debates on specific issues is low.”9
In addition, the Standing Committee on the Interior of the Lower House
discusses the public parts of the functioning of the AIVD, including the annual
reports. Also, the reports of the confidential parliamentary committee on Intelli-
gence and Security Services and Security discussed with the Standing Committee
on Home Affairs. The leaders of the political parties are held accountable by their
own MPs about how the confidential control of the intelligence and security
services have developed
In recent years, the amount of information from the AIVD through the
Minister of Internal Affairs to the Lower House rose exponentially. In the annual
reports and website of the AIVD there is a large quantity of documents to
parliament about the organization and functioning of the AIVD. Especially the
extensive annual reports of the AIVD offer a broad and public image on the
functioning of the Dutch secret service. It is no exaggeration to say that there is
intensive information to parliament. In the next quotation the main aspects of the
annual report of 2010 of the AIVD are presented:
“In its 2010 annual report, the General Intelligence and Security Service ( AIVD) states
that there is a serious risk of digital attacks on electronic networks in our country and that
these attacks are expected to increase in number. It is therefore important that essential
systems are adequately protected and that espionage and large-scale system failure can be
prevented. In 2010 the service has identified a number of cyber espionage attacks and has
informed relevant parties accordingly. The AIVD has developed an analysis method to
help boost the resilience of companies and governments against this threat.
The service’s annual report also states that there is a wide-spread lack of under-
standing of the value of information and how to assess what interests it may serve. People
overestimate the safety and security of technical devices, such as the laptops and
smartphones they use in their everyday work. Exchanging sensitive information over
the telephone or by email always constitutes a risk, because such communications can
pass through foreign communication hubs. And sometimes email messages sent from
aforementioned portable devices are temporarily stored on foreign servers. Foreign
intelligence services are eager to take advantage of such opportunities. The AIVD works
together with the government and trade & industry, within the framework of the National
Cyber Security Strategy, for example, to safeguard the Netherlands against this risk.
9 Commissie Bestuurlijke Evaluatie AIVD, De AIVD in verandering, Den Haag, 2004, p. 90 and 216.
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In 2010 the AIVD has established that foreign intelligence officers – from China,
among others – are demonstrating an interest in Dutch (high-tech) companies. The
service has also observed various kinds of Russian intelligence activities. Whenever
possible, the service has warned the companies in question and disrupted espionage
activities. A joint programme set up together with the Ministry of Security and Justice
has been launched to warn the sectors involved.
The service has observed that foreign services have demonstrated undiminished
interest in the various migrant communities in our country in 2010. This attention has
not only manifested itself in overt influence activities, but also in clandestine attempts
made by foreign governments to map and influence these communities. The service
informs as many parties and partners as possible to prevent the fundamental rights of
Dutch residents from being infringed upon.
The AIVD gathers foreign intelligence to provide the Dutch government with
information. The recent developments in North Africa and the Middle East are of great
interest to the Dutch government and have led the AIVD to intensify its focus on this
task.
Early identification of the jihadist-terrorist threat posed by terrorist groups operating
internationally has been a top priority for the service in 2010. This threat particularly
emanates from the border area between Afghanistan and Pakistan. There are various
indications to suggest that the threat against Europe as a whole has increased in 2010.
This also applies to the threat against our country, even though it is still less acute than in
some of our European neighbours.
The internet plays an important role in the threat manifesting against the West, the
AIVD concludes in its annual report. This role consists not only of disseminating
jihadist propaganda, but also of forming networks and recruiting militants, facilitating
Jihad, and plotting attacks.
In 2010 the AIVD has also focused attention on radical and ultra-orthodox Islamic
movements that may pose a threat to the democratic legal order. Examples include the
Muslim Brotherhood, the Tablighi Jamaat, Hizb ut-Tahrir and the Salafi movement. It
has been established that even though these movements may potentially pose a threat to
the democratic legal order in the long term, they are still relatively small and the Dutch
(Muslim) population is quite resilient to radicalisation.
Animal rights extremists exchange information, announce (protest) actions and
publish particulars of ‘bad’ companies on the internet, among other things. The AIVD
has, however, observed a decrease in the intensity and the number of activities under-
taken by animal rights extremists, partly as a result of tougher government policy.
Prevention and international co-operation have contributed greatly towards countering
this phenomenon in 2010. This form of extremism continues to have a strong
international dimension.
The latter also applies to extremists involved in opposition to the Dutch asylum and
aliens policy. Last year once again saw a rise in violent actions, such as arson and
vandalism. The AIVD has also observed that Dutch pro-asylum activists increasingly
take part in actions abroad, particularly in Belgium.”10
10 www.aivd.nl, see here also for the full and latest annual report of the AIVD.
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Review Committee
In the ISSA 2002 a new monitoring body was introduced in the form of the
Review Committee on the Intelligence and Security Services. The main task of
this committee is to monitor the legality of the AIVD (and MIVD). The Review
Committee is not allowed to conduct an effectiveness study or organizational
study of the secret services, but can comment on efficiency, effectiveness or
organization if necessary during their legal investigations. The committee can
give advice to the AIVD and MIVD and has a role in the complaints handling of
the services. The Review Committee consists of three independent members
appointed by the Council of Ministers on the recommendation of the Lower
House and are appointed by Royal Decree for a period of six years. The Review
Committee is independent and has been given far-reaching statutory powers to
perform its task. For example, the Committee has access to all relevant informa-
tion of the services and may hear all the staff of the services. Furthermore the
Committee has the right to hear witnesses (under oath) or experts. Finally, it may
access all places which it deems necessary in the context of its task, with the
exception of dwellings. The main articles in the ISSA 2002 on the powers of the
Review Committee are mentioned below.
Article 73
1. The relevant Ministers, the heads of the services, the coordinator and furthermore
everyone involved in the implementation of this act and the Security Investigations
Act will, if requested, furnish all information to the supervisory committee and will
render all other assistance the supervisory committee deems necessary for a proper
performance of its duties. The supervisory committee will have, upon its request,
immediate access to the information processed in the context of the implementa-
tion of this act or of the Security Investigations Act.
2. When furnishing information as referred to in the first paragraph, when there is
reason for this, it will be indicated which information in the interest of the national
security is to be brought to the knowledge of the supervisory committee exclusively.
Article 74
1. If deemed necessary for the proper execution of its tasks, the supervisory
committee may request the persons referred to in Article 73, first paragraph, as
well as other persons to furnish information as a witness or as an expert and may
summon these persons to appear before the supervisory committee.
2. The request will be made in writing and will state as far as possible the facts
regarding which the witness or expert is to provide information. If the witness or
the expert has been summoned to appear before the supervisory committee, the
request will also state the place where and time at which this person will be heard
and the consequences of non-appearing. The summons to appear will be made by
registered letter or by recorded delivery.
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3. The witness or the expert is obliged to provide all the information the supervisory
committee deems necessary for a proper execution of its tasks and to this end the
witness or expert, if the supervisory committee has indicated this in its request,
must appear in person. The person appearing may be represented by a lawyer.
4. The obligation to appear before the committee does not apply to the relevant
Ministers. If a Minister does not appear himself, he will appear by representation.
5. If a functionary involved in the implementation of this act appears as a witness or
as an expert pursuant to this article, Article 86, second paragraph is not applicable.
6. The supervisory committee may order that persons who, despite being summoned
to appear in accordance with the law, do not appear, are brought before the public
authorities in order to comply with their obligations.
7. The witness or expert may claim exemption from giving information on account of
his professional secrecy but only in so far as this concerns information that has
been entrusted to him as such.
Article 75
1. The supervisory committee may order that witnesses will not be heard before
taking the oath or making a solemn affirmation. In this case the witness will take
the oath or make a solemn affirmation before the supervisory committee’s
chairperson stating that he will state the truth and nothing but the truth.
2. The experts are obliged to perform their task impartially and to the best of their
knowledge.
Article 76
1. The supervisory committee is entitled if a proper performance of its tasks so
requires, to assign certain activities to experts.
2. The expert who has accepted his assignment, is obliged to perform his task
impartially and to the best of his knowledge.
Article 77
The supervisory committee or a member it has appointed to this end is entitled to enter
all places with the exception of a residence without the permission of its occupant, in so
far as this is reasonably necessary for the fullfilment of its task. The committee or the
appointed member can have himself accompanied by persons of the secretariat
appointed by the chairperson as referred to in Article 69.
The Review Committee will publish in principle a public report of its monitoring
research. They may also choose to publish a (partly) a confidential report. A
selection of the reports of the Review Committee which are available in English is
mentioned below:
The official messages issued by GISS in the period October 2005 up to and including
May 2010 (CTIVD no. 29, 2011)
The use of Sigint by DISS (CTIVD no. 28, 2011)
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The performance by GISS of the foreign intelligence task (CTIVD no. 26, 2011)
The performance by the AIVD of the obligation to notify (CTIVD no. 24, 2010)
The cooperation of the AIVD with foreign intelligence and/or security services (CTIVD
no. 22A, 2009)
The application by the AIVD of wiretapping and selection of undirected intercepted non-
cable bound telecommunications (CTIVD no. 19, 2008)
The investigation by the AIVD into the leaking of state secrets (CTIVD no. 10, 2006)
The official messages issued by the MIVD in the period from January 2004 – January
2006 (CTIVD no. 9b, 2006)
The official messages issued by the AIVD in the period from January 2004 – October
2005 (CTIVD no. 9a, 2006)
The deployment by the AIVD of informers and agents, more in particular abroad
(CTIVD no. 8b, 2006)
The deployment by the MIVD of informers and agents, more in particular abroad
(CTIVD no. 8a, 2006)
A counter-terrorism operation by the AIVD (CTIVD no. 7, 2006)
The AIVD’s investigation into radical animal rights activism and left-wing extremism
(CTIVD no. 6, 2006)
Investigation by the AIVD into the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and
means of delivery (CTIVD no. 5b, 2005)
Investigation by the MIVD into the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and
their means of delivery (CTIVD no. 5a, 2005)11
A major report of the Review Committee was on the assessment processes of
the AIVD with respect of Mohammed B., the political murderer of moviemaker
Theo Van Gogh in 2004, one of the major terroristic political murders in
the Netherlands. The central question was if the AIVD should have paid more
attention to Mohammed B. so possibly the murder of Van Gogh could have been
prevented. To give an impression of the work of the Review Committee the answer
of the Committee to this question is cited:
“The Committee is of the opinion that attention from the AIVD for Mohammed B. was
desirable because of his active and important role in the group and because of his violent
personality. The Committee has established that the team that conducted an investiga-
tion into the Hofstad group (only) had the capacity to closely follow a few people from the
Hofstad group (in particular by deploying special powers). As a result, priorities had to
be made within the investigation. In the Committee’s opinion, the AIVD could reason-
ably have decided to closely follow those persons with regard to whom there existed the
serious suspicion that they were directly involved in the preparation of possible attacks.
Mohammed B. did not belong to these persons in this context. In the Committee’s
opinion, the AIVD, compelled by the available capacity, could reasonably have decided
11 See the website of the Review Committee www. ctivd.nl
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that Mohammed B. was not among the persons to be closely watched (in particular by
deploying special powers) by the AIVD.
However, this does not imply thatMohammed B. did not need to be given any attention
at all. In the Committee’s opinion, the attention actually given to Mohammed B. from the
spring of 2004 onwards, was too meagre, considering his active and important role in the
Hofstad group and his violent character. The information that became available on
Mohammed B., in the Committee’s opinion, should have been analysed periodically, in
order that his activities and development in the group could bemonitored. Such an analysis
can only be performed in a proper way if all information available on him is considered in
close connection with one another (personal file) and his role in the network, just as the
roles other persons in the network had, is charted periodically (network analysis). By
analysing his activities and development periodically, it would have been possible to
review whether more attention for him was necessary and whether reprioritisation in the
investigation into the Hofstad group was, consequently, required. Limited capacity should
not and need not stand in the way of keeping a dossier on persons in respect of whom this
is necessary. For this is not about collecting extra information, but only about bringing
information together in an organised and orderly way, information which is collected
anyway. When the arrangement of information is in order, this will only add to the
efficiency and effectiveness of the intelligence work. The Committee observes that if the
AIVD had created a personal file on Mohammed B., as the Committee has done by
charting all the information available to the AIVD before 2 November 2004, there still
would have been no picture of a person in respect of whom there was a serious suspicion
that he had any direct involvement in the preparation of any attacks. However, the data
available do show an increased importance to pay attention to Mohammed B.
The Committee is also of the opinion that the AIVD could have made use of the
manpower and operational resources that the RID Amsterdam-Amstelland had to offer in
this period. The deployment of the RIDwould in particular have had an added value because
the AIVD, due to its limited capacity, was able to closely monitor only a limited number of
people. The AIVD could have called in the RID Amsterdam-Amstelland to monitor several
persons from the Hofstad group, including Mohammed B. For example, the AIVD could
have asked the RID Amsterdam-Amstelland to periodically trace Mohammed B. in the
police registers or to periodically inquire about Mohammed B. with the contacts of the RID.
By calling in the RID Amsterdam-Amstelland, the mutation in the police register of 3 May
2004 that Mohammed B. had threatened a staff member of the Social Services, could have
reached the AIVD. Furthermore, the Committee finds it incomprehensible that the AIVD
has dismissed the offer by the RID Amsterdam-Amstelland to conduct an investigation into
the documents that Mohammed B. was carrying when he was arrested, considering the
AIVD itself had insufficient capacity to study these documents in depth. Furthermore,
based on the information the AIVD possessed onMohammed B. before 2 November 2004,
he would have been a suitable candidate to be included in the Analytical Cell/CT-Infobox.
The Committee does observe in that respect that this instrument was still being developed
before 2 November 2004 and placing Mohammed B. in the Analytical Cell/CT-Infobox
would therefore in practice have made little difference.”12
12 Annual report CTIVD 2007, pp. 129-130.
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The Minister concerned has to indicate how he will deal with the conclusions and
recommendations of the Review Committee. The public report and the response
from the Minister are sent to the Lower House. Any confidential part of the
monitoring report is sent to the confidential parliamentary Commission on
Intelligence and Security Services of the Lower House. The Review Committee
also publishes an annual report of its activities including all surveillance reports.
The conclusions and recommendations of the Review Committee are generally
followed by the Minister of the Interior and the AIVD itself as the following quote
shows. “It turns out that by far most of the recommendations of the Committee
have been adopted by the two Ministers concerned and meanwhile (over the
period investigated) have been implemented by the AIVD and the MIVD. For
the most part, this took place by means of adjusting the internal rules within the
services. This is of course important, but the Committee considers it even more
important that the recommendations are implemented in practice and that this
also receives the necessary attention internally. Within both services a system has
been put in place that is to ensure that the recommendations of the Committee are
given the necessary attention and that activities are conducted in accordance with
these recommendations. The Committee has greeted with approval several
important adjustments within or with respect to the services that are (partially)
based on recommendations of the Committee. For example, a joint proliferation
team of the AIVD and the MIVD has been set up, the Designation Order of
the Prime Minister for the foreign task has undergone a major adjustment, there
is more clarity on and supervision over several collaboration arrangements of the
AIVD with a foreign service, important – restrictive – rules have been created
within the AIVD as to the exercise of powers against holders of the right of
nondisclosure and the Committee’s recommendations have resulted in several
proposals to amend the WIV 2002.”13
Discussions
The Minister of the Interior has concluded that the democratic control of
intelligence and security services is comprehensive and that there is no need
for an extra supervisory body. The supervision of the intelligence and security
services and in particular the AIVD has in recent years indeed greatly improved.
The Review Committee has the most important part in this growth. The establish-
ment of this committee with the introduction of the new law on the intelligence
and security services in 2002 was a valuable addition. Furthermore, within the
intelligence and security services a deep awareness exists that operating within
the law and democratic principles and rules is crucial. The internal control within
the AIVD itself also increased significantly. This awareness within the secret
service is crucial for its functioning and organization.
13 Annual report CTIVD, 31 March 2008, pp. 19-20.
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But within the current range of supervision there can still be some improvements
made. There is no need in the Netherlands for an extensive addition to existing
controls. But some changes would improve the supervision substantially.
It would be desirable if the Review Committee could not only supervise the
legality of the work of the AIVD but could also supervise the effectiveness,
efficiency and organization. This requires not only legal powers for the Review
Committee but also necessary personnel and finance. In this way the entire secret
services as a whole can be inspected and monitored. It is then possible to monitor
and supervise intelligence and security services more comprehensive.
The Review Committee could cooperate more frequently with the General Audit
Chamber and the National Ombudsman. Both High Colleges of State have already a
role in supervision of the intelligence and security services. It would also be
conceivable that the committee would cooperate with, for example, the Inspectorate
for Public Order and Security and Safety Research, for example with regard to
cooperation between intelligence and security services and police, judiciary, admin-
istration and others in different types of situations. These forms of cooperation in
the field of control and supervision will create a broader and integrated monitoring
and control of the intelligence and security services. In fact they may form a
structural and regular monitoring and supervision, like the Commission Adminis-
trative Review AIVD and the Research and Information Security Defense have once
implemented. Obviously it is necessary to look into the powers that are necessary for
this more comprehensive supervision.
The confidential Committee for Intelligence and Security Services in the Lower
House consists of leaders of political parties who have no specific knowledge in
the field of national security, intelligence and security forces. Because of their
political position they are supposed to be able to deal properly with confidential
data. The supervision of this committee would be provided if the political party
leaders would be accompanied by anMP who specializes in this subject and is also
bound to confidentiality. In this way, the necessary confidentiality and opportunity
for full parliamentary supervision are better linked.
8.5 Trends in intelligence services
In this last paragraph I give a sketch of the most important trends in intelligence
and security services in the Netherlands.14
14 See in more depth Muller 2011.
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8.5.1 PRINCIPLES FOR INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY SERVICES IN THE NETHERLANDS
In the Netherlands some substantive and organizational principles regarding the
intelligence and security services are formulated. The unique feature of an
intelligence and security service is the using of special powers to gather intelligence
and to promote measures which are necessary for the survival of the democratic
legal order, or for the prevention of threats to national security. The following
principles should be seen as guidance for the future direction of the intelligence
and security services in the Netherlands. They can be seen as targets to be achieved.
A. Legitimacy: An intelligence and security service in the Netherlands enjoys
legitimacy among citizens, businesses and government. There is confidence that
an intelligence and security service performs the maximum feasible in order to
protect national security. Confidence in the organization and in the operation of
an intelligence and security service is essential for the degree effectiveness of the
intelligence and security function in a democratic state.
B. Legality: The operation of an intelligence and security service is legitimate. Only
on the basis of explicitly defined powers in the act may an intelligence and security
service act. An intelligence and security service does have wide powers to perform its
tasks. These powers are granted only if the exercise of those powers is lawfully
executed. The legality of the operation of an intelligence and security service is
under strict supervision.
C. Effectiveness: An intelligence and security service functions effectively. Primarily
this presupposes that an intelligence and security service tries to gather maximum
information, and uses an ideal combination of intelligence resources. Effective-
ness also means that the maximum is done to exploit the information and that
here is a policy or operational follow-up to the collected information. An
intelligence and security service is designed to use the information effectively to
achieve a specific goal. The objective can be diverse (tracking suspects, disruption,
change policies, exchange information etc). Effective action by an intelligence and
security service means a strong focus on their stakeholders.
D. Ministerial control: An intelligence and security service is uniquely controlled by a
political-administrative authority under strict ministerial responsibility. The political-
administrative authority support structures and channels the expectations of the
functioning of the intelligence and security service so that for an intelligence and
security service it is clear which priority tasks must be implemented. An intelligence
and security service can only posteriorize with the consent of the Minister.
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E. Clear positioning: An intelligence and security service, in terms of powers and
responsibilities, is clearly positioned in relation to clients, regulators and partners
in the security chain. This concerns in particular the ministries, the police, the
PPS and the MIVD.
F. Intensive supervision: An intelligence and security service is intensively super-
vised. The supervision should cover all parts of the organization and functioning
of the Intelligence and Security Service. Due to the nature of the work of an
intelligence and security service there can not be full disclosure. For the various
forms of supervision (parliamentary, legal, functional, etc.), specific supervision
control agencies are designated which function under confidentiality. An intelli-
gence and security services provide full cooperation with requests of a supervision
agency. This is essential for the effectiveness of monitoring and the legitimacy of
an intelligence and security service.
G. Good national cooperation: The protection of national security and other
important interests in a democratic society is the work of many different parties.
Cooperation is therefore crucial. An intelligence and security service shall, where
possible, contribute to a good cooperation within national security chain. Infor-
mation exchange and focus on the exploitation of information are central themes
in this cooperation.
H. Strong international intelligence position: An intelligence and security service can
only operate within an international context. Collaboration takes place on an
international intelligence market where the “quid pro quo” principle is applied.
To be able to operate in this intelligence market, an intelligence and security
service acquires intelligence that is relevant to others. A national intelligence and
security service enjoys a good reputation with other countries. An intelligence
and security service has close collaborations with fellow services. An intelligence
and security service participates actively in international dialogues.
I. Separate intelligence and investigation services: An intelligence and security service
is not a criminal investigation agency. Gathering and providing information obtained
by means of special intelligence means is separated from the activities which are
taken on the basis of this information. There are legal options to use information
from an intelligence and security service, under clear conditions, in a criminal
investigation. An intelligence and security service is obliged to provide information
relevant to specific interests of stakeholders to prevent threats to materialize.
J. Disturbance procedure: An intelligence and security service can take certain
actions to disturb individuals and organizations if the survival of the democratic
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legal system and national security is acutely threatened. To this end, an intelli-
gence and security service has a specific procedure.
K. No full disclosure: An intelligence and security service functions in a democratic
society and can never act on full disclosure. The operation of an intelligence and
security service benefits from a degree of confidentiality. There should be an optimal
balance between openness and confidentiality. Disclosure and openness would be
preferable if no interests of the intelligence and security function are affected.
L. Coherent organization: The internal organization of an intelligence and security
service ensures the proper collection and processing of information. Also, the
exchange of information is optimally designed. The quality and quantity of
personnel, equipment and finances are in accordance with the duties and expecta-
tions. The administrative organization is designed so that planning, procurement
and implementation are optimally matched. The culture of the organization must
be based on the assumptions made here of an intelligence and security service in a
democratic state. The management of the intelligence and security service should
ensure that coherent internal organization.
M. Balance short and long term: An intelligence and security service aims at both
short-term threats and long-term trends and potential threats. Because creating a
long time intelligence position information takes a lot of time, the (long term)
potential threats must be recognized in an early stage so that effective measures
can be taken. The extent to which attention is paid to short-term and long-term
threat is the subject of the prioritization process. An intelligence and security
service monitors a balance between short-term and long-term reflection.
N. Adaptive capacity: An intelligence and security service is in a position to
adequately respond to a changing national and international environment. This
assumes an intelligence and security service with a high adaptive capacity.
8.5.2 ENVIRONMENT
The environment of the intelligence and security services has changed dramati-
cally in the recent years. For the AIVD terrorism – both in the Netherlands and
internationally – has become an increasingly important part of the investigations
which they must perform. For the RID this has also a major impact as they can be
less concerned with public order threats, but first and foremost must focus on the
threat of terrorism.
For all the intelligence and security services the expectations have increased
significantly. The threat is greater and more intensive. The politics, the media and
the public expect that intelligence and security services are actually able to collect
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the information needed to prevent these threats. The expectations are high, in
some cases too high. It is the question if these expectations are real, partly because
of the complexity and magnitude of current threats. That means, however, that
intelligence and security services in the Netherlands much pay more attention to
the management of expectations and clarify the possibilities, but also the limita-
tions of their work.
8.5.3 POWERS
The intelligence and security services have many powers to gather information. With
these powers they are able to effectively collect the necessary information. To date, the
intelligence and security services do not need extra powers. The existing powers are
sufficient for the task of the intelligence and security services. Within the intelligence
and security services the use of special intelligence powers is handled carefully. The
legality perspective is firmly rooted in the intelligence and security services.
Part of the work of the intelligence and security service is to perform disturbing
actions which are a threat to national security. This disturbance is not regulated in
a law. The intelligence and security services are not criminal investigation
agencies which can arrest, so the intelligence and security services have no formal
possibility to intervene directly. Formally, they must transfer the relevant infor-
mation through the PPS to the police who then can perform criminal investigation
operations such as an arrest. In practice intelligence and security services disrupt
acts of certain persons which they monitor. It would be desirable if there is a
comprehensive statutory arrangement for this disturbance power.
8.5.4 MUCH INTELLIGENCE AVAILABLE BUT SHARING IS DIFFICULT
The intelligence and security services have many powers to collect information. The
information gives a clear and concrete picture of specific threats. The annual reports
of the AIVD and the MIVD give an outline of the available information. The
intelligence and security services know more than they publish or share with others.
The confidentiality of information is for intelligence and security services of great
importance. The main product of the intelligence and security service is information.
If this information is transferred too quickly to others, the risk exists that no
additional information can be obtained because others may start a criminal investiga-
tion or other activities are undertaken which disturb the information gathering.
The committee which investigated the AIVD in 2004 came to the conclusion
that the AIVD should share more. Especially regarding the AIVD, the committee
concluded that the AIVD shared little information. This can affect the legitimacy
and the trust of the other organizations in the AIVD. This is not just about
providing information through the PPS to the police, but also under specific terms
to, mayors, ministers and others. In both cases, it would be desirable for the Dutch
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intelligence and security services to share the relevant information as much as
possible. Ultimately, the information is collected in order to avoid certain threats.
The impression is that both intelligence and security services in the Netherlands
are now more actively sharing information.
8.5.5 NATIONAL COOPERATION
The cooperation between the AIVD and other organizations within the Dutch
security chain was not optimal. The before mentioned committee expressed parti-
cular concern about the cooperationwith the police, especially regarding the exchange
of information. Meanwhile, various initiatives, including the Counter-Terrorism
Infobox created a more intensive cooperation. The cooperation between the AIVD
andMIVD has to improve, especially with regard to cooperation in combined teams.
Cooperation is a crucial precondition for the functioning of intelligence and
security services. Without cooperation they may never realize full information.
Only with close cooperation, there is a chance that all relevant information is
gathered at the right time and at the right place. The expectation is that because of
the continuing and growing threat of terrorism, the need for increasing coopera-
tion will be even more important.
8.5.6 INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION
Perhaps even more important than national cooperation is the international
cooperation between the intelligence and security services. Both the AIVD and the
MIVD have intensive operational collaborations with colleagues abroad. This has led
to a major international administrative bustle. There are agreements with many
countries to exchange information. This has repeatedly led to successful operations.
These are increasing not only in bilateral relations, but also in multilateral exchange
relationships. The EU and NATO play an increasingly important role.
Crucial to the international cooperation between intelligence and security
services is the so-called quid pro quo balance. Intelligence and security services
want information back for the information they provide. In fact, there is in the
field of international information-sharing by intelligence and security services a
certain trade in information. It is important that a country has specific informa-
tion that may be of interest to other countries so that new information from other
countries can be obtained.
8.5.7 CONTROL AND SUPERVISION
An important aspect of intelligence and security services is the way the control
and supervision is organized. The priorities of the work of the intelligence and
security services must be decided on by politically accountable ministers. The
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AIVD research committee criticized the control of the AIVD and called it
fragmented and unclear. The recommendation was to give the Minister of Interior
Affairs and Kingdom Relations a more prominent management competence,
which will now become reality.
Supervision of the AIVD is difficult because of the inherently confidential
nature of the work of the intelligence and security services. The Review Commit-
tee has published some thorough public and confidential reports on specific
investigations of the intelligence and security services. The Commission on the
Intelligence and Security Services in the Lower House will ensure parliamentary
control. Ultimately, the confidence of politics, administration, media and citizens
in the secret services is the main control method. That confidence can only exist if
the services behave in accordance with the applicable laws.
8.5.8 ORGANIZATION AND CAPACITY
Finally, how the intelligence and security services have shaped their internal
organization is important for the way they can carry out their tasks. The quality of
the products and employees are crucial. In the Netherlands the intelligence and
security services have launched extensive programmes to improve the quality of
processes, products and employees.
The AIVD research committees came to conclusion that the capacity of the
AIVD was too small to carry out their tasks. It made recommendations for an
intensive growth of the services. Meanwhile, the government accepted these
proposals. This results in the coming years in a strong expansion of the Dutch
intelligence and security services. The growth of these services takes place within
tight conditions in terms of safety and quality. Growth can only take place steadily.
8.6 Closure
Intelligence and security services play an increasing role in security and safety
policy in the Netherlands. This role is reflected in much information on specific
national and international threats. Cooperation with other organizations, in
particular the police, is a major concern. Only if the intelligence and security
services are capable of effective and substantive cooperation with the police, and
other organizations in the security chain it can be realized that the right informa-
tion is gathered at the right time in the right place. Within the intelligence and
security services everyone is aware of the impossibility of total security and
complete information.
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9 Public order maintenance
Public disturbances and public order maintenance are an important part of
security in the Netherlands. In this chapter I pay explicit attention to these topics.
I use the following definition of public order. Public order concerns the normal
course of business in the public space. This is a prevailing organization of social
life that objectively (by the public) is known. It is not possible to give an overview
of all possible forms of public disturbances. There is always a degree of freedom
for interpretation by the authorities.
In the first section I give an outline of the formal powers in respect of public order
enforcement. In the second section, the historical development of public order
is described, and in the third section the public order policy is analyzed. The
chapter concludes with a section on trends in public order and public order
enforcement. I will use several Dutch studies in particular in which I participated:
Public order (Van der Torre, Muller, et al, 2002), Governance, law and security
(Muller, Rogier, Kummeling, et al, 2008), Text and commentary public order,
security and safety (Muller, Brainich, Rogier and De Roos (eds), 2011) and Public
order and group violence during public events (Muller, Ferwerda, Adang, Zannoni, et
al, 2011). Together they give an overview on public order and public order
enforcement in the Netherlands.1
9.1 Powers of public order maintenance
The authorities in the Netherlands can use a colourful collection of powers
concerning public order maintenance. The mayor has the authority over the
police when it comes to public order maintenance. In the tripartite consultation
between the mayor, the prosecutor and the police chief, the different interests –
maintaining public order and enforcing the law – are balanced. In this section,
I give a general overview of the major powers and their operation in the
Netherlands to make clear the diverse legal possibilities a Dutch mayor has to
maintain public order.2
1 Compare Waddington 2007.
2 Based on Muller, Brainich, Rogier and De Roos, 2011 and based on and cited from Muller, Rogier,
Kummeling, et al, 2008.
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Public order maintenance mayor (art 172 Act on Municipalities (Gemeentewet))
The mayor is given in this article the general mandate in relation to public order
maintenance. In the third paragraph of this article, the so-called light order power
of the mayor is described which gives the mayor the power to give orders necessary
for enforcement of an imminent or actual disruption of public order. This provision
may be used when no other power is available. The light order power is primarily
used for residence and area disqualifications of people who are disrupting the
public order. In some municipalities, this is specified in the General Local Act but
not in all municipalities. Each municipality has is own General Local Act in which
the specific local powers and regulations are described. This power is only warrant
for incidental residence and area disqualifications and it remains unclear how long
that may take. The new Act on Instructions for Serious Inconvenience allows a
combination of an area denial and a behavioural instruction. These are a combina-
tion of powers of the mayor and of the prosecutor.
The light order power is now regularly used for area disqualifications of some
hours or days, especially with regard to drugs. This power is effective in the area
upon which the disqualification is aimed, but in practice there is always a
displacement effect to be seen. For youths standing on the street or at corners
who are not a nuisance this power is not effective. The new Act on Instructions for
Serious Inconvenience is expected to further improve the practice.
Public Events Act
Powers concerning public demonstrations, marches and events are described in
the Public Events Act (Wet Openbare Manifestaties). On the basis of this law
notification and other requirements are imposed on the organizers of events. In
special cases it is also possible to prohibit an event. The absence of a notice may be
grounds for the prohibition of an event. Usually the powers concerning events are
regulated in more detail in the individual General Local Acts of the municipalities.
In practice, there are little or no problems using these powers. In some cases
there were problems around demonstrations of the extreme right and the
subsequent demonstrations against them. Then the more fundamental question
is at issue between the interests of the public order versus the right to demon-
strate. This fundamental question has no relation to the powers in the Public
Events Act. There are no problems by imposing regulating conditions or
prohibiting public events. In case of acute problems the mayor can still use
emergency powers which I describe further on.
Supervision of public entertainment and public places (Article 174 Act
on Municipalities (Gemeentewet))
This article empowers the mayor to supervise fairs, football matches but also
shops, hotels and cafes. This supervision can also mean that the mayor gives an
order to close a public place if conditions are not met in accordance with
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regulations. On the basis of this article the mayor gives orders to halt the practice
of entertainment, or closes a facility. For frequent entertainment events, such as
football matches, there are further measures described in specific regulations.
There are no practical legal problems in the implementation of these powers. This
article is more detailed in the General Local Act in each of the municipalities.
Closing houses (Article 174a Act on Municipalities (Gemeentewet)
This article gives the mayor the power to close homes in case of disturbance of the
public order or fear for it. The disturbance of public order or the fear for it must be
precisely explained. The disturbance must be demonstrated. This article is
frequently used in major cities and some border towns in general especially for
drugs law enforcement. It is also used for other forms of nuisance such as
prostitution or inconvenience to neighbours.
The use of this power creates moral and practical objections for some mayors
in the Netherlands. The mayor has a duty to care for the citizens. Closing houses
can cause problems for partners and children. It may also lead to homelessness
for the people involved, bivouacking in a caravan or living in with relatives. In
particular for problem families deportation is not a real solution.
Administrative detention (Articles 154a and 176a Act on Municipalities (Gemeentewet))
These articles give the mayor the power to detain a group of people for up to
twelve hours by the police in a temporary place. This group is temporarily deprived
of their liberty. This can be done for different kinds of situations and with and
without the permission of the City Council. There are several procedural and
substantive conditions before administrative detention can be imposed.
In practice the organizational and legal conditions for administrative detention
are too complex so this power is actually rarely used. In particular, the organiza-
tional conditions such as designated place, shelter, sanitation, communication
organization, etc., appear in practice to be reasons why no mayor uses these
powers. There is a need for a different form of administrative detention but with
fewer legal and organizational conditions. In (impending) public disturbances
(such as risk football matches) mayors rather use a combination of other powers
such as emergency powers and identification requirements rather than having to
meet the complex organizational and legal conditions of administrative detention.
Mayors are asking for a simplification of the necessary conditions to impose
administrative detention.
Emergency orders and emergency regulations (Articles 175 and 176 Act
on Municipalities (Gemeentewet))
These powers give the mayor the possibility to impose emergency orders and
regulations. Emergency orders and emergency regulations have a long history in
the Netherlands. They refer not only to actual breaches of public order but also to
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the threat of a breach of public order. The proportionality and subsidiarity
principle is explicitly applied. The distinction between light order power and an
emergency order is not always clear. With an emergency order a more intensive
infringement on fundamental rights can be made, but in practice, the scope of the
light order power is usually enough.
In practice, the emergency orders and emergency regulations are not often
used in the Netherlands. Especially since the introduction of the light order power,
mayors are quite reluctant to impose emergency orders. Practice shows that the
emergency orders and emergency regulations can only be used in exceptional
situations. During the implementation of emergency orders and emergency
regulations there are no significant legal or organizational problems.
General Local Act
Provisions in the area of maintaining public order are very much governed by the
individual municipalities in their General Local Acts. In these acts many of the
powers described above and below are embodied. But the General Local Acts also
provide additional powers such as prohibition, cannabis prohibition and other
forms of nuisance. Municipalities use the APV to realize the powers they need to
maintain public order. In this way, the power is precisely tailored to the problems
of the municipalities. It is in the practice of public order that this is an important
and effective tool.
Police Act
The Police Act provides various articles that form the basis for the mayor to control
public order maintenance in the municipality. Several times Article 2 of the Police
Act, which describes the tasks of the police, was used as a peg article to the use of a
specific power for which no legal ground was available. This led to legal criticism
that I endorse. In practice mayors and the police have no objection to the use of
Article 2 of the Police Act in this way.
Administrative duress
Administrative duress gives the mayor or the mayor and Board of Aldermen the
power to actually act to end a violation or preventing its recurrence. This power can
also be used preventively. During the maintenance of public order administrative
duress is used only to a limited extent. It is frequently used at cannabis plantations
on the basis of the risk of fire. A special form of administrative duress is the so-
called Rotterdam Act which regulates that under specific conditions a building or
an area can be closed if a threat to life or risk to safety or health exists. In general it
can be used as an additional administrative power to maintain public order.
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Charge penalties
This power is an alternative to the administrative duress. By charging penalties
they are trying to reverse a violation or recurrence of a violation by conditional
forfeiture of a sum of money. Charge penalties are actually used in several cases to
maintain public order e.g. owners or users of houses from which drugs are sold,
or preventing a massive house party where no authorization is given or prostitute
visitors who in breach of the General Local Act try to contact prostitutes on a
public road. Charge penalties are an important means used in the daily practice of
public order maintenance.
Withdrawal and denial of licences
Licensing offers the municipality the ability to enforce specific conditions to
certain establishments or individuals. If they do not meet these conditions, the
licences can be revoked or denied. Denying or revoking a licence must be well
motivated and that is not always the case. Denial and revocation of licences takes
place frequently and has a direct impact on the state of public order maintenance
in a municipality.
Administrative fines
Administrative fines are not intended to restore, but to be punitive. An adminis-
trative penalty cannot be imposed conditionally. That is why this power is less
suitable for the maintenance of public order. The administrative fine is rarely
imposed in the context of maintaining public order. However, the administrative
fine is the keystone of the administrative enforcement route, including areas of
public order. The new acts Administrative Fines for Public Areas and Administrative
Fines for Illegal Parking play, in this respect, an important complementary role,
since they make a more direct response possible if public order is actually disturbed.
Closing drug establishments (Article 13b Opium Act)
This article makes it possible for the mayor to close down drug establishments with
administrative force. The power was created because of drugs being sold, delivered,
issued or present. It is not a specific power for public order maintenance but rather
a form of action against crimes on the basis of the Opium Act. However it should
concern local public places and associated areas. Municipalities use judicial
tolerance concerning coffee shops. Because of a change in this article closing
homes where drugs are sold, delivered, issued or present is possible. The use of
administrative power for criminal investigation purposes is hereby expanded.
This power to close drug establishments is applied in various ways. Some
municipalities make frequent use of this power, some do not. The degree of
disturbance influences the use of the power. The caution time limit for the use of
this power sometimes creates, in practice, problems. The new article appears to be
a solution for municipalities where there is a substantial drug problem. For
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municipalities that do not have such problems, or to a much less extent, this
legislative amendment is not necessary.
Designation security risk area and preventive searches (Article 151b Act
on Municipalities (Gemeentewet))
The mayor can use these powers to designate a security risk area because of
(imminent) disturbance of public order by the presence of weapons. Based on this
evidence, the prosecutor may order the police to search everyone for weapons and
search baggage and cars for weapons, the so-called preventive searches. This power
is not only aimed at maintaining public order but also on the investigation of
crimes. Meanwhile, on the basis of case law, the operation and the reasons for the
designation of the security risk zone have improved.
Many municipalities have in their General Local Act a provision that gives the
mayor the power to indicate a security risk area. That does not mean that this
power has to be used all the time. In the municipalities where the security risk
area is designated and effective preventive searches are performed, one is satisfied
with the degree of effectiveness. Some suggest that it would be good if this power
could be extended to other laws than the Arms and Ammunition Act.
Sometimes the discovery of weapons is subordinate to other yields. Sometimes
the side catch (drugs, money) is more important. Citizens seem very satisfied with
the preventive searches and therefore feel safer. Although a small amount of
weapons may be found, this power increases the sense of security of citizens.
CCTV (Article 151c Act on Municipalities)
On basis of this Article, the mayor – if the council has authorized him by
regulation – can decide to place permanent cameras for surveillance in a public
place. The presence of cameras should be clearly seen by everyone. There are
several conditions to be met before the cameras can be put in place. Also, it has to
be regulated in what way the public prosecutor may make use of the images from
these cameras.
Meanwhile, many municipalities use CCTV, mainly as a prevention but also
for criminal investigation. Citizens feel safer because of the presence of cameras.
Whether it actually contributes to the improvement of security is not clear.
Capacity and expertise to look at or investigate the appropriate images is not
always present. Camera surveillance – both for preventive purposes and criminal
investigation – is completely accepted in the Netherlands.
Integrity Public Administration Supervision Act (BIBOB)
The BIBOB Act gives administrative authorities the power to refuse licences or to
withdraw them if there is serious danger that offences are being committed with
these licences. The Bibob Act applies to various sectors and to specific institutions
and individuals. Governing bodies do not receive all information to decide on an
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application. The National Bureau Bibob gives advice to the relevant governing
body. In practice the Bibob Act is important although it has not been in existence
for long. The first experiences are positive but there are some bottlenecks.
Municipalities are not allowed to exchange Bibob information with each other
(there is no national database) which creates the risk of a new application in
another town by someone whom the Bibob Bureau has not accepted. The Bibob
Bureau cannot directly use information from the Public Prosecution Service and
the police. The police cannot give unsolicited information, there has to be an
explicit request first. The procedure is complex and bureaucratic. By only using
these procedures the risk exits that an applicant is seen as a criminal.
Act Temporary House Ban
This act makes it possible for the mayor to ban a person from his house when
somebody in the house is attacked or molested. It is a new law that is aimed at
reducing domestic violence. There is discussion in the Netherlands if this is a
power for the mayor. Some believe that the mayor is unable to assess whether a
person has committed domestic violence and must therefore be banned from his
house. Themayor cannot make this assessment, but is responsible for the decision.
For some mayors that this is a reason to say that they are not inclined to use this
power. Others believe that nowadays the legislature is too reluctant in granting
powers to protect civilians. They weigh protecting citizens heavier than privacy
protection. Who has the power is not really important, but the problem has to be
tackled. Yet others believe this really is a power for the mayor because then he can
start an aid programme for the family in which various parties are involved. In that
way themayor can organize safety and security in his municipality more effectively.
This overview of the most important powers for public order maintenance implies
that in the Netherlands the mayor and the public prosecutor have sufficient
powers to handle all kinds of public order disturbances. At this moment in time
there is no need for expansion of the powers to maintain the public order in the
Netherlands.
9.2 Policing public disorder
The Netherlands was regularly confronted with public disorder in the last century.
In this section I give an overview of the most important police developments
concerning policing public disorder.3
3 Based on and cited from Van der Torre, Muller, et al 2002.
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9.2.1 BREAKING POINT 1966
Some serious disturbances in the mid-sixties in the Netherlands show that the
practices of the authorities, police and existing concepts were not sufficient for
the nature and severity of high-profile disorders. The riots in Amsterdam in 1966
were a breaking point. The police did not know what to do with the, at that time,
unprecedented harsh and collective use of force. It was the time of the major provo
riots in Amsterdam. The police responded unwisely to provocations of left
(provolone) demonstrators or activists. The police action was used by the other
party to place the police in a bad light.
The police learned, under greater political and administrative interest than they
was accustomed to, lessons from their mistakes. Even before the events in 1966 –
in January 1965 – chief constables ordered the modernization of police training,
arms, clothing and connection equipment. After 1966 this modernization was
intensified, particularly in the hardest hit town: Amsterdam. The municipality of
Amsterdam police formedmobile riot units, and they spent more time and money
in training for large-scale police action than it used to do.
The Amsterdam mobile riot units are also deployed in peace time. This is a
fundamental choice. The idea is that mobile riot units that can handle fairly orderly
situations are more able to keep their self-control in hectic situations and frequent
violence. The mobile riot units in the Netherlands are for similar reasons no
standing organization within the police. Only a small part of the police is working
full time on large-scale police action. The vast majority of police officers in mobile
riot units spend most of their service in mainstream policing. This regular police
work should prevent potential perverse effects of mobile riot unit work. This is a
safeguard that the police will comply with the minimal force principles.
In 1972, the first so-called preparedness circular was written. This circular
emphasized that the mobile riot units can be deployed in various situations,
provided there is a need for tightly organized police. The mobile riots units are
deployed in addition to disturbances and public disorder for example in search
and deposits. The mobile units are rather a defensive tool than as a punitive
weapon. They are primarily for restoring public order in the first instance. The
idea is that a crowd more or less will disintegrate as the mobile riot unit act. The
mobile riot unit has supremacy over the contesters. During this period there is
little attention to the judicial component of the large-scale police action. The same
applies to the prevention of serious disturbances of public order.
9.2.2 HARD CONFRONTATIONS: NEW BREAKPOINTS
In the period from 1970 to 1985 a new series of severe disturbances ask a lot of
the mobile riot units. These crises exposed the fact that the police were not ready
for new patterns of disorder.
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City Wars
The evacuations of residential buildings which were to be demolished for the
construction of a metro line in AmsterdamNieuwmarkt Area (March 1975), and of
squatted houses on the Pierson Street in Nijmegen created violent confrontations
between mobile riot units and rioters. In both cases, the mobile units first sought
to penetrate an area and then drive out many smaller groups of rioters and
squatters. The counterparty persisted in its opposition longer and harder than was
expected. The resistance was systematic and long-lasting. The mobile riot units
needed to do more than barricade or charge. It looked like an “urban guerrilla” or
an “urban war”.
The opposition of left-wing activists (squatters, autonomes) had an ideological
basis and was rooted partly in the belief that the government was an illegitimate
power group. Moreover, leftist activists and residents who were evicted from their
homes were working closely together, especially in the Amsterdam Nieuwmarkt
Area. Police violence against local residents who wanted to commit non violent
resistance was contrary to the idea that the mobile riot unit was a defensive
concept. The existing police concepts seemed to offer little room to distinguish
between rioters and non-violent opponents.
The supremacy concept
Partly because of the long-cherished idea of supremacy – the mobile riot unit
always win – the events of the Vondelstraat in Amsterdam left deep traces,
especially in the Amsterdam police corps. On February 29, 1980 hundreds of
squatters again took over, by surprise, a building on the Vondelstraat in
South Amsterdam. The building had already been squatted and evacuated on
February 25. Hastily called mobile riot units were defeated in a rain of stones and
other projectiles for the first time in the history of the mobile riot units. The
squatters barricaded the crossing and found a temporary alternative state: the
Vondel Free State. It was painful for the police and the authorities painful that
the squatters had the necessary public support. For recapturing the street military
armored vehicles had to be used.
The mayor and the police were completely surprised. There was a direct shock
within the police because of the violence that the activists displayed. The mobile
riot units were not used to it: squatters had up to that time often only offered
passive resistance when the police came into action. With hindsight it is acknowl-
edged that the police corps was in total demoralized. The experience in the
Vondelstraat led to reflection on the process and equipment of the police. It also
had an influence on the culture of the mobile riot units and had a mental effect on
some individuals and groups within the Amsterdam police.
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Public order and arrests
For Amsterdam, the events in the Vondelstraat were already a breakpoint. For the
rest of the Netherlands the coronation riots on April 30, 1980 were. It was the day
that Queen Beatrix was installed. On that day, the hitherto most fierce confronta-
tion between the police and rioters took place. There were fierce fights from early
morning until late at night. The police could hardly avoid rioters trying to reach
the Great Church, and so disrupt the inauguration ceremony. Throughout the day,
police action was seriously hampered by an unclear command structure, by
continuously bad connections and lack of assistance platoons with knowledge of
the city, the structure and policy. On this day, a number of organizational
shortcomings became painfully obvious. For the (political) outside world, this
was shortly after the riots not yet visible. The criticism was then focused on the fact
that hardly any rioters were arrested. Although serious crimes were committed,
there are hardly any arrests.
Socially and politically, the Vondelstraat and the coronation riots were advan-
tageous for police and authorities, because the squatters’movement and wider left
activism lost a lot of credit with the public. The events were a stimulus for the
professionalisation of large-scale police action. Learning from public order crises
proved to be a two-edged sword. The police and judicial authorities actions, shortly
after the riots in the Vondelstraat and coronation riots, resulted in hard and fast
new criticisms arising in a number of public disorder cases.
On October 11, 1982, the Amsterdam police raided a squatted building on the
Jan Luijkenstraat 5. This property was called Lucky Luyk. The so-called squatters’
alarm was activated. Two days of the worst riots since for the coronation riots
followed. In order to deal with the riots, the police used containment measures.
On October 11, 124 arrests were made, and on October 12, 43 arrests were made. A
total of 149 persons were detained under an emergency regulation which
stipulated that those who were planning to disrupt public order, could be
extracted. The police used a lot of violence during the arrests, sometimes
excessively. The criticism afterwards focused on the legal basis of the detentions,
the escalating promotional nature of the containment actions and the sometimes
excessive police violence.
Judicial intervention in a tense situation or during disturbances appears to be an
art in itself. This became clear a year earlier. In September 1981 in Dodewaard, there
was a demonstration against the use of nuclear energy. Members of arrest teams of
the National Police used extreme violence and made no more than 22 arrests.
Moreover, they used an unprecedented amount of tear gas grenades. The Lower
House criticized the excessive use of tear gas and the ineffective arrest strategy.
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9.2.3 LEARNING FROM CRISES
Shortly after the two deep public order crises in 1980, the report, Large scale police
action after 1980, was published. A few years later the Ministers of the Interior and
Justice published a report, Large scale police action. Political, administrative and
police authorities rethought, in particular, the organization, equipment, strategy,
mental resilience and the required scale and uniformity of large-scale police
action.
Organization
A standard organization was developed that most police forces still use today.
There is separation between the chief constable, as a member of the triangular
consultation between the mayor, the public prosecutor and the chief constable, and
the General Commander, who is a prominent police chief. The triangle is the policy
center. The General Commander shall ensure that the policies are implemented
and inform the policy center on relevant developments. Under the General
Commander comes a chief of staff, who is assisted by a number of staff officers
with specific duties, depending on the nature and extent of the action.
In 1984 it was determined that the so-called basic units of the mobile units
should be formed by groups (a group commandant, nine members and a driver),
sections (a section commander, two groups) and platoons (one platoon comman-
der, two sections and a driver). If several platoons will be deployed, a company
commander commands. There are also special units set up. Important special units
are police on horseback, motorcycle police, canine police units, water pitchers, fire
and tear gas units (the BRATRA), reconnaissance units and arrest units.
At the political level, the detention units received the most attention. The
political aversion to the sharp violence of the activists had been an aid to the police
and authorities, but there was also – less visible – political criticism, because during
some large-scale events serious crimes were committed and few arrests were made.
The television images of these crimes made it extra painful. Shortly after the
coronation riots the twomost relevant ministers wrote in a letter about the events of
April 30, 1980 that the judicial component should receive more attention.
New strategies: de-escalation
In the first half of the eighties, more and more police officers became aware of
the usefulness of and need for riot prevention. In the report on large scale
police action, it was concluded that the police operation and the police strategy
now should be better adapted to the stage of a conflict or confrontation. It
emphasized that regular police officers (the so-called flat caps) can in some
situations remove stress and that the mobile riot units should ensure opportu-
nities for riot prevention.
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The idea of preventive measures was not initially welcomed within the prevail-
ing police culture, certainly not in the corps who suffered during the riots.
Nevertheless, the police steadily gave more value to riot prevention. Police and
authorities in the eighties try to avoid an (aggressive) confrontation where possible.
The de-escalation strategy in large-scale police action was really effectively in the
eighties. Where possible, prior to a large scale police action the police and “the other
side” conferred. There were contacts identified and an agreement reached on
specific conditions, in particular tolerances. If the risk made it possible, the flat caps
were the face of the police. Mobile riot units operated preferably in peace dress and
in the first instance they did not take prominent positions. If disturbances occurred,
the aim of the police was to restore order as soon as possible. Execution of detention
was in the hands of specialists arrest units.
From 1983, the Revised Primary Education provided an impetus for preventive
strategies. Police were socially-psychologically trained from the very beginning of
their career to solve conflicts without or with a minimum of violence. This had a
major influence on the police culture and so on the large scale police action. The
review of education was based on a new vision of the police function that was
rapidly gaining more ground among prominent police chiefs: community poli-
cing. This movement stressed the need for administrative and social integration.
This resulted in the police consulting more and negotiating with activist leaders
and demonstrators. This forms, even today, an important feature of the “Dutch
approach”.
Mental resilience
Several strong public order crises at the beginning of the eighties showed that large
scale police action had a great mental influence on individual police officers. The
coronation riots were the most severe and violent riots. After long battles, many
police officers, on April 30, 1980 went home exhausted. After the riots, several
studies showed that good mental relief and stress counseling was required. The
police officers were not only under pressure from the violence and tension that they
would endure. The switch from regular police to riot prevention and riot manage-
ment was also difficult. This period was the birthplace of a more or less systematic
internal guidance in police forces, which began with an internal review immedi-
ately after the events. Police officers could directly exchange experiences. This
internal guidance has, by now, been professionalized in the Dutch police force.
Centralization and standardization
In the eighties, scaling up and standardization took place. The various training
schemes, both at operational and strategic level, were more or less unified. The
equipment of the mobile riot units of the different forces was unified. Training
centers merged. Experiences were more intensively exchanged. Similar command
structures were designed. The formation of the regional police forces in 1993
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meant that police units could be deployed more effectively. This was closely
related to the creeping centralization of the police in the Netherlands. National
consultations increased the quality of cooperation and information exchange in
the context of large-scale police action.
9.2.4 OPTIMIZING AND ANTICIPATING THE UNFORESEEN
In the nineties and the beginning of the 21st century there were no massive, large-
scale disturbances. Police, governance and justice focussed on optimizing existing
routines, instructions and regulations. The public order on the streets, however,
was increasingly of interest to police and politicians. Small incidents and senseless
violence dominated the image. Yet in this period there were some major order
disturbances: cross riots in New York in 1996, Beverwijk football riots in 1997, the
riots in the Groningen District Oosterpark in the year 1997/1998, Eurotop 1998,
European Football Championship in Holland and Belgium 2000, riots in Den
Bosch in 2000 and 2005, multi-racial riot in Amsterdam-west in 2001, riots in a
district of Utrecht in 2007 and increased riots during New Year’s Eve in many
municipalities. Next to these riots there was an increase in rioting and order
problems around football matches. In recent years public order disturbances
during public events were a main concern for all parties involved. During severe
riots at the beach in Hoek van Holland during a dance event in 2009 police
officers had to shoot many times because they were attacked by hooligans. One
hooligan died and five were severely injured. These circumstances created a major
political and public discussion on the way pubic order disturbances during public
events should be organized.
The need for the police and authorities to anticipate unforeseen disorder is
paralleled by a further decline of the traditional large-scale disturbances. This
raises questions about the usefulness and necessity of the mobile riot unit in the
Netherlands. However, the increased risk of unforeseen serious disorders makes
the continuous readiness of mobile riot units even more necessary. Largely
independently of these policy developments, in large-scale police action there is
an increased use of modern technology. For a large police action, for example,
regular video surveillance is used which can be viewed in the command center.
Some general and operational commanders find that these images provide
welcome additional information, while others are somewhat apprehensive that
they are too much guided by images. For public order maintenance during public
events another way and form of policing is necessary.
There are major differences in preparedness between forces. Smaller forces
with a relatively large rural area cannot react quickly to unforeseen disturbances.
The differences are not limited to preparedness. Some forces show experience
with large-scale police actions, while others do not. Some forces systematically
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collect public order information, while others only have ad hoc information. For
this reason, a Reference Guide Conflict and Crisis Management Police has been
established in which all references are mentioned to which a police region must
apply. These include references such as an agency conflict and crisis management
in a corps, a general scheme and plan for large-scale police action, an events
calendar, a communication plan, training, etc. The Public Order and Safety
Inspectorate regularly reviews whether the corps complies with references.
9.3 Trends in public order
The quality of public policy, the intensity of public order problems and the
possibilities and limitations of public order maintenance in the Netherlands are
largely determined by relevant social developments. In this section I give an outline
of the key social trends and their impact on public order policy in the Netherlands.4
9.3.1 INDIVIDUALIZATION
Individualization is the most important social development of the last twenty-five
years. Increasingly, individual values and interests are at stake during group
protests. Citizens are increasingly being individually liable for certain problems
and solutions. Increasingly the government, citizens and businesses are held
accountable for all forms of nuisance. Citizens find it increasingly obvious that
individuals that cause problems are held individually liable. Individualization has
resulted in the Netherlands that, in addition to large-scale disturbances, increas-
ingly small-scale order conflicts arise, both in the public and private sphere. The
administration, justice and police have to prepare for smaller but more intensive
order disputes between citizens, and not only for large-scale order disturbances.
The tendency of more public disturbances during public events is an example of
this development. In the future, apart from collisions with large groups of
demonstrators and activists, there will be small, often hard incidents involving
citizens vigorously defending values and interests that affect them personally.
This requires a redefinition of how the police, for example (in large groups), deal
with public order issues. The public order policies, in addition to large-scale
disturbances, have to take into account small, often hard incidents.
9.3.2 DIFFERENTIATION
The differentiation of society occurs on many fronts. The distinction between
immigrants and natives and between “poor” and “rich” are the most mentioned in
the context of law enforcement and public disorder. Disorder will not occur along
4 Based on and cited from Van der Torre, Muller et al 2002.
cha p t e r 9
240
such simple lines. The increasing individualization causes a further differentia-
tion between and within populations. Moreover, the cultural and physical separa-
tion of certain groups is in some cases so explicit, that a conflict between groups
can hardly occur. More and more there is a concentration of specific groups
and categories in the Netherlands. Public order conflicts will occur within
individual categories such as drug scenes, scenes of young people, problem areas.
Each category of public disorder has its own forms. In the urban life, disadvan-
taged youth spends more time in the public domain (the street) than young
people who have access to “mass private property”. This separation is similar to a
differentiation in the way young people can potentially be disruptive: from
traditional and visible crime and nuisance on the streets and all kinds of private
civil disturbances to the spread of disorder by digital information.
The administration, justice and police in the Netherlands face the question to
what extent and in what form appropriate intervention strategies have to be
developed for each category. That question also concerns the intervention
strategies with regard to public order. In public order policy, conflicts within
groups and categories should be considered, in addition to possible conflicts
between different and latent antagonistic groups.
9.3.3 INTENSIFICATION
The individualization and differentiation go hand in hand with the strengthening
of individual and group expressions and behaviour. This intensification is mani-
fested in the increased emotionality of individual and social activities and events. It
is striking how quickly individual experiences, in particular shocking peak experi-
ences, can become collective. It is obvious that the media contribute significantly.
The mediatization of society contributes to new forms of harmful imitation
and mobilization. It has an increasing effect on the frequency and range of
potential disturbances. Rumors are no longer spread by the interpersonal transfer
of bad data, but through media and new communication tools with a massive
range. It can go so far that some people elsewhere create imitation behaviour:
immediate or in a calibrated occasion. Order disturbances may be more than
before developed in this way to expressmoral panic. Sometimes a hype arises in a
short time in different places and sometimes it lasts for a longer time, also under
the influence of mass media.
Administration, justice and police, but also other organizations with a public
function, are increasingly confronted with the meaning of the non-cognitive
aspects of social order and of the related role of mass media. Their relationships
with the media should be extended. Efforts should focus on developing a long-
term view of the intensification and emotionalization of individuals and groups in
society. This has major implications for public order policy and the role of the
(social) media.
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9.3.4 PROVISION OF INFORMATION
In the knowledge society, information is one of the most important resources, but
also a possible obstacle to a functioning society and for ensuring public order. The
use of new forms of information and communication technology – the Internet is
just one example – raises questions about the future contours of the public and
private domain, and by extension about the effect on public and private order
maintenance. The current and future information and communication technology
offers individuals, groups, organizations and institutions extensive opportunities
within the privacy legislation to perform activities that are a veiled threat to the
public order. The emerging role of social media, before and during public
disturbances, is a new development which has to be taken into account. This
implies questions about the role of government. What information can and should
the government collect? Who manages this information? What measures are
permitted on the basis of what information? What information can and must be
provided by the government? In what way can the government influence the
content of the social media before and during disorders?
Further professionalization of intelligence services in administration, justice
and the police involved in the collection and analysis of the public order informa-
tion is necessary. The professionalization of criminal intelligence is largely ignored
in other police intelligence services in the Netherlands. Police gathering of public
order information must be improved. This requires a clear division of responsi-
bilities between the various intelligence agencies. The distinction between im-
minent breaches of public order and other offences will be increasingly difficult to
use in organizing the information function of the government.
9.3.5 TRANSNATIONALIZATION
Transnationalization changes public order and public order maintenance drama-
tically. The public order and policing was, for centuries, an eminent subject of
attention, legislation and policies within nations, and within the Netherlands also
largely a local matter. Gradually it seems that transnationalization is a reality in the
field of public order. In many countries, the authorities have headaches regarding
public order threats because of international developments and events.
The police, administration and judiciary will increasingly have to deal with
foreign citizens they have little or no information on, including any information
relevant to public order maintenance. Foreigners will be more involved in activities
and disturbances which are initiated by persons residing in the Netherlands. Some
action groups have intensive international cooperation. This requires the national
government to redefine the “opponent”. The era in which the police mainly act in
local public disorder is long gone.
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Ofmajor importance for the police, administration and justice are the different
forms of international cooperation. In the first place, this is the operational
cooperation in the border areas. Current agreements between border countries
usually relate to the investigation of criminal offences. It is important that these
agreements are also applicable for public order maintenance. The international
gathering, processing and dissemination of intelligence in the field of public order
maintenance are still developing.
9.3.6 PERMISSIVE CULTURE
The permissive, consensual social and political culture in the Netherlands has a
large influence on the extent and frequency of public disturbances. The Dutch
social and political system is based on four C’s: consensus, coalition, collegiality
and cooptation. The entire Dutch decision-making system is aimed at achieving
consensus among social and political groups. No group will have the opportunity
for majority power. This is why they need to make coalitions with each other. The
collegiality principle manifests itself in many governance bodies, councils and
committees. Coopting – neutralizing resistance – occurs in many forms. In the
Netherlands, antagonists have relatively easy access to the authorities and action
groups may even rely on government subsidy. There is no need for action groups
to use large disturbances to make their point.
The public order in the Netherlands has to be considered with the dominant
presence of the four C’s in mind. They influence the flexible attitude of the
government to small disturbances and reluctance to take repressive measures and
use of violence. The emphasis in public order maintenance is on prevention and
minimal use of force. The use of violence, and in particular firearms by the police
is subject to severe restrictions. The use of firearms remained a major exception.
9.3.7 REPRESSIVE TENDENCIES
The traditional permissive response to public disorder is under pressure in the
Netherlands. The social and political climate has hardened. Confidence in the
exclusive effectiveness of prevention is decreasing. The law and policies have
created more powers and measures for the effective repression of civil distur-
bances. This can be seen, for instance, in powers such as administrative duress
and preventive searches.
This development poses new questions for the administration, justice and the
police. How can a traditionally permissive culture be combined with repressive
elements? Is a responsible combination possible? Despite the hardening of the
social and political climate there is still doubt about a more repressive approach to
public policy problems. The limited public disorder in the Netherlands is caused
partly because of the permissive culture. The extension of powers and repressive
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measures in the Netherlands invariably encounter constitutional concerns. More-
over, proposals aimed at repression sometimes contradict the in Dutch culturally
rooted need for freedom. Despite this, in recent years the police, justice and
administration gained new powers to maintain the public order. The repressive
tendencies are also continually developing in the Netherlands.
9.3.8 PRIVATE AND PUBLIC ORDER
In the future, public order maintenance will not only be street and public domain-
oriented, but will also concentrate on events and developments in a formal private
context. There are many new private structures that place the maintenance of
public order increasingly under pressure. The privatization of the public domain
and the emergence of “mass private property” such as shopping centers, event
halls, sports facilities, recreational and leisure centers – may cause private order
maintenance. In this context, the equipment of private security and surveillance
deserves the necessary attention.
Public order becomes increasingly influenced by developments and events in
the private domain. The image of an exclusive territorial domain in which public
order problems occur, does not exist anymore. Public order issues are no longer
limited to squares, parks and streets. They hide themselves increasingly behind
the walls of the “mass private property” and the displays of personal computers.
The public order issues will leave the streets.
The artificial separation between public and private policy is increasingly
difficult to maintain in the Netherlands. There will increasingly be an overlap
between public and private order. This implies a completely different way of
thinking and legal framework than before. Indeed, it implies a break with a
historical development in which the separation between public and private domain
became ever more refined. The overlap between private and public order is
nowadays in the Netherlands an undeniable fact.
9.3.9 FROM EVENTS TO CONSTELLATIONS
In conjunction with important social developments, there is a trend towards more
complex, less easy to identify, order disturbances in the Netherlands. The isolated
riot is replaced by a series of incidents and structural forms of nuisance. Many
hybrid riots can often only be posted in specific categories afterwards. This makes
the maintenance of public order and combating disturbances more difficult. The
maintenance of public order shifts from clearly demarcated events in time and
place to the influencing of constellations of facts and perceptions and of feelings of
discomfort and unease. There are some sudden terrifying events that effect the
population and the public as a whole.
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The concept of “structural incidentalism” refers to a more or less constant
pattern of incidents which can effect the public perception of order in large groups
of the population. Senseless violence, drugs and persistent crime, hooliganism and
local protests still provide the administration, justice and police with identifiable
targets to act on. If they can detect the structure behind the seemingly isolated
incidents, the authorities can try to intervene. More difficult are the shifting
constellations of facts and perceptions that only after a period of time are associated
with public order and the maintenance of it. These are fundamental issues
concerning the existing social and political order that sooner or later affect the
public order. Disturbances are then just a momentary manifestation of tensions
within society.
9.3.10 VARIATION IN PUBLIC DISORDER
There are clear trends and fluctuations in the frequency and intensity of different
categories of public disorder in the Netherlands. The patterns and trends can be
determined by a historical analysis of public disturbances in the Netherlands.
Less ideological public disorder disturbances
Because of the de-idealogicalization in the Netherlands there has been a decline in
public order disturbances with a clear ideological character. In the fifties, public
disturbances were limited to demonstrations, marches, riots and sometimes riots
with a political-ideological commitment. In the sixties demonstrations and other
disturbances were mainly aimed at the foreign policy of the national government
and the authorities as exponents of an old system. The new emancipation strategy
was associated with public order disturbances. In the seventies the focus moved to
new areas of social protest: environmental, nuclear. The eighties were dominated
by squatter riots. In the nineties, this type of disturbances became less frequent.
The focus has shifted to public disorder as a secondary product to developments
and events in different domains: disturbances in margins of the drug scene in large
and medium-sized cities, violence at mass events, collective violence as a result of
global or political events, violence as incidental to serious congestion on public
transport nodes, violence both outside and inside restaurants. Football hooliganism
and violence has remained from the seventies on constantly important.
Not only interests but also values
Behind social trends such as differentiation and intensifying, a strong involve-
ment of members of social groups coexists. The existence of different social
groups and their future orientation is not only based on the defence of their
material interests but also their shared values. These values are reflected in the
history of a cherished lifestyle and in a strong bond with a particular territory or
location. These groups also have their own way of looking at the inner and outer
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world and have an almost self-evident willingness to defend their lifestyle against
well-meaning attempts from outside the group to innovate and reform.
If the government with well-intentioned policies try to persuade such groups to
enlighten themselves, this can lead to conflicts in which communication is very
difficult. Such conflicts can best be characterized as value conflicts. They do not
lend themselves to a cool, rational approach in which the contradictions are
resolved through a compromise: averaging between that which is requested and
that which is offered. Value conflicts may be much more difficult because the
government and the group in question do not understand each other well. The
government does a real bid, the group feels threatened in its existence. In the past
this has occurred in the Netherlands during confrontations with caravan dwellers,
barge masters, fishermen and some categories of farmers.
From collective disturbances to nuisance
For a long time the maintenance of public order consisted of prevention,
preparation and reactions towards more or less large-scale disturbances. The
prototype of the average disorder was whether or not it was prepared as a collective
action, where the use of violence against the government could not be excluded.
The significance of such disturbances was related to criteria such as the number of
participants, the number of injuries and possibly the number of detainees.
Gradually alongside this picture of the public order another perspective emerges:
the progressive effect of more or less anomic micro situations in the public
domain. Nuisance, the visible presence of beggars and the public use of drugs in
corridors, porches and doorways in the public domain disrupt public order in a
creeping, diffuse way. Maintaining public order here requires other strategies and
resources than the approaches used in the concentrated, time-defined disorder.
Transnationalization of disturbances
So far mainly transnationalization of serious and organized crime occurred. It is
time the transnationalization of public order issues receives more attention in the
Netherlands. We note a number of developments in this respect:
* demonstrations and disturbances in the context of long-distance nationalism,
for example on the part of Kurds, Turks, Iraqis and Iranians;
* increased pressure on social order and public order problems caused by the
concentrated presence of asylum seekers and other immigrants;
* international events where the demonstrators are not familiar with the typical
Dutch permissive context;
* controversial international conferences involving a fixed pattern of protest
manifests
* disturbances focused on the presence and activities of international organiza-
tions in the Netherlands. Special importance is given to a number of inter-
national law institutions in The Hague.
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Relocation of the arena
In the Netherlands we have less traditional public disturbances such as squatters’
riots, large-scale demonstrations or football riots. The arena of public disorder
moves to other arenas. Large-scale events such as pop concerts, dance festivals and
others are more and more the terrain of possible disturbances. But the weekly
entertainment spots are increasingly becoming a place where public order
disturbances are likely. This does not mean that in the future the old forms of
public disorder will no longer occur but it does mean that all concerned should
take into account a shift in the arena of possible public disorders.
9.4 Closure
Public order and public order enforcement in the Netherlands has changed
dramatically in recent years. There are now other forms of public disorder, so
other forms of public order maintenance become necessary. This dynamic
character of the development of public order will continue to occur in the future.
This means that the police, municipality, Public Prosecutor Services and others
will have to adjust to constant changes in public order.
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10 Terrorism and counter-terrorism
10.1 Introduction
“Terrorism is an anxiety-inspiring method of repeated violent action, applied
by clandestine or semi-clandestine individual, group or state actors, for idiosyn-
cratic, criminal or political reasons, whereby – in contrast to assassination – the
direct targets of violence are not the main targets. The immediate human victims
of violence are generally chosen randomly (targets of opportunity) or selectively
(representative or symbolic targets) from a target population, and serve as
message generators. Threat- and violence-based communication processes be-
tween terrorist (organisation), (imperiled) victims, and main targets are used to
manipulate the main target (audience(s)), turning it into a target of terror, a target
of demands, or a target of attention, depending on whether intimidation, coercion
or propaganda is primarily sought.”1
This long definition reflects the complexity of terrorism. In this chapter I will give
an overview of the most important patterns in terrorism and combating terrorism
in general, and in particular with regard to the Netherlands. This chapter is mainly
based on the Dutch volume Terrorism edited by Muller, Rosenthal and De
Wijk (2008) and other personal publications such as Muller, Spaaij and Ruiten-
berg (2004), Rosenthal, Muller and Ruitenberg (2005 and 2006), Rosenthal and
Muller (2007) and Muller (2011C).2
10.2 Modern terrorism
In addition to traditional terrorism, a modern form of terrorism can be distin-
guished also in the Netherlands. The question arises whether this concerns a
really modern form or a new stage in the development of traditional terrorism. To
make the distinction, I use the term “modern terrorism” in order to emphasize
that some of the characteristics of present-day terrorism are different from those
of the traditional kind of terrorism that we have grown used to. By now, several
examples of modern terrorism may be given:
• the World Trade Center Bombing in 1993
1 Schmid and Jongman 1988, p. 28.
2 An earlier version of this chapter is published as Muller 2011C.
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• the Oklahoma City Bombing in 1995 (Michel and Herbeck 2001)
• Attacks and violence in Algeria, starting in 1992
• Attacks on the Paris underground, 1995-1996
• Car bomb at US military headquarters, Dahran, Saudi Arabia, 1996
• the Sarin attacks by the Aum sect, Japan, 1995
• Attacks on US embassies in Africa, Nairobi and Dar es Salaam, 1998
• Attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, 2001
• Attack on USS Cole, 2002
• Attack in Bali, Indonesia, 2002
• Attacks in Iraq, 2003-2005
• Attack in Casablanca, 2003
• Attacks on synagogues and English targets in Istanbul, 2003
• Attack on trains in Madrid, 2004
• The murder of van Gogh, Amsterdam, 2004
• Attacks on the underground and a bus, London, 2005
• Terroristic attack in Sharm el-Sheikh, 2005
• Attacks Mumbia, 2008
• Attack metro Moscow, 2010.
The terrorist organisations behind these attacks are for the most part inspired by
religious extremism (Muslim fundamentalism and sects, inter alia). It concerns
terrorist organisations such as Al Qaida the Algerian GIA and the Aum sect.
The distinction between old and new terrorism is based on a broad range of
modern scientific literature, but by now there are some people who wonder how
new modern terrorism really is. It is striking that most of this literature was
written before the 2001 attacks. Modern terrorism has the following crucial
characteristics.3
A. Diffuse purposes
First, the underlying purposes of these modern terrorists are diffuse. Modern
terrorists do not aim to release specific prisoners or target their actions at a
specific country. Modern terrorists hardly ever make specific demands; instead,
they concentrate on general demands.
In any case, they do not have a specific purpose that can be defined in
geographical terms. Usually, it is not about economic or social deprivation either.
The underlying motives for these modern terrorists are based on a fundamentalist
attitude towards life, which involves the pursuit of living and letting live according
to the strict regimes of mostly religious laws and rules. According to these
terrorists, this kind of fundamentalism – some call it extremism – should
3 See in more depth Muller 2011 C. See also Bjorgo and Horgan 2009; Crelinsten 2009; Lynch,
Macdonald and Williams 2007; Posner 2007; Wilkinson 2007A; Wilkinson 2007B.
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dominate not only the private lives of citizens but should also constitute the basis
for the manner in which the government and the state are organised. According to
this kind of fundamentalism, there should be hardly any separation of religion
and state. Their main ambition is to abolish this separation and achieve integra-
tion to the maximum extent possible. The reasoning behind their actions is that if
the leaders in Western democracies are found to be unable to safeguard the
security of their own citizens, these citizens will be more sensitive to alternative
forms of government.
B. Worldwide fear
The primary purpose of modern terrorists is to arouse worldwide fear for the
purpose of creating room for fundamental changes within states. Modern terrorists
interpret the word terror as literally as possible. By means of far-reaching actions,
these modern terrorists attempt to instil fear among the population, all over the
world if possible. Fear arises where attacks are launched at unexpected moments,
in unexpected places and against unsuspecting persons, involving significant loss
of life and injuries. This means that everybody may fall victim to this kind of terror.
Arousing fear is also one of the characteristics of traditional terrorism. The arousal
of fear was targeted mainly at a specific population group or authorities, however,
or at specific moments. Not everybody needed to be afraid.
Unmistakably, modern terrorists have succeeded in doing so by means of the
attacks on 11 September for a substantial period of time. Many citizens adjusted
their behaviour to the potential threat posed by modern terrorism, certainly in the
first few months after the attacks. Viewed from the terrorists’ perspective, the
attacks were tremendously successful.
Repeating terrorist actions several times is crucially important to the arousal of
fear. If the terrorist organisation succeeds in carrying out awe-inspiring attacks
several times in a row, the population will become aware that the state is no longer
able to safeguard its security. Repeating terrorist actions is conducive to the
escalation of fear.
C. As many victims as possible
Third, these modern terrorists are not afraid, apparently, to arbitrarily kill as many
people as possible. The sarin in Japan’s subway and the attacks on the WTC show
that the terrorists’ primary purpose was to create as many victims as possible. The
earlier scientific literature was based on a rationalist approach of the terrorists. It
was argued that terrorists did not seek to create more victims than they considered
necessary for achieving their political purposes. That was inspired by the idea that
the “old” terrorists acted on the basis of a logical end-means plan that could be
interpreted from the perspective of Western rational thinking. Such Western
rational arguments do not seem to apply to modern terrorism to the same degree.
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The fact that it concerns mainly religiously inspired groups is an important factor
in this.
Modern terrorists deliberately seek their own deaths. Modern terrorists do not
attach any value to their own lives in carrying out terrorist attacks. Martyrdom
constitutes the highest honour for modern terrorists. This is reinforced by a deep
belief in a better life after death. This kind of terrorism was hardly ever taken into
consideration until recently. Below, I will deal with the possibility and willingness
to use biological, chemical and nuclear weapons. The methods used by modern
terrorists are also targeted at a large number of victims. The execution of a major
attack satisfies this criterion. Hostage-takings, kidnappings, ICT disruptions and
other terrorist methods are less frequently used by modern terrorists.
D. Arbitrary victims
Fourth, there is hardly any relationship between the victims and the political
purpose pursued. The old terrorist organizations preferred to target their actions
primarily at representatives of the country at which the terrorist actions were
aimed. For example, the IRA targeted its actions mainly at British soldiers. In
modern terrorism, there is no such relationship most of the time. Indeed, it
cannot even be ruled out that the terrorists will spread death and destruction
among their own population and people of their own kind.
As is shown by the terrorist “detour” defined above, terrorism does not entail a
relationship between the victims and the purpose of the terrorists. Even so,
terrorism analyses in recent years show that the existence of this relationship
was preferred, because it had two advantages for the terrorist organisations.
First, it could be used to indicate in unmistakable terms that the actions related to
a specific purpose and were usually targeted at representatives – soldiers and
politicians most of the time – of a specific country or region. Second, it could be
used to allay the fears among the population, as there was an action targeted at
specific persons having a specific background. Others did not need to worry in
principle, unless they happened to be in the wrong place at the time the attack was
carried out. In this way, these terrorist organisations tried to legitimise their
actions and mobilise support among the population as well.
E. Religious fundamentalism
Fifth, modern terrorism seems to be rooted in religious fundamentalism. Even
though many concentrate on Muslim fundamentalism, it is quite conceivable that
other forms of religious fundamentalism, such as sects, may play a role in
terrorism. For those used to combating rationally oriented terrorism, it is hard
to readjust their minds to terrorism rooted on values, such as religious funda-
mentalism or extremism. There is a certain logic in the preparations and actions
of religious zealots that is not always recognised in the Western world. Even so,
religious fundamentalists perceive their own rationality in their actions.
cha p t e r 1 0
252
In addition, modern terrorists are made to feel that they are fighting for
religious honour, where the sacrifice of their own lives constitutes the highest
honour. Consequently, modern terrorists are much less afraid of being killed
during a terrorist action, which greatly enhances the terrorists’ possibilities and
means. As far as “old” terrorism was concerned, both the terrorists and the anti-
terrorist operatives assumed that the terrorists wanted to do everything possible to
prevent being killed during the actions. This assumption is one of the foundations
underlying the negotiations during terrorist incidents. If this basic assumption is
disputed because terrorists seek to sacrifice their own lives, the police, the judicial
authorities and the intelligence services are forced to change the various forms of
anti-terrorist activity fundamentally.
F. International
Modern terrorism is primarily internationally oriented. There is no terrorism that
is linked with a specific country. The sphere of activity of modern terrorism is the
whole world. In this context, modern terrorists use the freedoms that have by now
become customary in international traffic. They travel a great deal and there are
close ties between cells in various countries. There is intensive communication,
through the Internet or otherwise, between the representatives of the modern
terrorists in the various countries. Modern terrorists set up home as law-abiding
citizens in several countries. They live and work according to the relevant
country’s traditions and culture. They are hardly recognisable by the police, the
judicial authorities and the intelligence and security services.
The foregoing applies even to the traditional forms of terrorism, even if the
latter generally had a home base in a country. This is no longer true of modern
terrorism, even if an exception must be made for the countries sponsoring
terrorism. Countries such as Afghanistan (during the Taliban regime) and Iran
are known countries that support terrorist organisations. Even so, specific terrorist
groups are also active in other countries.
G. Fluid network
In modern terrorism, there is usually no strictly managed organisation where all
the orders are given from a single centre. Even though this was not true of the more
traditional forms of terrorism, it its even less so in the case of modern terrorism.
Sometimes modern terrorists are hardly aware that they are part of a larger
organisation. There is a fluid network where many core groups take decisions on
the execution of terrorist actions. There are hardly any specific organisation cells. A
broad range of people and resources available in several countries are deployed.
Many of them are instructed to perform only a part of the entire terrorist action.
In addition, it is impossible to define an unambiguous profile of the modern
terrorist. The perpetrators of the attacks mentioned above differ from each other
according to every conceivable criterion, except that they share a certain degree of
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religious extremism. This is why the literature refers to amateur terrorists who
have not received any specific training but who are deployed for the purpose of
performing a terrorist action. Due to the extended international communication
possibilities, it is easier to find and have access to supporters than in the past.
H. Fluid financing
Terrorist financing is also fluid. It is very difficult to pinpoint and sort out the
manner in which terrorism is financed. Certainly in the case of complex fluid
networks, it is hardly possible to identify the person or persons financing terrorist
actions and the manner in which these are financed. Moreover, modern terrorism
is increasingly interwoven with organised crime. In that case, modern terrorism is
financed by committing criminal offences in an organized setting (drug traffick-
ing, women trafficking, raids, counterfeiting etc.).
Traditional terrorism received state assistance more often, as a result of which
it was easier to tackle specific states. The financing of modern forms of terrorism
is based on individuals and non-transparent financial constructions to a far greater
extent. This means that it is much more difficult for those involved in counter-
terrorism to concentrate on specific states or groups.
I. Time
The final characteristic feature of modern terrorism is time. The time horizon of
modern terrorists is nothing like the one customarily used in the Western world.
Modern terrorists have time on their side, whereas the anti-terrorist forces always
feel the pressure of time. A terrorist attack that takes years to prepare does not
pose a problem for modern terrorists. They infiltrate into regular societies without
anybody noticing and function as ordinary citizens within these societies. They are
hardly recognisable by the police and the intelligence services.
The long-term perspective of modern terrorists creates a problem for the anti-
terrorist effort. The fight against terrorism focuses on results in the short term.
The practice of tapping and observing people without any concrete suspicion for
years is not in line with the legal systems in the Western world. Being aware of an
ever present threat for years is dysfuntional.
10.3 Terrorism in the Netherlands
Compared with the intensity and structure of terrorist problems in neighbouring
countries, the Netherlands has known little terrorism over the past twenty-five
years.4 As a consequence, academic research on terrorism and counter-terrorism
in the Netherlands has been rare, and only a few Dutch scholars have written on
4 See Muller 1994; Eikelenboom 2007; De Graaf 2009.
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this topic, although the Dutch Intelligence and Security Service (Algemene
Inlichtingen en Veiligheidsdienst, AIVD) has written extensively about terrorism
and counter-terrorism in its published annual reports. Only after the establish-
ment of the National Coordinator Counter-terrorism in 2004 did the public and
scientific attention for terrorism and counterterrorism increase. The Dutch lack of
experience with massive terrorist attacks has brought with it one disadvantage:
terrorism and counter-terrorism have been low on the political and judicial
agenda. However, the terrorist attacks on the United States of 11 September
2001 – an even more the attacks in London and Madrid – have caused a major
change in counter-terrorism policy. The murders of Forutyn and Van Gogh in the
Netherlands in 2002 and 2004 contributed to the rising attention of terrorism and
counter-terrorism.
In the Netherlands, several indigenous groups have committed acts of terrorism:
the Rode Jeugd, South Moluccan youngsters and RARA. The intensity of such
attacks has been mild compared with other European countries, although the
attacks by South Moluccan activists were serious enough.
A number of terrorist incidents have occurred in the last 25 years and some of
these have had a major impact on the decision-making process. The unprece-
dented hijacking of trains in the 1970s by South Moluccan activists was crucial in
this respect and a few remarks about the position of people of South Moluccan
descent in the Netherlands are in order here. In colonial times, many male South
Moluccans, the vast majority of them Christians, served in the Dutch Indian army.
During the Japanese occupation of the Dutch East Indies at the time of the
Second World War, they remained loyal to the defeated colonial power. After
the Japanese were defeated and the Dutch East Indies gained independence to
become Indonesia, many South Moluccans longed for an independent state of
their own. The Dutch government sympathized but was unable to lend a helping
hand. Over 10,000 South Moluccans immigrated to the Netherlands in the early
1950s, without giving up their hopes of a return. Partially as a consequence of this
hope, they did not, as a community, integrate easily into Dutch society. At various
intervals, South Moluccan activists have reminded a number of governments of
their nationalist ambitions. More recently, they have also demanded (diplomatic)
interventions to quell violence between Christians and radical Muslims in their
homeland. Sometimes their actions took a violent character, as was notably the
case with the hijacking of trains in the 1970s.
The Dutch government was utterly taken by surprise by the hijackings. It
needed several years to develop a consistent policy on counter-terrorism. In
addition to repressive methods to counter terrorism by South Moluccan activists,
the Dutch government also developed a preventive and social strategy to integrate
the South Moluccans in Dutch society. The mix of repressive methods and
preventive and social measures succeeded in ending serious terrorist attacks,
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but in the meantime the South Moluccan actions came closest to any form of
structural terrorism that the Netherlands has known.
Incidental terrorist actions have occurred in the Netherlands relatively fre-
quently, which means that anti-terrorist forces have been faced with ever-chan-
ging opponents. Preventing and controlling incidents calls for a different
approach than countering a more structural threat. Dutch policies have so far
largely been adapted to incident control. The following overview reflects Dutch
experiences with terrorism.
Dutch Political Terrorism
• Occupation of the Indonesian residence in Wassenaar by 33 South Moluccans, 1970.
The perpetrators, second-generation South Moluccans, wanted an indepen-
dent state and blamed the Dutch government for not living up to earlier
promises of help in that endeavour. Impatient with the “polite” way of their
elders, they turned to terrorism. A police officer died during the hostage-
taking in Wassenaar. The crisis ended when the occupiers surrendered.
• Hijacking of a train at Wijster and hostage-taking in the Indonesian embassy in
Amsterdam by South Moluccans 1975. South Moluccans captured and held a
train and the Indonesian embassy. The Dutch government was again fully
taken by surprise. The terrorists killed three hostages. The government
started intensive negotiations and used South Moluccan mediators. After two
weeks the hostage-takers surrendered. This form of negotiation became
known as the “Dutch approach”. The goal of this long negotiation was to
exhaust the hostage-takers.
• Hijacking of a train at De Punt and hostage-taking in a school in Bovensmilde by
South Moluccans, 1977. South Moluccan terrorists again hijacked a train. At
the same time they occupied a primary school. The hostage-taking of such
young children particularly upset the Dutch government and public. The
government tried again, but in vain, to end these crises through negotiations.
After three weeks, it ordered a massive attack on the train and the school. Six
terrorists and two hostages died in the process. The children had been freed
some weeks earlier because of the outbreak of a contagious disease among
them.
• Hostage-taking in the Provincial Government in Assen by South Moluccans, 1978.
The last major terrorist attack by South Moluccans was directed against the
Provincial Government Building in Assen, in the province of Drente. One
hostage died. The newly installed government refused to negotiate, and after
only 36 hours, it sent in the Marines. Another hostage died a month later
because of wounds inflicted by the terrorists. No more major terrorist attacks
were subsequently mounted by South Moluccans, although every few years
there are riots concerning young South Moluccans. At Christmas 2000
South Moluccans were responsible for some smaller bomb attacks in the
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Netherlands. Dutch intelligence is still watching potential activists within the
Moluccan community.
• Bomb attack by RARA, 1987 and 1991. RARA (Radikale Antiracistische Aktie;
RARA is also Dutch for “guess who?”) was a small group that attacked
multinationals with bombs. They wanted to protest against apartheid in
South Africa. The attacks in 1985-1987 were concentrated on the
Dutch multinational Makro, which owns a number of supermarkets in the
Netherlands and in South Africa. Although there was substantial material
damage, no casualties were involved in the bomb attacks. In 1991, RARA
attacked the house of the State Secretary of Justice and the Ministry of the
Interior to influence Dutch policy on refugees and asylum-seekers. Although
some persons were arrested, no one was convicted, and after 1991 there were
no more attacks.
• Assassination of Pim Fortuyn
On 6 May 2002, the populist politician Pim Fortuyn was killed at the Media
Park in Hilversum. Fortuyn was a successful leader of a new political party
that was expected to gain a major victory at the Dutch national elections on
13 May 2002 (and in effect did gain such a victory). In some polls, Fortuyn
was mentioned as the next Prime Minister of the Netherlands.
• Assassination of Theo van Gogh
On 2 November 2004, Mohammed Bouyeri murdered filmmaker Theo Van
Gogh in Amsterdam. Van Gogh made controversial films in which he did not
back off from far reaching criticism on the Islam. Mohammad Bouyeri
pinned a letter to the chest of Van Gogh in which he announced further death
threats to other Dutch politicians, most importantly Ayaan Hirschi Ali. It was
the first politically motivated murder in centuries in the Netherlands. There
was still major political and public turmoil months after the assassination.
Islam fundamentalists terrorism had reached Holland. A young Moroccan
man could be so radicalized that he was able to commit such a horrifying
murder.
International Terrorism in the Netherlands
• Hostage-taking in the French embassy in The Hague by the Japanese Red Army,
1974. This was the first time that the Netherlands faced major international
terrorism. Almost all the demands of the terrorists were met, including the
freeing of a member of the Japanese Red Army detained in France. The
terrorists fled with their friend and a substantial sum of money, but they did
free their hostages unharmed. Still, this is a case of flawed counter-terrorism
because no one was arrested and the government, which was taken utterly by
surprise, complied with all the demands.
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• Killing of the British ambassador by the IRA, 1979. The IRA killed the British
ambassador, Sir Richard Sykes, in The Hague. This killing led to more
sophisticated security concerning diplomats, and was the first time after the
Second World War that a politically motivated killing of a specific prominent
foreign individual had occurred in the Netherlands.
• Bomb attacks on British soldiers carried out by the IRA, 1988. The IRA attacked
six British soldiers in two separate attacks. Three soldiers were killed; the
others seriously wounded. The IRA claimed the attacks one day later. They
demanded that the British leave Northern Ireland. There was no explanation
of why they attacked in the Netherlands. There were no arrests.
• Killing of two Australian tourists by the IRA, 1990. In 1990 the IRA shot two
Australian tourists in the marketplace in Roermond, mistaking them for
British soldiers. The IRA later acknowledged responsibility and apologized.
No arrests were made.
• Bomb attacks on Spanish buildings by the ETA, 1989-1990. The ETA bombed
Spanish buildings and authorities in the Netherlands. There were no
casualties but material damage was considerable. The bombing of the
residence of the Spanish ambassador in The Hague forced the Dutch
government to intensify security measures. There were no arrests.
• Hostage-taking in the Greek residence by Kurdish separatists, The Hague, 1999. In
reaction to the capture of the Kurdish leader Öcalan, Kurdish activists
occupied the Greek residence and some people in it were taken hostage.
Occupations and demonstrations simultaneously occurred all over Europe.
The action in The Hague was spontaneous. The authorities were once more
taken by surprise. Most of the hostage-takers were arrested and convicted.
• Bomb threat on tunnels in Amsterdam and Rotterdam, 2001. Two weeks after
the 11 September 2001 attacks in the United States, authorities received a
sophisticated looking threatening note indicating that some tunnels in
Amsterdam and Rotterdam would be bombed. Although none of the
authorities thought that the threat would be implemented, all possible
security measures were taken. Dutch citizens were confronted with a
massive military force. No attack occurred. Nobody was arrested.
Some patterns can be discerned in this overview. Until the late 1960s, the
Netherlands was spared any terrorist acts, but in the 1970s, various hostage
situations and occupations occurred. In many cases, terrorists tried to pressurize
the authorities by threatening human lives. In the 1980s, criminal kidnappings
replaced politically motivated hostage-taking, and during that period no promi-
nent terrorist movements were active in the Netherlands. The end of the 1980s
and the early 1990s saw mostly bomb scares and bombings, raids on army
barracks, arson and other types of violence, focused on objects rather than on
persons. Those hit-and-run actions called for different measures from the
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authorities than hostage situations, in which the location of the terrorist was
known and remained fixed: only when the terrorist could be arrested at the crime
scene were some convictions proved possible; in all other cases, the Dutch police
and Public Prosecutors were not successful.
In the new century terrorism in the Netherlands was motivated by fundamentalist
Muslim groups. The murder of Theo van Gogh was the most prominent
fundamentalist Muslim terrorist attack in the Netherlands. The murder of Van
Gogh was associated with a group of young radical Islam fundamentalists which
the AIVD named the Hofstad group. The following description of the Hofstad
Group is cited from a study of the EU Research Group Transnational Terrorism,
Security and the Rule of Law.5
“The Hofstadgroep is an Islamist terrorist organization of nine young Muslims in the
Netherlands. The name ‘Hofstad’ was originally the codename the Dutch General
Intelligence and Security Service (Algemene Inlichtingen en Veiligheidsdienst, here-
after: AIVD) used for the group, which leaked to the media in 2003. The name refers to a
popular name for the city of The Hague, where some members had been active. The
group was influenced by the ideology of Takfir wal Hijra, a violent Islamist organization.
One of the Hofstadgroep’s key members is Mohammed Bouyeri, the man respon-
sible for the murder of the controversial Dutch writer and filmmaker Theo van Gogh in
November 2004. On the morning of Tuesday November 2, 2004, he was brutally
assassinated while biking to work unsuspectingly. Bouyeri was convicted in July 2005
for planning and carrying out the attack. Thirteen other suspects were taken into custody
on various charges in connection with the murder. Nine of the fourteen suspects were
convicted for membership of a terrorist organization and are currently serving various
sentences ranging from one year to life imprisonment.
As a diffuse and self generated autonomous network, the Hofstadgroep was not
organized in a ‘top down’ command structure although they did have spiritual support
and guidance from outside the country. It did, however, not appear to come from any
international groups. The methods and tactics of the Hofstadgroep are difficult to
distinguish because the ‘group’ lacked a coherent strategy and most of the crimes were
committed by individual members. The murder of Van Gogh was deliberately aimed at
one specific individual whom the perpetrator – but also his sympathizing friends –
regarded as an ‘enemy of Islam’. Samir Azzouz, who had participated in the network of
the Hofstadgroep but who himself was never convicted for membership, is believed to
have made plans to attack several institutions. Nonetheless, in general one could argue
that the main aim was that of a classical terrorist organization: to take lives, or threaten to
do so, with the aim of bringing about social change or influencing political decision
making. Despite its rowdy operations and inability to gather the right ingredients for
making explosives, the Hofstadgroep was initially always regarded as a terrorist
5 I was chairman of the consortium of research institutes which conducted this research,
www.transnationalterrorism.eu, see here for notes and literature on the Hofstadgroup.
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organization. It was also labeled as such by the court that convicted nine individuals for
their membership. However, these persons where cleared of these charges in 2008 when
the high court (Dutch: Gerechtshof) argued that the Hofstadgroep could not be regarded
as a terrorist organization. (high court verdict, 2008). In february 2008, the public
prosecutor appealed to the supreme court (Dutch: Hoge Raad) to revoke this verdict.”6
10.4 Counter-terrorism in the Netherlands
In this paragraph I will make a distinction between the period before 9-11 and the
period afterwards. The authorities in the Netherlands tried to maintain the
abovementioned Dutch approach: a balanced combination between preventive
and repressive counter terrorism measures. It is not surprising that during and
after terrorist attacks in Europe or in Holland a call for a more repressive counter-
terrorism in the Netherlands increased.7
10.4.1 BEFORE 9-11
In the period before 9-11 the Netherlands was hardy confronted with terrorism in
comparison with neighbouring countries. To understand the actual counter
terrorism in the Netherlands it is important to look into the history of counter-
terrorism. Discussions about counter-terrorism policy before 9-11 were concen-
trated on a few topics.
Legal order versus public order
The central question in the discussion of powers before, during and after terrorist
incidents is the relationship between the administrative and the judicial autho-
rities (the Minister of Justice, the Procurator General and the Public Prosecutor
versus the Minister of the Interior, the Queen’s Commissioner and the Mayor). In
the Proceedings of Parliament this choice is defended with the following
argumentation: “Since these are completed (and still continuing) criminal
offences, the Minister of Justice is the first responsible authority in such cases.
He must decide in close consultation with the Prime Minister, also Minister of
General Affairs, and the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Defence, and possibly
with other officials involved. If a terrorist act occurs, however, interests related to
public order are also at stake, and other measures of an administrative nature will
also be required. It is important that judicial measures and measures related to
public order are carefully harmonized.”8
6 http://www.transnationalterrorism.eu/tekst/publications/Hofstadgroep.pdf
7 See also Oosterom Staples 2008.
8 Bijlagen Handelingen Tweede Kamer 1972-1973, 12000, VI, no. 11 [author’s translation].
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In the early 1970s, the government primarily defined terrorism as a violation
of legal order. That placed the responsibility for response to a terrorist act with
the judicial authorities. The then Minister of Foreign Affairs wholeheartedly
agreed with that construction, which made it possible to apply the hierarchical
power structure of the Public Prosecution Service. Combating terrorism primarily
became a matter for the national government, in particular the judicial bodies, and
in 2002 this was still the basic structure for counter-terrorism in the Netherlands.
To date, the responsibility for combating terrorism in the Netherlands has
primarily been vested in the Minister of Justice. Over the years, however, it has
become customary for judicial and administrative authorities to consult on the
measures to be taken. The interaction between maintaining public and legal order
during terrorist incidents was acknowledged. In the case of a terrorist attack, the
Chief Prosecutor of the region has the lead. All his/her decisions have to be
coordinated with the Mayor and Chief of Police involved. The coordination of
security measures rests with the Department of the Interior. The National
Handbook of Crisis Management is the main procedure for decisions.
Legislation and regulations
There were no specific Acts in the Netherlands that govern procedures during
terrorist incidents. There were merely (confidential) ministerial circulars and
policy rules. Policy in the Netherlands was based on a 1972 letter from the then
Prime Minister Biesheuvel to the Dutch Second Chamber.
Separate circulars and scenarios have been developed for various types of
terrorist incidents. In 1976, a more general scheme for combating terrorism was
drawn up: the Order on the Investigation of Organized Crime of a Terrorist
Nature. In 1981 the Cooperation Scheme for the Control of Terrorist Crimes
replaced that Order, and introduced the National Public Prosecutor for the
Combat of Terrorism, who is in charge of coordinating investigations in the
event of an imminent terrorist incident. The scheme is an attempt at regulating
the exchange of information between the police, the Public Prosecution Depart-
ment and the administrative bodies. The Special Investigation Department of the
Central Criminal Investigation Department plays a pivotal part in this. In the
1990s a national structure for crisis management was formed, but it is not certain
whether all forms of terrorism have been included in this structure.
The Netherlands has no special emergency legislation for terrorist incidents.
The Civil Authorities Extraordinary Powers Act or the War Act, both of which
grant far-reaching powers to political/administrative persons in authority, do not
apply to terrorist acts (Schmid 1992). The action taken during terrorist incidents is
usually based on powers that exist in regular criminal law. Special (criminal)
legislation for terrorist incidents was set aside as a form of “overacting”.
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The use of force in terrorist situations must meet the same conditions as the
use of force in more regular situations. The police and the military must be
extremely reticent, and instructions to use force must be described as accurately as
possible. Even during terrorist incidents, operational units must observe the
applicable instructions on the use of force. Subsidiarity and proportionality
requirements are essential here.
Anti-terrorist units
In the Netherlands, combating terrorism is primarily a police task. The Dutch
government has acknowledged the risk of an entirely separate anti-terrorist
organization becoming isolated from the rest of society, and it has set up various
Special Support Teams, in which the police and the military are handed specialist
anti-terrorist tasks in addition to their regular work. These units can assist in the
handling of terrorist incidents and they operate under the responsibility of the
judicial authorities during a terrorist incident.
Figure: Anti-terrorist Support Teams
BBE-K
BBE-RP
BBE-M
BSB
AEKL
Armed Forces Special Support Team: marksmen
National Police Force Special Support Team: marksmen
Marine Special Support Team: close combat fighting
Military Police Special Security Assignments Brigade: personal security
Royal Army Cordoning Unit: cordoning the place of the incident
There is a thin line between the use of regular police services and these special
units. The special (BBE) units can be engaged only with the approval of the
Minister of Justice. Arrest Squads of the municipal and national police forces can
be engaged with the approval of the Chief Public Prosecutor. In urgent cases, the
authorities in charge can be informed of the use of Arrest Squads afterwards.
10.4.2 AFTER 9-11
Many measures were taken in the Netherlands after 11 September 2001 to
intensify the combat of terrorism. It must be noted again that combating
terrorism had little priority in the Netherlands before that date. Due to the
infrequent occurrence of terrorist acts in the Netherlands, it had become the
work of a few specialists. Executives and officers paid more attention to con-
tingencies and breaches of the peace than to the threat of terrorism. This changed
immediately after 11 September 2001, both with the authorities and with the
general public. In late 2001, the Dutch considered international terrorism to be
the most important threat.
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In response to the assaults of 11 September 2001, the Dutch government
formulated a detailed Anti-terrorist and Safety Plan of Action.9 The Plan of Action
comprises a wide range of measures to be taken by almost all of the relevant
organizations in the Netherlands. The Dutch parliament is kept informed of the
progress of these activities by means of regular progress reports. The government
has concentrated on the combination of measures after the attacks in the United
States. The Dutch government has formulated policy targets on a wide range of
subjects such as combating radicalization, international collaboration, the creation
of effective tools and structures, the implementation of security measures,
preparations for (the consequences of) a possible attack, and communication
and information.
Threat assessment
In early 2001, the Dutch Security Service published a report containing a risk
assessment of terrorist threats to the Netherlands for the early twenty-first
century. It is the first substantiated terrorist threat assessment to be published
by the secret service, for whom assessing these risks is a professional priority.10
“The threat of terrorism to the Netherlands is largely a derivative of the interna-
tional threat”, the Service stated, naming American, British and Turkish interests
or properties as examples for potential terrorism targets. “The internationalization
of terrorism has meant that violent political attacks may in principle take place
anywhere in the world, including the Netherlands.” Still, the Service pointed
at various relevant factors that may arguably draw special attention to the
Netherlands from terrorists looking for targets: the Netherlands’ strategic geo-
graphical position, with major nodes of international traffic (Rotterdam harbour;
Schiphol airport); its position as host to a number of international courts (e.g. the
Lockerbie trials; the Yugoslav tribunal) and offices charged with the verification of
international agreements (such as the Organization for the Prohibition of
Chemical Weapons, OPCW); and its role as host country to large groups of
immigrants from various parts of the world. These immigrants may import
violent conflicts from their homelands into their new country of residence (such
as conflicts between Turks and Kurds, or among Afghans of opposite persuasions,
etc). Finally, the Service mentioned the reputation of the Netherlands as a tolerant
society, where many religious and political opinions, even outlandish ones, are
generally respected and the judicial system is known for its mild punishments. In
some cases it is likely that terrorists have deliberately opted to come to the
Netherlands – either illegally or through the asylum policy – to hide here and to
support their home organizations.
9 Bijlagen Handelingen Tweede Kamer 2001-2002, no. 27925.
10 National Security Service, Terrorism at the Start of the Twenty-first Century: Current Threat and
Positioning of the Netherlands National Security Service (BVD) (Leidschendam: Binnenlandse Veilig-
heidsdienst, 2001), p. 15 and 16.
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The secret service continued by noting that, unlike the situation in most
neighbouring countries, homegrown terrorism did not presently play a significant
role in the Netherlands. It did not exclude the risk of “a certain continuum
between failed integration, increased segregation, growing polarization and
violent confrontation”, but concluded that there were no indications that such a
process would result in terrorism. In conclusion, the report stated: “there is no
great risk that society will be confronted with terrorist attacks on Dutch territory in
the near future. Nevertheless, there are many risk factors that require that the
country be on its guard”. It also noted that the Netherlands arguably is attractive to
terrorists as a place to stay unnoticed and prepare attacks elsewhere.
This was a threat assessment in 2001 before the attacks in the United States.
Nowadays the Dutch government makes regular threat assessments which give an
overview of the terrorist threat to the Netherlands. To give an impression of the
current threat I cite the threat perception by the National Coordinator Counter-
terrorism of March 2012:
“The threat level in the Netherlands remains ‘limited’. This means that the risk of a
terrorist attack is currently low, but that it cannot be eliminated altogether. This is
written in the Terrorist Threat Assessment Netherlands that Minister Opstelten of
Security and Justice sent to the Lower House of Parliament today. The limited threat is
posed in particular by the manifestation of international jihadism. It is a cause for
concern that young persons in Western countries travel to jihadist areas of conflict in
order to train there or take part in the struggle. They may constitute a threat after their
return. The recent attacks in Southern France against soldiers and a Jewish school,
perpetrated after DTN28 was drawn up, demonstrate this.
Jihadists weakened but not beaten
The strength of the core of al-Qaeda has been mitigated since the death of several of its
leaders. The various regional organisations affiliated with the core of al-Qaeda seem
currently primarily focused on both the armed and political struggle in parts of Africa
and Asia, but the outcome of this struggle is still extremely uncertain. It is possible that,
in some countries, jihadist will take advantage of the political and military developments.
This may pose a higher threat to Western countries in the short to medium term. As
evidenced by an additional number of arrests in Europe and North America, the jihadist
ideology has proved to be still able to inspire individuals and groups to come into action
in and against Western countries.
The Netherlands still a prominent target of jihadists
The Netherlands and its citizens are still legitimate targets for jihadists as a result of
alleged discrimination of Muslims and perceived blasphemy against Islam and the
Prophet Muhammad in our country, and Dutch participation in military or civil
missions in Islamic countries. In December 2011, threats were placed on the Internet
against Amsterdam and against Dutch diplomatic representations. Dutch citizens and
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Dutch interests abroad run a higher risk of being confronted with terrorism than
persons and objects in the Netherlands itself. This was evident just recently, for instance,
from two Dutch tourists in Mali and the Philippines.
Concerns about jihad travellers
Jihadist networks in the Netherlands have focused more on the jihad abroad than in the
Netherlands. It is worrisome that the number of jihadists travelling abroad to a jihadist
conflict area has increased in the past few years, and that they succeeded in reaching
their destination more often. They have the knowledge and contacts required to organise
new jihad trips from the Netherlands. Upon return to the Netherlands, they are able to
enthusiastically urge others to make jihad trips and to assist them in this respect. They
are also able to use their acquired battle experience for an attack in the Netherlands.
There is currently no concrete evidence of plans for such an attack.
Vigilance demanded for other forms of terrorist violence
It is necessary to stay alert to other forms of ideologically motivated violence. After the
violent acts committed by Breivik in Norway, other European incidents also showed that
this threat is more than a theoretical assumption. In Florence, a sympathiser of neo-
fascism shot five Senegalese citizens, of whom two were killed. In Germany, it became
known that ten unsolved murders, in particular on Turkish migrants in the period 2000-
2006, had been committed by the Nationalsozialistischer Untergrund, a far-right group.
An anarchist group – this time from Italy – sent letter bombs again to targets in Rome,
Frankfurt, and Paris.
Radical groups in the Netherlands usually remain within the limits of the law; resistance
continues to be high
Radical groups In the Netherlands continued to act mainly within the limits of the law.
In the last quarter of 2011, various incidents were reported involving Islamist radicals
and left-wing, right-wing, animal rights and asylum rights extremists, but those
incidents were not very grave in nature. The authorities did find weapons in the
possession of members of a North Holland right-wing extremist group. The weapons
had probably beenmeant for sale, not for an attack. The resistance against violence based
on ideological motives remains as high as ever in the Netherlands.”11
Legislation12
Even though the Dutch had some experience with terrorism in the form of
bombings, train hostage takings and other activities listed as terrorism, the Dutch
government in that period deliberately chose not to adopt specific terrorist
11 www.nctv.nl
12 This paragraph is cited from the before mentioned project Transnational Terrorism, Security and the
Rule of Law, The ethical justness of European counterrorism measures,
http://www.transnationalterrorism.eu/tekst/publications/WP2%20Del%202.pdf. See also Van der Woude
2010; Hirsch Ballin 2012.
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legislation. The current position of the Dutch government is that the present
terrorist threat is substantially different from the old form of terrorism and thus
calls for a definition, or at least a classification, of terrorism and terrorist crimes in
the Dutch Penal Code. The manner in which the Dutch government has engaged
in this is by introducing four notions related to the concept of terrorism: namely
terrorist offences, terrorist intent, cooperation and preparation. The category of
terrorist consists of three sorts of offences:
– grave criminal offences committed with terrorist intent;
– other criminal offences that when committed with terrorist intent call for a
higher penalty;
– newly introduced offences committed with terrorist intent.
The category of terrorist intent also consists of three sub-categories, mentioned in
Article 83a of the Dutch Penal Code:
– to cause serious fear amongst the population (or part thereof);
– to force a certain action by a government or international organization;
– to destroy or disrupt the political, constitutional, economic, or social structu-
res of a country or international organization.
All of these articles were incorporated in the Dutch Penal Code on the 10th of
August, 2004 and have already led to jurisprudence on various occasions, for
example through the trial of the murderer of Theo van Gogh, but also through the
trying of other suspected terrorists and organizations. Much discussion has taken
place since on whether the definition as adopted now is not broader than intended
in the Framework Decision, or whether the difference between motive and intent
has been sufficiently defined. Most of the trials executed have led to disputable
outcomes, such as court rulings mostly citing problems concerning the evidence.
Lastly, despite certain actions by animal rights activists “forcing” certain busi-
nesses to establish offices elsewhere (the businesses themselves cited that they
were forced to move!) the government has quite explicitly ruled that such actions
would not constitute terrorism.
Noted, the backbone of Dutch policy towards terrorism was that of negotiation,
which came to be known as the “Dutch Approach”. However, the violent endings
of the train and school hijackings in 1977, and the occupation of the Provincial
Government Office in 1979, marked the end of the famous Dutch approach. This
approach did lead to a great area of expertise concerning hostage negotiation, the
experiences of the negotiators were used by Scotland Yard to devise their famous
hostage negotiation course.
After the attacks of 9/11 Dutch lawmakers contemplated about the possibility
of anti terrorist legislation. The Wet terroristische misdrijven, the first example of
Dutch counter-terrorism legislation ever, was implemented in the summer of
2004. One of the highly debated issues between Dutch members of parliament
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was that of using information gathered by the AIVD in a court of law. As noted,
the AIVD expanded and was forced to adapt to a new role, but many opposed the
secret nature of evidence provided by the AIVD in a court of law. The new law
permits the prosecutor to use information gathered by the AIVD, but the Judges
must be able to verify that the evidence has been gathered in a proper fashion.
Additionally, a decree by the AIVD can serve as evidence in an eviction case of a
terror suspect.
The Dutch government has initiated a number of measures, created to confront
the entirety of the terrorist threat. The first of these measures is Criminal Law,
Art 83 WvSr, which outlines the criteria of the terrorist objective. Related to this are
Articles 80 and 96WvSr, in which themotive is established. Other Dutch counter-
terrorism measures include preliminary investigation regarding data retention
measures, control orders, intentional disturbance measures, custody guidelines
for terrorist suspects, witness guidelines, and anti-terrorist financing measures.
In a self-assessment of the Dutch government on the coun-terrorism police in the
years 2001-2010 the following conclusions were drawn about the legislation.
“In the context of this evaluation, researchers from Radboud University Nijmegen
looked at six counterterrorism measures specifically from the perspective of funda-
mental rights. These measures concern the Crimes of Terrorism Act (Wet terroristische
misdrijven), Training for Terrorism Act (Wet training voor terrorisme), the Investigation
and Prosecution of Crimes of Terrorism Act (Wet opsporing en vervolging terroristische
misdrijven), the Protected Witnesses Act (Wet afgeschermde getuigen), the National
Security (Administrative Measures) Bill (Wetsvoorstel bestuurlijke maatregelen nationale
veiligheid), and the person-specific approach. So far, for a variety of reasons, the Dutch
courts have barely, if at all, examined these measures for compatibility with fundamental
rights. None of the measures have yet been examined for compatibility with any of the
provisions of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), or the additional
protocols to the European Court of Human Rights. The first conclusion that can be
drawn from an analysis of the measures based on the general case law of the European
Court of Human Rights is that none of the Acts or other types of measures that were
analysed, when considered as a whole, are actually in violation of the ECHR. That said,
elements of such measures could be considered insufficiently foreseeable if they were
examined by the European Court of Human Rights. The European Court of Human
Rights would very likely regard the application of the aforementioned measures as
serving a legitimate purpose. At the same time, there is a risk that the application of
these measures in certain circumstances might be in violation of the Convention, as
their application in individual cases could be deemed not to be ‘necessary in a
democratic society’ within the meaning of the ECHR. The analysis based on the case
law of the European Court of Human Rights does not lead to the conclusion that the
legal basis, the provisions or the application of any of the measures definitely implies the
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violation of fundamental rights. However, with respect to some measures, it was argued
that there is a latent risk of the convention being violated, particularly as regards specific
elements of measures, and depending on the application of the measures and the
relevant circumstances in individual cases.”13
National Coordinator Counter-terrorism
Apart from laws, the Dutch government created an interdepartmental entity. The
Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of the Interior provided the infrastructure for
the National Coordinator Counter-terrorism (NCTb) in 2004. The growing call for
more cooperation between national and regional bodies in the struggle to prevent
a terrorist attack on Dutch soil pressed the government to seek coordination in
this complicated mission. The NCTb is there to coordinate the approximately
twenty organizations that are involved in counter-terrorism. The main tasks for
the NCTb are described in the Order of the Minister of Justice and the Minister of
the Interior and Kingdom Relations in June 2005:
• “The NCTb collates, analyses and integrates the information provided by
intelligence services, the scientific community, government and other
sources so that integrated analyses, threat assessments and other knowledge
products pertaining to terrorism and radicalisation can be generated and
used as resources for developing policy.
• The NCTb develops clear, cohesive and unambiguous counterterrorism
policy, including a strategic and international policy.
• The NCTb coordinates the collaborative efforts of the organisations involved
in counter-terrorism. This applies to both systematic and incidental
cooperation.
• The NCTb is responsible for managing the communication strategy, which
includes providing information about terrorism to the public and the media.
• The NCTb is responsible for maintaining, implementing and modernising
the national surveillance and protection system.
• The NCTb is responsible for the civil aviation security.
• The NCTb monitors the civil aviation security. Civil aviation security and the
surveillance and protection system are not concerned exclusively with
terrorist threats but also with other sources of danger such as violent
demonstrators and confused individuals.
The NCTb operates in an administratively and politically complex environment.
Political coordination is primarily the domain of the Cabinet Committee on
National Security (RNV), under the direction of the prime minister. The ministers
most closely involved in matters relating to counterterrorism and the intelligence
13 NCTB, Counterterrorism measures in the Netherlands in the First Decade of the 21st Century, 2011,
www.nctv.nl, p. 9-10.
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and security services consult in this committee. RNVmeetings are prepared by the
Joint Counterterrorism Committee (GCT), whose members represent the minis-
tries and government agencies involved in combating terrorism.”14 By the
establishment of the NCTb the Minister of Justice was made responsible for
counter-terrorism. This was in line with the historical division of power between
the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of the Interior. In case of an actual
terrorist attack both ministers have to work closely together because the Minister
of the Interior is politically responsible for disaster and crisis management. This
division of authority can create a conflict of responsibilities.
The NCTB organises a Counter-terrorism Alert System. “The Counter-terrorism
Alert System is an alert system for the government and economic sectors. It warns
the operational services and economic sectors in the event of a heightened threat.
This enables prior measures to be taken quickly in order to minimise the risk of
terrorist attacks in the Netherlands and to limit the potential impact of terrorist
acts. The system is aimed solely at professionals who may have to deal with a
terrorist threat. Fourteen economic sectors are currently connected to the
Counter-terrorism Alert System. The National Coordinator Counter-terrorism is
responsible for the implementation, operation and overall management of the
system. The Counter-terrorism Alert System has four levels of alert: the standard
level and three levels of ascending threat (low, moderate and high). Each level
comes with its own set of security measures in each economic sector. As the level
of alert rises, the security measures become more stringent and more far-reach-
ing. The agencies concerned are free to vary their measures according to the
nature of the threat. They can take additional measures if necessary. The basic
principle is to specifically tailor the measures to meet the threat at hand.”15
The NCTB organized a self assessment of the counter-terrorism policy in the
Netherlands in the period 2001-2010. The NCTB, Cabinet and Parliament did not
feel the need for an independent evaluation of the anti-terrorism policies. They
concluded as follows:
The attacks of 11 September 2001 and the subsequent threat of global terrorism have had
major consequences for the whole world in many areas. Terrorism was one of the greatest
threats to our internal and external security in the first decade of the newmillennium. It is
therefore encouraging that the number of radicals in our country who are prepared to use
violence to achieve political or religious goals has gradually decreased.
This evaluation – a self-reflection on the part of the government – takes a look at the
measures that have been taken to counter terrorism. With regard to the counter-
terrorism measures that are available, the conclusion of this evaluation is that probable
14 Website NCTV.
15 Website NCTV.
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cause existed whenever a measure was introduced or amended, and that the measures
were developed and applied in a consistent manner. To a significant extent, this is due to
the fact that the Netherlands has a strong wish to learn how this phenomenon, which is
relatively new in this country, can be tackled in the best way, i.e. with the emphasis on
preventing terrorism by means of taking proportionate, effective action and making use
of legitimate means. Based on the large number of studies and evaluations conducted in
the past nine years, and the way in which the lessons learned have been adopted, it is
evident that there is an ability to learn in the area of counterterrorism. Both central and
local authorities and executive agencies have learned from various individual evaluations
and legal opinions, and have applied these lessons.
Counter-terrorismmeasures in the Netherlands are characterised by the fact that they
are tailor-made, in terms of both their development and their application. There are still
only a limited number of specific measures that were taken exclusively in the context of
counter-terrorism. The system of measures has been specifically tailored to the goal that
needs to be achieved, giving due consideration to the safeguarding of fundamental
rights. It should be noted in this context that such consideration should be given on an
ongoing basis to individual measures as well as to the system of measures as a whole.”16
In 2011 the Dutch government published a new counter-terrorism strategy for the
coming years 2011-2015:
“When formulating and executing the counter-terrorism policy, the Dutch government
uses the following points of departure:
• The policy must be oriented towards preventing deliberate infringements of our state
organisations, the democratic legal order and our vital infrastructure.
• Counter-terrorism and security measures must have a legal basis to safeguard the legal
protection of the citizen.
• Counter-terrorism measures must be proportional, and as much as possible in balance
with the free exercise of basic rights.
• The cross-border nature of terrorism makes international cooperation essential.
• The nature of the threat determines the approach. This applies at strategic, tactical and
operational level.
• The unpredictable and changeable nature of the threat and the large number of parties
involved mean a central coordination structure is essential.
• The procurement of information and intelligence forms the foundation for the ability to
prevent (support for) terrorism.
• Effective counter-terrorism demands a rapid and coordinated translation of intelligence
into policy and implementation.
• An optimal link is necessary between the international, national and local levels.
16 NCTB, Counterterrorism measures in the Netherlands in the First Decade of the 21st Century, 2011,
www.nctv.nl, p. 8.
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The Dutch commitment in the field of counter-terrorism has been developed on the
basis of these points of departure into the following five components:
1. Procure
The collection of information and intelligence in the Netherlands and abroad forms the
basis for making thorough threat analyses. The more concrete information is available,
the more insight there is into the nature and extent of the threat and the more
possibilities there are for specific intervention to prevent terrorism and identify
processes of radicalisation in time. The increasing unpredictability and changeability
of the threat, in combination with an increasingly strong international, national and local
interrelation, mean that good information and intelligence gathering is essential. This has
been the focus of significant investment in recent years. The focus in the coming years
will primarily be on promoting and facilitating the timely exchange of relevant informa-
tion between the multitude of organisations and bodies which each have their own pieces
of information. These facets needs to be improved in order to ensure the timely
identification and response to new security risks which result from modern technology,
the dramatic increase in travel movements and the risks represented by radicalising
individuals. The importance of the proactive procurement of intelligence in and about
foreign countries is increasing due to such security risks and this will be encouraged.
2. Prevent
In line with international developments, the focus of the Dutch government is
increasingly on the prevention of violent extremism. Non-violent forms of extremism
and orthodoxy are not by definition worrisome from the security point of view. In order
to prevent violent extremism among individuals or groups and (ultimately) to counteract
terrorist crimes, intervention will have to take place as soon as possible. The current
terrorist threat comes primarily from jihadists. The strategy is aimed at measures
designed to hinder the carrying out of an attack (terrorism as a deed) and measures
intended to prevent or avert violent extremism (terrorism as a phenomenon). In order to
tackle violent extremism (and ultimately terrorism) effectively, the Dutch government is
also going to work simultaneously on increasing the resilience on the demand side of
certain groups in society, on undermining the supply of the terrorists’ narrative,
reducing the breeding ground for terrorism and investing in deradicalisation. Interna-
tional cooperation is essential in these areas as well.
3. Protect
The state, the legal order and the (vital elements of ) Dutch society must be optimally
protected against concrete and virtual terrorist threats or attacks. This demands
thorough and realistic preparation. The point of departure is that it has to be possible
for the threatened person, the object, the sector or the event to function with as little
interference as possible. The degree and the extent of the protection are aimed at making
threats and risks manageable, rather on eliminating them completely. This implies the
protection of people, objects, events and services which make up the core of our state and
legal order. Examples are the Royal Family, politicians, members of the judiciary,
government buildings, embassies and international organisations. Steps also need to be
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taken to prevent vital sectors such as the energy sector, the financial sector, the
telecommunications sector and the civil aviation sector from being negatively affected.
Lastly, attention is being paid to the protection of the national harbours and airports. The
strategy as regards this element is aimed primarily at the optimal combination of
technological protection resources, the timely identification of the security risks of new
technological developments and the realisation of the importance of the human factor as
regards encouraging security (‘security awareness’). The strategy is also aimed at
reducing the possibilities of illegally acquiring or manufacturing chemical substances
and homemade explosives, and the timely identification of radicalised individuals.
4. Prepare
Dutch society must be aware of the possibility of an attack and must be prepared for the
(possible) consequences. Thorough crisis decision-making after an attack, effective
assistance, practice sessions with crisis situation simulation training, and optimal
communication with the general public are therefore essential as well. Public and crisis
communication will have to be aimed at specific target groups in the international and
national arena to prevent or reduce any new discrepancies. In addition, the coordination
structure must be organised in such a way that intelligence, policy, implementation and
assistance can be linked rapidly and effectively.
5. Prosecute
The detection, prosecution and sentencing of people who are suspected of committing
terrorist crimes, or of preparing them, are essential elements of counter-terrorism. National
legislation – criminal, administrative and civil – has been expanded in recent years as a
result. Given the sometimes quite considerable violations of the privacy of citizens in
particular, these specific measures are to be monitored and evaluated periodically. The
increased international dimension of the terrorist threat means international cooperation
between the police and judiciary is of crucial importance. Bilateral and multilateral
cooperation with other countries and multilateral organisations will be encouraged.”17
Radicalization and deradicalization
The Committee of Experts on Terrorism from the Council of Europe gives a clear
overview of the Dutch counteracting radicalism and radicalisation. “Dutch policy
on radicalisation aims at counteracting and containing tendencies towards violent
radicalisation and the recruitment of people for terrorist ends. This policy consists
of two pillars: preventive measures and repressive measures. First and foremost,
the Dutch approach to radicalisation seeks to eliminate potential breeding
grounds, so as to stop people from coming into contact with radical ideas. The
package of measures designed to achieve this is meant to give people a greater stake
in Dutch society and increase social cohesion. The goal is to create the conditions
for social participation and ensure that even vulnerable groups enjoy society’s
benefits. (…) The most virulent expressions of radicalism can be combated through
17 National Counter Terrorism Strategy 2011, p. 8-1, www.nctv.nl.
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criminal law. They include acts of violence, threats of violence, incitement to
violence, hate speech, as well as a number of other acts committed with the intent
of bringing about social upheaval. Once people are convicted, additional penalties
can also be imposed that will hinder them from carrying on with their activities.
One such penalty is stripping them of the right to vote or be elected. The
effectiveness of using criminal law against radicalism depends to a great extent
on mastering the grey area between behaviour that would constitute a criminal
offence and behaviour that is merely socially unacceptable. In the Netherlands two
strategies can be put to work in this grey area: tackling hotbeds of radicalisation and
conducting person-specific interventions.”18
Special Units19
In the Netherlands, it is possible to deploy special police and military units in
certain cases, for instance to bring an end to lifethreatening situations or arrest
armed and dangerous suspects or persons suspected of terrorism or serious
violence. The old system of special units is reorganised. One aspect of the review
of the system is the establishment of the new Special Intervention Service (DSI), a
coordinating unit at the National Police Services Agency (KLPD). This service has
general operational responsibility for deployment of special units in cases of
terrorism or serious violence and other special circumstances, with the exception
of cases in which the Arrest and Support Units (see below) operate independently.
Such deployment takes place under the authority of the Public Prosecution
Service. The new system consists of four types of special unit:
• Arrest and Support Units (AOEs) within the regional police forces or the
KoninklijkeMarechaussee (KMar). The task of these units is to bring an end to
ordinary criminal situations by arresting armed and dangerous persons,
regardless of any links with terrorist activities. These units deal with situations
that, in view of their nature and scale, are not expected to escalate to the level of
violence dealt with by the Intervention Unit or the Marine Intervention Unit.
• Intervention Unit (formerly the Special Support Team/Rapid Intervention Unit).
The Intervention Unit specialises in smallscale, high-risk operations invol-
ving explosives or heavy firearms, suspects prepared to sacrifice themselves
and CBRN threats. The Intervention Unit is composed of personnel from the
military (2/3 of the unit) and the police (1/3). This enables it to operate flexibly.
• Marine Intervention Unit (formerly the Marine Special Support Team). The
specialisations of the Marine Intervention Unit include offensives and large-
scale or complex operations, as well as situations in which the Intervention
Unit has insufficient capacity.
18 Council of Europe, Committee of Experts on Terrorism, Profiles on Counter Terrorist Capacity,
November 2008.
19 Website NCTV.
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• Expertise & Operational Support Unit (UE&OO). This DSI unit includes
sharpshooters specialised in long-distance precision shooting. It replaces
the part-time police andmilitary Special Support Units (BBE-Politie and BEE-
Krijgsmacht), which consisted of sharpshooters. The unit includes equal
numbers of military and police sharpshooters.
10.5 Trends in terrorism and counter-terrorism
To end this chapter I give an overview of the trends in terrorism and counter-
terrorism in the Netherlands.20
A. Terrorism is here to stay
Terrorism is of ancient origin and not just of our day, even if many authors create
the impression that the 2001 attacks signalled a new stage: terrorism has been
around for a very long time. There is not a single indication that terrorismwill ever
fully disappear. Modern societies such as The Netherlands should learn to live
with the fact that terrorism exists and will continue to exist. The underlying causes
of terrorism are so diverse and numerous that it is an illusion to expect that
terrorism could disappear. There will always be reasons for terrorism. Not all
conflicts between and within population groups in the world will be solved. Some
groups may feel forced or called upon to draw attention to their cause by means of
terrorism. Further, the recruitment of young people or specific population groups
or religions for the terrorists’ cause shows that the terrorism risk will be here to
stay. The future terrorists are now being recruited and trained.
A certain degree of control of terrorism is the best we can achieve. We must
prevent terrorists from holding society in the grip of terror. In all likelihood,
terrorism will come in waves, as a result of which it will seem quiet in certain
periods, while in other periods terrorist actions will be intensified. These waves
may create the impression that some parts of terrorism have been solved; history
shows, however, that new forms of terrorism will continue to emerge.
Open democratic societies such as The Netherlands create freedoms for
citizens and organisations, but terrorists can use these freedoms as well. These
freedoms allow terrorists to prepare their actions in the best possible manner
without being disturbed by legal or other restrictions. The obvious response –
curtailing these freedoms – will be practicable only to a limited extent, as the
curtailment of these freedoms will also curtail the freedoms of the regular
citizens. In a totalitarian state there will not be a great deal of terrorism, but
only few people will consider that to be an attractive prospect. One of the costs of a
democratic society is that a certain degree of terrorism will be inevitable.
20 Based on and cited from Muller 2008B.
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B. Greater NBC risk
Many writers concentrate on the NBC risk relating to terrorism. The relevant
literature warns against the risk that terrorists will use NBC weapons in terrorist
attacks in the coming years. Until now there has never been any successful major
nuclear, biological or chemical attack anywhere in the world. In many instances,
preparations for such attacks were made and some failed attacks were carried out.
There is a rich diversity of literature on the risk of NBC weapons. Some authors
are confirmed believers: they are convinced that terrorists will use NBC weapons
before long. Others take a more cautious and balanced position and point out the
problems and difficulties surrounding the use of NBC weapons – which equally
apply to terrorist organisations.
It is difficult to assess to what extent there is a realistic risk. It is clear that if a
properly organised terrorist group has a certain level of expertise and sufficient
financial resources and is also able to avoid being traced by the police and the
judicial authorities for a substantial period, it may be in a position to develop NBC
weapons. It should be borne in mind, however, that it is by no means as easy to
produce these weapons as is often claimed. A terrorist cannot just put together an
atomic bomb. The production of chemical and biological weapons is less
complicated but a certain level of expertise and organisation is essential for that
as well.
The fight against NBC terrorism is focussed on the preliminary stages, and
aims to prevent terrorists from being able to acquire such weapons in the first
place. In the United States in particular – but in Europe, too, by now –
preparations have been made for such NBC attacks. These preparations are
limited by definition. Democratic societies cannot really be protected against
such attacks and there are no adequate response strategies for cushioning any
NBC attack. Moreover, at the end of the day, many people cannot imagine the
consequences of any NBC attack for a society. Present-day administrators are not
used to dealing with a threat of this magnitude.
C. Terrorists use both new and old weapons
The relevant scientific literature has paid a great deal of attention, relatively
speaking, to new weapons such as cyber terrorism, net wars and NBC weapons.
There seems to be numberless possibilities of terrorist disruptions of computer
networks and the Internet. In view of the current security measures, it is difficult,
however, to achieve disruptions serious enough to cause long-term damage or
long-term disruption to society. With these weapons, it is far more difficult to
kindle fear than with the older category of weapons. For the most part, modern
terrorism methods based on complex information technology are still in their
infancy. As with NBC weapons, these forms of terrorism require a certain degree
of organisation and expertise that many terrorist groups do not have.
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In the relevant literature, it is rightly pointed out that modern weapons are not
the only ones that deserve attention, because the creative use of old weapons can
cause as much damage and fear. For a long time, hijacking of aircraft seemed a
weapon that the anti-terrorist campaign was able to tackle adequately. The use of
hijacked aircraft as bombs is a new variant. Similarly, there are many other
possible uses of the old weapons (hijacking of aircraft or other means of transport,
hostage-takings, bombings, suicide attacks, kidnappings, and liquidations). The
anti-terrorist operatives will be forced to prepare for the various combinations that
are conceivable.
In this context, too, the dominant trend is that attention will have to be paid
to the risk of modern forms of terrorism, where the disruption of information
technology is of crucial importance, but that the old weapons should not be
forgotten. After the attacks in the United States, it was found that the relevant
agencies had primarily prepared for the worst case scenarios of large-scale NBC
attacks or information technology disruptions. Few had considered the possibility
of the attacks that actually took place.
D. Closer ties between crime and terrorism
There are ever-closer ties between terrorism and organised crime. In recent years,
research has shown that nearly all larger terrorist groups use organised crime for
raising funds that are necessary to carry out terrorist actions. Terrorist groups use
all conceivable forms of organised crime, but drug trafficking is their favourite
activity. Terrorist groups are forced to raise funds in this way, because state
sponsorship for terrorism is steadily declining, among other reasons. Even
population groups that were prepared to support specific terrorist groups in the
past are apparently becoming more and more risk-averse. Terrorist groups are
increasingly facing financial problems. Only once in a blue moon are they able to
find a sponsor wealthy enough to allow a terrorist group to be operated without the
need to resort to criminal activities for a longer period.
Even though there are also definition problems in relation to organised crime,
the actions of the police, the judicial authorities and the intelligence services are
much better regulated. In many countries, the extent and intensity of organised
crime is greater than the threat of terrorism. Since terrorism and organised crime
are becoming ever more closely connected, the powers and investigation methods
applicable to organised crime can be usedmore andmore frequently. Accordingly,
the interdependence of terrorism and crime means that anti-terrorist operators
have a broader range of instruments at their disposal. For example, terrorists may
be tracked down through investigations into organised crime and vice versa. Even
so, very different people and motives are involved and this is why it necessary to
keep making a distinction between terrorism and organised crime.
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At the same time, the fight against terrorism is becoming more complex,
because all kinds of new organisations, which usually do not play any part, are
involved in the anti-terrorism campaign on the side of the police, the judicial
authorities and intelligence services. This may lead to miscellaneous bureaucratic
conflicts and discussions about the possibilities and limitations in respect of the
exchange of information and information ownership. In the future, the various
anti-terrorist operatives and organised crime fighters will have to collaborate more
closely, which will entail some organisational adjustments and, perhaps, some
problems, because the fight against terrorism and the fight against organised
crime are not regulated by the same persons and organisations. It is also expected
that there will be problems in relation to the uniformisation of the anti-terrorist
measures to be adopted by the various countries.
E. No real solution
There is not one right solution for terrorism. Even though many books and articles
claim that they have found the right solution, it is an illusion to think that there is
such a thing as a perfect remedy. Terrorism is too complex for simple solutions.
Anti-terrorist experts are under immense pressure by politicians and the media to
define a good solution, however, which is apt to result in new anti-terrorist
methods being presented during debates as the universal remedy against the form
of terrorism prevailing at that time. A comprehensive remedy does not exist,
however, and it is not very sensible to try and find it. A complex and ancient
problem such as terrorism can be solved only by means of complex and long-term
measures.
Accordingly, administrators must be cautioned against consultants and pro-
fessionals propagating one or just a few solutions. The scientific literature also
reveals quite clearly that the advocates of specific solutions to certain problems are
often guided by an interest other than the solution of the problem. The political
context of both the definition of terrorism and the solution of terrorism is
complex. There are but few interest-free solutions in this world. In this context,
administrators and scientists alike should always be aware of questions such as
the following: Who perceives and defines the threat and in what manner? What
kind of threat relating to what kind of terrorism is meant?
What is useful and necessary to achieve a responsible combination of different
measures against terrorism? Every country should examine what combination of
preventive and repressive measures is desirable and possible considering the
specific terrorist threat and the existing form of government and security system.
Some measures may work well in a specific context, whereas others will not work
well. It is important to provide tailor-made anti-terrorist arrangements for each
individual country and sometimes even for each individual region. In that context,
the administrators may choose from among a wide range of options, whereby
scientists could make a contribution to answering the question of when a specific
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measure is useful on the basis of solid comparative country studies. This will
necessitate administrators to develop an integral strategy on the basis of a solid
risk analysis in relation to the terrorist threat in their own country, which defines
the measures relevant to that country and that specific terrorist threat that are to be
taken.
F. Increasing role of the intelligence
Time and again, intelligence ismentioned as one of themost importantmethods and
instruments against terrorism. Good intelligence can prevent a great deal of
terrorism. A good information position means not only that terrorist actions can
be prevented but also that adequate repressivemeasures can be taken. If anti-terrorist
operatives possess adequate information, they are better able to track down and
prosecute terrorists. The advantages of a good information position are clear and are
endorsed by everybody. Time and time again, it is found, however, that the gathering,
processing and exchange of information is so complicated that it is exceedingly
difficult to actually achieve this information position. We expect that these intelli-
gence function problems will only increase in the years ahead. The quantity of data is
steadily increasing and relevant information is more and more difficult to amass. In
addition, it will be more and more difficult to gather information in view of the
diffuse nature of modern terrorist organisations. This means that reinforcing the
intelligence function should not be expected to work miracles.
The amount of intelligence will only increase in the coming years. Intelligence
services, but also all kinds of police services and private security organisations, are
being given more and more powers to gather and process information. It will be
difficult to select the relevant information from the immense flow of data that
results from this process. It will be more and more difficult to make sound threat
and risk analyses on the basis of this jumble of data. In addition, the exchange of
information between the relevant organisations will become increasingly difficult
as a result of the intensification of the powers. Not only the formal privacy rules
are responsible for that, but also the well-known problems organisations have in
exchanging their information. Time and time again, it will be found after a
terrorist action that there was a warning somewhere in one of the relevant
organisations but that the warning was not acted upon as a result of the overload
of information or as a result of the late or absent exchange of information. Finally,
the problems relating to the cooperation between intelligence services are a factor.
Even though this cooperation has been intensified – certainly after 11 September
2001 – an intelligence service will by definition exercise restraint in exchanging
information. For this reason, it is important to strike a sound balance between
national interests and the corresponding restraint in the exchange of information
and international (and national) interests that, by contrast, require the exchange of
information. In order to achieve this, not only changes in structure and powers but
also cultural changes are needed within the intelligence services.
cha p t e r 1 0
278
G. The advantages of the financial strategy against terrorism should not be exaggerated
Politicians and anti-terrorist operatives alike have pinned their hopes on the
financial side of the fight against terrorism. “Follow the money” is a well-known
expression in the counter-terrorism world. Many of the measures taken after
11 September 2001 are intended to trace and seize the assets of terrorist organisa-
tions. New acts aimed at better monitoring of financial transactions were intro-
duced. Any person who carries out financial transactions with a potentially terrorist
organisation is suspect. The underlying idea behind the “follow the money”
strategy is that, if terrorist organisations are actually hit in the heart of their
financial dealings, they will not be able to launch new attacks. New initiatives have
been taken not only at the national but also at the international level.
However, experiences gained in the fight against organised crime show that
combating the financial side of terrorism is not as successful as was previously
thought. These measures did not turn out to be very effective. The anti-terrorist
operatives managed to gain an insight into terrorist financing operations and
intervene therein only to a limited degree. The complexity of the current financial
structures and possibilities is such that adequate tracing and disruption will
become increasingly difficult. In tackling this problem, the anti-terrorist opera-
tives can learn important lessons from the tracing and disruption of financial
dealings in the case of organised crime.
This does not mean that tackling terrorists and terrorist organisations finan-
cially is not a good idea. But for the foregoing reason, it seems to be sensible only if
it is incorporated into a broader and comprehensive strategy. In combination with
other preventive and repressive measures, interfering in the financial dealings of
terrorist organisations can certainly be highly important in a specific context.
H. The increasing role of the media and communication
The role of the media in relation to both terrorism and terrorist combating is
becoming more and more important. For the media, terrorist actions constitute a
very important subject – “Breaking News”. Partly because of the current complex-
ity, diversity and competition among the media, reports on terrorist actions are
among the highlights. All media want to be on the spot. All media want to have
their own approach. All aspects of a terrorist attack are highlighted 24 hours a day.
This is exactly what the terrorists want. The media constitute the most important
instrument for voicing their message. This is why terrorists use the media
intensively to communicate their message and pictures and to achieve the changes
they desire. In the end, media management and communication are a crucial part
of every terrorist attack.
Attempts to restrict the freedom of the media during or after terrorist actions
by requesting or demanding that they should refrain from broadcasting certain
pictures or information are effective to a limited extent only. In view of the current
international nature of the media, it is difficult to make such arrangements.
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Anti-terrorist operatives are increasingly aware that they can also use the media for
combating terrorism. The media may show terrorists as freedom fighters or as
intruders who take away the freedom of ordinary citizens. If a government and/or
the anti-terrorist operatives succeed in portraying terrorists as enemies, they will
create more room for their own measures. This is why an adequate anti-terrorist
strategy also focuses on a good and well-thought-out communication strategy, not
only vis-à-vis the terrorists but also vis-à-vis the citizens and other countries. The
manner in which this communication strategy is to be shaped highly depends on
the specific type of terrorism involved and a country’s customs and practices. Here
too, it is important to differentiate according to country, type of terrorism and
constitutional and security system.
I. Problems of internationalisation
Both terrorism and combating terrorism are becoming more and more interna-
tional. This sounds easy but it is in fact quite complicated. Terrorist groups are
less and less concerned with the borders between countries. Several terrorist
groups increasingly cooperate with each other in all kinds of manners, both within
and outside the borders of countries. But countries still observe these rules in
terms of powers and responsibilities in relation to the fight against terrorism.
Even though the possibilities of international counter-terrorism are gradually
increasing, the international flexibility of modern terrorists is greater than the
flexibility of international cooperation between the countries. This means that the
anti-terrorist operatives are lagging behind the terrorists in this respect.
As a result of the endless debate on the different definitions of terrorism, it is
still difficult to enact international anti-terrorist legislation. Even though the
number of treaties is on the increase, it continues to be difficult to arrive at an
unequivocal division of powers and responsibilities. This is certainly the case with
respect to the exchange and use of information. The laborious efforts in the EU
and, above all, the UN show how difficult it is to make sensible and effective
arrangements on the international fight against terrorism.
The international problems are not just of a legal nature. Many borders must
also be opened when it comes to international organisational cooperation. In every
country, several organisations are involved in one way or another in combating
terrorism, and from an international perspective, there is an even greater number
of organisations. Each of these organisations has its own “borders”. These borders
should disappear for the purpose of cooperating in the exchange of information.
As things stand, many anti-terrorist operatives are wasting time “crossing” these
organisational borders. Even though terrorism and anti-terrorist activity are
becoming increasingly international, the fight against terrorism continues to be
beset by border problems.
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10.6 Final remarks
The Netherlands has had its own experience with terrorism. While in the
Netherlands no large mass terror attacks have occurred, the political murders of
Fortuyn and Van Gogh increased the terrorism awareness of the public. The
attacks on September 11, 2001 and the attacks in the Netherlands have created a
fully-fledged counter-terrorism policy in the Netherlands. The trends in terrorism
and counter-terrorism show that in the coming years the Netherlands will need
this counterterrorism policy.
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11 Defence and armed forces
11.1 Introduction
The armed forces in the Netherlands constitute the government’s ultimate “power
to use the sword” and the state’s instrument for retaining its power. This power to
use the sword means that the armed forces have a wide range of instruments at
their disposal to protect state interests. Article 98 of the Dutch Constitution
mentions this task explicitly: “To protect its interests, the State shall maintain
Armed Forces…” It is not the police but the army, the air force and the navy that
hold the true monopoly on violence in the fundamental sense of the word. The
police have far-reaching powers with respect to the citizens’ freedoms. Apart from
the influence they may exert on the state’s citizens or the citizens of other states,
the armed forces have the personnel and equipment to protect the state itself.
Primarily, the armed forces are designed to protect the independence and the
territorial integrity of the Netherlands. Even though this aspect receded into the
background after 1989, this is and continues to be the core element of the institute
of the armed forces.
The government shall have supreme authority over the armed forces. In the
Dutch context, it is inconceivable that the military will somehow attempt to use
force for the purpose of changing the organization of the Dutch state. In other
countries this idea is not as farfetched. The primacy of politics is firmly
established in the Netherlands. Nevertheless, the Dutch armed forces have a
wide range of instruments and manpower at their disposal, which allow them to
exert considerable influence on the functioning of the state. In this chapter, I will
show the crucial aspects of the armed forces as a power to use the sword on the
basis of a few propositions. This chapter will not seek to define the task and
operation of the armed forces in a specifically legal sense, but to give a descriptive
analysis of these aspects. The aimed forces are a determining part of the state.
The operation of the armed forces and the manner in which the state and the
government of the day deal with the armed forces reveal a great deal about the
level of democracy in a country. The message of the propositions is that a mature
democratic state under the rule of law continues to need strong and well-
embedded armed forces.1
1 See also Collins 2007; Williams 2008.
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In this chapter I describe the organization and functioning of the armed forces
in the Netherlands. This chapter is mainly based on the volume Armed Forces
edited by Muller, Straink, Bosch and De Jong (2004).
11.2 Organization of armed forces in the Netherlands
The Dutch armed forces have a long and heroic history. Once upon a time the
Netherlands were a colonial power where the armed forces and especially the
Dutch navy played an important and crucial role. The Dutch armed forces are still
impressive considering the size of the Netherlands. The Dutch armed forces are
still one of the major employers in the Netherlands. The Dutch armed forces are
militarily active all over the world. In this paragraph I will give a short overview of
the most important aspects of the organization of the Dutch armed forces.2
11.2.1 ORGANIZATION
The Ministry of Defence consists of the Central staff (the department), the Royal
Navy, the Royal Army, the Royal Air Force, the Royal Marechaussee, Defence
Material Organisation and the Support Command. In total more then 60,000
people are working for the Ministry of Defence.
2 Mainly based on the website of the Dutch Ministry of Defence and the brochure Facts and figures
about the armed forces 2007.
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The Dutch armed forces have three main tasks:
• protecting the integrity of national and Alliance territory, including the
Netherlands Antilles and Aruba;
• promoting the international rule of law and international stability;
• supporting civil authorities in upholding the law, providing disaster relief
and humanitarian assistance, both nationally and internationally.
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Military operations Military assistance
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•  Protection at sea,
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•  Command & control
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•  Strategic Transport
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•  Strategic Military
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•  Separating parties
•  Stabilisation
•  Military support
•  Coastguard
•  Marechaussee tasks
•  Verification
•  Personal security
•  Ceremonial duties
•  Explosives clearance
•  Host-nation support
•  Coastguard
•  Military support
•  Emergency assistance
•  Instruction & training
    of foreign units
•  Disaster response
•  (Hydrography)
•  (Geography) 
SupportUpholding the rule of law
The Dutch Defence Organization has developed a Future Policy Survey Project in
which crucial questions are researched on the future organization and development
of the armed forces in the Netherlands. In this project five crucial questions for
Dutch politics were mentioned to be able to formulate a comprehensive strategy:
1. What military contribution does the Netherlands want to make in an
international context and vis-à-vis other countries? What do we want to
mean in the world? What interests and values do we stand for? Who are we?
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2. What defence effort is required or desirable in the light of the future security
analysis of the Future Policy Survey? How do we deal with the fundamental
uncertainty concerning future developments?
3. What balance must be struck between the protection and, if necessary,
defence of national and Allied territory, on the one hand, and engaging
threats to our security at a distance?
4. What contribution should the Armed Forces make within the national
borders to the security of our society in the light of the growing vulnerability?
5. In what areas is the Netherlands willing to accept dependence on other
countries with respect to security and defence? To what degree do we want to
retain our autonomy?
The findings of this project are now implemented but are confronted with the
need for new financial cuts on the armed forces and the defence organization.
11.2.2 INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS
Military personnel carry out these national and NATO tasks at home and abroad
every day. Every year, thousands of Dutch military personnel and civilians – both
men and women – are deployed for peace missions abroad. In 2009 the Dutch
armed forces had 2,067 people deployed abroad for missions in other countries:
• Afghanistan – ISAF: The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)
helps the Afghan government in maintaining security. In addition, the
military are in various ways involved in the reconstruction of the country.
• Bosnia-Herzegovina – EUFOR: The main task of EUFOR is to stop the
conflict between the former warring parties and to ensure that the Dayton
agreements are respected.
• Iraq – NTM-I: NATO NTM-I training mission (NATO Training Mission –
Iraq) trains Iraqi soldiers and security officers.
• Sudan –UNMIS: The main role of UNMIS is to monitor compliance with the
peace agreement Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) 2005
• Bahrain nlo CTF 150/Bahrain CIFC: CTF 150 focuses on a stable and secure
region where international terrorist organizations (ITO’s) reports
In 2012 the contribution of the Dutch armed forces to international missions was
reduced. The Netherlands had then 877 personnel on missions abroad. The Dutch
Defence organisation is in 2012 currently involved in the following missions:
• Afghanistan – ISAF: The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)
supports the Afghan government in maintaining security. In addition, the
military personnel are involved in various ways in the reconstruction of the
country.
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• Bosnia-Herzegovina – EUFOR: The main task of European Union Force
(EUFOR) is to prevent the formerly warring parties from engaging in conflict
again, and to monitor the observance of the Dayton agreements.
• Somalia –Ocean Shield and Atalanta: Various ships of the Royal Netherlands
Navy are being deployed for anti-piracy missions off the coast of East Africa
until mid-June 2011. The missions are Operation Atalanta (European Union)
and Operation Ocean Shield (NATO). The naval ships are to increase security
on the shipping routes near Somalia and discourage and disrupt acts of
piracy.
11.2.3 NETHERLANDS DEFENCE DOCTRINE
The Dutch armed forces made a Netherlands Defence Doctrine which gives
strategic and operational direction. I cite some main points to give an overview of
the most important aspects of the deployment of the armed forces.3 These are the
national legal framework, the foreign, security and defence policy, the interna-
tional context and the decision making.
“National legal framework
Stipulations concerning the existence, the direction and the deployment of the armed
forces can be found in the Dutch Constitution:
Article 90
The government will promote the development of international law.
Article 97
1. The armed forces exist for the defence and protection of the interests of the
Kingdom, and in order to maintain and promote the international legal order.
2. The government has supreme authority over the armed forces.
Article 100
1. The government will supply the States General with advance information on the
intended use of the armed forces for the purposes of maintaining or promoting the
international legal order. This also includes the supply of advance information on
the intended use of the armed forces for the provision of humanitarian relief in the
event of armed conflict.
2. The first paragraph will not apply if there are compelling reasons for withholding
the supply of advance information. In that case, information will be provided at the
earliest possibly opportunity.
3 Netherlands Defence Doctrine 2005.
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Article 90 defines the promotion of the international rule of law as a Dutch interest.
According to Article 97(2) of the Constitution, the government has supreme authority
over the armed forces. The meaning of the provision on the supreme authority is that the
use of the armed forces is an exclusive power of the government: the primacy of politics.
The government has a political responsibility towards parliament. If the government
assigns troops to an international organisation, it does not surrender supreme authority.
Deployment for the purpose of defence takes place on the basis of an international
support obligation 18. Deployment for the purpose of defence could also occur as a
response to a threat, acute or latent, to national territory (in Europe or the Caribbean
region), including the airspace above it and territorial waters. In such cases, parliament
does not have to be informed in advance. Advance information is required, however, in
the event of deployment for the purpose of maintaining or promoting the international
legal order (Article 100).
Foreign, security and defence policy
The main aim of Dutch foreign and security policy is to ensure the independence,
integrity, stability and welfare of the home nation. The Netherlands also sets great store
by the promotion of the international rule of law and has long demonstrated a deep
involvement in cases of human suffering and actions against human rights violations.
Our market economy, which is one of the larger economies in the world, benefits from
the unrestricted movement of goods and free access to trade areas and raw materials.
Dutch defence policy has an objective that is derived from this: to form, maintain and
deploy a military force in the context of the government’s security policy. Dutch security
policy distinguishes between an internally and an externally oriented component. The
armed forces can be deployed in the context of both components. Internal and external
security have become increasingly interwoven in the security situation in recent years.
The defence activities of the Netherlands are focused on a combination of security
interests, the protection of values and foreign affairs objectives. Our country sets great
store by a stable and peaceful international environment, for it is dependent to a large
degree on good international relations and security institutions that function properly.
The Netherlands pursues an active peace and security policy. In practice, that means that
our country wants to help to resolve security problems within and outside Europe, even
those that are a considerable distance away. Experiences in Afghanistan have shown that
our security and other interests can be threatened by developments that take place a long
way from home. An active security policy also involves, therefore, the willingness to
respond swiftly to crisis situations elsewhere in the world, obviously in an international
context. It is important in this respect to apply the various policy instruments that the
Netherlands has at its disposal – diplomatic, economic, financial, humanitarian and
military cohesively. Foreign policy, development cooperation and defence issues are
increasingly becoming extensions of each other 21.
Armed forces in an international context
The Dutch armed forces now have a much firmer footing on the international stage.
Bilateral and multinational military cooperation with Allies and partners have been
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further strengthened over the past few years. NATO and the EU form the main
institutional frameworks for military cooperation. Because of the recent expansion of
both the EU and NATO, especially as a result of the accession of East European states,
the politico-strategic environment has changed radically. Both organisations now share
borders with potentially unstable regions.
NATO is the most important pillar of Dutch security policy and epitomises the
transatlantic connection. Good transatlantic relations will continue to be essential for
our security in the future. Thanks to NATO, previous threats have been consigned to the
past. The Alliance is the most important asset we possess to ensure our security and to
nip in the bud any threat that may arise. NATO is also an important forum for political
consultation and for harmonisation of the defence plans of the member states. Since the
end of the Cold War, NATO has adapted to the new international relations and has
successfully sought cooperation with Russia, Ukraine and other countries. It has
conducted crisis management operations in the Balkans and in Afghanistan and
has proved itself capable of providing effective leadership in complex operations. This
has once again demonstrated the value of the integrated military structures of the treaty
organisation. A rapid reaction force, the NATO Response Force, has also been
established. This reaction force of some 25,000 military personnel from land, air and
naval forces, to which the Netherlands also contributes, has to be deployable at extremely
short notice for the most demanding operations at the upper end of the spectrum of
force. The military aspects of combating terrorism and the risks of the proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems have been placed high on the
Alliance’s agenda.
The Netherlands attaches great value to the further development of the European
Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), including civil crisis management tasks. Within
the ESDP, the EU member states have agreed to counter threats such as terrorism, the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts and failing states. The
EU is thus able to make a significant contribution to global security and stability. The EU
has sufficient structures to be able to take decisions with military implications and to
undertake the implementation of those decisions by calling upon the member states. For
example, with its ‘Headline Goal 2010’, the EU has taken on a capabilities objective
which aims to improve the quality of the units supplied. The emphasis in this respect is
on deployability, sustainability and the capacity for mounting combined operations
(interoperability). The Netherlands wants to contribute to the EU high-readiness
capability in the form of the EU battle groups, which are to be operational by 2007.
These formations of over 1,500 military personnel are to be capable of deployment in
crisis management operations outside EU territory, notably at the request of the United
Nations, at very short notice. The development of the ESDP has strengthened the
European input into NATO, which will help to ensure that the burden is shared more
evenly and will benefit transatlantic cooperation. The EU-NATO arrangements provide
for the necessary dialogue and cohesion between the two organisations.
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National decision making
The national political decision making in respect of a contribution of Dutch units or
personnel to a military operation is closely connected to that in an international context,
but always exists in its own right. There is, after all, no obligation to participate in a crisis
management operation. In the context of national political decision making about and
military planning for participation in a military operation, three instruments are
particularly crucial:
a. The risk and threat analysis by the Military Intelligence and Security Service (MIVD
in Dutch);
b. The 2001 Frame of Reference for Decision-making for the Deployment of Military
Units Abroad (the ‘Toetsingskader’, hereinafter the 2001 Frame of Reference)29;
c. The CDS planning process for operations.
A decision is made at grand strategy level as to which countries or regions should be
monitored by the MIVD as a matter of priority. In this context, the MIVD performs a
warning function. In its risk and threat analysis, the MIVD gives a rundown of all the
risks associated with the operation as a result of, for example, the state of the terrain, the
climate and whether the parties involved in the conflict have consented to the operation.
The outcome of this analysis is used in the application of the parliamentary criteria as
well as in the operational planning for the mission. The set of parliamentary criteria (the
2001 Frame of Reference) is used by the government and the House of Representatives
and consists of a number of points to aid the decision in respect of participation by units
of the Dutch armed forces in a crisis management operation30. At the same time as the
evaluation of the objectives, risks and other features of the operation is conducted, the
Defence Staff will consider, in the event of a positive decision on participation, what
form the Dutch contribution should take. The result of the CDS planning process for
operations is a recommendation from the CDS regarding Dutch participation in the
operation: the units, personnel and equipment which can be supplied for deployment.
Once a positive political decision has been made regarding participation, the CDS will
issue what is known as a CDS operational directive stating the national guidelines,
assignments, tasks and responsibilities in connection with the deployment, as well as the
arrangements that have been made for the transfer of authority (TOA) to the operational
troop commander of the crisis management force. The TOA to an international
commander only ever concerns the operational element of the authority. The govern-
ment (or the CDS on its behalf) will retain ultimate control (full command). The decision
to approve Dutch participation in an operation may be linked to national caveats in
respect of deployment. The government or parliament can (and often does) attach
conditions to the deployment of the armed forces. The CDS will ensure that the
multinational force commander will take account of the stated caveats.
After consultation with the national and international authorities, the Dutch government
will establish the military-strategic objective(s) and preconditions for the deployment of
its contingent. The national military-strategic authority, the CDS, is responsible for the
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use of military means in a particular area of operations. He is also responsible for
directing the operational units of the RNLN, the RNLA and the RNLAF.”4
11.2.4 NATIONAL OPERATIONS
The armed forces makes all of its capabilities available to civil authorities to
provide support in the event of emergency. Military personnel and material can be
placed under civil command to, for example, evacuate people, support the fire
brigade in the event of large and complex fires, and to provide support in the event
of imminent or actual, especially violent, situations. Civil-military cooperation
makes optimum use of assets available in the Netherlands to provide as much
security as possible to civilians. The contribution of the Defence organisation to
national tasks falls into four groups.
1. Normal contribution to civil tasks by the Royal Netherlands Marechaussee
based on the Police Act 1993:
– Protection of the Royal House
– Civil-aviation security
– Guarding security transports for the Central Bank of the Netherlands
– Border control
– Mobile Monitoring of Aliens
– Police tasks at Schiphol and other airports
– Riot Squads
– Special Security Missions Brigade
– Special Assistance Units
2. Permanent tasks in support of civil authorities arising from legislation and
formal agreements:
– Netherlands Coastguard
– The Netherlands Antillean and Aruban Coastguard
– Explosive ordnance disposal
– Disaster-response hospital
– Airspace security (Air policing/Renegade)
– Search-and-Rescue Capability
– Participation in the Urban Search and Rescue Team
3. On-call capacity based on ICMS agreements
– Battalion for guarding and securing locations, routes, and objects
– Two duty vessels to intercept and board sea-going vessels and detect/clear
sea mines
– Staff capacity for operational command of major evacuations
– Transportation capability: maximum of 350 tracked and wheeled vehicles
for the evacuation of civilians from disaster areas;
4 Netherlands Defence Doctrine, 2005.
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– Ribbon-bridge platoon for emergency bridges and rafts
– Construction company, including advisory capacity for setting up emer-
gency services facilities
– Three thousand military personnel
– One military reception site per province for disaster response
– Six medical aid stations
– Mobile emergency hospital
– Ambulance platoon
4. As-available capacity
– NBC-response unit
– NBC decontamination capability
– Air transport
– Specialised diving and explosive ordnance disposal group
– Firefighting helicopters
– Fire-brigade units
– Casualty air transport
– Engineer units
11.2.5 MILITARY SECURITY AND INTELLIGENCE SERVICE
Tasks and organization
Within the armed forces in the Netherlands there is a Military Security and
Intelligence Service (MIVD).5 The MIVD is subjected to the Intelligence and
Security Service Act 2002 (just as the General Intelligence and Security Service
is). In this Act the tasks of the MIVD are described as follows:
A. to investigate and assess:
1. the operational capability of foreign militaries, so that we can build up
and effectively deploy our own armed forces as needed;
2. factors that influence the promotion and enforcement of the interna-
tional rule of law where these involve our armed forces.
B. to carry out security vetting, as laid down by the Security Screening Act.
C. to investigate and assess developments in order to:
1. prevent and counter activities aimed at threatening the security or
operational readiness of our armed forces;
2. promote the effective mobilisation and concentration of our armed forces;
3. ensure the uninterrupted preparation and deployment of our armed
forces as referred to under A (2).
5 See for history Engelen 2000.
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D. to promote measures for the protection of the operational interests of our
armed forces as referred to under C, including the protection of classified
military information.
E. to investigate and assess, on behalf of other countries, matters of military
relevance designated by the Prime Minister.
F. to produce threat assessments for the purpose of protecting persons and
securing property and services that belong to or are relevant to the military.
The MIVD has the same powers as the AIVD, which I described in Chapter 8. To
produce timely and data-based intelligence, the MIVD collects information from
various sources, including open sources (e.g. free or paid publicly available
information) and imagery (e.g. aerial or satellite photos). The MIVD also obtains
information through liaison with its national and international partners and with
the NATO and EU intelligence communities. Finally, the MIVD is able to draw
upon secret intelligence and technically intercepted communications or signals
intelligence (SIGINT). These activities are subject to the legal constraints within
which the MIVD operates and the scrutiny of the Intelligence and Security
Services Supervisory Committee. The MIVD is part of the Central Staff of the
Ministry of Defence.6
“MIVD’s planning is dictated on the one hand by the annual Defence
Intelligence and Security Requirement (Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsbehoefte Defensie –
IVD) issued by the Minister of Defence and on the other hand by the Prime
Minister’s Directions designating subjects as defined under the Intelligence and
Security Services Act (Foreign Directions) governing MIVD and the General
Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD). The annual plan sets out the areas that
MIVD will focus on in the coming year, detailing the amount of time and
capabilities MIVD will devote to a particular area. The focus areas include
countries and regions, as well as specific themes and subjects.
The Minister of Defence bears responsibility for the manner in which the MIVD
performs its tasks. The minister defines NLDDISS’s tasks and priorities andmust
account for these to the Parliament of the Netherlands. The minister also submits
the MIVD annual plan to the Cabinet Committee on National Security for
approval. The director of the MIVD reports to the minister by means of the
annual plan and other instruments. The Prime Minister coordinates tasks relating
to the fight against terrorism and in the fields of intelligence and security. These
tasks interface with those of the MIVD and AIVD. Each year the Prime Minister
designates areas of investigation for both services. The order to perform the
investigations is laid out in a public directive that is published in the Government
Gazette. A detailed version of the order is included in a classified appendix to the
6 See Wiebes 2002; Van Reijn 2009.
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directive. The MIVD is accountable to the Minister of Defence for the investiga-
tions ordered by the Prime Minister in connection with missions abroad. The
Minister of Defence periodically reports to the Prime Minister on how NLD DISS
is handling the investigations and the progress being made. NLD DISS, GISS, the
Foreign Ministry and the Coordinator of the Intelligence and Security Services
periodically submit joint reports to the Prime Minister.”7
Defence Intelligence and Security Research Group
In 2006 the Defence Intelligence and Security Research Group published an
independent report on the organization and functioning of the MIVD. It was the
first integral organization research of the MIVD.8 Here are some of the main
conclusions. It should be noted that this research group not only looked into the
MIVD but also at some other intelligence services of Defence. That is why the
research group always speaks of the Defence Intelligence and Security chain.
Meanwhile, the Minister of Defence has accorded the conclusions and recom-
mendations of the research group, and the recommendations will be implemen-
ted in the coming years.
“Changing environment
The changing environment increases the need for timely and proper security and
(contra-) information for decision making on the deployment of the armed forces and
the functioning of the armed forces during deployments. Within the military, the
relative importance of the intelligence and security chain will increase. Intelligence will
become even more a crucial part of military operations. Not only by the nature of the
operations, but also because the physical and technical capacity to collect and edit
intelligence will further increase. There may also be more information to be collected.
The expectations on the quality and quantity of the products of the information and
security chain will thus increase further. The tolerance for incorrect or missing
information will decrease. The distinction between strategic, operational and tactical
intelligence will blur, in the sense that local (tactical) events can be of great importance
for political and military (strategic) decision-making.
Independent military intelligence and security service
The intelligence and security organizations of Defence provide crucial tasks for the
national security, in particular with regard to the interests of the armed forces, both in
the Netherlands and in the NATO treaty area, and for the preservation or restoration of
international law. The Research Group considers these tasks crucial to the functioning of
a full army in a democratic state. The Research Group believes that it is and remains
desirable and necessary to have a standard sensible military intelligence and security
service for these tasks and interests. The duties and powers are so specific that they are
7 Annual report MIVD 2007.
8 I was a member and author of this Defence Intelligence and Security Research Group (Onderzoeks-
groep Inlichtingen en Veiligheid Defensie 2006).
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the reason for continued support of the existence of the MIVD. It is not feasible because
of the specific tasks, organization and culture of the armed forces that the intelligence
and security task can be provided by a civilian intelligence and security service. Especially
not since most other countries have also a separation between civilian and military
intelligence and security services, as well as in international cooperation intelligence
exchange is crucial. The other side of the co-existence of a military and civilian
intelligence and security service is that both of them have a costly obligation to a close
co-operation.
Cooperation is crucial
The need for internal and external, national and international co-operation is in the
changing environment further increased. The intelligence and security organizations of
Defence are unable to gather the information for the (inter) national security alone.
Increasingly they will need others to perform their tasks, both inside and outside
Defence. Operational co-operation and information exchange both nationally and
internationally are the arteries of the work of the MIVD. This involves cooperation
along three tracks. In the first place there is a need for intensive cooperation with partner
services abroad. In addition intensive cooperation and information exchange with civil
intelligence and security in the Netherlands is crucial. Finally, because of the blurred
distinction between strategic, operational and tactical intelligence, a seamless interaction
and communication between different levels of information gathering and analysis
should arise.
Independent threat analysis
The strategic quality of the MIVD threat analysis is good. The operational quality of the
supplied threat analysis can be further improved. The Research Group believes that
the MIVD should continue to make an independent threat analysis the Minister and the
Chief of Staff. This threat analysis is for the CDS the basis for decisions on the planning
of operations and current operations. The threat analysis of the MIVD is for the CDS a
proven fact with regard to further decision making.
Sufficient powers and sufficient assurance legality
The MIVD has sufficient powers to carry out their tasks. To date, the MIVD does not
need more powers. The Research Group has not established that the MIVD is hindered
in the exercise of his duties by a lack of powers. Partners and customers of the MIVD
have not the impression that the MIVD need more powers. Not all the powers are
intensively exploited (e.g. HUMINT). Other powers such as SIGINT are used very
extensively. The legality of the use of special powers is properly secured within the
MIVD. There is a clear process and procedure design. The Judicial department of the
MIVD and the Ministry of Defence play an important role. If necessary, the Secretary-
General and the Minister are asked for permission. The Research Group has noted, both
in interviews and in concrete cases, the precise way in which the MIVD deals with the
use of special powers. Within the MIVD, there is a culture of lawfulness concerning the
exercise of special powers. This culture is encouraged by managers within the MIVD.
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Control
The intelligence and security Defence organizations are all under the ministerial
responsibility of the Minister of Defence. The MIVD is organizationally placed within
the Administrative Staff of Defence and is hierarchically placed directly under the
Secretary-General. There is a close relationship between the Secretary-General and the
MIVD. There is a clear structure to identify the demands of the customers of the MIVD
through the Direction Decision of the Prime Minister and the document Intelligence
and Security Demands Defence. These both provide the opportunity and structure to
achieve an informed prioritization.
The relationship between the departmental and interdepartmental demand setting of
the MIVD tasks is not always parallel. The Ministry of Defence and especially the Chief
of Staff plays an important role in setting the departmental demands. Experiences with
the preparation and implementation of deployments have contributed to a more explicit
role of the Chief of Staff to the demand setting of the MIVD. The role of Prime
Minister’s Department and Foreign Affairs in the inter-departmental demand setting
increases. The Direction Decision has become more specific and more concrete in the
last years. The Prime Minister proposes it. It would be desirable if the Direction
Decision could be more specific, so the actual the tasks of the AIVD and MIVD abroad
become brighter and practical cooperation on this basis can be effectively designed and
duplication be avoided.
There is increasing use of ad hoc demand setting, both nationally and internationally
through the questions received from partner services and international organizations.
These questions are often unexpected, requiring deployment of people and resources
should be aligned with the planned demands. These ad hoc priorities intervene deeply in
the planned production process. The MIVD is there – despite the fact that this takes
place over many years – still insufficiently equipped for.
Quality
The implementation of the tasks of the intelligence and security organizations of
Defence deserves special attention. The Research Group has found that customers are
generally satisfied with their products. Only in isolated cases there were complaints
about the quality and timeliness of products. The Research Group also notes that the
MIVD is a strong product-focused organization.
Intelligence
The MIVD focuses largely on SIGINT information. There is an extensive organization
for SIGINT designed. The SIGINT organization is the largest part of the MIVD. SIGINT
information is important for the quid-pro-quo principle between intelligence services.
The Netherlands has a good reputation abroad regarding SIGINT information. SIGINT
needs high and long-term investment. The Research Group has noted that not all
investment requests actually are met and that the decision-making and implementation
take too much time. The effectiveness of SIGINT for specific operations and deploy-
ments is not entirely clear. It is highly dependent on the quality of the search profiles if
useful strategic and operational information becomes available.
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HUMINT is a major information resource within the intelligence and security organiza-
tions of Defence. HUMINT can, in the opinion of the Research Group, be deployed for
the intelligence task as well as the security task. HUMINT acquisition costs much time
and effort, including training. There may be made more use of informers and agents.
HUMINT is a tool that can not quickly be deployed because it has a long preparation
time. During deployments HUMINT will therefore be only useful if the deployment will
take some time.
OSINT is also a very important for the MIVD. Cooperation and exchanges with
universities and other (scientific) institutions can still be improved. The actual use of
OSINT for analysis can also be improved. The current capacity for OSINT is relatively
low, especially given the importance to the products of the MIVD.
Collaboration with the AIVD
The Research Group concludes that the cooperation between the two services is
improving. A covenant concerning the collaboration is a step forward and there is
growth in efficient and effective collaboration between departments. At management
level there is regularly consultation between the administrative departments and the
implementation of the Covenant is consistently been realized. The management of both
services are therefore positive about the cooperation and say to pursue greater
cooperation.
At operational level, however, there is a mixed picture. The cooperation is not
sufficient in the capillaries of the services available and not yet fully internalized. Some
suggest that there is hardly concrete cooperation, while others emphasize improvement
in the cooperation. This seems highly depend on the type of activity being discussed.
The Research Group has the opinion that the cooperation between the AIVD and
MIVD can still be further strengthened and intensified and that some actually existing
duplication can be avoided. The Research Group calls for the establishment of integrated
teams by the AIVD and the MIVD in proliferation and other parts of the international
tasks of both services.”9
11.3 Armed forces in the Dutch state10
11.3.1 THE ARMED FORCES’ CRUCIAL BUT CHANGING ROLE IN THE STATE
Since time immemorial, the armed forces have played a crucial role in the state.
Initially, the armed forces were crucially important to the formation of states and
nations. In this period, defence was not the only primary function of the armed
forces, but so were attacks aimed at expanding or consolidating power. Over the
9 Defence Intelligence and Security Research Group, Intelligence and Security Defence, Den Haag: June
2006, chapter 8.
10 Based on and cited from Van Eekelen and Muller 2004.
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centuries, the defence of the states and nations that had been shaped by then
became the most salient element of the armed forces.
In this day and age, this defence task is still one of the most characteristic
functions of the armed forces. For this reason, the present changes in the armed
forces are to a great extent attributable to the shift from a defence organization to
an organization that can be deployed in several conflicts at the same time. The
defence function is deeply rooted both within the armed forces and within society.
The crucial function was that the state’s right to exist could be enforced at the end
of the day by means of military force. External threats faced by the state could be
neutralised by deploying the services of the army, the air force and the navy, and in
special cases by the marechaussee (i.e. the military constabulary).
In recent years, the functions of the aimed forces have changed unmistakably.
The traditional threat has disappeared and has been replaced by a more diffuse
threat. At present, crisis management operations are of primary importance to the
Dutch armed forces. These are not aimed at defending the Netherlands’ own
territory or the territory of the Alliance but at contributing in an international
context to the resolution of violent conflicts throughout the world. In such
operations, the traditional defence task mentioned above is much less important.
A separate state without its own armed forces remains an exception, although a
few countries could be mentioned. This was true for a long time. By now, the
European and international organizations (EU, UN, NATO) have developed to
such an extent, however, that even though separate armed forces are still
considered essential, there are very intensive links in practice between the various
countries’military forces. Treaties have created an obligation to assist and support
all kinds of other countries and organizations. By now, the function of the Dutch
armed forces is much broader and above all much more international than the
mere defence of Dutch territory. Current thinking about the armed forces hardly
ever focuses on this traditional military task.
Are the armed forces still important to the Dutch state? We believe that this
question must be answered in the affirmative for various reasons. First, separate
armed forces continue to be a distinctive feature of a strong state, It is still difficult
to imagine a state that wishes to fully participate in the international scene without
its own armed forces. The Netherlands will not be able to play any role in the
international scene if it does not have its own military capability. Second, the
Netherlands should contribute to the management and resolution of violent
conflicts in the world, not only for moral reasons but also because stability and
development are in the interests of our open economy and worldwide orientation.
A separate military contribution is a prerequisite for that. If the Netherlands is to
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make this contribution, high-quality armed forces within its borders and in the
Kingdom continue to be of crucial importance.11
Finally, the traditional reason for the armed forces – defence – continues to be
relevant, not as a deterrent against an enemy from the East but against new threats
such as terrorism, with or without weapons of mass destruction, organised crime,
drug trafficking and illegal immigration. The police, the fire brigade and other
emergency services are able to face up to these new threats only to a limited extent.
The armed forces may play an important part in preventing and defending against
these new threats facing the Netherlands and its allies. In addition, the armed
forces can also make a significant contribution to maintaining law and order and
disaster relief in the form of assistance to the regular emergency services. This
means that the new-style armed forces also have a role to play in the field of
national security.
For the foregoing reason, some countries regard terrorism as a first step
towards or even a continuation of a war. On 12 September 2001, NATO declared
that Article V on collective self-defence was applicable to the attacks that had been
perpetrated by Al-Qaida the day before, Both in the literature and in practice, there
is a tendency in favour of deploying the military more intensively for the purpose
of combating terrorism. In discussions about the definitions of terrorism and war,
the differences appear to be smaller than the similarities. The use of military force
is sometimes defended by invoking a country’s right of self-defence if it is attacked
by terrorists. In addition, the fight against terrorism focuses to a great extent on
tackling the “failed states”, currently better known as President Bush’s Axis of
Evil,
Since traditional warfare is less prominent at this juncture, the military seems
to have found a modern function in the form of combating terrorism not only
within the states themselves but also in other countries.9 In this context, we
cannot ignore the role of the armed forces in peace-supporting activities both in
terms of peace-keeping (with the parties’ consent in a situation where a truce has
been agreed on) and in terms of peace enforcement (the imposition of a truce for
the purpose of ending armed conflicts). These activities may have an important
preventive effect in relation to future terrorism. If, however, these are not carried
out properly, they may also encourage terrorism.
This modern role of the armed forces has both possibilities and limitations.
Traditionally, Wilkinson points to the risks associated with the deployment of the
military for the purposes of democratic freedoms and rights. The specific role of
an army in international conflicts is clear and explicit, but the military is
increasingly used in the context of national protection against terrorism. In recent
years, the United States in particular has been trying to launch anti-terrorist
11 See Van der Meulen and Soeters 2004.
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actions involving a great deal of air force activity, in Libya, Afghanistan and Iraq,
among other countries.
Various military units appear to be highly suitable for specific anti-terrorist
activity. Usually, anti-terror units are, wholly or partly, part of a branch of the
armed forces. These units seem to be perfectly trained. On the other hand,
combating terrorism constitutes a modern task for the armed forces, which
confronts them with the core of social conflicts to a greater extent than in the
past. This will require both an organizational and a substantive adjustment of the
military machinery.
Interesting questions to be addressed include the extent to which military
intelligence services can be used in combating terrorism and the manner in which
collaboration between the regular intelligence services and the military intelli-
gence services is shaped. Due to the shift in the military’s tasks, it is likely that
military intelligence services also regard combating national and international
terrorism as a part of their tasks. In this context, it should be borne in mind that
the regular intelligence services are generally subject to greater and more
intensive control and administrative openness than military intelligence services.
Military actions in other countries are reserved to only a few large countries or
coalitions of countries. They are the only ones able to achieve this kind of
potential. Naturally, it is especially the United States that possesses the weaponry
and methods to combat terrorists with a great deal of military force in all of kind of
forms and capacities. By contrast, Lesser describes how the UK, for example, is
committed to the basic principle that a minimum amount offeree should be used
in combating terrorism and there should be cooperation with the local authorities
as much as possible.
11.3.2 INVIOLABILITY OF THE PRIMACY OF POLITICS OVER THE ARMED FORCES
The primacy of politics (in particular, the government) over the armed forces is
essential for the armed forces in a democratic state under the rule of law. In the
Netherlands, this primacy is written down in the Constitution. The fact that there
is no discussion at all in the armed forces and in society about the desirability and
necessity of this military subordination is at least equally important as its
inclusion in the Constitution. As far as the police are concerned, it was considered
necessary to shape the subordination to the competent authority such that the
police fall partly under the mayor and partly under the public prosecutor. As far as
the armed forces are concerned, there is no such separation of authority. The
armed forces are subordinate to the government and the government is accoun-
table to the House of Representatives (the Lower House of the Dutch Parliament).
As far as this issue is concerned, there is no room for debate on the question of
who is politically responsible for the organisation and performance of the armed
forces.
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An exception should be made for the Royal Marechaussee. This branch of the
armed forces is organisationally subordinate to the Minister of Defence, but as far as
their policing tasks are concerned, it is subject to another authority regime, which
depends on the specific tasks concerned. In addition, it is worth mentioning that if
branches of the armed forces are deployed for the purposes of maintaining public
order or disaster relief, they formally fall under the authority of the competentmayor.
Deploying the armed forces is a political decision. War and crisis management are
a matter of politics. Decisions must be taken about scarce public resources, which
involves great interests. The purpose of the deployment of the armed forces is
crucial, rather than a means in itself. This means that the political decision-
makers should bear and assume ultimate responsibility for deploying the armed
forces. If the armed forces themselves were to have a decisive vote on their own
deployment, this would involve the risk of a military dictatorship.
Born and Metselaar mention six ways in which political leaders can realise this
primacy. In the first place, they may determine the shape and content of the
various branches of the armed forces by allocating financial resources, In the
second place, they can shape these organisational and substantive parameters for
the armed forces by means of legislation. In the third place, political leaders have
the formal power to concern themselves with the details of specific military
operations. Born andMetselaar use the term “micro-management” in this context.
In the fourth place, political leaders may achieve the primacy of politics by
appointing specific military officers to crucial positions within the armed forces.
In the fifth place, attempts may bemade to monitor the armed forces constantly by
means of inquiries. Finally, attempts may be made to achieve the primacy of
politics by means of the civil and military counterbalance. The military officer’s
oath (“I swear allegiance to the Queen, obedience to the laws and submission to
military discipline”) may also be interpreted as one of the crucial instruments for
institutionalising the primacy of politics and the loyalty of the military.12
The primacy of politics is not a subject of debate in the Dutch context. Even if
the degree of loyalty that may be required from the military is discussed with some
regularity, the basic principle of subordination to the political system is taken for
granted, both inside and outside the armed forces. As far as this aspect is
concerned, the primacy of politics can be said to be inviolable indeed.
11.3.3 THE DEEPLY EMBEDDED LOYALTY OF THE ARMED FORCES TO THE STATE
There can be no misunderstanding that the Dutch armed forces’ loyalty to the
state is deeply embedded. There are deep ties between the armed forces and the
12 Born and Metselaar 2003.
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Dutch Royal House, which can be traced to the remote past. To this very day, there
are close connections between the military and members of the Royal House. The
large number of rituals surrounding the armed forces and the Royal House are
indicative of these close ties.
But the loyalty of the armed forces is deeper than these ties. Within the armed
forces, there is a deep-rooted conviction that great loyalty to the government and,
in particular, the Minister of Defence constitutes a crucial element of the armed
forces. Decisions taken by the Minister of Defence are decisive. Decisions are
carried out in accordance with a hierarchical model that has become exceptional in
the other segments of public administration in the Netherlands. This applies not
only to decisions favourable to the members of the armed forces but also to
decisions, such as far-reaching spending cuts, that have a deep impact on the
organisation. There are various examples of top military officers expressing their
displeasure, both internally and externally, about specific plans and decisions, and
there is even one example of a commander-in-chief leaving in connection with
specific decisions. These exceptions resulted in heated debates in the media and
among politicians and in unjustified doubts about the military’s loyalty, for in
general, the Minister of Defence’s decisions are carried out with strong loyalty.
Serious protest or even actions are hardly ever seen, quite apart from the strike
ban for military personnel. The cuts of 2003 and even the abolition of commander
positions have not triggered any major actions.
The question arises to what extent the armed forces short-change themselves
by demonstrating such deep loyalty, whereas other parts of public administration
are increasingly trying to create a distinct profile for themselves, both internally
and externally, partly for the purpose of preventing far-reaching cuts. The loyalty
of the armed forces to politics and in particular the Minister of Defence with
respect to the actual performance of military tasks is beyond doubt. It is the
politicians who have to decide to what extent it is desirable and necessary that the
Netherlands should make a military contribution to controlling a specific conflict.
But we believe that as far as decisions concerning the organisation of the
armed forces are concerned, the “voice option” of the military should be more
explicitly manifest. As a result, it is inevitable that top military officers will
participate in the public debate on the desirability of cuts and the necessity of
full-fledged armed forces. This cannot and should not be conducted only by the
Minister of Defence. In this context, the Minister and the top military officers
should make precise arrangements about the subjects about which there can be
discussions in the media and in other fora. But it is in the interests of the
democratic decision-making about the tasks and the operation of the armed forces
that the public and the politicians should be able to gain an insight into the wishes
and backgrounds of top military officers. The present complexity of the military
system is such that the strict hierarchical decision-making model will no longer be
sufficient as far as the organisation of the armed forces is concerned. If the armed
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forces do not want to be the natural victims of cuts, it is necessary that they should
take a more active part in the political and public debate on military matters.
11.3.4 THE STATE’S DUTY OF CARE FOR THE ARMED FORCES
Loyalty and subordination are not a matter of course. The state cannot impose only
obligations on the military. There should also be a certain degree of reciprocity in a
hierarchical relationship such as the one between the government and the armed
forces. The crucial point is how both the government – and in particular the
Minister of Defence – and the armed forces themselves give substance to this
reciprocity.
The state asks the armed forces and their staff to make great sacrifices. In the
end, the state requires military personnel to be willing to die in the performance of
their work. Elsewhere in Dutch public administration, there are hardly any
organisations or jobs that require staff to make such sacrifices. This means that
military personnel are different from regular public servants and this also means
in particular that the state has a more far-reaching duty of care vis-a-vis the
military than vis-a-vis other public servants. In addition, conscription was
abolished years ago and military personnel are now deliberately choosing a
profession as a soldier. This means that the relevant soldiers have made a free
choice and the government’s duty of care weighs even more heavily as a result.
This duty of care is related not only to the terms and conditions of employment
but also to the state of the armed forces. Soldiers must be convinced that they have
been provided with sufficient resources and equipment to enable them to execute
their missions without taking unjustified risks. The state of the armed forces must
be such that the military’s self-evident loyalty will continue to exist in the longer
term as well.
The question arises to what extent politicians in The Hague are aware of this
duty of care. Too often we hear statements like “soldiers have to carry out our
decisions and they should not go on about it.” For decades now, the armed forces
have constituted an automatic “instrument” for cuts. These signals are not
indicative of clear reciprocity in the relationship between the armed forces and
the government. In this context, the duty of care is hardly ever mentioned. There is
not a single indication that the Dutch armed forces have been stretched to their
limits, but it would be a good thing if, in considering the current reorganisation of
the armed forces, the government defined more explicitly how it will give
substance to this duty of care in practice.
11.3.5 LEGAL ASPECTS
The Dutch Constitution explicitly mentions the armed forces and outlines their
tasks and organisation. The Netherlands has not enacted a special Armed Forces
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Act or Defence Act along the lines of the Police Act or the Fire Services Act. The
manner of deployment and the decision-making thereon are derived from the
relevant constitutional provisions. The Assessment Framework for Deployments
plays an important part in the parliamentary decision to support or reject any
deployment. In addition, the international Rules of Engagement specify when
specific forms offeree may be used. The international legal framework within
which the Dutch armed forces must function is becoming increasingly important.
Besides, the military personnel’s legal position and military criminal law and
military disciplinary rules are separately and accurately defined.
This means that – even if they are not governed by their own special act – the
Dutch armed forces are actually and formally governed by various national and
international statutory regulations. Over the years, these have accurately defined
the use of force in particular. Usually, Parliament precisely defines the circum-
stances under which the use of force is permitted and the military is dispatched
before an actual deployment is decided on. It is crucially important that in
performing their tasks, Dutch soldiers increasingly come within the competence
and are under the command of other countries as a result of the ever increasing
internationalisation of military operations. Formally, the Netherlands continues to
have supreme authority, but the actual decisions on the execution of tasks are
taken by others outside the Netherlands.
11.3.6 THE MILITARY’S OWN DECISION-MAKING POWER RELATING
TO OPERATIONAL ASSESSMENTS
The military’s subordination to the government is inviolable and its loyalty is
beyond dispute. Even so, it cannot be denied that the military has its own decision-
making power, in particular in relation to operational assessments. Naturally, the
crucial question is what is to be regarded as operational and what as strategic or
policy-related. The parameters guiding any deployment or the determination in
advance of the type offeree that will be permitted are strategic and policy matters
that have to be defined by the political leaders and in particular the Minister of
Defence, The same is true of crucial decisions during a deployment, for example,
about withdrawal or any changes in tasks. Naturally, the military is not an agency
responsible for automatically implementing all decisions taken by the Minister or
the State Secretary.
There are numberless implementation decisions and organisational decisions
that are formally taken by the Minister but actually by military officers. It is up to
these officers to judge to what extent they consider it necessary to submit a specific
implementation decision to top-ranking politicians or civil servants. The criterion
to be used in this context is that the politicians in authority had better decide too
much than too little. This means that the politicians in authority at the Ministry of
Defence – i.e. the Minister or the State Secretary – are faced with many decisions
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that have hardly any strategic significance as a matter of fact, but that have to be
formally taken by a politician in authority. This formal ministerial responsibility
means that the politicians in authority are responsible for all decisions taken. But
that does not mean that all decisions really have to be taken by the politicians in
authority themselves, but the prevailing culture at the Ministry of Defence is to
submit as many decisions as possible to the politicians in authority. The persons
involved believe that earlier incidents and a strict hierarchy necessitate this kind of
strategy.
The advantage of this strategy is that the factual and the formal political
responsibility of the politicians in authority are “closer together”, The decisions
for which the Minister is politically responsible are for the most part his or her
own decisions. The disadvantage is that it is an illusion to think that a politician in
authority can take all decisions in large bureaucratic organisations such as the
Ministry of Defence and the armed forces. In addition, there is the risk that
politicians in authority could concern themselves with operational details about
which others within the armed forces have more knowledge. It is essential for
politicians in charge of the Ministry of Defence to find a responsible decision-
making balance between the important strategic decisions and the crucial
operational details,
11.3.7 INTENSIVE MONITORING OF THE ARMED FORCES
The armed forces have far-reaching powers and extensive resources. For this
reason, it is essential to a well functioning democratic state under the rule of law
that there should be intensive internal and external monitoring of the organisation
and the operation of the armed forces. Various control mechanisms have been
created: military hierarchy, quality control, internal audits, the Inspector-General
of the Armed Forces, the Netherlands Court of Audit, Parliament, the media,
international inspection etc. Many of these control mechanisms are indirect and
are used for specific incidents. In a few cases, there is more detailed and
structured monitoring.20
There is no such thing as a Defence Inspectorate or an Inspectorate for
the Armed Forces. The Inspector General acts as a kind of ombudsman within the
armed forces. Consequently, we can gain only an occasional picture of how the
armed forces function, with the possible exception of the many audits performed
by the Netherlands Court of Audit, Specific elements of the operation of the armed
forces are highlighted in particular, mainly in the wake of specific incidents. It is
of crucial importance to the development and the continued existence of the
armed forces that a survey of the performance of their tasks and the development
of the organisation should be provided and requested on a regular basis. Like the
other state inspectorates, a Defence Inspectorate or an Armed Forces Inspectorate
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may be able to make a contribution to achieving broader monitoring of the
defence system and the armed forces.
11.3.8 THE CRUCIAL IMPORTANCE OF DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY
Parliament constitutes the control centre for the armed forces and the defence
system. Parliament focuses intensive attention on the armed forces to an
increasing extent. In this process, Parliament is also fed by the media, which
have been increasingly preoccupied with the defence system and the armed
forces. This democratic accountability through the media and Parliament is
highly important to a sound development of the organisation and the operation
of the armed forces. Over the years, the attention focused by Parliament on the
organisation and operation of the defence system has increased sharply. All the
discussions and debate surrounding Srebrenica and the committee of inquiry
set up have played an important role in this respect.
But there is a tension between Parliament and the media on the one hand and the
armed forces on the other. The armed forces do not always feel that Parliament
and the media show a sufficient insight into the specific problems on which
decisions are taken. Usually, specific incidents induce the media and Parliament
to raise fundamental issues. The armed forces are not always involved in defining
such problems. On the other hand, the military is hardly prepared at all to
participate in the public debate on the role of the armed forces. It is experts from
Clingendael or retired military officers who engage in discussions about the
armed forces. This is why politicians and the media do not always feel that that
they are properly served by the armed forces.
This ongoing tension between the armed forces and the Ministry of Defence on
the one hand and Parliament and the media on the other hand may be healthy and
useful if it results in better decision-making and more effective, efficient,
legitimate and democratic armed forces. It is questionable, however, whether
this tension has this effect at this juncture. The debates that are currently held
especially in the media are strongly focused on incidents, which results in a
distorted picture of the armed forces. To be sure, Parliament discusses not only
incidents but also addresses general aspects of the organisation and operation of
the armed forces quite extensively, but these more general debates are covered
only indirectly in the media.
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11.3.9 INTERNATIONALISATION OF MANAGEMENT AND CONTROL OF
THE ARMED FORCES
In the context of several propositions, the increasing internationalisation of both
the organisation and the operation of the armed forces has been pinpointed.
Formally, the Netherlands still has its own armed forces but in actual fact, the
armed forces are tied to many international organisations and the rules developed
for these organisations. NATO and the UN, and usually the US, too, determine to
a large extent the scope of operations of Dutch soldiers and how they are to be
deployed. As far as that aspect is concerned, the Dutch armed forces are actually
part of much broader and more international armed forces.
In spite of this process of internationalisation, the Dutch Government formally has
and will continue to have supreme authority over deployments. Even though
command over specific troops is actually transferred to an international coalition,
the Dutch Government formally continues to be in a position to issue different
instructions, but this is exceptional in practice. This adds an ever-increasing
international dimension to the management and control of these troops,
which involves not only the Dutch Government, the Dutch Parliament and the
Dutch media but also a large number of other forums in other countries and the
international media. This means that the Dutch armed forces are part of interna-
tional armed forces.
The Dutch state’s sovereignty is limited because some of its powers over its
armed forces pass to an international coalition. The Dutch state also loses
sovereignty in other policy areas. There are hardly any subjects over which the
Netherlands still has full sovereignty. In nearly all cases, international organiza-
tions or other countries have an influence. It is to be expected that the Nether-
lands’ sovereignty over its armed forces will be reduced even further in favour of
international organisations in the years ahead. This does not need to be a problem
as long as the majority of the Dutch Government and Parliament support the
policies and the execution of these international organisations. If, however, there
are fundamental discussions about the extent to which trust or information is
abused within such organisations, as seems to be the case in the war in Iraq,
countries may retreat back to their own independent sovereign positions. But due
to current national and international security developments, it is no longer a
realistic option to retreat to the former position of full sovereignty over the Dutch
armed forces.
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11.4 Trends in military and armed forces in the Netherlands13
11.4.1 THE ARMED FORCES AS PART OF A BROADER SECURITY POLICY
Security is a concept that is broader than only external or international security. It
is more than international or regional conflicts, civil wars and terrorism. For many
citizens, it also includes issues such as crime and nuisance. Most citizens are
more directly concerned with the nuisance they experience in their neighbour-
hoods on a daily basis than the larger-scale problems in the rest of the world. After
major disasters, safety in relation to risks in society is also a subject that receives a
great deal of attention. Such disasters and serious accidents affect a totally
different part of public administration. Within the armed forces, those involved
focus on international and external security. In his article in this book, de Wijk
deals with this aspect in great detail. In it, he reveals the shifting perspectives in
respect of this form of international security.
We are of the opinion that it is time to achieve a broader and more
comprehensive security policy in the Netherlands. This should involve not only
the traditional international and military security issues but it should also
incorporate the other types of security. It is increasingly becoming clear that the
various kinds of security are closely related. Certain kinds of security are closely
related with terrorism. Partly as a result of migration flows, international security
issues are also connected with crime figures. For this reason, it would be sensible
to avoid a situation where the various governmental organisations that are
somehow engaged in security issues work and function separately, and to examine
the extent to which the integration of security policy and security organisations
can be achieved.
Does this mean that the armed forces, the police and fire brigade will be
integrated in the Netherlands? For the time being, this seems to go too far but we
do recognise the possibility of the armed forces being more closely involved in all
kinds of security issues in the future. Parts of the armed forces may play a part in
surveillance and security. Soldiers may help to solve crime by making expertise,
manpower and resources available. Soldiers may also play a part in the reintegra-
tion of juvenile delinquents. With some special training, soldiers could be
deployed as police officers or fire fighters. Cooperation between the military
and the civilian authorities in the field of security may be intensified. If this results
in further integration of the relevant services in the future, we would welcome
this, but more intensive collaboration is the best thing that can be achieved for the
time being. Naturally, it will be necessary to create a well-defined legal framework
for the foregoing, but this necessity does not mean that it is futile to make more
far-reaching attempts to improve the quality of cooperation.
13 Based on and cited from Muller, Starink, Bosch and De Jong, 2004, chapter 30.
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11.4.2 THE EVER CHANGING ARMED FORCES
The history of the armed forces reveal constantly changing armed forces. One
reorganisation follows another directly; one round of spending cuts has not yet
been completed and a new round is announced already. It is especially the large-
scale changes following the Fall of the Berlin Wall that have had a major impact on
the organisation and the operation of the armed forces. This event resulted in
sweeping changes, both in terms of substance and in terms of organisation and
culture. The armed forces of 2012 are fundamentally different from the armed
forces of 1989. A period of 25 years has seen changes that could not have been
anticipated. These changes have contributed to armed forces that are up to their
new tasks in a new security spectrum.
We cannot help feeling, however, that the armed forces have been confronted
with too many changes in recent years. It goes without saying that the armed
forces will have to adjust to the ever-changing environment. But in addition, it is
necessary to preserve a certain degree of consistency. Those involved within and
outside the armed forces feel a need for long-term transparency about the
organisation and the content of the armed forces. This cannot and should not
change every four years. This cannot and should not happen not only because of
the necessity of long-term personnel planning but also because of the necessity of
achieving support and legitimacy for the armed forces. In compiling this book, we
found that structures and processes already described had often changed again
after a period of 18 months.
The armed forces are also the automatic victim when it comes to spending
cuts. Successive governments have implemented very drastic spending cuts.
Naturally, it is still possible to cut the defence budget even further, but this will
have an effect on the tasks the Dutch armed forces are able to perform. It is all
right to take this decision, but then it must be clear to politicians and citizens alike
that this decision has been taken. This means that the armed forces should not be
the automatic victim of spending cuts, but their size and structure may be adjusted
on the basis of a clear choice with respect to the role of the armed forces.
Changes within the armed forces are a good thing and necessary. Many
chapters show, however, that there are too many changes. The military personnel
and organisation are able to cushion only a specified quantity of changes without
these having an impact on the operation of the armed forces.
11.4.3 FRAGMENTED MANAGEMENT AND CONTROL OF THE ARMED FORCES
The armed forces are subject to management and control by many organisations,
If we compare the armed forces to many other public administration organisa-
tions, it seems clear that the Minister of Defence is responsible for managing and
controlling the armed forces. This is actually the case in practice as well. This
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ministerial responsibility is exercised with great care and precision, as is shown by
various chapters in this book. It sometimes seems as if every decision and eveiy
detail can and should fall under the ministerial responsibility. In this context, we
consider it sensible to allow the various branches of the armed forces and their
leaders more scope to participate in the political and sometimes even the political
debate on national and international security issues in the future. Naturally, close
coordination with the Minister will be necessary for this purpose. A broader
interpretation of ministerial responsibility under which the Minister bears
primary responsibility for the main policy features and the leaders of the branches
of the armed forces may fill in the details could contribute to more flexible armed
forces. In that case, the Minister can be held to account for the main policy
features, whereas the military leaders are accountable for the details. Control of
the armed forces is effected internally for the most part. Except for parliamentary
control and the Netherlands Court of Audit, there is no permanent external
control over the armed forces. Parliamentary control is necessarily limited to the
basic outlines and usually too much dependent on incidents. The Netherlands
Court of Audit has a long history of auditing branches of the armed forces. In our
opinion, this auditing has the greatest long-term impact on the operation and
organisation of the armed forces. At this juncture, there is no such thing as a
Defence Inspectorate, which could complement the defence control system. As
things stand, the Inspector General primarily plays the role of an ombudsman
within the armed forces. Possibly, this institute could be extended into a more
modern inspectorate. Media attention for the armed forces is strongly focused on
incidents and spending cuts. In this way, the media’s control function is only
occasionally fulfilled. Even so, whenever the media devote attention to the armed
forces, this stirs many people within the military into action. The image
surrounding the armed forces and the Ministry of Defence is of crucial
importance.
11.4.4 MANAGING THE ARMED FORCES: AN ART TOO
Many chapters in this book show that the management of the armed forces has to
satisfy specific requirements. By now, the planning, staff policy, equipment,
logistics, technology, infrastructure, spatial planning and funding of the armed
forces have become genuine specialist policy areas. Managing the armed forces is
an art too. This means that the military leaders of the future will have to be trained
not only in substantive tactics and strategies but they should also increasingly
focus their attention on integral management in a specific context. The knowledge
and experiences gained in the private and public sectors cannot be simply
translated on a one-by-one basis to the armed forces. These chapters show that
it is necessary to opt for a translation that takes the special qualities of the armed
forces into consideration.
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Does this mean that the armed forces are not comparable to other organisa-
tions? The armed forces are faced with many elements that are also relevant to
other public and private organisations. Within the armed forces, there is a great
need for borrowing expertise from the private sector. Management models from
this sector are very popular in the armed forces. There is less enthusiasm for the
knowledge and insights from the public sector. There are quite a few misconcep-
tions about the role of politics in the area of public administration. The govern-
ment’s supreme authority over the armed forces is never in dispute, but there is a
yawning gap between politicians and the armed forces. Politicians should devote
more attention to the profession of a soldier both in terms of substance and in
terms of organisation, whereas the armed forces should be more open to the
processes and backgrounds of politics.
Indisputably, the culture of the armed forces has its distinct characteristics, but
the same applies to many other organisations. In particular organisations that are
somehow concerned with the monopoly on violence or work that involves danger
to life usually have a very specific organisational culture. The special emphasis on
traditions in the armed forces differs from what is customary in many other
organisations. The value of these traditions in the military system is, however,
unmistakable. It is a good thing that these traditions are highlighted in a book
about the armed forces.
11.4.5 INCREASINGLY PROFESSIONAL PERFORMANCE OF THE ARMED FORCES
The armed forces has specific doctrines tailored to the many aspects of its tasks.
Attempts are made to structure and standardise the actions within the armed
forces as much as possible, Evaluations of deployments are used to further refine
the structures and processes. The strategic framework constitutes the basis for
taking explicit decisions. There is a strong tendency within the armed forces to
shape all processes on the basis of a rational-synoptic model. If soldiers are
confronted with processes that are not unambiguous, there is a risk that they will
have an insufficient insight into the possibilities of handling these. The armed
forces are becoming increasingly aware that taking decisions in a state of
uncertainty constitutes one of the key elements of military operations.
This increasing professionalism applies not only to the structure and sub-
stance of military operations but also to the culture of the armed forces. Compared
to many other organisations in public administration, the armed forces pay much
and well-structured attention to the education and training of their personnel.
Management development had been invented within the armed forces before it
was referred to by that name. In addition, the ethical aspects of military operations
have been receiving more and more attention in recent years, as a result of which
complicated and often personal assessments in relation to a soldier’s performance
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can be defined. In this way, the armed forces attempt to address the full range of
elements of enhanced professionalism,
11.4.6 DESIRABILITY AND INEVITABILITY OF THE INTEGRATION OF THE ORGANISATION
AND OPERATIONS OF THE BRANCHES OF THE ARMED FORCES
There are differences between the various branches of the armed forces, but this
book also shows that the similarities are predominant. In many fields, the
branches of the armed forces cooperate, even though they are still formally and
effectively separate. In the coming years, there will be far-reaching integration at
the top. It is important to find out to what extent all kinds of other parts of these
branches can be integrated in a comparable manner, not so much for the purpose
of achieving new spending cuts but for the purpose of ensuring that the tasks of
the armed forces are performed as effectively and efficiently as possible.
We are of the opinion that the organisational and substantive integration of the
branches of the armed forces is both desirable and inevitable. It is desirable
because the raison-d’etre of the separation of the branches of the armed forces is
based only on historical arguments. It is inevitable because nearly everybody
recognises that the integration of the organisation will result in better and more
cost-efficient armed forces. In other countries, similar transformation processes
are taking place, even though the actual integration of the various branches of the
armed forces has nowhere materialised as yet. Even so, it would be a good thing if
the Netherlands were able to be a trendsetter as far as this issue is concerned. With
the reorganisation of the top of the armed forces, a valuable first step towards
actual integration has been taken.
11.4.7 CONSTANT REVALUATION OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE ARMED
FORCES AND SOCIETY
Several chapters have addressed the relationship between the armed forces and
society. The editorial staff has found it striking in particular that there has been
hardly any relationship apparently in the past few years. Society’ relationship with
the armed forces has been limited. People are not very interested in the
organisation and operation of the armed forces, except for the actions surrounding
the spending cuts and specific incidents relating to Srebrenica or the JSF
purchase. The armed forces themselves seem to have focused their attention on
society in an international context rather than society in a national context, barring
the occasional flood. Even though it goes too far to say that the armed forces and
society have drifted apart, they certainly have not come any closer together in
recent years.
The tasks and functions of the armed forces have changed and the emphasis
has shifted to international peace issues and terrorism. Society has also changed
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and has seen processes towards greater individualism and globalisation. It is
unclear how these partly conflicting and partly parallel developments relate to each
other. In our opinion, it is important, however, to redefine the relationship
between the armed forces and society. Both have changed and now the relation-
ship should be changed as well. In this context, society should become aware of
the necessity of fully-fledged armed forces in order to be able to continue
achieving the desired development towards greater individualism and
globalization.
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12 Emergency services and crisis management
In this chapter, I focus on the emergency services in the Netherlands. In particular,
I will concentrate on the fire brigades and themedical emergency services including
the ambulances services. These organizations operate within a new institutional
structure in the Netherlands, the so-called safety regions. Given that this institu-
tional development is crucial to the Dutch security system, I will pay some attention
to these safety regions. They play, during critical incidents in the Netherlands, an
important role. In this chapter I use the volume Fire Brigades: Studies on organiza-
tion, function and environments (Helsloot, Muller and Berghuijs (eds.), 2007), the
volume Crisis: Studies on crisis and crisis management (Muller, Rosenthal, and
Helsloot and Van Dijkman (eds.), 2009) the volume Crises in the Netherlands:
Disasters, riots, hostage-takings and other crises (Muller (ed), 2011B).
12.1 Safety regions
“The Netherlands is not yet well prepared for major disasters and crises” is the
first entry of the national TV Journal on Friday, May 30, 2008. The Ministry of
Interior Affairs and Kingdom Relations published on that day a report on the state
of national security. One of the methods of the Netherlands to make it well
prepared is shaping safety regions. The new Act on Safety Regions came into force
in 2010. This is remarkable since this is one of the most wide-ranging institutional
changes in the security system in the Netherlands for many years. After the
regionalization of the police in 1994, the safety region is a new major system
change. For the future of the organization of security in the Netherlands, the
establishment of the safety region is important.
In this section I briefly outline the contents of the Act and I will formulate some
criticisms. The safety region is now a reality in the Netherlands but the question is
whether this should stay in the way it is now organized. What is needed is a safety
region that can be developed further in the coming years. The current safety
region is hopefully a starting point to a broader safety and security region.
12.1.1 ACT ON SAFETY REGIONS
The proposal for the Act on Safety Regions, which was sent to the Lower House in
July 2007, has a long history. The desire to achieve an integration of tasks,
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organization, powers and responsibilities in the field of security exists for a long
time. The concept of safety region is an idea that arose at the beginning of this
century. The new Act on Safety Regions came into effect in 2011.
Evaluations of large-scale disasters and crises such as the firework disaster in
Enschede, the cafe fire in Volendam, the prison fire at Schiphol Airport and many
smaller disasters and accidents in the Netherlands have shown that cooperation
between the various organizations such as fire brigades, medical emergence
services, police, municipalities and others did not work well before, during and
after such disasters and crises. There was often little cross-disciplinary practice,
there was uncertainty about powers and responsibilities, there was no unified
command structure, there was uncertainty about the scale, there was uncertainty
about the information and communication and the quality of task performance
was also not optimal. The establishment of the safety region should prevent these
problems occurring in the future.
A safety region is a public entity based on a common regulation by municipalities,
where the regional fire services and medical emergency services are integrated to
improve crisis management and emergency response. The tasks and the organi-
zation of the fire brigades and the emergency services are secured in the safety
regions. The police are not part of the safety region but there is intensive
cooperation between the safety regions and the police regions. In the Netherlands
25 safety regions were established on the same scale as the police regions. These
police regions will be reorganized into a national police force in 2012. From that
moment on there will be 25 separate safety regions and one national police force.
A disaster is a major accident or other event in which the lives and health of many
people, the environment or large material interests are seriously harmed or
threatened, involving a coordinated deployment of organizations to eliminate
the threat or reduce the harmful effects. Crisis is in the act defined as a situation
where vital interests of society are affected or are likely to be affected.
The safety region has the following tasks:
a. identify the risks of fires, disasters and crises;
b. to advise the authority on the risks of fires, disasters and crises;
c. advising the board of mayor and aldermen on the fire service;
d. preparing to fight fires and organizing the disaster relief and crisis management;
e. establish and maintain a fire service;
f. establish and maintain a medical emergency service;
g. providing the dispatching function;
h. purchasing and management of common material;
i. organizing and maintaining information.
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The general board of the safety region consists of the mayors of the participating
municipalities. The Charirman is the person who in the Police Act 1993 is
appointed as Police Force Manager. This is most often the mayor of the largest city
in the region. The Chief Public Prosecutor and the President of the Water Board
may be invited to participate in the meetings of the board. Other authorities can be
asked to participate in the meetings. They have no voting rights.
Based on a risk profile every region develops a policy plan which determines the
operational performance. In a crisis plan, the organization, responsibilities, duties
and powers during the emergency and crisis management are described. In a
national regulation the requirements for fire services, medical emergency ser-
vices, the emergency room as well as for the organization of disaster relief, crisis
management and medical care are imposed.
In the Act it is included that during disasters and crisis that a have larger effect
than on one municipality the chairman of the safety region will act as the
competent authority. In the Netherlands, the mayor is the competent authority
during crises and disasters. If there is a large scale disaster the mayors have to
work together. Up until this act there was no other mayor who had competent
authority over other mayors. In that case the mayors voluntarily appointed one of
them as coordinating mayor or the Queen’s Commissioner became the competent
authority. The authority of the Chairman of the safety region now includes not
only the emergency services, such as fire brigades, the medial emergency services
and the police but also the other mayors in the region. In the note following the
report the government summarizes this as follows. “During a disaster or crisis of
more than local significance, the chairman of the safety region is the competent
authority. He exercises the authority powers after consultation with the mayors of
the affected municipalities and the Chief Public Prosecutor in the RBT (Regional
policy team), unless emergency does not allow this.”1
The Chairman of the safety region has exclusive jurisdiction to apply the
supreme command in case of disasters and accidents. This means that a mayor
may have to deal with a decision of the Chairman of the safety region regarding his
own town with which he does not agree. In that case, the mayor can submit a
written objection but there are no other ways to undo the decision. The Chairman
of the safety region has to present a written report to the councils of the affected
municipalities. If a written objection by the actual mayor has been given the
Chairman of the safety region orally gives information to the council of that
municipality about that decision.
Much political and even public discussion arose about this new legal option.
This was in the view of the government necessary to realize speed and perseverance
1 TK 2007-2008, 31117 nr 6 p. 29.
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power during a crisis. The criticism focused on the possibility that one mayor could
give orders to another mayor which would not fit into Dutch constitutional
government as the Commissioner of the Queen would then have a role to play.
The government was not impressed with the criticism and did not fundamentally
change the proposal of the act. The Commissioner of the Queen got the task to
ensure that collaboration between the members of the regional policy centre was
working well. If this is not the case the Commissioner of the Queen could address
both the Chairman of the safety region as the mayors. But the Commissioner may
not intervene in the policy decisions taken by the President, but has to focus on the
relations between themayors and the chairman of the safety region. In addition, the
Commissioner of the Queen gets a greater role in overseeing disaster relief and
crisis management and in the administrative settlement afterwards. The position of
the chairman of the safety region remained as previously proposed by the Cabinet
in the Act.
12.1.2 ATTENTION FACTORS FOR SAFETY REGIONS
The Safety Region Act is a product of intensive administrative and management
negotiations with all stakeholders. In the Netherlands, major institutional changes
are rare and they occur only with small steps. This bill is a perfect example. I’ve
tried to formulate the major critical issues on this act.
Scope
Actually, it’s not safety regions which are established on the basis of this act but
crisis regions. The name safety regions is confusing since it implies more than it
actually is. The task of the safety regions focuses first and foremost on the
organization and working of the fire brigades and the medical emergency services
and on the preparation and implementation part of the decision-making in
disasters and crises. The broader safety and security is not at issue. This is
demonstrated by the fact that the police and the PPS are not fully part of the safety
region. There remains still a separate police region and a separate regional
counciluntil there will be a national police force. The police and the PPS are
somewhat reluctant towards the emerging safety region. In sum, it is now only a
small part of their duties. The safety region is now mainly an organization of the
fire brigades and the medical emergency services.
It is reasonable that the safety regions are established. It offers finally the
opportunity for a better organizational integration of the various tasks, powers and
responsibilities in the field of safety. It is good to start with this integration in
terms of crisis management and disaster relief. These are two areas where further
integration before, during and after disasters and crises has to be achieved.
However, it is a missed opportunity that in the law no possibility was created to
integrate other forms of safety and security in the safety region. The act is now
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limited only to crisis management and disaster relief. It is conceivable and
desirable that other forms of social and physical safety and security could be
part of the safety region. Why not also forms of crime control, assistance, nuisance
control, public order enforcement, combating terrorism, physical security and
other security and law enforcement included in the safety region? In that way they
will become full safety and security regions.
In many ways, these forms of security have intensive relations with each other
if only because the same organizations carry out these tasks. If these forms of
security become part of the safety region a full substantive and organizational
integration of different security issues can be realized. Now it is expected that the
safety regions will handle parts of crisis management and emergency response,
that the police region and the PPS are responsible for the criminal investigation,
that municipalities handle nuisance, that municipalities and provinces are
responsible for physical security, that the mayor has the authority on public order
enforcement and the Ministry of Security and Justice and the National Terrorism
Coordinator on Terrorism are responsible for counter-terrorism. This act could
have created the opportunity to integrate these different forms of security policies.
It is unclear how the safety regions will develop. Is the safety region the first
step towards a full safety and security region or will it remain just a safety region?
Should therefore at national level the functions, powers and responsibilities in the
field of safety and security be clustered? The public and political debate should
focus on these questions. This means that a decision will be made on the safety
and security system in the coming years, a politically sensitive area in the
Netherlands.
The original proposal of the act contained such a broad safety and security
region. It is unfortunate that in the current act this is not realized. The explanation
can only lie in competing interests of all stakeholders. To realize effectively
integrated security it is necessary to integrate the Ministries of the Interior,
Justice, Housing, local municipalities, police, OM, fire services and medical
emergency services and other organizations. Institutional interests are currently
preventing such an integrated approach. It would be harsh if the Netherlands
should have new safety and security incidents before this integrated security
approach can be realized.
Super Mayor
In the public debates on the act, the construction which makes it possible that the
chairman of the safety region imposes a decision on another mayor is known as
the super mayor. This introduces a new element in Dutch public administration.
One mayor is in specific circumstances placed hierarchically above another
mayor. The question is if this is a desirable development in Dutch domestic
governance. In my opinion, this conflict-generating structure is neither necessary,
nor desirable.
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It is true that in some crises and disasters it is necessary to take direct
operational decisions. These operational decisions should be taken by trained
operational emergency services. In specific situations such as evacuations or the
allocation of scarce resources, it is necessary that an administrative decision
follows. In the Act the chairman of the regional force has the supreme command
during disasters on a larger scale than one municipality, and all decision-making is
thenmade by him, of course, after consultation with the other mayors. If the mayor
of a municipality disagrees there is nothing he can do to prevent the decision.
Such a structure can lead to perverse effects. The Chairman of the safety region
is not only chairman of the safety region but also mayor of the largest town in the
region which can create difficulties in balancing the interests with the other
municipalities. The chairman of the safety region will be in a hierarchical relation-
ship to the other mayors which is not in accordance with the equality of the
municipalities themselves. The accountability of the decision-making takes place
indirectly by themayor of anothermunicipality to the councils where the disaster or
crisis occurs. The position of the mayor who has made a note against the chairman
of the safety region is politically in danger and in some cases becomes untenable.
The administrative situation in the region after a mayor has used his endorsement
will be disturbed for a long time, while the need for cooperation still exists.
If the chairman of a safety region has a conflict with another mayor during a
crisis (for example to evacuate an area or to declare an emergency), the chairman
may decide if the other mayors in the regional policy team (RBT) have been
consulted. The Commissioner of the Queen should ensure cooperation in the
RBT. Should such a conflict arise, the Commissioner can address the chairman of
the safety region and the mayor as a part of the National Government. It is unclear
what this response means now. Can he annul or modify the decision of the
chairman? Or is it just asking all participants to be nice to each other? Or should
the Commissioner, as the conflict continues, ask the minister to give an instruc-
tion? Can he, in such cases give an instruction himself? In reality this situation is
rare, but it is good to know exactly who is competent to do what. This is not clear at
this moment.
12.2 Fire brigades
12.2.1 ORGANIZATION FIRE BRIGADES
“In 2007, 163 thousand fire reports were received by the fire brigade, a slight
increase compared with the previous year. From these reports 41 percent was
a false fire alarm or rumor. The number of fires has decreased slightly from
50 thousand in 2006 to 47 thousand in 2007. This is mainly due to a decrease in
the number of outside fires and chimney fires. The total fire damage was 864
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million euros. The damage of internal burning was 778 million euros, of which 82
million in house fires. The average loss during a house fire was 21.5 thousand
euro. (…) On January 1, 2008 the Netherlands had 443 municipalities, the same as
a year earlier. There were 409 municipalities that have their own or a joint fire
brigade. In 8 municipalities, the fire services is implemented by neighboring
forces. Further there were 26 municipalities where the fire services were hosted
by the regional fire brigade. In total, these forces employ 27 thousand firefighters
both professionals as volunteers. In addition, 3.3 thousand people perform tasks
for the fire brigade. (…) The municipal cost for fire and disaster relief in 2007
compared to the previous year increased by 6 percent to 913 million euros. This
corresponds to an average of 56 euros per capita.”2
This quote from the fire service statistics of the Dutch Central Bureau for Statistics
shows the contours of the fire services in the Netherlands. The fire brigades in the
Netherlands are primarily locally organized, now within the emerging safety
regions. The mayor serves as the competent authority on fire brigades. The mayor
also has the supreme command during fire and other accidents where the fire
brigade is functioning. A large part of the fire brigades in the Netherlands consists
of volunteers. Only a small proportion is employed full time by the fire services.
The tasks of the fire brigades were regulated in the Fire Service Act 1985 but are
now regulated in the new Safety Region Act.
In addition to the municipal organization of the fire brigades the fire services
in the Netherlands are organized in regional fire brigades. The municipalities are
obliged to cooperate in this regional fire brigade. The region borders correspond
with the borders of the police and the medical emergency regions. The regional
fire brigade is responsible for the regional tasks of the local fire services and
emergency response. The separate municipal forces were too small. The extent to
which functions are transferred to the regions varies widely. Under the Disasters
and Heavy Casualties Act, the fire brigade plays a major role in the preparation
and implementation of disaster management in the Netherlands. The fire brigade
is, in principle, the operational leader during the disaster. This remains un-
changed under the new Safety Region Act.
12.2.2 TRENDS IN FIRE SERVICES AND ORGANIZATION OF FIRE BRIGADES
There is currently much to be done about the fire services in the Netherlands. It is
not difficult to predict that in the near future the organization and functioning of
the fire brigades will be much discussed. Even without new incidents and
disasters occurring, the internal and external organization and operation of the
fire brigades is still the subject of much discussion and debate. The fire services in
2 CBS 2008.
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the Netherlands are still changing. In this section I outline some key trends in the
current debate about the fire brigades in the Netherlands.
The fire brigade must be a visible part of society
For many citizens, the fire brigade is distant. Most people will not, or hardly ever
during their lives, be faced with the fire brigade. The probability that citizens have
direct contact with a fire brigade is low. Most people in their lives will not be faced
with a fire or a disaster. People have thus only a limited knowledge and image of
the fire brigades. Their image is determined by television and stories, rarely
through direct experiences of citizens with fire services. This is a big difference
with other emergency services, especially the police. In ancient times the fire
brigades were muchmore a part of society than today. The degree of specialization
of the fire brigades is so high that the fire brigade is now remote from citizens and
society. Few – even within politics and government – have a good and complete
picture of the activities, organization and needs of the fire services. We do not
know what the fire brigade does. We do not know what exactly is required
regarding money and equipment. And we do not know how the fire department is
organized internally and how complex alliances are formed. The fire brigade is for
many in society a blind spot.
The legitimacy of each service calls for regular social weighing. The role and
organization of the fire services should deserve more attention. The fire services
should be a integral part of society. That means that the contacts with citizens,
government and politics have to be intensified. Everyone should ideally have
experience with the fire services, whether specific preventive advice, extinguishing
fire, information in schools or an explanation in the City Council. This will force
the fire brigades to a more external orientation on society. This external orienta-
tion should not only be from the management of the fire brigades, but also from
the operational parts of the fire services. The primary question is and should be
how the fire brigade with its organization, resources and people can contribute to
a safer society.
The fire brigade is not Calimero
The Dutch fire brigades have sometimes a tendency to act as a Calimero in the
political-administrative force. They soon feel less important than other services
such as, for example, or perhaps especially, the police. In public debates on
security and safety fire commanders have very limited input. In formations and
budget discussions, the fire brigade is only to be heard in the background. The
political-administrative lobby of the fire brigade is therefore limited. There is
limited contact between the fire organizations and representatives of national
politics. At the local level (in towns) it is only slightly better. A locally more active
attitude of the fire brigade in the political-administrative sphere can improve the
position of the fire brigade. In the media the work of the fire brigade is regularly
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published, but that is mostly limited to reporting on fires and incidents. A fully
integrated media and a national public relations strategy from the fire brigades
does not exist. The fire brigade is a mature and full physical security organization,
which therefore must ensure full participation in the political-administrative
environment. A safety organization as vital as fire brigades cannot take a
subordinate position and are sometimes even cherished. For their own interests
and the interests of safety, it is necessary that the fire brigades gain a more activist
role in the political establishment. This means that political arguments and
methods can be used to protect the interests of the fire brigades and the interests
of safety more explicitly. That means, for example, a much more active and
intelligent media approach, where appointments could be made on the substan-
tive messages of the fire services in the Netherlands. This requires also a stronger
organizational integration of the fire brigades at national level.
The Dutch fire service does not yet exist and it should
The current fire service organizations is still mainly formed by local and regional
forces, but especially in and around some major cities regionalization is far
advanced. The fire services as a one group and one organization does not yet exist
in the Netherlands. Rarely, the fire brigades have their own opinions on specific
issues or policy issues. The resistance of both governments and fire commanders
to a more national fire service remains high.
The police are now a few steps further. The regionalization is not a discussion
point (after years of debate on merging the municipal police and gendarmerie).
The debate is now about the extent of a national police force. The fire services are
still debating about the regionalization. It is necessary, as quickly and as firmly as
possible, to form an integrated fire service (and not only disaster relief) in fully-
fledged regional organizations. These regional organizations should have all the
powers and resources to perform all tasks of a fire service in a complete and full
manner. The safety region is a first step. Everyone understands and knows in his
heart in which way the organizational development will go. Professionalism and
efficiency call for regional scale and sometimes national scale.
This evolution towards full regional forces should immediately be accompa-
nied by the establishment of a national institution of regional fire commanders
which makes extensive arrangements on management aspects of the fire services
in the Netherlands. If the act concerning the reorganization of the police system
and the establishment of a national police force becomes reality, then it is
necessary to shape a similar structure for the fire services. It is useful to organize
the political-administrative and management control of the police and fire brigade
in a similar way. Management is totally separate from the daily duties, which
continues to be under the municipal formal authority of the mayor. There is no
need or even possibility for a central point in the region or country to control the
local fire or rescue services.
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Crucial to implementation of these proposals is that there is complete clarity
about the financing of the fire services. The current hybrid municipal and
government financing does not create that clarity. A new funding system should
be made in a manner designed that the quality and quantity of fire services can be
designed at the same level everywhere in the country, emphatically in relation to the
risks of a specific area. The quality and quantity of the basic fire service should not
depend on the extent to which municipalities are able to donate finances. These
measures do not require comprehensive legislative changes. This can be achieved
through agreements and understandings between the parties concerned. In this
way a first step towards the fire brigade as a national organization can be taken.
Volunteers an asset and a risk
Voluntariness is one of the key features of the Dutch fire brigade. It has an
important asset because through voluntary fire fighters a close relationship with
parts of society is created. Citizens are in this way – through strict requirements
and also training – themselves directly responsible for part of their security. In
addition, there are important advantages with respect to the financing of the fire
services in the Netherlands; they are much cheaper than full-time professional fire
fighters. The volunteers within the Dutch fire brigade have a long tradition, which
we do not find in other emergence services.
After this praise a nuance has to be made. In fact the Dutch fire services do not
employ volunteers in the pure sense of the word. They are really first and foremost
part-time employees with a special scheme. In the big cities, the fire brigade
consists completely of professionals. There is a misunderstanding about the level
of professionalism within the voluntary fire brigade. In our picture the volunteers
within the fire service are professional staff. They have followed the same required
courses, diplomas and exercises as their professional full-time colleagues. They
also have often broad experience with various forms of assistance. Voluntary fire
brigade staff are therefore professional, versatile fire fighters. Many citizens,
administrators and politicians do not realize this.
The risk of the current system is the limited possibility for further development
and broadening of the task of the fire brigades. The limits of the volunteers have
been reached, though it is now increasingly clear that professional execution of the
current fire services asks for extra tasks (training) effort. It is the question if the
concept of voluntary can be matched with these developments. For employers of
the volunteers it will mean in the future that the volunteers will have to be more
available for the work of the fire brigade. The willingness of employers is not
expected to increase. But for the volunteers themselves the increasing quantitative
and qualitative requirements of the relative gravity of their contribution to the fire
brigade will grow. If the ambition to realize a broader concept of fire services and
integration with other emergence services becomes a priority, the current manner
in which volunteers are treated should be thoroughly reviewed.
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Improving professionalism and culture
The professionalism and culture within the fire service can be improved. Mainly
the knowledge about fire fighting should be organized. The risk remains that fire
knowledge is primarily provided through oral transmission, while it is necessary
that it is (also) in writing and otherwise explained. In recent years much have been
done on the development and refinement of protocols and other forms of
behaviour instructions. This creates on skill level a good description of the
repressive fire fighting. It would be desirable and necessary to realize also on
analytical and abstract level their own theories to reflect on the wider fire service
and safety in general. This presupposes not only training and development of
management but also of the operational fire fighters. It may well be connected to
initiatives already designed in other emergence services.
The same can be stated regarding the organizational culture within the fire
service. Although over the last few years significant changes have occurred, a few
cultural features still can be improved. The primary masculine culture of the fire
brigade has a negative impact on attracting and retaining women and immigrants.
The professionalism and the culture of the fire department could improve if a more
differentiated inflow can be realized. The latter refers to an optimal combination of
different criteria on which fire fighters and their management can be selected. Not
only employees with a technical background are necessary but also with a social
scientific or legal background. Not only Dutch men but also women and immi-
grants have to be employed by the fire services. Not only experienced people but
also young people with new ideas are useful. Not only managers but also people
with specialized knowledge of a specific part can contribute to the fire services. This
means that management of the brigade must consider the ideal mix of knowledge
and people within the organization. Also, in cooperation with the other joint
emergency services more progress can be achieved.
But there is another element of the fire service culture that we want to highlight.
Above and below, we havemade it clear that we believe that the fire services can and
should be deployed more intensively in security. That means that the fire brigade
should not only pay attention to its own sector and its own work, but increasingly
attention is needed for other organizations, for society and for the wider contribu-
tion that the fire services may provide the security. This implies a strong external
orientation of both the managers and the operational framework within the fire
services. The culture of the fire brigades has traditionally been internally focused.
The fire fighter culture should always and ever more adapt to developments in
society. Such an adjustment – which should take place continuously – is only
possible if the perception of the fire brigade is turned to the environment.
Better repression, and more prevention is needed
The emphasis of the work of the fire service is traditionally on repression. That is
important and crucial for the fire brigade.With regard to repression, improvements
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can be achieved, especially regarding the refinement of specific procedures.
Improving repression requires more systematic evaluation and lessons of various
forms of commitment in different types of fires and incidents. If the fire brigade,
both regionally and nationally, can arrange that evaluation and review are well
organized, it can actually learn from both successes and failures in enforcement
efforts by the fire brigade.
More crucial, however, is to pay more attention to the left of the security chain.
That left side contains elements such as education, licensing and enforcement.
The role of the fire services in assessing applications for use permits, building
permits, environmental permits for chemical companies, etc. has still little
attention within the fire brigade itself. This role and its affect are increasingly
important in today’s society precaution. The fire brigade will also have to invest to
ensure that the review and issuance of permits is well organized. Recent disasters
such as Enschede, Volendam and the Schiphol fire show that with regard to the
authorization of permits improvements are necessary. In addition, information to
citizens and businesses on fire safety should be more creative. The fire brigade
should play a more active role towards citizens and businesses in providing
information and support with regard to fire safety. Only a few people in society
care about fire safety. The fire department should ensure that the responsibilities
of citizens in relation to fire safety receive more attention. But to achieve this it is
essential that people have sufficient knowledge and understanding of the various
aspects of fire services.
In the third place, we consider it necessary to that the fire brigade has a more
active role in the enforcement of fire regulations. Enforcement is still a relatively
weak task in the fire brigade. But prevention through specific authorization is only
meaningful if a full enforcement follows. The major disasters in the Netherlands
have not yet led to full improvement of enforcement. The fire service should create
adequate space and resources necessary to actually give form to the enforcement
of the issued permits. Only then will there be a full cycle of fire service. If there is a
lack in enforcement specific authorization has limited sense. The lack of
enforcement is caused by a lack of capacity but also by a lack of expertise. Not
every town and not every fire brigade may have all the information and knowledge
to fully maintain it. Inter municipal and regional cooperation is therefore required
to maintain an acceptable level of knowledge and enforcement.
To a fire brigade with a broad mission, on the way to an integrated emergency service
The separation between the emergency services, in particular between the police,
medical aid and fire brigade, is a historical one. The rationale for this is lacking.
This appears both from the fact that in other countries the dividing lines between
the organizations are sometimes quite different and from the fact that more and
more it become clear that the during incidents intensive operational cooperation
is necessary. The fire brigades cannot perform their tasks in “splendid isolation”.
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Virtually all functions of fire brigades require cooperation with other organiza-
tions such as the municipality, police and medical services. This is true even for
the simplest daily duties for the citizens. The task of the government does not end
when the fire is put out. Integrated care means that good care and aftercare have to
be scheduled immediately.
The fire brigades in the Netherlands should have a broad mission. Not only fire
and disaster but also crisis management. Not only prevention but also repression.
Not only licensing but also enforcement. Not just actually acting but also
informing. This broadness can in our view only be realized if the organizations
are sufficiently large and robust. Only then is it possible that this broad mandate is
contributed fully. This underlines the need for regionalization of the fire brigades
and even for nationalization of management issues of the Dutch fire services.
The fire brigade should continue to play a central role in disaster response and
crisis management. The fire brigade should have a coordinating role in the
preparation for physical security incidents. For some types of incidents outside the
physical security domain other organizations than the fire brigade are more
obvious coordinating organizations, such as in civil disturbances, terrorist attacks,
epidemics and so on. In such cases, either the police or the medical emergency
services would be the organization which has the operational lead. The generic
preparation that is coordinated by the fire brigade has also meaning in these cases.
The broad mission includes a culture within the fire department that pays
attention to this broad mission. That means that within the fire brigade in both
management and executive ranks, generalists are actually working alongside the
necessary specialists. The fire brigade has not only a need for specialists, but also
for people who are capable to value and implement the wider role and respon-
sibility of the fire brigade in the Dutch context.
Further cooperation and integration with the police
Further cooperation between the emergency services as the police, the fire brigade
and medical assistance has, in recent years in the Netherlands, mainly been
realized due to the pressure to improve disaster management. A lot has been
achieved over the years, both at local and regional level, to make such cooperation
deeper and more extensive. Sometimes in the form of arrangements and
agreements, sometimes in joint buildings and sometimes in common emergency
rooms. Cooperation in the field of disaster response is on a reasonable level. The
establishment of safety regions currently contributes to the further intensification
of cooperation between different organizations, especially with regard to this
aspect of safety. Of course it is good to note that cooperation between stakeholders
in specific areas is still further improving. We see good examples, both in terms of
operational performance of the duties of the various emergency services but also
at the level of management and boards.
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In the Netherlands a discussion is held to which extent it is possible, effective,
efficient and sensible to integrate fire brigade, police and medical assistance in
one organization. A first step is visible in the sense that in different regions fire
brigades and medical emergency services form a joint emergency service. Actually
this cooperation is mainly on management issues. The operational divisions
between fire and medical aid still exist. It would be valuable if it is examined how
the integration of the three characteristic emergency services could contribute to
an effective, efficient, democratic and integrated safety and security. Our assess-
ment is that – after a period of reorganization and habituation – both operational
and management benefits will be achieved. With such an organizational and
institutional integration a fully integrated emergency service for both social and
physical security is established.
12.3 Medical Emergency Services
In this paragraph I briefly discuss another emergency service, the medical
emergency services. Police – and to a much lesser extent the fire brigades – are
welcome topics of scientific research. Regarding the medical emergency services,
this is hardly the case. There is only very limited data and analyses available on the
organization and functioning of the medical emergency services. Nevertheless
they play an important role in disaster management in the Netherlands.
The medical emergency services assume responsibility for medical coordination
during disasters and major accidents. “The Medical emergency services got at the
end of 1999 the responsibility on the somatic health care, preventive public health
and psychosocial health care. Medical emergency services was the organization
responsible for coordinating the medical and health aspects of disasters and was
in the same way administrative and geographically embedded as the fire disaster
and the police. Fire brigades and police forces were organized in 2 matching
regions. Setting up a new post of a regional medical process for health care was a
basic requirement. This became the 25 Regional Medical Officers (RGF) who had
to be appointed within two years. In preparing disaster management the RGF has
a role in bringing together the various parties of the health services. During a
disaster, the RGF has the operational leadership of the medical care.”3
The medical emergency services operated on the basis of the Medical Emergency
Services Act. But also other laws were of interest such as the Ambulance Act, the
Disasters and Serious Accidents Act, the Law on Professions in Individual Health
Care, the Law on Quality Health Services and the Law on Collective Preventive
3 Bierens 2009.
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Health Care. The medical emergency services is now the responsibility of all the
mayors in a safety region on the basis of the Safety Regions Act.
The Regional Medical Officer leads the medical emergency services. In the Safety
Regions Act he is called director of medical emergency services. Sometimes this is
a side task for a director of the Local Health Service, sometimes it is the superior of
medical emergency services agency, sometimes it is the management of an
integrated health care service. The Regional Medical Officer has often a difficult
position because he does not have hierarchical powers in respect of the partners in
the medical chain. This is complicated because he is deemed to have the
operational direction on medical care during a disaster. The medical chain in
the Netherlands is complex and includes municipal health services, GPs, regional
ambulance services, ambulance care Netherlands, trauma centres, hospitals, the
National Institute of Public Health and Environment, the Dutch Red Cross,
mental healthcare and social work. Within the medical chain there are not only
public but also private parties which play an important role. For example, the
ambulances in the Netherlands are for a large part privatized. The Regional
Medical Officer can make agreements with other organizations in the health chain
but he has, during disasters, no authority over hospitals, trauma centres etc. He
does not have his own operational organization which he van use directly, like the
chief of the fire brigade or the police commander. At different times pleas have
been made to grant such powers to the Regional Medical Officer. So far this has
not been realized. The new Safety Regions Act offers a little improvement in the
position of the Regional Medical Officer. Bierens provided some examples of the
institutional difficulties for the medical emergency services.
“– The medical emergency services-domain has to handle two ministries: BZK for
structure and VWS for the content, with sometimes conflicting interests, but ultimately
the same goal. Because the core of the medical emergency services tasks are in the
border area between these ministries, small changes in policy of the ministry or new
agreements between the ministries often lead to fundamental changes for the medical
emergency services.
– Many aspects of medical emergency services have everything to do with public health.
The legal responsibility for public health lies with the Municipal Health Service (GGD).
There are many opinions how the relationship between the Medical emergency services
and the GGD should be regulated and various interested parties try to influence it. The
possible development to make the Municipal Health Service regions congruent with the
police, fire and medical emergency services regions is regarded by some as a threat to
medical emergency services, by others as the next improvement of the development of
the medical emergency services. (…)
– Within the health care increasing efficiency is needed. This also leads to less capacity
and less redundancy in the capacity of health. There will be less scope for individual
emergency patients to be slide in between. Over time this can lead to a separate, and
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probably expensive, organization of acute care that would be paid largely on the basis of
readiness, not based on performance. Some care institutions will decide not to provide
acute care. Together with the expected development of the privatization, and competition
between hospitals and ambulance services in the long term this means that the
additional capacity available in case of a disaster will significantly decrease. (…)
All in all, there is more of a structural trend in health care to pay less attention to the
Medical emergency services than to devote more attention.” 4
The medical emergency services has to operate in a highly complex institutional
environment and without having sufficient power, finance, organization and
resources. It is no exaggeration to say that the risk of errors and problems in this
way has become very large. Possibly, the new Law on safety regions and the earlier
in this chapter mentioned recommendations could create some improvements.
But what is really needed is a stronger institutional embedding of the medical
emergency services within the medical health services and chain in the
Netherlands.
12.4 Crisis en crisis management in the Netherlands
In this paragraph I pay attention to the following topics. In the first place I give a
brief overview of the major crises in the Netherlands in recent years. Then I give a
formal outline of the current system of crisis management in the Netherlands.
Then I explain the current institutional crisis system in the Netherlands and the
possible institutional improvements. These improvements are also related to
other security and safety aspects in Holland. I finish the paragraph with a few
trends on crisis management in the Netherlands. The basis for this paragraph is
formed by the volume Crisis: Crisis and crisis management in the Netherlands
(Muller, Rosenthal, Helsloot en Van Dijkman, 2009) and Crises in the Netherlands:
Disasters, riots, hostage takings and other crises (Muller 2011).
12.4.1 CRISES IN HOLLAND
The Netherlands has experienced different crises in recent years. A complete list of
all crises is not feasible for this chapter. Below themain crisis arementioned. These
are the crises which led to a high degree of collective stress and/or far-reaching
changes in policy and organization of crisis management in the Netherlands. In
addition, I focus on the crises after 1990 unless they had a crucial role in the
contemporary crisis management.5
4 Bierens 2009.
5 See also Rosenthal 1984.
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Disasters and major accidents
• Flood Disaster 1953
• Train disaster Harmelen 1962
• Chemical explosion DSM Geleen 1975
• Cindu disaster explosion chemical factory 1992
• Disaster Bijlmer El Al crash airplane 1992
• Train disaster Hoofddorp 1992
• Hercules airplane disaster 1996
• Dakota airplane disaster 1996
• Floods of 1993 and 19956
• Legionella infection Bovenkarspel
• Enschede firework disaster 2000
• Cafe fire Volendam 2001
• Fire prison Schiphol 2005
• Crash Turkish Airlines plane 2009
• Disasters abroad with Dutch involvement
• Air plane crash Tenerife 1977
• Air plane crash Paramaribo 1989
• Air plan crash Faro 1992
• Tsunami Asia and Africa 2004
Terrorism
• French Embassy hostage taking 1973
• South Moluccan hostage-takings 1970s
• Rara attacks 1980s
• IRA and ETA attacks 1980s
• Political murder Fortuyn 2002
• Political murder Van Gogh 2004
Public disorder
• Riots marriage princess Beatrix and Claus 1966
• Maagdenhuis occupation in 1969
• New Market riots in 1974
• Squatters Riots Amsterdam including Coronation 1980
• Squatters Riots Groningen and Nijmegen
• Demonstration 1993 Youth Riots
• Riots Eurotop Amsterdam 1997
• Disorder Oosterpark District Groningen 1997
• Riots Amsterdam-West 1998
• Celebration Riots Feyenoord 1999
6 See Rosenthal e.a. 1997.
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• Soccer Riots European Championship 2000
• Riots Den Bosch in 2000 and 2006
• Mass Riots Queen’s Day (Koninginnedag) 2001
• Riots Utrecht 2008
Farming crisis
• Foot and mouth crisis
• Bird flu crisis
• Swine fever crisis
12.4.2 CRISIS MANAGEMENT IN THE NETHERLANDS
The Netherlands does not have a fully-fledged crisis act. The crisis decision-
making in the Netherlands is designed on the basis of various laws, regulations
and plans. The main structure of the crisis management is described below. At
this moment there are several plans for change but in the rest of the chapter I will
discuss this.
The primary responsibility for crisis management and disaster management is at
the municipal level. In the Safety Regions Act the obligations for each munici-
pality are displayed. Each municipality in the Netherlands should have a con-
tingency plan setting out how, during a disaster or crisis, intervention will take
place. The mayor has the final responsibility and the supreme command during a
crisis. All municipalities work together in the before mentioned safety regions
where the crisis management and disaster response is organized.
In principle, the crisis management and emergency response take place within
this safety region. This requires a unique structure which is applied in each
region. This is called the GRIP structure. The GRIP structure distinguishes
various stages, also called coordination alarms (GRIP 1 to 4). Each GRIP stage has
another decision-making structure:
• GRIP I: Incident Command Location (COPI)
• GRIP II: COPI + Operational Team (OT)
• GRIP III: COPI + IP + Municipal policy team (GBT)
• GRIP IV: COPI + IP + Regional policy team
Depending on the nature, extent, severity and trend of the (threatened) incident,
many public and private partners are involved. Below is the core occupation of the
various decision-making structures.
Incident Command Location (COPI):
• Leader COPI (from one of the columns)
• Officer Fire Service (OvDB)
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• Officer Ghor (OvDG)
• Officer Police (OvDP)
• Information Officer (from one of the columns)
Operational Team (OT)
• Operational manager (one of the columns)
• Operational Team Member or Staff Officer Fire brigade
• Operational Team Member or Staff Officer Ghor
• Operational Team Member or Staff Officer Police
• Operational Team Member or Staff Officer Municipality
• Information Officer (from one of the columns)
Municipal policy team (GBT)
• Mayor
• (Main) Public Prosecutor
• Member Fire policy team
• Member Ghor policy team
• Member Police policy team
• Member Municipality policy team
• Information Officer (from one of the columns)
Regional policy team (RBT)
• Coordinating Mayor
• Mayors concerned
• (Main) Public Prosecutor
• Regional Fire Commander
• Regional Medical Officer
• Police Chief
• Member policy team town
• Information Officer (from one of the columns)
If there is national crisis another system comes in effect. The Minister of Security
and Justice in the Netherlands is coordinating minister in respect of crisis manage-
ment and disaster relief. This means that the Minister must coordinate between
different departments. ThisMinister has however no power to determine the actions
of other ministers. That is, in the Netherlands, not even the case for the Prime
Minister.
In case of a national crisis, a ministerial policy team with all relevant ministers
is formed under chairmanship of the most concerned minister. The ministerial
policy team is assisted by an inter-departmental policy team consisting of the
senior officials of various departments. The national crisis center prepares the
decisions of both crisis teams. The various departmental coordination centers in
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each department prepare the crisis management activities for these departments.
The monitoring of the whole system is done by the Public Order and Safety
Inspectorate, the inspectorates of the various departments and the independent
Dutch Safety Board.
For specific crises such as terrorism, infectious diseases and agricultural
decision-making processes there are specific decision-making structures. Some-
times they do not fit the just mentioned general structure for crisis management.
Not every crisis in the Netherlands is handled by the same crisis structure. In
principle, each department has an own responsibility during a crisis. It depends
on how the crisis looks, how the decision-making takes place. In the ministerial
policy team one tries to coordinate the differences between the Dutch depart-
ments and ministers.
12.4.3 THE DUTCH CRISIS SYSTEM7
The Dutch crisis system is complex. In this paragraph I will try to give an opinion
on the current state of the crisis system and make some recommendations for the
near and distant future. My starting point is that the current administrative
organization in the Netherlands no longer suites appropriate crisis management.
What is needed is a more fundamental review of the system in order to achieve a
higher quality crisis management. In many reports in response to disasters and
public disturbances comments were made on the need for further cooperation
between police, fire brigade and medical chain. Careful observations are made
about the need to achieve greater integration of these emergency services. But in
all action plans as a result of recent disasters and civil disturbances this point is
not addressed intensively. There is no action plan for integration of the emergency
services.
In five propositions I give an overview of the problems of the current organization
of crisis management in the Netherlands. Then I give, in three propositions,
suggestions on how the organization of crisis management in the Netherlands
could be improved. The before mentioned remarks about the safety regions apply
also for this paragraph.
Current administrative organization crisis management
Proposition A: There is a diffuse network of organizations and officials involved in crisis
management.
Crisis management requires the cooperation of many organizations, municipali-
ties, provinces, virtually all departments, water boards, police regions, fire regions,
7 Based on and cited from Muller and Baars 2009.
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local fire brigades, health authorities, medical emergency services regions, regional
health officials, ambulance organizations, public prosecutors and others. It should
be noted that within each of these organizations, parts are involved in specific
aspects of crisis management. In its totality, dozens of organizations are involved in
the different phases of crisis management.
The administrative system in the Netherlands also applies before, during and
after crises. This fine-grained administrative system – known as the adminis-
trative polder model – seems to work reasonably well for regular administrative
and political problems. However, it is questionable to what extent this will work in
crisis situations. Before, during and after crises, it is necessary to take quick and
sometimes vigorous decisions. The current administrative organization of the
crisis management does not meet these requirements.
All these organizations have their own powers, rules and laws. These powers,
rules and laws are not always compatible. The territorial limits of all these
organizations are often not identical. The establishment of the Safety Regions
Act contributes to reducing the problem. There are many border problems in the
different phases of crisis management. In some cases there is even competition of
powers. It is not just a debate on the powers but also about the tasks of the
different organizations. Many exercises are necessary to let the various agents get
to know each other. The high turnover of employees in public administration
makes a constant exercise policy in crisis management necessary.
Many different types of partnerships are necessary to achieve optimal crisis
management. There are not only more or less legal regional relationships but also
through agreements one is trying to structure the administrative organization of
crisis management. This created a patchwork of arrangements and agreements,
all of which play a role in the organization of crisis management.
But the main problem of this diffuse network of organizations involved in
crisis management is that it is not exactly clear who is responsible. Since many
people are responsible, for example regarding the provision and monitoring of
licences it is not clear who has the final responsibility. Crisis management is an
area where the responsibility is shared by many hands. After a crisis there are
always unpleasant political and public debates in which political, administrative
and official representatives are held accountable. The above described diffuse
network only leads to more confusion of responsibilities.
Proposition B: There are insufficient opportunities for unity and uniformity in the
various stages of crisis management
The above mentioned diffuse network of organizations involved in crisis manage-
ment makes it clear that unity and uniformity is difficult to achieve. Each of these
organizations has its own authority and management structure. The complex
structure around the police authority is only one of the examples of the
impossibility to achieve integrated management and control. The ability of
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provincial or central government to effectively intervene in the different phases of
crisis management is limited. The intervening powers do exist but are rarely used
during real crises.
Although a National Crisis Decision Making Handbook exists, and a large part
of the organization during crisis is designed like it is described in this Handbook,
it appears that major substantive and qualitative differences arise between the
various organizations during a crisis. There is little possibility of formal guidance
from state level. The ministerial policy team and the inter-departmental policy
team, together with the National Center for Crises are seen as coordinating units.
The administrative structure of state instructions is used a few times however, but
is still considered “not done” within the Dutch polder model. However, it is
questionable to what extent it is not desirable for national authorities to have a
more important role in crisis management.
Crisis management – with the exception of terrorism – is primarily a local
matter. In the Netherlands, we have considered it prudent that the mayor of a
town directsthe disasters and civil disturbances and has a direction role. Of course
in a regional context and, of course, with the support of professional equipment,
and even with coordinating mayors. This local embedding of the security is of
great importance in the Netherlands. It allows for the best possible tailor-made
security policy for every specific situation. National or provincial interference is
not appreciated. The emerging safety regions are the first careful steps towards a
more regional organization of crisis management.
Proposition C: There is no democratic control over crisis management in the Netherlands
Crisis management in the Netherlands is a matter of many organizations. These
organizations are all involved in only a small part of the overall crisis manage-
ment. The police focus on civil disturbances, fire brigades on disasters and
physical safety, and health authorities and the rest of the medical chain on the
health of citizens, the Public Prosecution Service on law enforcement and the
water boards on flooding. Earlier we saw that there is a fragmented set of
organizations representing all key functions in crisis management.
Each of these organizations has its own accountability and control system.
This fragmentation can also be found as we look more specifically at the
democratic control of security in general and crisis management in particular.
There is no comprehensive accounting of the activities that organizations perform
in the field of crisis management. Only for parts of crisis management, is there an
accountability process. Local councils supervise only a part of the duties of the
police and fire departments; few permits are actually submitted to committees of
the council; provincial councils have a limited view of the controlling functions of
the province in this area, the regional board of the police has almost no insight
into crisis management. Local councils can hold a mayor accountable for his part
in crisis management as the Second Chamber of Parliament can do with
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ministers. But it always will be a fragmented accountability. There is no direct
democratic control of crisis management in the Netherlands.
Proposition D: There are differences in degree of professionalism of the officers of the
organizations involved
The many organizations involved in crisis management employ many officers and
staff members. There is a considerable difference in the degree of professionalism
of the staff. The courses they have taken with regard to crisis management vary
greatly. Some organizations such as the police, fire brigades and medical chain, are
trying to improve the professionalism of their employees. Sometimes there are
volunteers in Dutch crisis management which makes the issue of professionalism
even more complex. Other organizations such as the Public Prosection Service and
the water boards to views crisis management much less as one of the core tasks.
Before, during and after crises it is expected that all staff united work to achieve
effective crisis management. The difference in professionalism – and in this
sector, the difference in status and hierarchy – makes this cooperation not always
easy. This is especially problematic in the relationship between the fire brigade
and the police. Although the fire brigade formally has a leading role during major
incidents, fact is that mainly the police have the actual leading and coordinating
role on those measures. The difference in experience and knowledge of dealing
with critical situations play a major role. Also, the informal hierarchy between
these organizations is important.
Proposition E: The organizations involved in crisis management speak different
languages
Cooperation between all organizations is crucial for the proper conduct of crisis
management. Each of these organizations has its own history, culture and
language. The way the police are executing their tasks cannot be compared with
the way the fire department does. The contacts between the organizations involved
are sometimes very low. In most cases they are confronted with each other in
regular work. But it is also possible that only in case of disasters or other crises the
staff of the individual services will face each other. If you do not or insufficiently
train in the stage before a crisis then there will be “language” problems. One
simply lacks the knowledge about each other’s associations and background.
This problem is often solved by ensuring that the preparation for crisis exercises
is organized. These exercises – which are often operational in nature – have as a
main objective to get to know each other. But it appears from reviews of recent
disasters and crises that it is difficult to speak each other’s language. The back-
ground and training of staff in crisis management is often very different. Doctors
and firefighters do not necessarily have the same reference system. There is a risk
that due to communication problems during a crisis unwittingly wrong decisions
or lack of coordination takes place.
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Future organization of crisis management
Proposition F: Integration of the organizations of police, fire brigades and medical chain
has to be realized.
The organizations of police, fire brigade and medical chain are independent of
each other. An integration of these organizations in one security organization can
have many benefits. It should be examined to what extent the licensing parts of the
municipalities can be accommodated in this security organizations. The benefits
relate not only to disaster and crisis management but to the wider security policy
in the Netherlands.
The new security organization will be better able to provide integrated crisis
management. The various tasks before, during and after crises can be performed
effectively and efficiently in an integrated security organization. Licences for
companies and institutions can be better coordinated. Also, enforcement can be
shaped more effectively and efficiently. The saving of lives, the management of
large masses of people and action against defendants may be better if these
different organizations are brought together.
With one security organization it is also easier to improve the training and
knowledge around crisis management. It will be easier to achieve coordination
and agreements within one organization. It will be necessary to change the
different cultures of the various organizations into one safety culture for the
security organization. Such a culture change of organizations is a difficult task.
But it offers the possibilities to achieve an integrated perspective on security
issues. The now necessary organizational alignment will almost disappear.
Proposition G: There should be integral security in different phases of crisis management
With the proposal of one security organization it is also possible to achieve integral
security for the various stages of crisis management. The prevention of crisis can
actually be given shape as the authorization relating to safety is placed in one
hand. At this time different standards and licensing organizations are competing
with each other which leads to problems for citizens or the owners of establish-
ments. They are now faced with different demands from one government. If all
concerned organizations become a part of one security organization then it is
much easier to achieve the necessary alignment.
The acute control of crises could be improved since both the direct control of a
disaster, such as saving lives and controlling the crime scene in places are in the
hands of one organization. The police, the medical chain and the fire brigade can
still play a recognizable role Dutch in security, but the integration is achieved
because these services are all part of one organization. The new Dutch crisis
organization should consist of a combination of expertise of police, fire services
and medical organizations.
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But even after the crises it is useful to have these functions in one organization.
It increases the possibilities for appropriate aftercare for victims. It also reduces
the chance that needless discussions arise over the cause of the crisis and the
failure of parts of the organization. The traditional disaster after the disaster can
be reduced if one security organization is realized.
Proposition H: There should be a possibility of national crisis management
The safety regions can largely act autonomously with respect to their crisis
management. However, the possibility should exist – and may actually be used –
for national level of government to influence crisis management. It is necessary
that at national level personnel, organization and finances are formed to carry out
this task. Crisis management does not agree with the vague responsibility of
coordinating ministers. For an adequate crisis management in the different phases
it is necessary that one of the ministers actually has the power to intervene. To
achieve this we conclude with the opinion of the Council for Public Administration
for a decision-making structure for disastermanagement and crisis management at
national level.
“For national crises, where one or more vital interests is at stake, a GRIP-5 structure is
introduced. GRIP-5 is there at the moment that the Prime Minister decided that there is
a national crisis. In GRIP-5 the structures of the National Manual of Crisis Decision-
making come into operation and a MBT is formed which is chaired by the Prime
Minister. The Prime Minister decides which department gets the lead in tackling the
crisis. During crises where more departments are responsible or where conflicting
interests are possible, the Prime Minister has perseverance power in decision-making
and he has the decisive voice. He may also give individual ministers an indication to use
their powers. Furthermore, the Prime Minister – similar to the mayor at the local level –
is responsible for administrative coordination within the government during a crisis, for
information to the media and the public and public accountability. Formal legislation is
needed for this arrangement.” 8
12.5 Trends in crisis and crisis management9
Crisis management has in the Netherlands in recent years grown intensively. In
the last twenty years great changes have taken place. Crisis management remains
a policy in development. At the end of this chapter, I would like to place crisis and
crisis management in perspective.
8 Council for Public Administration, Beter besturen bij rampen, Den Haag 2008. I was member of the
Council for Public Administration and chairman of the working group which prepared this advice.
9 Based on and cited fromMuller 2009C. See also Rosenthal, Charles and ‘t Hart 1989; Rosenthal, Boin
and Comfort 2001; Boin, ‘t Hart, Stern and Sundelius 2005; Smith and Elliott 2006; Boin, McCnnell
and ’t Hart 2008; Borodzeicz 2005; Gilpin and Murphy 2008.
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12.5.1 CRISES BECOME MORE IMPORTANT
Crises are important in contemporary society. Society depends on a smooth and
uninterrupted process of everything. More complex systems are designed to
achieve a trouble-free society. In many areas much progress is realized. For many,
a peaceful use of ICT or the road or a visit to a hospital has to become a habit.
Participation in society without disturbance is increasingly possible. Many
processes have been improved or are being improved. Divergence from the usual
is becoming more and more important.
Disturbances of these processes are leading, faster than in the past, to
irritation, especially when it comes to major crises. The reasoning is: it cannot
be possible that this crisis takes place in our society, we have everything so well
organized. Crises receive more and more attention. Deviations from the standard
deserve to be more and more mentioned. Furthermore, in the media there seems
to be a constant need for new crises and incidents. Both developments reinforce
each other so that a new crisis arises in the media every day. Some of them are real
accidents, disasters, bombings, floods or other types of crisis. In other cases, crises
are created. Crises thereby form an increasingly important part of society. They
are central to the media, they are an important topic for policy, administration and
business, they may directly affect the lives and welfare of citizens, they show
defects in the functioning of organizations, they are intensively studied by many
inspections and inquiry committees and they remain in the collective memory of
society.
For all, it is crucial that a specific crisis can be placed in its proper context. At
the time of an actual crisis it may seem that society can no longer function after
the crisis. History shows something different. Again and again, society continues
with or without modified rules, procedures, organizations and laws. For crisis
managers – both in politics, governance, civil service and the industry – it is
important to take this into perspective. Obviously without losing sight of the
severity and consequences for those directly involved.
12.5.2 NEW AND OLD THREATS
The number of crises seems to be increasing. The vulnerability of society seems to
be growing. There are not only old threats such as disasters or floods or infectious
diseases but also new threats such as ICT failure, nuclear energy, new forms of
terrorism and other risks. Old threats may have played an important role in the
history of the Netherlands, that does not mean that they are present in the
contemporary collective consciousness. For only a few in the Netherlands a major
flood from the sea is a real memory. Such threats appear for many people to be
something of the past. Crises in the rest of the world show that this is not the case.
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The different threats cause various organizations to be involved in crisis and
crisis management. There is not one organization within the government that has
all types of risks and crises under its responsibility. Companies may be faced with
entirely different forms of threats and risks depending on their own products and
operations and the place where their offices and factories are situated. Citizens
may also be faced with a large variety of crises. The variety of types of crises makes
it difficult for all concerned to achieve unique preparation. Partly because of the
complex division of responsibilities between all parties involved there will always
be an extensive need for intensive forms of cooperation.
12.5.3 RISK ACCEPTANCE IS LOWER
The willingness of citizens and companies to accept risks is becoming less. It is
expected that this will not increase in the coming years. Risks are to be excluded
and if that cannot be done they have to be insured. This seems to be the main
attitude. This development has been called the vulnerability paradox. While
society is increasingly vulnerable to disturbances of all kinds, the willingness to
accept such disturbances has decreased. In addition, few have real practical
experience themselves with crises and disasters. The ability to cope of citizens
who have never faced a disaster will be reduced.
The reduction of risk acceptance makes it for political authorities, governments
and business more complicated. Citizens and customers increasingly expect that
governments and businesses are able to prevent crises and as they unfortunately
nevertheless occur they are effectively managed. The expectations of citizens and
customers are high. This is forcing governments and companies to intensify
preparations for possible threats and crises. An error that could have been avoided
will lead to problems in the stage after the crisis.
12.5.4 ROLE OF THE MEDIA AND COMMUNICATION ARE BECOMING INCREASINGLY
IMPORTANT
The media play a vital role in various ways before, during and after crises. Media
can identify problems in licensing and enforcement. Media are during crises of
crucial importance to provide information from the government to citizens. After
crises the media play a sometimes decisive role in the justification of the measures
taken. Media and crises are closely linked. Governments and businesses are
increasingly aware of that. This means that in many organizations intensive plans
are developed to implement the most effective way to manage the media. The
communication towards citizens during a crisis is sometimes problematic.
The intensity and extent of media attention during and after crises is for most
concerned authorities always a surprise. The increased diversity and competition
between the media becomes apparent with 24 hours every day news of smaller
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and larger crisis being published. The Dutch regional channels have nowadays
extensive coverage. Internet has become a crucial part of news distribution. The
intensity of media attention and the increasingly important role of the Internet
must lead to further professionalism on the side of crisis management by
government and business.
12.5.5 CITIZENS HAVE A CRUCIAL ROLE
Citizens are more capable than hitherto was assumed. Citizens are during a
disaster reasonable people, just as in everyday reality. They do not panic, but they
will, based on the available information and within the time available, decide
thoughtful and practically what they can or should do. Authorities do not have to
take all initiatives immediately after a disaster. Citizens are able, for themselves, to
find alternatives to fit their needs, even during crises. They are also capable of
helping others usefully. The government then preferably performs a supporting
role and a safety net function for the relatively small group of citizens who, due to
circumstances, cannot take care of themselves. Actions of citizens after a disaster
are characterized by two elements: saving themselves and saving others. In this
context we speak of self-reliance. Self-reliance is any act performed by citizens:
– in preparing for disasters and serious accidents;
– during and after disasters and serious accidents;
– in order to help themselves and others
– in reducing the impact of the disaster or serious accident.
The potential contribution of citizens in preparing for incidents and the response
has been under-used so far. Citizens can be actively involved in crisis manage-
ment. The Dutch campaign “Think Forward” is a first initiative to involve citizens.
However, the campaign focuses primarily on preparing citizens for disasters.
Citizens can also have an active role in the actual response to a crisis. The
government could, much more than in the past, involve the public before, during
and after crises. Attention is now almost unilaterally paid to the preparation of
professional emergency services. Citizens could be more intensively informed
about crises and disasters. Citizens can be more involved by asking them for
information about risky situations similar to successful initiatives such as Crime
Report Anonymous. Citizens could be involved in disaster exercises. Citizens can
obtain a volunteer role during crises which is conducted with a degree of training
experience. Citizens can assist in many ways after a crisis. These and other
features should not only be identified but also actually be implemented.
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12.5.6 PREVENTION AND PREPARATION AS AN ENABLER
Increasingly we can speak of the crisis before the crisis. It is about the extent to
which organizations actually pay attention to prevention and preparation. Crises
investigations and inspections show again and again that in these areas large profits
can be obtained. The pre-phase of crisis management is just as crucial as the acute
phase. Exercises and training aremainly actually focused on the acute response, but
most administrative value is realized in the pre-phase and the after-phase.
In particular, it is about the content and methods of licensing and enforce-
ment. After larger and smaller disasters and crises in the Netherlands it shows
that the licensing and enforcement was lacking. It was unclear who was
responsible for what, what exactly should be regulated, very complex rules that
only experts can be understood, unclear enforcement, non-scheduled mainte-
nance, dubious licence negotiations and enforcement, etc.
In addition, continued attention has to be paid to the preparation for the actual
crisis. Meanwhile, most public organizations and businesses have plans on how
they should act during crises. Inspections of the Public Order and Safety
Inspectorate do not always show a positive picture of the state of preparedness
for crises in the Netherlands. Formal plans are in place but some remarks can be
made about the actual preparation. In particular with regard to exercises and
training. There are relatively a lot of practices and training sessions in this sector.
The quality of the exercises varies. The intensity of follow-up of the lessons from
the exercises is also different. For some authorities an exercise is an opportunity in
which they and their organization can effectively learn, for others it is a forced
ritual.
12.5.7 RESPONSE CRUCIAL FOR OPERATIONAL EMERGENCY SERVICES
Exercises and simulations are often only aimed at the acute phase response. In
these exercises both management of operational services as well as authorities
participate. At this stage the operational services play a key role. They are trained
and selected to do this. The substantive operational decisions are often only taken
by the operational services. Formally, however, authorities like the mayor are in
charge of these operational services. They must formally approve the operational
decisions taken by the emergency operations such as police, fire brigades and
medical emergency services.
This regularly creates problems in the practice of crisis management. Autho-
rities who are too much involved with operational decisions, managers of
operational emergency who are making strategic decisions. The distinction
between operation and implementation on the one hand and policy and strategy
on the other hand is during crises often difficult to make. Exercises and training
should therefore focus on the differences between operational and strategic
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decision-making during crisis. It may be helpful to specifically name the strategic
decisions that are reserved for administrative authorities, such as the decision to
evacuate, content and implementation media messages or the prioritization of
life-saving resources. In other cases, the operational services just make and
implement operational decisions. Authorities should be heavily involved in
operational details during a crisis. These details should be left to the operational
services. In the pre-phase authorities need to ensure that the operational services
are capable of operating adequately during crises.10
12.5.8 AFTER-PHASE CORE OF CRISIS MANAGEMENT AUTHORITIES
The after-phase is the core task for the authorities in crisis management. Here
important political decisions have to be made. Here the media plays a crucial role.
Accountability is one of the central concerns during the after-phase. The after-
phase is the responsibility of the authorities, both in public and in private
organizations. In the response phase, the operational services have the primary
responsibility. In the after-phase the authorities of public organizations and the
board of private organizations are necessary to ensure that the different parts of
the after-phase of the crisis receive sufficient attention. The complex political and
administrative considerations often occur in the after-phase. For authorities and
board members this is the real crisis management. Therefore, it is necessary
through planning and practice to be sufficiently prepared for this after-phase of a
crisis. After a crisis an intensive one-year after-phase is not uncommon. This
implies sufficient administrative and organizational attention.
10 Compare Scholtens 2008.
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13 Trends and conclusions
In this final chapter I sketch some general themes related to security, safety and
criminal justice in the Netherlands. In the first section I sketch the main
conclusions about the crucial security, safety and criminal justice organizations
in the Netherlands. The second section deals with the general trends on security
and safety which can be distinguished. In that section I outline a prospective
organizational perspective on security and safety in the Netherlands.
13.1 Trends on criminal justice, security and safety
In this section I give the main conclusions and trends regarding the organization
and processes of criminal justice, security and safety in the Netherlands on the
basis of the previous chapters. They provide an overall picture of the complexity of
the Dutch security, safety and criminal justice system.
13.1.1 ORGANIZATIONS
Ministers and State government
Ministers and national government in the Netherlands received in the last ten years
substantially more influence and power on security, safety and criminal justice.
Their powers have been extended, they have finances to stimulate policy objectives,
theymake performance agreements with regions, the management over police, fire
brigades and emergency medical services are delegated to the ministers, they can
give instructions to local authorities and in some situations even take over the
decisions. Theministers of Security and Justice and of the Interior have become the
most important authorities with respect to safety, security and criminal justice in
the Netherlands. More than in the past, it is possible to make national security and
safety policy and intervene in specific situations. Security policy in the Netherlands
is actually becoming a national issue.
Many ministers at the national level have a task in security, safety and criminal
justice. Although a certain coordinating responsibility for some specific subjects
exists, security and safety policy at the national level is particularly common policy.
In the Netherlands, ministers have no hierarchical relationship to each other, not
even the prime minister. This means that policy at the national level should be
achieved by negotiation and compromise. Although in the Netherlands there is
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now a Minister for Security and Justice the powers and responsibilities for
security, safety and criminal justice are spread across many ministries.
Mayors and municipalities
At the same time there is another development in the Netherlands. Mayors and
municipalities have also received more powers and resources to address security
and safety. In recent years, especially the mayors obtained significant additional
security powers. Mayors play, in Dutch security, safety and criminal justice policy,
a major role. Their responsibilities go very far, in some cases mayors even have
criminal powers in respect of their citizens and have the power to restrict
fundamental rights. It should be remembered that Dutch mayors are not elected
but appointed by the Minister of the Interior on the recommendation of the town
council.
In addition, the municipalities as a whole got more opportunities to perform
security, safety and criminal justice policy. Many of the tasks in respect of security
and safety are decentralized to municipalities. They have a core function in the
implementation of the national security and safety policy. At the local level also
various initiatives to establish cooperation are created. After the integrated
security policy the security house is established. In this security house police,
justice, youth services, probation and many others work together to decide which
security and safety measures are necessary for a specific person of family. These
measures are integrated at the level of a person or family.
Police
The police in the Netherlands are increasingly becoming a national organization.
The latest plans for the reorganization of the police actually include a nationaliza-
tion of the management of the police. The ministers can almost immediately give
guidance regarding the management of the police as the plans become reality. It is
expected that the national police force will be effective in 2012. Especially when
you look at the Dutch police over a longer period, it is clear that an intensive
nationalization process is taking place. While the formal authority over the police
continues to be with the mayor and the public prosecutor, the actual power over
the police becomes more national.
The Dutch police are traditionally closely embedded in society. Forms of
community policing have been, for many years, practised in the Netherlands.
The direct relationship between the police and the population has diminished to
some extent. There is a certain distance between the police and society. This
distance is not necessarily bad. It gives the police the ability to act repressively if
necessary. A close integration of police and society would be make repressive
action by the police difficult.
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Judiciary and public prosecution
The judiciary in the Netherlands formally consists of both the judges and the
public prosecutors. Although the distance between these two organizations is
becoming greater, the judiciary in the Netherlands is still formed by both
organizations. Both the courts and the Public Prosecution Service have in recent
years undergone intensive restructuring. Centralization and nationalization were
also the main effects of the reorganization of the Dutch judiciary. The Council for
the Judiciary and the College of Prosecutors-General execute an explicit central
and national policy. This is much more than just management issues.
For the judiciary, cooperation with other organizations has become increasingly
important. The Public Prosecution Service has spent a lot of time and paid a lot of
attention to improving the control of the police regarding criminal investigation.
The interaction between the courts and the Public Prosecution Service is
intensified. Both are explicitly convinced that the legitimacy of society is essential
for them. This means that much more than in the past information and
explanations should be given in respect of the activities and decisions of the
judiciary. The support of society for the judiciary is not static.
Prison and probation service
The Prison Service in the Netherlands has become more professional and more
national in recent years. Formal and factual, all correctional institutions are now
part of one organization. This has made it possible in the Netherlands to achieve a
more uniform prison policy. Probation in the Netherlands is still carried out by
three separate organizations, although they now are brought under firmer control
of the Minister of Security and Justice too.
The number of people in Dutch prisons has decreased in recent years. After a period
of strong growth, for some years now a decline can be seen. The explanation by the
government is that a proper security policy creates less prisoners. Probably this
statement has a certain value. Perhaps another explanation is that the Netherlands
in the last ten years had to catch up with other countries in relation to crime and that
this catch up is now realized. Complex statements regarding the degree of tolerance
in the Netherlands have little significance nowadays.
Intelligence and security services
The importance of intelligence and security services has increased in the
Netherlands. Not only in counter-terrorism but also regarding other threats to
national security, intelligence and security services now play an important role.
This role is so far reaching that it is now possible in the Netherlands to use
information from the intelligence and security services as evidence in criminal
proceedings under certain circumstances. Mainly because of the increased
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attention to the threats of terrorism, the intelligence and security services have a
more prominent role in security policy in the Netherlands.
In the Netherlands there are no problems with the misuse of powers or
inadequate accountability of the intelligence and security services. That is formally
and in practice adequately regulated. In the Netherlands, the relevant debate is
whether and to what extent intelligence and security services exchange sufficient
information with other organizations. The intelligence and security services have
much information but this is not always shared with other (security) organiza-
tions. The cooperation and exchange of information with other (security) organi-
zations in the Netherlands could be more intense.
Armed forces
The Dutch armed forces play an important role in international deployments in
conflict areas. After 1989, the Dutch armed forces changed into expeditionary
armed forces so that it was possible to deploy them to specific areas. Meanwhile, the
Dutch armed forces have a lot of experience with these deployments. The decision
to deploy has been carefully regulated in which parliament has an explicit role.
In addition to these intensive deployments, the Dutch armed forces have done, in
recent years, much work on civil-military arrangements. There are intensive
agreements between the national, provincial, regional and local governments and
the armed forces for assistance during all kinds of national operations. These are
issues such as assistance in the event of major disasters and accidents but also in
more mainstream forms of law enforcement in which the armed forces have
specific people or resources available. The Dutch armed forces are even cooperat-
ing in counter-terrorism. The armed forces in the Netherlands are well aware that
a close connection with their own society is sufficient to achieve legitimacy.
Emergency services: fire brigades and medical emergency service
The emergency services in the Netherlands – fire brigades and medical emer-
gency services – are compelled to follow the developments described above. The
further professionalization of the other security organization makes it necessary
for the fire brigades and the medical emergency service to professionalize
themselves. That means for both the fire brigades as the medical emergency
services a major task. Relatively, these organizations are the weakest links in the
security chain in the Netherlands.
With respect to these organizations there are now regional structures emerging in
the so called safety regions. The fire brigade remains largely local while there are
many reasons that regional and even national control will be very useful. Due to
the complex structure of the medical emergency service in the Netherlands, the
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regional medical officers have almost no power and means to actually achieve
things. The whole organizational structure around the medical emergency
services is relatively weak. I have advocated an integration of police, fire brigade
and emergency medical service to further professionalize the emergency services
in the Netherlands.
13.1.2 PROCESSES
Criminal investigation
Criminal investigation in the Netherlands faces different dilemmas. These are
dilemmas regarding the investigation and the evidence, the organization of the
criminal investigation and the policing methods. These dilemmas require the
leadership of the criminal investigation to make explicit decisions, for example on
which methods should be used in which phase, how the CID team should be
organized, what leads should be followed and what evidence should be collected.
With respect to these and many other questions explicit decisions have to be made.
A criminal investigation requires explicit choices and not automatic decisions.
The organization of the Dutch criminal investigation is complex. There are
different levels of criminal investigation departments and the distinction is not
always clear. Again there is a degree of nationalization. The establishment of the
national criminal investigation department and the top regional criminal inves-
tigation teams also show the need for further forms of unification and even
nationalization. The role of the Public Prosecution Service in relation to the
criminal investigation has been strengthened in recent years. Certainly as a result
of the parliamentary inquiry committee Van Traa the control of the Public
Prosecution Service over the police regarding the criminal investigation has
tightened. In most cases it can be said that the Public Prosecution Service is
effectively the head of the criminal investigation process.
Forensic investigation
Forensic investigation in the Netherlands has – as in other countries – grown
intensively. The number of areas of knowledge regarding forensic expertise is
greatly increased. The Dutch Forensic Institute plays an important role regarding
forensic research. In addition, very slowly, other forensic institutes are allowed to
perform forensic research for the police and the Public Prosecution Service. Also
it becomes slowly possible that not only the police and public prosecutors make
applications for forensic investigation, but also suspects and their lawyers are
getting this opportunity.
The increased intensity of forensic investigations does not mean that it is well
organized. In the Netherlands we have seen that through some major errors in the
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organization of the forensic investigations, innocent persons were convicted. These
miscarriages of justice have led to major organizational changes for the police, the
Public Prosecution and the forensic institutions. These changes focus on further
professionalizing and deepening of the procedures related to forensic investigation.
Media, police and the Public Prosecution Service
Media and public relations is a particular topic in this book. The police and the
Public Prosecution service paid, in recent years, much attention to influencing
their image in the media. Both organizations now have broad organizational
components attempting to shape the image of the police and the Public Prosecu-
tion Service. This happens sometimes directly to citizens via internet or indirectly
through the media.
Perception and image of security organizations are important. These security
organizations must have sufficient legitimacy to perform their tasks. The police
and the Public Prosecution Service cannot function if they lack support in society.
In that case they receive no or insufficient information. It is also important for
security organizations to pay enough attention to how their image may be affected.
The aggressive way in which the police and the Public Prosecution Service have
dealt with their image building backfired on them. It seemed more a power
conflict between the two security organizations than the effective provision of
information and responsibly influencing their image in the media.
Public order maintenance
The Netherlands has in its history regularly been faced with forms of mass public
disorders. Recently they focus mainly on football hooliganism, unrest in poor
areas in large cities and incidents during public events. The number of large-scale
disturbances has been significantly reduced. Nuisance has increased. The mayors
in the Netherlands increasingly obtained new powers to maintain public order.
Mayors have in fact almost all powers for all conceivable forms of public
disturbances or nuisance. Under specific circumstances it is even possible that
mayors evict citizens from their homes on the basis of criminal offences.
In the Netherlands traditionally much attention is paid to preventive measures to
ensure public order disorders. In recent years, however, more repressive mea-
sures have been deployed. At this moment, a combination of preventive and
repressive measures is deployed. But – also caused by harsh reactions from local
and national politicians – increasingly more repressive measures are used.
Counter-terrorism
Counter-terrorism has in recent years in the Netherlands grown intensively. Not
only because of the attacks in the U.S., Madrid and London but also because of
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the political murders of Forutyn and Van Gogh in the Netherlands, an increased
focus on counter-terrorism emerged. The threat level for terrorist attacks in the
Netherlands has for several years now been substantial or limited. This has led to a
much more professional organization of counter-terrorism than before 2001.
The core of this organization is the National Coordinator Counter-Terrorism,
since 2011 the National Coordinator Counter-Terrorism and Security. This person
and organization must ensure that the activities of all organizations in the
Netherlands involved in the fight against terrorism are coordinated. This concerns
various ministries, municipalities, police, public prosecution, intelligence and
security services, armed forces and many international partners. Coordination
between these organizations is a complex matter. Although the National Coordi-
nator Counter-Terrorism has certain powers under the political responsibility of
the Ministers of Security and Justice and of the Interior, it also remains necessary
to achieve various forms of dialogue, consultation and coordination to formulate
and implement counter-terrorism policy in the Netherlands.
Crisis and disaster management
Risks can lead to crises. In the Netherlands, a crisis system is designed to make
sure that decisions before, during and after crisis can be made. It will not be
surprising that this is a complex system in which many organizations share
responsibility and in some cases there is an overlap in responsibilities. Never-
theless, it must be said that in the last ten years major improvements can be seen
regarding the organization and functioning of the crisis and disaster management
in the Netherlands. Specific changes in the system of crisis management in the
Netherlands can be further refined. Safety regions have now been formed in
which municipalities, police, fire brigades and medical emergency services are
working together. The establishment and development of these safety regions are
important aspects of the institutional development of the Dutch security system.
A major problem remains. During a crisis it is not clear who has ultimate
responsibility. Although various proposals have been made no final decision
has been taken. In my proposal, the Prime Minister has an important role to fulfil.
In the Dutch egalitarian political system, this is a difficult proposal to realize.
13.2 Trends on security, safety and criminal justice1
In science, some see security as a fashion phenomenon. This ignores the
enormous interest in recent years in all aspects of safety and security. For
1 Based on and cited from Muller 2004. Compare Cachet and Ponsaers 2008 and Cachet, de Kimpe,
Ponsaers and Ringeling 2008.
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government, parliament and the public it is one of the greatest concerns. Many
policies are formulated to improve safety, security and criminal justice not only in
the Netherlands. In ten propositions I formulate my perspective on safety, security
and criminal justice in general and more specifically in the Netherlands.
The extent and intensity of safety and security and the way they are ensured are
key indicators for the quality of a society. At present, the strength of a society is
determined on the basis of economic figures. Employment and gross national
product are the main clues to whether a society functions properly. But safety and
security are also increasingly important as an indicator of the quality of a society.
Especially after the attacks of September 11, 2001 it became an integral part of
assessing how a society operates. Security and safety are becoming crucial
variables in the way citizens and businesses rate the quality of a society.
13.2.1 SAFETY, SECURITY AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE WILL REMAIN IMPORTANT
Safety, security and criminal justice will remain important in the coming years for
both practice and science. My expectation is that this issue will continue to be in
the top three of worries of citizens, media and politicians. Security and safety have
direct consequences for citizens. They are personally faced with an increase in
crime and nuisance. It marks the direct consequences to themselves: it is broken,
they are harassed and feel unsafe. Safety and security are problems that occur daily
and directly.
The safety and security problems are too complex to resolve in the coming years. A
certain degree of insecurity and unsafety will always exist. But the tolerance of the
citizens regarding insecurity and unsafety has decreased. More than before people
will draw attention to unsafe and insecure situations. Security is an issue that can
break and change taboos, for example on the crime of specific ethnic groups. This
will create a vast and permanent focus on security and safety. Even if the unsafety
and insecurity will decrease, the attention for safety and security will stay. Security
and safety remain a constant problem because they have direct consequences, not
because the actual or perceived rise of unsafety and insecurity. The importance of
security will increase if new increases in crime and insecurity will occur. But even
if this does not happen, it will continue to attract attention.
Another important reason is that government and industry have mobilized money
and people to focus on security and safety. These are increasing budgets and
growing organizations. All of these organizations actually do something with that
money and those people. This will affect the degree of security and insecurity. The
budgets and organizations related to security and safety are becoming very
important. They represent a power in itself.
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13.2.2 SAFETY AND SECURITY BECOME BROADER AND MORE INTEGRATED
The concept of security in the Netherlands has multiple interpretations. Many
practitioners and scientists use the term in various ways. There is no compre-
hensive definition of security. Even a difference in safety and security as we see in
the English language is not available in Dutch. The result is that Dutch authors
and practitioners use different terms in English, sometimes safety, sometimes
security, sometimes different terms. Security is now in law and criminology an
accepted concept but a clear definition is still lacking. As indicated in chapter 1,
everyone uses in science and in policy the definition of security that best suits
them. To define a problem as a security or safety issue or to appoint a solution as a
safety or security solution opens new doors. It is attractive to define problems and
solutions as security and safety problems and solutions.
Safety and security problems are comparable. The similarities are greater than the
differences. There is not only crime and nuisance, but also accidents, unsafety,
disasters, food poisoning, threat of terrorism, possibility of an epidemic etc, They
all have far-reaching consequences for the lives and welfare of citizens. These
risks are reality for the public. They do not distinguish between these risks. Safety
has a strong relationship with technical risks. This relationship occurs, for
instance, much less in security.
Organizations in safety and security are responsible for just a (small) part of these
risks. They have to work together to solve a safety and security problem. This
creates all kinds of problems of their own. The organizations involved in safety
and security are confronted with the borders that arise during this problem
solving. On the other hand, organizations depend on the specific context in which
that happens so they have hardly any opportunities for effective and efficient
problem solving.
We need a broader concept of safety and security. This is not just about whether
and how one becomes a victim of crime, but also what risks people run in traffic,
in respect of food and industrial productions. At this moment problems of
security and safety are divided into different organizations. Every organization
has its own goals and problems. Mutual cooperation is difficult to realize. This
divided organizational thinking about safety and security is increasingly less
effective. A more inter-organizational or broad perspective on safety and security
is necessary.
Safety and security should then be understood as a convergence of the prevention
and threatening of risks for citizens. There can only be a safe and secure situation
if all conceivable risks are really mitigated. Not only the risks of crime, but also the
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risk of an attack by a terrorist organization or the risk of a major fire or disaster.
This broad vision of the concept of security and safety implies that all stakeholders
can and actually want to look outside the borders of their own organizations. My
expectation is – unfortunately – that this will be realistic only in a next generation.
This broad perspective also implies that a more integral problem solution is
needed. Organizations have to work together to solve security and safety pro-
blems. The handling of security and safety problems needs a more integrated
organizational level. In recent years we have seen that cooperation and coordina-
tion between organizations in security is not without problems. Organizational
changes to a more comprehensive view on the handling of safety and security
problems are moving slowly. There are a few hopeful signs that significant
changes are to be expected in the coming years.
13.2.3 INFORMATION IS CRUCIAL
Crucial for the perception and evaluation of safety and security is information.
There are differences between objective and subjective perception of safety and
security. But both are based on available information. This information is strongly
influenced by personal experiences or – even more – through stories of other
people. My expectation is that it will expand in the coming years, both by personal
experiences and by the ever increasing media attention. More and more is publicly
known about unsafety and insecurity. In a more objective description of the
insecurity and unsafety one seeks a more scientific approach.
Information about unsafety and insecurity is crucial. With this information the
effects of certain measures will be compared and a more precise view of the
insecurity in a specific sector can arise. The quantity of monitors and records on
safety and security is enormous. It is not always possible to establish the scientific
basis of these data sources. That does not mean that they not are frequently used.
The information on safety and security itself is more important than the way it is
obtained.
Information is power, even regarding safety and security. Who has the right to the
decisive information? This question will play a crucial role in the debate. The
information on security and insecurity will be monopolized mainly by govern-
ment. These data will also be more confidential. Under the guise of tactical and
strategic interest safety and security information increasingly will be treated as
secret information. This implies that there can hardly be an objective scientific
analysis of the safety and security information.
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13.2.4 SECURITY AND SAFETY MEANS MANAGEMENT OF EXPECTATIONS
The number of organizations involved in safety, security and criminal justice is
increasing. Safety and security are core tasks of many organizations. In this book I
have described the complex network of organizations in the Netherlands. But
virtually all organizations and all citizens have a certain relationship with safety
and security. Crucial for the effectiveness of safety and security measures is the
management of expectations of the real possibilities to ensure safety and security.
The number of safety and security plans and initiatives suggests that it is possible
to reduce insecurity and unsafety to zero. The expectations of citizens and
organizations about the effectiveness of these measures are very high. The
massive efforts of so many people and organizations must surely lead to a total
safe and secure society.
It is necessary to create less tense and more realistic expectations. Insecurity and
unsafety will continue. Individual citizens will be permanently faced with some
unsafety and insecurity. Organizations in public administration and in industry
will increasingly be faced with some form of crime. There is hardly any discussion
about an acceptable level of unsafety and insecurity. It remains unclear for both
politics and governance and for citizens and businesses what an acceptable level of
insecurity and unsafety is.
It would be valuable if at local, regional and national (and perhaps European) level
decisions would be prepared and discussions would be held about the acceptable
level of insecurity and unsafety. That means that politicians and public adminis-
trators as well as chiefs of police and fire commanders would be more explicit that
there are real risks in modern society for business and citizens. They should not
only indicate what organizational, financial and other safety and security mea-
sures have to be taken, but they also have to be explicit on the risks there are and
will remain. This discussion should not only be at an abstract level, but should be
made individual. Only in this way, will citizens and businesses have a realistic
picture of the security and safety that is possible. This is crucial for their
acceptance of measures to reduce insecurity and unsafety.
13.2.5 SECURITY, SAFETY AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE ARE BIG BUSINESS
Many are concerned with safety, security and criminal justice. The safety, security
and criminal justice market is still growing. A large number of organizations and
individuals exist because of safety and security: police, fire brigades, public
prosecutors, the judiciary, the Interior and Justice, prisons, research agencies,
private security and surveillance, computer companies in monitoring, training
and many others at local, regional, national and international level. The amount of
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money being earned in the safety and security sector can only be estimated, but
the impression is that in recent years a significant increase has occurred. Security
is and will be big business.
The private security market in the Netherlands is substantially present in respect of
security and private investigation. The extent of private security in the Netherlands
remains in comparison with other countries low. There are about 30,000 private
security employees in relation to more than 50,000 public police officers. In other
areas of security and safety a limited amount is done by private providers.
Exceptions are the institutions for the mentally ill offenders which are mainly
private institutions, the probation organizations in the Netherlands are almost
entirely private and parts of the ambulance services in the Netherlands are private.
Within the regular police and the prison system, there is little emphasis on
privatization. That seems also to be true for other security sectors.
This observation has two sides. It is good that many people are intensely involved
in an increasingly competitive safety and security market. Only in this way can it
be ensured that through competition the best ideas and the best products to
reduce insecurity and unsafety are designed. Security and safety have become
areas where the elite in the public sector, business and science spend their time
and attention. This can lead to valuable contributions to improve safety and
security. The exchange of ideas is becoming more international. Security products
and concepts developed for example in the United States are rapidly and
increasingly translated into the European context. These positive effects of
increased organizational and individual attention to safety and security must be
promoted.
The accountability structure for the private security market in the Netherlands is
not intensive and mostly concentrated on private investigators. It is undeniable
that many of these organizations and individuals have an interest in continuity of
insecurity and unsafety. This does not mean that they directly contribute to the
unsafety and insecurity. At this moment there are a few examples of exaggeration
or unfair influence on the market. The stakes are high and effective control is not
or hardly available. The need to realize adequate control of the security market is
growing even in the Netherlands.
13.2.6 SECURITY ORGANIZATIONS ARE STRUCTURALLY RECEIVING MORE POWERS
There is an unmistakable tendency to give safety and security organizations, in
particular police and public prosecutors, more and more far-reaching powers.
Preventive searches, administrative courts, Terrorist Crimes Acts, increasing
penalties, anonymous reporting, stretching special investigative powers, flexible
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privacy provisions are only a few of the many examples. The rise of unsafety and
insecurity is the dominant argument. There are no examples that if the insecurity
of unsafety declines powers are revoked. Once given powers remain, regardless of
the actual insecurity and unsafety.
There is hardly any independent research into the actual effectiveness of extend-
ing powers on safety and security. It seems a political and public feeling that as
police, judiciary and others have more powers, they are better able to combat
insecurity and unsafety. There is no need for evidence for this argument. It is a
well spread knowledge, they say.
Some in science and practice perceive any extension of powers as a violation of
law. I do not agree with such a dogmatic perspective. If extending these powers
actually contributes to reducing insecurity and unsafety is not undesirable. But
before, during and after the decision to extend the powers independent research
has to be available that indicates its importance and effectiveness. This is often
lacking. At this moment political rhetoric is dominant. Obviously political will and
opinion is important, but a more scientific objectivity would be valuable.
A meaningful discussion about what values exist even in the unprecedented rising
insecurity will not be affected. A reference to fundamental rights is too simple.
Again, in the light of insecurity curtailment of fundamental rights is already
granted. But there are also objective and subjective values that will never be
affected, how large is the insecurity? Is torture permissible when a major terrorist
attack can occur? Is violation of the privacy of a large group of men, for example,
the taking of DNA allowed if it can catch a serial rapist? I would find it desirable if
a political and public debate would arise because that way the limits of the
extension of powers would produce a better picture. Now this discussion is ad hoc
rather than on the basis of a concrete proposal by a chief or a politician on
extension of a specific part of the power complex. Such an ad hoc approach does
not lead to a meaningful contribution to the identification of fundamental values.
13.2.7 SECURITY AND SAFETY ARE A RESPONSIBILITY FOR EVERYONE
The government is not solely responsible for safety and security. Citizens and
businesses have their own responsibility. The government have claimed a
monopoly on safety and security for a long time. Based on the size of the safety
and security problem and the necessary measures to be taken, an awareness has
arisen that others can have their own specific responsibilities. Security and safety
are a broad responsibility for all participants in modern society.
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So far there are few differences of opinion. Almost everyone is convinced that this
broad responsibility exists. Much more uncertainty exists on the size of the
responsibility of citizens and businesses. What should the government do and
what should citizens and businesses do? The answer to this question is the subject
of intense disagreement. “Everyone his own responsibility” is the principle in the
modern security and safety debate. Partly based on the need for cuts, the
government tries to shift responsibility to private parties and citizens. But how
often it occurs and what remains with the government is not entirely clear. Forms
of public-private cooperation in this area are structurally problematic. Shifting the
responsibility to citizens and businesses can lead to politically undesirable forms
of vigilantism.
The debate and decision on the extent of the responsibilities of citizens and
businesses is not finished. It is an easy phrase to say in the current political
discussion, but there is hardly any specific content of the responsibilities. It has to
be clear what the responsibility of the government is and what the responsibilities
of others are. There is little point in fine rhetoric to indicate that citizens have their
own responsibility for their safety and security, but not make clear what it really is.
Citizens and businesses can do a lot in the prevention of insecurity and unsafety.
Not only by technical means, but also by being more aware of what is happening in
their environment. Few realize the everyday relevance of the information available
to them for safety and security. Awareness in itself is necessary but not sufficient.
Citizens – and companies – should have a real possibility to give the relevant
information on safety and security to an authority with a formal responsibility for
safety and security. The government has and retains responsibility for security and
safety if the use of powers are intervening with constitutional rights. In that case,
government intervention is necessary. In my opinion, in a democratic state that
cannot be transferred to private organizations or citizens.
In the Netherlands there is relatively little discussion and debate about the
possibilities of privatization of security. While there is a substantial private
security market, this market has not grown because of privatization, but by the
emergence of new functions and tasks and by the attitude of the Dutch govern-
ment to allow private security organizations to take a part in the security market.
While the private security market was growing the public security organizations
grew also. The total security market in the Netherlands has simply increased. It is
undeniable that the private security market is currently growing faster than the
public safety market.
The slight tendency towards privatization of security in the Netherlands has several
causes. The forms of security that could be done privately in the Netherlands have
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partly remained private. These include probation, parts of the ambulances and
forensic care. These forms of security have never fully been public, although of
course now intensive monitoring and funding by national government exists. In
addition, there is an intensive cooperation between security organizations and parts
of the industry on safety an security. In public-private partnership structures, the
safety of a particular area or a particular form of insecurity are improved. This
requires long-term cooperation structures. In several security organizations volun-
teers are active for example in the fire brigades. This element enhances the private
side of safety in the Netherlands. The state has traditionally an important role in
security and safety in the Netherlands. Few will see privatization as an attractive
alternative, although it would be valuable to examine if the experiences in other
countries with meaningful forms of security privatization would be possible in the
Netherlands.
13.2.8 SECURITY AND SAFETY ARE LOCAL AND INTERNATIONAL
Ensuring safety and security needs measures both at local and international level.
The dilemma in the coming years is how to be bring local and international safety
and security measures together. Unmistakably, many problems in the field of
security and safety have become increasingly international. This internationaliza-
tion occurs in all areas of society. But the daily problems of security and safety are
felt locally: nuisance of drug addicts or young criminals, risks, increased theft
and violence and excesses of organized crime. How can we combine, coordinate
and arrange international, national, interregional, regional and local safety and
security measures?
A problem that is both local and international, does not fit well in the social and
political structures of a country. At the same time realizing security in a small
town and fighting organized crime in Colombia is organizationally impossible.
The problems in the cooperation between all these organizations are extensive.
Within a country, a certain form of local security and safety policy can take form.
The variation of safety and security organizations among countries is very high.
This makes the exchange of information and the operational and strategic
cooperation even more difficult.
Is there a solution? This will only be possible if all stakeholders are prepared to
give away some of their independence and sovereignty. A more extensive form of
cooperation between countries is the only way to ultimately improve safety and
security. This is not a plea for international centralization of security. The actual
security and safety measures will take place at local level in decentralized units
with a high degree of substantive autonomy. For citizens and businesses, the
manifestations of insecurity and unsafety are visible at a local level.
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13.2.9 COMPLEXITY AND NATIONALIZATION
The Dutch security system is complex. In previous chapters I have outlined all the
organizations involved in the different parts of security, safety and criminal
justice. The responsibilities are divided in a complex manner. There are all kinds
of overlap between responsibilities. Sometimes this seems to have a function to
ensure that different organizations have an impact on an important aspect of
safety. In other cases there is simply unnecessary overlap. In the Dutch security
system there is no ultimate decision maker. The dominant Dutch nature of
compromise, coalition and consultation also occurs in the security system. Even in
crisis situations there should be consultation between all stakeholders.
This complexity leads to unnecessary administrative bustle. In order to provide
full security various forms of consultation and coordination are necessary. There
have also been different coordination arrangements designed. In recent years,
regionalization of security has occurred in the Netherlands. The primary coordi-
nation mechanism is the creation of a specific regional body. Thus, in recent years
police regions, fire brigade regions, medical emergency regions and safety regions
have been formed. Parts of the power of the municipalities and these organiza-
tions are transferred to the regions. In addition, the power and influence of the
national government with regard to security and safety has increased immensely.
In particular the Ministers of Security and Justice and of the Interior play an
increasingly dominant role in the safety and security system in Holland. Through
performance agreements and funding arrangements the national government is
directly influencing local policy.
The result of these developments – complexity and nationalization – is that the
possibility may arise that through nationalization the complexity of Dutch security
system can be reduced. National – and partly regional – policy and management
priorities are set. Regions and municipalities are then responsible for the
implementation of these priorities. This would be a desirable development
because in this way a more unambiguous and comprehensive security policy
can arise. An explicit threat is that this nationalization only adds to the complexity.
In the Netherlands simply new coordination arrangements are added and nothing
will be abolished. The municipalities stay important, the mayors too, the regions
too and national government too. To reduce the complexity it will be necessary to
really abolish organizations and coordination arrangements.
13.2.10 DUTCH SECURITY SYSTEM CAN BE IMPROVED
Security and safety are broad and extensive problems. The Dutch security and
safety system is based on distinctions such as the maintenance of public order and
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the judicial order. There are also many task divisions between many organiza-
tions. Police, fire brigades andmedical authorities operate still quite separate from
each other, while the problems of safety and security are increasingly becoming
more integrated. Based on historical relationships the Dutch have created some
complex cooperation and coordination structures. The result is a complex “safety
and security polder model” in which many, many people must confer before
decisions can be taken. This necessarily leads to compromises that do not always
have a positive impact on safety and security. The many and complex institutional
interests must be taken into account.
There is a need for broad public debate on the reorganization of the Dutch security
and safety system. The complexity of insecurity and unsafety requires a more
comprehensive review. Such a debate is currently difficult to implement in the
Netherlands. Authorities and politicians claim that no time could be wasted on a
debate and discussion on structures and processes. More and more I am however
convinced that the interaction between the contents of safety and security
measures and the security and safety system is crucial. There is a growing need
to fundamentally look at the organization and structure of the Dutch safety and
security system.
The concept of security is nowadays primary formed in different sectors. Every
sector of society or the public administration has its own safety and security policy.
Cooperation between these sectors and organizations is difficult. The sector-
oriented thinking on security is becoming less effective. Persons and organiza-
tions in the various sectors are starting to realize that an inter-sectoral or broad
perspective on security is necessary.
Security should therefore be understood as a convergence of the prevention of
risks that threaten a citizen’s life or functioning. A really safe situation exists when
all conceivable risks are mitigated. Not only the risk to become a victim of crime,
but also the risk of a being attacked by a terrorist organization or the risk of being
confronted with a major fire or disaster. This broad vision of the concept of
security requires that all stakeholders can and actually want to look outside the
borders of their own sectors. This broad perspective on security also implies that a
more integral security policy is needed to effectively and efficiently handle security
problems. Security will, in other words, become more integrated at an organiza-
tional level. In recent years we have seen that cooperation and coordination
between organizations in security is not without problems in the Netherlands. I
therefore call for a thorough review of the Dutch system of criminal justice,
security and safety. Hopefully the insights in this book will be useful for this
review.
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Glossary
Algemene Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst (AIVD): General Intelligence and
Security Service
Algemene Inspectiedienst (AID): Investigative Agency of the General Inspectorate
of the Ministry of Agriculture, Nature and Food Quality
beheer: management
bestuur: public administration
bestuurder: public administrator
bijzondere opsporingsdiensten: special investigative agencies
brandweer: fire brigade or fire service
burgemeester: mayor
Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek (CBS): Central Bureau of Statistics
Centrale Raad van Beroep: Central Board of Appeal
college van burgemeester en wethouders: board of mayor and aldermen
College van Procureurs-generaal: Board of Prosecutors General
Commissaris van de Koningin: Queen’s Commissioner
Dienst Justitiele Inrichtingen: Correctional Institutions Agency
Eerste Kamer: Upper House or Senate
Fiscale Inlichtingen- en Opsporingsdienst en Economische Controle Dienst
(FIOD-ECD): Economic Control Agency and the Customs and Excise Investigative
Office of the Inland Revenue Ministry
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functioneel parket: functional prosecution office
Gedeputeerde Staten (GS): board of provincial deputies
gemeente: municipality
gemeenteraad: city council or municipal council
Geneeskundige Hulpverlening bij Ongevallen en Rampen (GHOR): medical
emergency services
gerechtshof: court of appeal
gevangenis: prison
gezag: authority
Hoge Raad: Supreme Court
hoofdcommissaris: chief constable
hoofdofficier van justitie: chief public prosecutor
huis van bewaring: remand house
hulpofficier van justitie: auxiliary to the public prosecutor
Inspectie voor Openbare Orde en Veiligheid (IOOV): Public Order and Safety
Inspectorate
Inspectie voor de Sanctietoepassing: Inspectorate for Sancties Application
Inspectie Volkshuisvesting, Ruimtelijke Ordening en Milieu: Information and
Investigation Agency of the Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and the
Environment
justitiele inrichtingen: detention organizations or correctional institutions
kantongerecht: subdistrict court
korpsbeheerder: police force manager
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Korpsbeheerdersberaad: Council of Police Force Managers
Korps Landelijke Politie Diensten (KLPD): National Police Services
landelijk paket: national prosecution office
Militaire Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst (MIVD): Military Intelligence and
Security Service
Ministerie van Algemene Zaken (AZ): Ministery of General Affairs
Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties (BZK): Ministry of
Interior and Kingdom Relations
Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken (BZ): Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Ministerie van Defensie: Ministry of Defence
Ministerie van Justitie: Ministry of Justice
Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie: Ministry of Security and Justice
Ministerie van Verkeer en Waterstaat (VenW): Ministry of Transport and Water
Works
Ministerie van Volksgezondheid, Welzijn en Sport (VWS): Ministry of Health,
Welfare and Sport
Ministerie van Volkshuisvesting, Ruimte Ordening en Milieu (VROM): Ministry
of Housing, Spatial Planning and Environment
Ministerie voor Wijken, Wonen en Integratie (WWI): Ministry of Neighbour-
hoods, Living and Integration
Nationaal Coordinator Terrorisme Bestrijding (NCTb): National Coordinator Counter
Terrorism
Nederlands Forensisch Instituut (NFI): Dutch Forensic Institute
officier van justitie: public prosecutor
Onderraad Veiligheid en Rechtsorde: Council for Security and Legal Order
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Openbaar Ministerie (OM): Public Prosecution Service
politieregio: police region
procureur-generaal (PG): prosecutor-general
provincie: provence
provinciale staten (PS): provincial council
Raad van Hoofdcommissarissen: Council of Chief Constables
Raad van State (RvS): Council of State
Raad voor de Rechtspraak: Council for the Judiciary
rechtbank: district court
rechter commissaris (RC): court commissioner
regionaal college: regional council
regionale politie: regional police force
Sociale Inlichtingen- en Opsporingsdienst (SIOD): Social Information and
Investigation Agency
staatssecretaris: State Secretary of deputy minister
Tweede Kamer: Lower House
veiligheidshuis: security house
veiligheidsregio: safety region
waterschap: water board
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